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I.

INTRODUCTION

It is necessary to make some introductory remarks on this matter in
which private international law should provide fair solutions. The right of
consumers in private law is reflected as a legal microsystem of consumer
protection.
In this sense, Professor Lorenzetti points out some facts that
illustrate the gestation of the process of microsystem formation:
a) it installs a protective order that abolishes the general
principle of equality of citizens. The supplementary
order becomes imperative, virtual nullities arise and it
seeks the maintenance of the practical purpose pursued
by the contracting parties. Additionally open modules
are formed for the qualification of abusive contractual
clauses, the listing of black and gray clauses, the
previous administrative control, and the rejection of
some clauses maintaining the business and redrawing
it, although they are not very frequent in common law;
and
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b) a separation of the principle of comparative effects of
contracts exists, when suggesting the imputation of
damages to the manufacturer, the distributor, the
wholesaler, the owner of the brand that has not
celebrated some contract with the consumer, as in
Brazilian Law 8078/90.'
In the same way, the author continues, actions are conceded to the
consumer, the user, members of the family, and consumer associations,
neither of which have had previous conventional ties.2
In the 1994 constitutional reform of the Republic of Argentina,
article 42 has brought about the constitutionalization of consumer rights in
the relationship of consumption, such as the protection of health, security
and economic interests, appropriate and truthful information, the freedom
of choice, and fair and honest treatment. It looks for, says Professor
Farina, the reconciliation among the individual and social ends that is
carried out on the basis of recognition, respect and the preferred rank
which, in the hierarchy of values, corresponds to the human person.
We find ourselves, without a doubt, facing a protective private
right loaded with values, and which the private international law cannot
honor, but rather should 'establish a tool apt for the development of
fundamental basic ends, like consumer protection.
The entire
methodological focus should be guided toward this substantial value at
stake.
II. DIFFICULTY IN DEFINING THE CONCEPT OF CONSUMER AND THE
NECESSARY SCOPE OF SAME IN THE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
(P.I.L.)
A definition of consumer should be sufficiently broad to comprise
the variety of prospective situations needed. Now, it is already necessary
to highlight the difficulties that arise from casuistry to structure any
concept, in spite of the inevitable and potential circumstance, generated by
the intervention of national Tribunals with different interpretations on the
topic. The importance is not minimal, since the concept of consumer

1.
RICARDO LORENZETT1, LAS NORMAS FUNDAMENTALES DE DERECHO PRIVADO 16
(Rubinzal Culzoni, ed., 1995)

2. Id. at 16. It also points out that the most evident example is that of Brazil that has
considered the topic at a constitutional level, being dictated by the law 8078/90 that is a code of
the consumer's defense that allows coherence, and homogeneity to certain branches of the right,
facilitating its autonomy.
3.

JUAN M. FARINA, DEFENSA DEL CONSUMIDOR Y DEL USARIO 5 (Astrea ed., 1995).
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constitutes the material scope of application of the protective principle it
guides and the special system foreseen for it.
The doctrine has highlighted different parameters in defining the
consumer: the final destination of the goods (family, personal or domestic
use); the existence or lack of the professional nature of the consumer's
activity when concluding the contract (whether or not it favors the
reintroduction of the good in the market); whether or not the goods are
integrated into the productive process; final destination of production
(although the final destination is the consumption, e.g. recruiting of goods
and services with an immediate final destination, but meanwhile integrate
benefit to third parties; the purchase of calculation equipment or recruiting
of food service); or simply, the legal fact of "consumption" in a
consumption relationship or in its function. Let us look at some legislative
proposals:
The Rome Convention of 1980 on Applicable Law to Contractual
Obligations in effect since 1991 for the European Economic Community,
in article 5, defines "contracts concluded with consumers," as the supply
or supplies made to a person "for a use that can be considered foreign to
its professional activity. "4
The Brussels Convention adopts a similarly negative definition,
Lugano 1978, depending on the interpreter, if the use could be considered
as foreign to the beneficiary's professional activity (article 13).
The subjective delimitation is problematic, as Professor Esplugues
Mota points out, in relation to this European instrument. It implies the
need to appreciate the differential fact that unchains the application of the
special normative system of protection foreseen by articles 14 and 15. The
non-professionalism of buyers of goods and services is juxtaposed with the
theological consideration of the destination, final use; that is to say that the
particular destination is verified starting from the negation of the
professional use.
This subjective configuration of the agreement has been interpreted
by the European Court, excluding the application of the special system to
individuals not needing protection; for example, when they act in a
professional manner. Conference the sentence in the Bertrand v. Ott KG
of June 21, 1978; but subsequently it was more restrictive, in the Hutton v.
TVB of January 19, 1993, in which a company was a grantee of consumer
rights, the tribunal did not consider it a consumer, since "the plaintiff acts
4. See Carlos Esplugues Mota, Los Convenios De Bruselas Y De Roma Y La Proteccion
De Los Consunidores En Europa, REVISTA INSTITuTOS DE DERECHO COMERCIAL ECONOMICO
Y EMPRESARIAL 10 (1994).
5.

Id. at 10.
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as a professional and therefore does not have the same, consumer
condition, aside from one of the enumerated contracts in the first
paragraph of this disposition (article 13)" since that "only refers to the
private final consumer, not involved in mercantile or professional

operations. "6
The Switzerland legislation, combines personal use with the
existence or lack of the professional nature of the activity developed by the
consumer when concluding the contract. Article 120 of the 1987 Swiss
Law of Private International Law, 7 speaks of "average benefit of
consumption dedicated to the consumer's personal or familial use and does
not have a relationship with the consumer's professional or commercial
activity. "I
In the 1980 Hague Project on "Convention on certain sales to the
consumers" the consumer was defined as "that person who acquires
merchandises, mainly for personal or domestic family use," adding the
requirement that the salesperson act "in the course of his/her business or
profession." 9
The Vienna Convention of 1980 on Contracts of International Sale
and Purchase of Merchandise, excludes "the personal, family or domestic
use" unless "the salesperson, at any moment before the execution of the
contract, or at the moment of their execution, could not or should not have
had knowledge that the merchandise was bought for that use." "0
The Protocol of Buenos Aires on International Jurisdiction in
Contractual Matters, excludes from its material scope of application "the
sales to the consumer." This narrowness of the material scope has also
been criticized."
In any case, the idea that should gravitate to the ends of
establishing a concept, is the scope, and the principle that should guide the
6.

See Luis CARILLO POZO, COMENTARIO AL CONVEN1o DE BRUSALES RELATIVO A LA

COMPETENCIA JUDICIAL Y A LA EJECUCION DE RESOLUCIONES JUDICIALES EN MATERIA CIVIL

Y MERCANTIAL 274, 275 (Alfonso-Luis Calvo Caravaca, ed., 1995) This author is of the
opinion that such a formalist perspective that only protects those who don't hire in exercise of its
profession, leaves the small merchant that hires without protection compared to with a great
dominant company in the market. . . . It is designed this way for control at two successive
levels, defining the subjective aspect, with the triple demand that it is a final consumer, of
contract tipificado, and it leaves of the process. Id. at 279. (Editorial note: Translated from
Spanish).
7. Swiss Law of Private International Law, art. 120 (1987).
8. Id. at 120.
9. Hague Project, arts. 1, 2 (1980)10. See generally Vienna Convention (1980).
11. See generally JAVIER TONIOLLO, REFLEXIONES ACERCA DE LA FUNCI6N
JURISDICCIONAL EN EL MERCOSUR, in DEL MERCOSUR 246 (1996).
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interpreter's task is the protective purpose. The need for protection of the
weak party in the consumption relationship, because of the inferior position
in the face of the other, justifies the use of broad terms that facilitate the
later task of application of the protective right.
That an eventual
qualification problem may arise neither obstructs nor hinders the
protection. The proposal of the construction of a concept of P.I.L. starting
with the consideration of the legal systems with which the case is
connected always leads us to the possibility of using the one with the larger
scope as the starting point, in order to later adopt, naturally, the one that
better favors its interests.
It is of supreme interest to highlight that in the confines of the
Mercosur a sufficiently wide definition has been proposed in accord with
the protective end. The consumer is considered to be "any physical or
artificial person who acquires or uses products or services as consignee in
a consumption relationship or in performance thereof.
It portrays
consumers to other people, determinable or not, exposed to consumption
relationships."',
In sum, the definition that should be adopted is the one that has the
necessary scope as a starting point and for the correct operation of the
principle of consumer protection as the weak party in the consumption
relationship, enlarging, of course, the concept of the lex fori if it were
more narrow than proportioned by the next legislation to the consumption
relationship in question.
We come closer to Professor Uzal's methodological proposal that
intends to define it by the characteristics of the parts that intervene in the
negotiation in that it attributes him such a role as for the use of the
acquired merchandises or committed services."
The qualification
problems should be guided toward the solution that offers more protection
to the consumer.
III.

THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION AND THE SOURCE OF THE

CONSUMPTION RELATIONSHIP:

UNILATERAL ACTS, THE CONTRACT,

LAWFUL, AND UNLAWFUL ACTS

"In internal private law, for example in the Bolivian Project
together with contracts, are unilateral acts (behaviors) that create a

12. See Richards Lorenzetti, La Relaci6n De Consuno: Conceptualizaci6nDogmdtica En
Base Al Derecho Del Area Regional Mercosur, LA LEY (Dec. 3, 1996). (Editorial note:
translated from Spanish).
13. See Maria E. Uzal, Protecci6nAl Conswnidor En El Derecho InternacionalPrivado,
R.D.C.O. 242 (June 1991).
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reasonable expectation
about quality or price of a good or service destined
14
to be consumed."
The economic act of consumption is a legal fact: whoever utilizes

the service is a consumer; whoever is a user may not be contracting, or
they may be the head of a family or social group who is not a consumer
and has used the product. 6 There may be unlawful acts which give rise to
a consumption relationship: when the products or services given by the
importer or oWner of the brand cause damage and generate the obligation
of reimbursing, assuming the supplier is not contracting. The right of
consumption hangs the suppression of the distinction between contractual
and non-contractual responsibility.
Private international law should also tend to overcome such a
dichotomy (that can lead to different results) and to offer protection for the
harmful act by virtue of the existence of a consumption relationship, with
or without a contract. 7 The right of consumption, says Professor
Lorenzetti, forms part of a conception that, taking into account the act of
consumption in the market, is not based on only one of its parts. It is, then,
a market regulation.'" It is simply the need to "protect the market
economy," since "a strong consumer, implies a more solid and more
dynamic market." "It is not a revolt against the market," 9 but "a current
in favor of the market . . . that corrects the deviations that threaten the

dependability and stability of the exchange relationships. "'
What should be avoided is that the solution to this eventual
problem of qualifications (contractual or non-contractual responsibility) is
used to deprive the consumer of appropriate protection levels, since
traditionally the positive norms of P.I.L. in regard to unlawful acts., are
more rigid than the contractual ones.
IV. METHODOLOGICAL STANDARDS OFFERED FOR APPROPRIATE
SOLUTIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF PROTECTION

This will discuss searching for a system of private international law
that overcomes the dichotomy of contractual and non-contractual

14.

LORENZETTI,

supra note 1, at 5 (editorial note: translated from Spanish).

15. C6DIGO DE DEFENSA DEL CONSUMIDOR DE BRAZIL § 8078, art. 2.

16. Ley 24.240, art. 1 (22/1X/1994); BOLETIN OFICIAL 27/1X/1994.
17. LORENZErI, supra note 1, at 5
18. Id.at 3.
19. FARINA, supra note 3, at 13 (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
20. Antonio Benjamin, Protecci6n Del Consumidor y Patentes: El Caso De Los
Medicamentos, III. JA 689 (1994) (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
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responsibility, to unitarily regulate "the international consumption
relationship." We will proceed with an analysis of the internal source and
with the purpose of carrying out an interpretive and integrated task of the
system, trying to preserve the general principle of protection of the weak
party in the international consumption relationship.
It is necessary to begin with an interpretation of the norms of
Contractual Private International Law contained in Articles 1205 to 1214
of the Civil Code.2 ' The norms distinguish between contracts with
Argentine contacts and without Argentine contacts, although our proposal
will be centered on overcoming this distinction.
V.

CONTRACTS WITH ARGENTINEAN CONTACTS:

THE LAW OF THE

HABITUAL RESIDENCE (ARTICLES 1209, 1210, 1212, AND 1213 OF
THE CIVIL CODE)

A. The System to Regulate
The interpretation of such norms should bear in mind the special
nature of the "Microsystem" of consumption law. In this sense, if we
analyze the nature of the obligations that arise from the contractual
consumption relationships, we should point out that there is an apparent
weakness with one of the parts in the face of the other for which the
legislator intervenes, with a protective purpose, and in more general terms,
with the intention of maintaining "a healthy market," based on the
principle of "solidarity." 22
As Professor Mosset Iturraspe wisely indicates, a Copernican
gyration of civil law takes place toward the protection of the weak in a
civil society, characterizing the consumer as "the clumsy one," "the
adolescent" of the market, who moves with unsatisfied needs, lack of
negotiating power, inexperience, lack of knowledge, etc. It is necessary to
create a microsystem, the author continues, contemplates the weaknesses
and protects it, that contains norms and special principles sometimes
different from those of the Civil Code or Commercial Code and others
contrary to them. 3
It is naturally, a Microsystem "loaded with values,"1' and it is
necessary "to communicate them harmoniously through the interpretation
21.

COD. CIV. arts. 1205-1214.

22. See generally Jorge Mosset Iturraspe, Introducci6n Al Derecho Del Consunidor,
REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO Y COMUNITARIO 5 (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
23. See id.
24. Id.
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and integration of the P.I.L. system. "5 We should keep in mind Professor
Von Mehren's warning, in the sense that the genuineness of the decisions
of private law cases rests on the substantive fairness of the result and not
on the formal legality (similar to cases of internal legal order).26
The traditional rule of neutral conflict, should be adjusted by
substantive values and requirements in the context of protecting the
weakest party. 27 The traditional conflicting goals of harmony of laws and
solutions, in Professor Vischer's reflection, have lost a certain degree of
priority and open ways toward other considerations, such as those of
substantive coherence on the basis, for example, of the priority of
constitutional rights when cases have sufficient contact with the forum.28

B. Discardingthe Theory of the CharacteristicBenefit
By virtue of Argentine conflicting norms, regulators of contracts
with Argentine contacts, the law of the place of execution is decisive. 29
However, the definition of the place of execution that Article 1212 of the
Civil Code,3" offers, among its interpretive possibilities, contains
references to the debtor's home.
Professor Schnitzer's theory of characteristic benefit was proposed
by Professor Boggiano as an interpretive and harmonizing approach to the
possibilities that Article 1212 of the Civil Code offers; like that theory that
has localizing virtuality; also specifying that the place where the
characteristic benefit should be physically completed does not prevail, but
the debtor's domicile that should complete the characteristic benefit. 3
The theory of the characteristic benefit, from Professor Juenger's
sharply realistic optic, was born as a tie-breaker to satisfy the yearning to
obtain a simple, connecting objective factor that works well on the
25. Id.
26. See Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignJudgements, R.C.D.I. (1980).
27. See Antonio Boggiano, InternationalStandard Contracts, R.C.D.I. 59 (1981).
28. See Arthur Taylor Von Mehran, General Course on Private International Law,
R.C.D.I. 95 (1986).
29. C6D. CIV. arts. 1209, 1210.
30. Id. art. 1212.
31. See ANTONIO BOGGIANO, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 719 (1983). This
author recognizes, nevertheless, observations to such a theory, regarding the sought function of
connection of the contract with the socioeconomic environment of a country; this way for e.g.
the price of a sale and purchase is not less gravitational than the merchandise. See also
CONTRATOS INTERNACIONALES 47 (Depalma ed.), who affirms the undeniable value to establish

a functional localization of the contract in spite of the critics and difficulties that it presents the
theory of the characteristic benefit, facilitating reasonable certainty, international harmony of

decisions and effectiveness.
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assumption of common domicile of the parties or of simple business...
"32
The equation was explained by the noted professor: "The higher the
complexity, the lower benefit obtained from the theory. "
Now then, the most committed point in the theory, in such a
vision, is that it tends to confer "unjustified privileges:" the supplier of
merchandises or professional services is usually in a better position- of
evaluating the risks that involve the realization of international business
and of isolating them for choice of law clauses. To give such companies
additional advantages of having their domiciliary law as controlling adds
force to the powerful situation.' The solution we achieve will obligate the
supplier to anticipate the effective legal systems in the place where its
goods and services are commercialized.

C. The Appropriate Interpretationat the End of the System.
It is necessary then, to interpret Article 1212 of the Civil Code,
beginning with "the nature of the obligations."
In the consumption
relationship, we should not lose sight of the qualifying, typifying and
decisive element that distinguishes it from all other contracts and to the
ends of subjecting it to a special regime to offer legal protection: that is,
the final destination of the goods or services, the final consumption, and
has been this way since the existence of consumers.
The right of the consumer's habitual residence, then, is decisive.
This solution places in the "strong" part of the relationship, the obligation
of knowing protective norms of the consumer's habitual residence, where
the acts of consumption normally take place, final destination of the goods
and services. Without affecting it, one should also know the norms of
such a place if the consumption acts take place outside the consumer's
habitual residence.
VI.

TOWARD THE LAW OF THE PRINCIPLE ESTABLISHMENT OR

RESIDENCE OF THE SUPPLIER:

CONSUMER'S ELECTIVE ABILITY

The theory of characteristic benefit offers the supplier the
possibility of applying the law to its "center of commercial life." In such a
place, the supplier is naturally committed to the normative protection of the
local consumers. There is no reason why consumers, not domiciled in
such a place, cannot invoke such a right if it is more favorable to their

32.
(mentions
33.
34.

K.F. Juenger, General Course on Private International Law, R.C.D.I. 180 (1984)
examples of exchange Contracts of distribution).
Id. at 180.
Id.at 181.
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interests. The single fact that consumers reside in a state other than that of
their principal establishment is not an impediment so that the supplier can
escape from the local law. Of course, it is more favorable to consumers
with residence abroad.
The norms of such a system naturally accompany the production
and commercialization of goods and services from the supplier's principal
establishment. This way, for example, a salesperson established in Brazil
who contracts with a consumer with habitual residence in Argentina, faces
the option of the latter, by the right of the established (the Brazilian right).
There is no reason to seek the supplier, the irrelevancy of such a right,
because of the fact that the consumer resides in a market other than the
national one. It is their duty as the strong party in the relationship and
because they find themselves in better conditions of doing it, to foresee the
legislation of the consumer's habitual residence. With more reason, they
should do it with the local law of their principal establishment.
The position of superiority in the contractual relationship loads on
their backs the obligation of foreseeing the risks that carrying out business
internationally involves. The general principle of Good Faith that should
reign in contractual relationships, impedes for a contract, by a "powerful"
contracting party to breakaway from its "natural statute" of right of
consumption if it is more favorable for the consumer than others narrowly
construed.
The choice cannot be neutral, the establishment of alternative
contacts proclaims, founded in the interpretation of our norms of internal
source, facing consumer choices, discarding naturally the establishment of
a point of simple connection. The implied "nature of the obligations"
demands it this way.
VII. CONTRACTS WITH OR WITHOUT ARGENTINE CONTACTS:
TOWARD THE LAW OF THE PLACE OF ACQUISITION OF THE PRODUCT AS
THE ELECTIVE ABILITY OF THE CONSUMER

A. Place of Performanceas Place of Acquisition of the Product
The place of execution of the supplier's benefit (the delivery of the
good or benefit of the service) can be found outside of the previously
described points (the consumer's habitual residence and the supplier's
principal establishment).
Correlatively, this implies the acceptance or acquisition of the
product by the consumer (act of consuming). One cannot overlook this
circumstance when interpreting the execution place, taking into account the
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nature of the obligations involved.35 The place of acquisition of the
product represents an inflection point between the supplier's obligation
(commercialization act), and the consumer's right of consenting to the
consumption (consumption act). The place of acquisition of the product
should be taken into account in the catalog of consumer's options.
B. The Place of Execution of the Contractas Place of Acquisition of
the Product
It is also necessary to consider the solution that Article 1205 of the
Civil Code36 offers, the one that leads us to the contact celebration place
(lex loci celebrationis). As Professor Juenger says, the tendency to focus
on the actions manifested by the parties to the contract, for example, the
signature of a paper or social customs followed by the parties with the
formation of the business, determined by the classic doctrine and leaning
towards the lex loci celebrationisoriginates with Bartolus.37
Today, the execution is carried out by fax, cable, television, the
Internet, "making it impossible to discover which form of communication
is decisive" or simply "it is carried out in flight," hence the celebration
place can be entirely "fortuitous." 3"
Notice that the assumptions in
question have a high degree of proximity with the place of acquisition of
the product, and when the same is acquired abroad, outside the consumer's
habitual residence and the supplier's principal establishment (for example,
the consumer domiciled in Brazil that hires a service during their vacation
in Uruguay from a company wholesaler whose main establishment is in
Spain).
The application of the law of the place of execution, which is
usually the place of acquisition, would seem justified and appropriate.
Although the place of execution may not coincide with the place of
material acquisition of the product (e.g. taking the previous case, if the
service is linked with Chile). In this example, the place of execution loses
localizing force, for the place appears "fortuitous," for what is the
application in such a supposition the law of the place of acquisition of the
product.
Then Article 1205 of the Civil Code 39 should always be interpreted
in favor of the consumer as the place of acquisition of the product when it

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
C6D. CIV. art. 1205.
Id. at 175.
Juenger, supra note 32, at 181.
C6D. CIV. art. 1205.
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coincides with the place of execution, and it is possible to identify the
latter. Otherwise, the law of the place of acquisition of the product is
always important as the consumer's elective ability. It also implies the
supplier's obligation to foresee the effective legislation of the place of
commercialization of goods and services.
C. Concerning the Unreasonableness of the Distinction as Far as
Solutions 1205, 1209, and 1210 of the Civil Code
However, it is still necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of
such a solution foreseen by the legislator. Is it reasonable to maintain the
duality, based on the sole fact of Argentine contacts? It would seem an
unconscionable and discriminatory solution, if we keep in mind the
flexibility of the connection factors foreseen for contracts with Argentine
contacts, that as we saw, can work more appropriately the ends of offering
guidance to the weakest party of the business transaction. It is evident that
it does not concern those minimum standards of justice that Professor
Lipstein spoke of, producing unconscionable discriminations. We offer the
same international protection with or without Argentine contacts: the
international contract of consumption. This way, we integrate the
protection in the foreseen system Articles 1205, 1209-1210 of the Civil
Code, without discrimination against the contact.
VIII. DISPLACEMENT OF THE SOLUTION OF ARTICLE 1214 OF THE
CIVIL CODE
With such an interpretation, Article 1214 of the Civil Code would
be without sustenance. The place of performance in any event would be
determined by way of the previously expressed criteria, which would
displace, per se, the possibility of application of Article 1214 of the Civil
Code.
A. The Autonomy of Dispositionand its Limits
The Argentine P.I.L. admits the autonomy of the disposition in
both its forms: conflicting and material.' It is necessary to clarify that
such an ability recognizes as general limits: a) the Judge's Public Order;
and b) police norms or rigorous imperatives of the judge or foreigners that
present narrow bonds with the contract. Without neglecting general
limitations, the parts should be interpreted, in light of the principle of
protection of the weakest party in the business transaction: the favor
debilis.
40. Boggiano, supra note 27, at 23.
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The option of excluding the autonomy, has more inconveniences
than advantages: on its own, it does not resolve the imbalance and it is
against the minimum degree of security and legal predictability required in
commercial traffic, even in contracts with general conditions. 4'

B. Choice of Law Agreements: Expressed or Implied Forms; Real
Agreement, not Hypothetical
The choice of restricted reach, in implicit form, arises from the
jurisdiction of the parties in the framework of Article 1212 of the Civil
Code: "designating the place of performance." 42 The choice of broad
reach, arises from the jurisdiction of the parties in choosing a judge or
arbitrator, with its foundation in article 1 of the Civil and Commercial
Procedural Code of the Nation: when choosing a foreign tribunal, the
D.I.P.r. system of the tribunal is chosen and if they can choose this last
one, they can choose the Rectorate Private Right of the business, argument
to maiore ad minus.43
The election of a right (without imposing a limit of reasonable or
sufficient connection) in expressed or tacit form, also arises from article 7
of the 1986 Hague Convention on Applicable Law to International
Contracts of Sale and Purchase of Merchandise; Sanctioned and
Promulgated by law 23.916. 44 The incorporation of the Convention also
imports its principles to the positive internal D.I.P.r. But it is necessary to
illustrate that this principle of freedom has precise limits: internationally
imperative norms (exclusive and excluding police norms) and Public Order
(principles of public order).
Nevertheless, we should interpret the autonomy in this area with a
protective purpose. Such a result is achieved by departing from its
permission, although conditional, of the protection levels that are offered
to consumers in their habitual residence, in the supplier's principal
establishment, and the place of acquisition of the product.
In this sense, Professor Boggiano understands that the principle of
autonomy is limited especially in international contracts, when one of the
parties is "typically weak. "45 This way, the interest of the producer, says
41. Santiago Alvarez Gonzalez, Condiciones GeneralesEn La ContratacionInternacional,
LA LEY 159 (1992) (proposing the construction of a system based on the idea of protection of the
trust that struggles for the consideration of the law of the contractual or social environment of the
weak part: that is to say, on the base of law of the habitual residence or of the home of this part).
42. COD. CIV. art. 1212 (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
43. BOGGIANO, supra note 31, at 696.
44. Id.
45. See Gonzalez, supra note 41, at 55 (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
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Professor Boggiano, can offer greater levels of protection, as politics of
international sales, holding the autonomy subject to certain minimum limits
of protection like those offered to buyer's or seller's right.4
This way, we estimate that the parties can choose a right to govern
their contract, but this ability, cannot be detrimental to the protection levels
that offer the rights of the consumer's habitual residence nor those of the
co-contracting party's principal establishment, nor those of the place of
acquisition of the product. Everything naturally, should always be at the
consumer's option.
This solution still governs the choice of law cases by way of
adhesion contracts with predisposed clauses:
respecting the existent
protection levels in the "half-closed spatial or contractual adherent"; that
is, their "habitual residence or domicile." 4'
Now then, it is always
necessary to set forth the possibility of the application of police norms or
rigorously imperative of the law with which the contract has close links.48
The contacts that appear as sufficiently narrow in consumption contracts
are: place of execution; acquisition of the product; the consumer's
habitual residence; principal establishment of the co-contracting party; and
place of effectuation of the final destination (usually the place of the loss).
But it is necessary to highlight that, as propounded in this realm,
the consumer can always choose among the most favorable solutions; for
the option realized has supreme importance to the ends of the application
of the rigorously imperative right of the legal classification chosen by
consumers when they file the claim.
The police norms of the forum would also be applied
on the
condition that the foreigners, for those that opted for the consumer to file
the claim, cannot be more favorable. Naturally, always subject to the
control of public order of the forum carried out by the judge.

46. Id. at 59. It outlines the autonomy of the will, like a vehicle of elevation of the levels
of justness, in the protection of the typically weak part.
47. Id. at 165. This author's proposal is relative to the contracts with conditions generals
predisposed in general, and limited to the home or habitual residence of the weak contracting
party. The exception, when in the group of circumstances another thing arises. For example, it
offers the existence of previous contractual relationships among the parts or previous negotiations
that could determine a different solution. Without these circumstances, the law of the habitual
residence or of the home it should be taken in consideration by the proposer; Id. at 104.
(Editorial note: translated from Spanish).
48. C6D. CIV. art. 1208; Boggiano, supra note 27, at 325 (defining it like a "decisive
economic connection" with the contract of the law it seeks to escape); Id. at 716.
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C. The MaterialAutonomy
The possibility of incorporating material clauses into the contract,
excluding the coercive norms of internal private right, is affirmed and
recognized by our doctrine and jurisprudence.49 It is necessary to clarify
that the exclusion is partial: not to mediate substantial incorporation, the
coercive norms of the competent private right are not displaced.
It is evident that they govern the general limitations as much as the
special ones: a) public order of the judge; b) Police Norms of the Judge or
Foreigners with a narrow link to the contract, with the ability of the
consumer's option playing an important role; and c) One could say then
that the material autonomy confronts the minimum public order,
constituted by the minimum levels of protection of the consumer's habitual
residence, of the principal establishment of its co-contracting party, of the
place of acquisition of the product, and of the choice by the parties, to the
consumer's option.
The norms of private right rigorously imperative, to reflect a
minimum public order of protection, constitute a doubtless limitation to the
exercise of such a material autonomy, their exercise should tend to
improve, never to worsen the consumer's legal situation in the
consumption relationship. The nature of the regulated question in some
systems has its roots in fundamental, constitutional principles, that make us
think of the strong authoritative ingredient, fruit of similar conquests to
those taken place in the field of labor rights.
Also, in adhesion contracts with predisposed clauses, the
incorporation of same to the business undoubtedly originates from the
exercise of the material autonomy.50 And the solution is no different. The
questions referring to interpretation, validity and effectiveness are
subjected to general and special limitations indicated at supra, when they
appear inserted in the contractual relationships of consumption.
The complicated problems referred to the validity and effectiveness
of predisposed clauses should be guided by the protective principle of the
weak parties in the business transaction, for what pre-indicated limitations
play an important role in control.
It is of the utmost importance to understand it this way because the
contractual superiority of the supplier of goods and services places on its
back the risk of international commercialization, and should foresee the
49. BOGGIANO, supra note 31, at 700. This author justifies his exercise, starting from the
possibility that they have the role of excluding the coercive norms of the private right chosen by
the legislator, by the election of another right entirely that the elect for the legislator, they can
also exclude partially coercive norms, by means of the exercise of the material autonomy.
50.

Id.
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protective legislation of the states where the commercialization was
effectuated.
The possibility of an option offered to the consumer
constitutes an appropriate mechanism for protection of interests and also, it
is manifested as a precursory step toward the leveling in the superior
protective systems.
On the contrary, it does no more than to legitimize the profit
obtained, starting with the diversity that exists in the legal guide to the
weak party in the consumption relationship.
IX. THE PUBLICITY OR OFFER IN THE COUNTRY OF THE CONSUMER'S
HABITUAL RESIDENCE (ARTICLE 5, CLAUSE 2 OF THE AGREEMENT OF
ROME 1980)
It has been said that new marketing and publicity techniques have
impelled the development of the human consumer.51 Marketing constitutes
the appropriate vehicle, dedicated to bringing the product closer to the
consumer, by offers in domiciliary sales, publicity by massive means of
communication, internet, etc. Such means produce a flow of information
that overcomes the political boundaries of the States, shortening the
distances and penetrating directly into the consumer's residence.
It is of evident normality, the situation that the publicity arrives
and penetrates in the habitual residence of the weak party in the business
transaction, encouraging the consumption, generating necessities, with
which the contact, charges bigger localizing force, beyond the place where
the contract is executed acquiring the product.

A. The Need to Harmonize Substantial Norms for the Consumer's
Effective InternationalProtection
The material unifications are conquests by the international
legislator, but necessarily limited to matters in which a common ground of
principles exists.5 2 Cooperation and solidarity among countries, based on
the valuation of superior ideas of justice, justify the fight for the adoption
of fair, uniform solutions.53 In this branch of protective law, with last ratio
in human dignity, it fully justifies any unification intent.
But as Professor Benjamin has emphasized, the fruit of the labor of
unification of the Law of Consumption in Mercosur, we will not see in this

51.

MANUEL SANTELLA,

INTRODUCCI6N AL DERECHO DE LA PUBLICIDAD 282 (Civitas

ed., 1982).
52. BOGGIANO, supra note 31. at 120. The independence and equality of the national
juridical systems are opposed to the unification.
53.

Id. at 121.
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century. 54 True that the task is as necessary as it is difficult, but in any
event, it is not completely impossible.5 5 Nevertheless, it is always
necessary to develop a uniform D.I.P.r. system that accompanies such
substantial unifications. 6 The task then should be common: to private law
and international private law experts.
B. Examples of Unlawful Acts
There is a lagoon in the internal source regarding the regulation of
unlawful acts.5 ' The lagoon should be filled. with the analogy and the
general principles of law.5" Article 43 of the 1940 Treaty of International
Civil Law of Montevideo mandates the application of lex loci delicti.
There has been widespread criticism of this rigid contact: the so-called
Conflictual Revolution in the United States against this system is good
59
proof of it.
That is why it is necessary to keep in mind the material
orientations of favor, and with more reason still, in the face of the need for
filling such a lagoon, we should build the conflict norm that responds to
those generalprinciples of law.'
And in the consumption relationship, the victims are the
consumers, establishing themselves as the weak parties of such a
relationship, with the natural need for protection (in systems like ours,
their rights were recognized as fundamental). 6
Any construction that we carry out, should not lose sight
of this
protective purpose, nor be different from the proposal in a contractual
matter. Let us look at a proposal in the international source.

54. Id.
55. See, LORENZETIrI, supra note 1. Where she/he informs us the task of the Technical

Committee note 7.
56. See Fawcett, ProductsLiability in PrivateInternationalLaw: A European Perspective,
R.C.D.I. 228 (1994) (where it outlines the problems that arise in the European space, before the
ratification lack on the part of some States of the Convention of The Hague of 1973).
57.

BOGGIANO, supra note 31, at 1160.

58. C6D. CIV. art. 16.
59. See K.F. Juenger, Balance Y Perspectiva De La Decada En Los Estados Unidos,
CUARTAS JORNADAS DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 37 (June 4, 1993); RAMON
CARANDE, PRINCIPIOS OBJECTIVOS Y METODOS DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO:
BALANCE Y PERSPECTIVAS DE UNA DECADA (1995).

60. Id.
61.

CONST. ARG. art. 42.
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C. The Hague Convention's Solution on Applicable Law to the

Responsibilityfor the Manufacture of the Product
In the Hague Convention on the Applicable Law to the
Responsibility for the Manufacture of Products on October 2, 1973
(convention that went into effect October 1, 1977), the injured party's
habitual residence and the place of the loss play a predominant role,
instead of the place of acquisition of the product or of the defendant's
principal establishment. This is determined by analyzing the suppositions
of coincidence of the habitual residence: a) with the law of the place
where the loss occurred; and b) with the law of the defendant's principal
establishment; or c) with the place of acquisition of the product by the
injured party.62
The hierarchy of the connection factors is given only for two of the
four: the place of the habitual residence and that place where the loss
occurred. The defendant's principal establishment and the place of
acquisition of the product are "subordinate connection factors" and if these
coincide, it does not drive the application of the law of the principal
establishment.63
A hierarchy of combinations also exists in the instances where the
habitual residence of the injured party coincides with the principal
establishment or with the State of acquisition of the product." The result
then is that when the loss occurs outside the habitual residence of the
injured party, for example when they are on vacation in another State, not
article 4, but article 5 of the aforementioned Convention is applicable.65
62. The Hague Convention has more than enough Applicable Law to the Responsibility for
the fact of the products of October 2, 1973.
63. Fawcet, supra note 56, at 141; this noted author, mentions a failure of the Dutch Court
of Alkmaar in the case Nieuw Rotterdam Schade NV v. Baier & Koeppel Gmb H & Co. It is
necessary the main combination of both with the subordinates. This way, it is applicable the Law
of the Place of habitual residence if it coincides: to) with place of the fact; or b) with the person's
main Establishment whose responsibility is invoked; or c) the place of acquisition of the product
for the directly damaged person.
64. Hague Convention, art. 5.
65. Fawcett, supra note 56, at 141. This author analyzes the Convention from a European
perspective and he makes us important precisions. It is in vigor in four members of the EEC:
France, Luxemburg, The Low Countries, Spain; and between two of the EFTA: Norway and
Finland; it has been signed and not ratified by Belgium, Italy and Portugal. Few registered cases
of the Convention exist. The lack of harmonization of norms of D.I.P.r. in the European area of
illicit facts projected toward the responsibility by the product, hinders certainty and security of
the solutions. Is the point in question: like they operate the norms from relative D.I.P.r. to illicit
facts, in matters of responsibility for the product elaborated in countries non ratificantes of the
Convention of The Hague? This author realizes proposals of creation of norms of special
D.I.P.r., so that they work in the Community material environment of the Directive ones, with
the rising danger that would represent to have two rules of D.I.P.r.: one for the cases
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The possibility of choosing the'applicable right comes from article
6, when none of the laws designated in articles 4 and 5 are applicable. It
mandates that the law of the place of the defendant's establishment be
applied, allowing the actor to opt in subsidiary form for the law of the
place where the loss occurred.

D. Solution in the InternationalSource: The Habitual Residence of
the injured Party Coinciding with Lex Loci Actus
The habitual residence of the injured party, consumer, should be
favored as the starting point for the construction of the Norm of Conflict.
It is the place where the consumer has its center of life and the
harmonization takes place with the contractual solution, that in the face of
the lack of a specific solution in our internal source, we can integrate it
with the same principles of the P.I.L. in the contractual area.
This way, the traditional lex loci actus' would be justified, as long
as and as soon as it coincides with the victim's habitual residence. And it
should consist of, in the principal connection, when it would be this way
(similar to the supposition of Article 4, Clause A, of the 1973 Hague
Agreement on Responsibility for the Product).

E. Elective Solution in Favor of the Consumer:

Principle:

Establishment of the Defendant; Place of Acquisition of the
Product
Nevertheless, it is important to introduce in the methodology the
victim's ability to choose alternatively between the laws: a) of the
principal establishment of the defendant; b) of the place of acquisition of
the product (these last possibilities are contemplated in Switzerland: article
135, l(a) and (b) of the 1987 Switzerland Law of Private International

Law).
In sum, the system of P.I.L. will be identified in the order of its
ability to overcome the dichotomy (contractual and non-contractual
responsibility).
We do not find axiological justification for the fact that the solution
is different from the one outlined in contractual matter and for the sole fact
that there is no prior contract between the ultimately responsible party and
the injured consumer.

contemplated in the Directive ones, where armonizaef6n would exist, and another for the rest,
where harmonization would not exist. Id. at 228-40.
66. Treaty of Montevideo, art. 43 (1940).
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The protective purpose should prevail over the solution, in the
sense of producing such a conquest.
X. LIMITS ON THE APPLICABLE LAW
By the characteristics of the protective private law and its projected
solutions there are two extremely important factors: first, the option
offered to the consumer, and secondly, the judge's public order. The
rigorously authoritative norms of the forum always maintain a minimum
limit of protection.

A. The Realm of the Rigorously Authoritative Norms of the Judge
and the Foreigners Tightly Connected with the Case
Police norms, mentioned supra, constitute a limit to the applicable
right that excludes all types of applicable possibilities, always encapsulated
under the favor principle and in the consumer's option. The police norms
which we refer to, are those of the judge and the foreigners with intimate
links to the consumption relationship.67 Naturally it arises from the
previously indicated function that foreign police norms are applicable on
the condition that they do not violate the principles of public order of the
Argentine legal arrangement.
Nevertheless, the existence of an Argentine police norm would not
constitute a limit on the application of a foreign police norm, if this were
more favorable to the consumer (by virtue of the interpretation principle in
favor of the weak party). The protection principle, is a general principle"
of Argentine international public order.69 If the rigorously imperative
foreign right (foreign police norm) is more favorable to the consumer than
that of the forum (police norm of the forum), we should give priority to the
foreigner, unless, fundamental principles of the Argentine judge's public
order are violated.
It is necessary to examine if the separation of Argentine police
norm harm other fundamental principles of the forum (e.g. the economic
public order).

67. C6D. CIV. art. 1208.
68. Id. art. 16.
69. Id. art. 14; CONST. ARG. art. 42.
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B. The Dimension of the International Public Order and the
Function of Judges in the International Protection of the
Consumer
The principles of international public order, play a dominant role
in the control of the solutions in the multinational private law cases. The
protective function in the P.I.L. system planned for the consumer's
international protection, unfolds in three ways: a) election of a system
connected with the relationship, granting the consumer the ability to choose
the most favorable option; b) framing the autonomies with the protective
principle; c) always rigorously playing the consideration of the imperative
law most favorable to the consumer (in the one who presents the action or
that of the forum).
The whole proposal is subject to the condition that the principles of
Argentine international public order are not violated. When we speak of
protective legislation, consumer protection is the purpose for bringing into
existence a series of fundamental values that have as the ultimate rationale,
the respect for human dignity. Law 24.240, in Article 65 states that the
present law is one of public order.
Naturally, such a declaration makes reference to the internal public
order, not the international one. But we should not overlook the fact that
the aforementioned law, is based on Article 42 of the National Constitution
which begins speaking of the "consumption relationship" and establishes
the rights of the consumers and users:
a) to the protection of their health;
b) to the protection of their security and economic interests;
c) to adequate and truthful information;
d) to the freedom of choice; and
e) to conditions of equal and appropriate treatment.
The text also expresses that the authorities will provide for the
protection of those rights, to education for consumption, to the defense of
competition against all forms of distortion of the markets, to the control of
the natural and legal monopolies. Without a doubt, law 24.240 contains
protective parameters on which the protection of consumers in
consumption relationships rests. Now then, basic rights like the protection
of risks that may affect the consumer's health or security, of their
legitimate economic and social interests, of adequate information, of the
freedom of choice; constitute respect of their dignity as the fundamental
principle of the human being. They are basic principles that any foreign
solution, or solution brought about by the exercise of the autonomy of the
will, cannot ignore.
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It is on these principles that the Argentine system of P.I.L. of
consumer protection should be built. Here is the importance of the
jurisdictional function, in the consumer's international protection: The
comparative task of the judges, that contact the foreign solution or
agreement to by the parties, with these principles that are necessarily
planned on same.
C. The Jurisdictional Function in the International Protection of
Consumers
The jurisdictional contacts as tutorage means, should also surpass
the diverse source of the international relationship of consumption
(contractual or non-contractual). The international jurisdiction should have
as its fundamental pillar, access to the jurisdiction, which is a human right
with constitutional hierarchy. Through this right, the Argentine norms of
international jurisdiction should be interpreted.7°
D. The Consumer's HabitualResidence
This is a forum that enjoys undeniable advantages to protective
ends. The interpretation of Article 1215 of the Civil Code allows one to
reach this conclusion. The contact place of performance should be
understood in a wide sense, any place of performance facilitates access to
the justice system, an international principle that enjoys constitutional
importance.7 '
In this sense, when the consumer is the plaintiff, it notably
facilitates the access to the justice system. Access which on the other
hand, has its roots in fundamental rights recognized by international
treaties of human rights with constitutional importance in our country. 2
The plaintiff's forum, would only be justified, says Professor
Vicher, in matters where it is pursued to facilitate the execution.73 In this

70. See TONIOLLO, supra note 11.

71. Werner Goldschmidt, teaches about private international law at the conference of
Derecho Internaccional Privado, Derecho De La Tolerancia (1982).
72. CONST. ARG. art. 75, § 22; The American Convention of Human Rights of San Jose,
Costa Rica, National Supreme Court of Justice, Dec. 22, 1994, especially the vote of Dr. Fayt,
considerations 21 and 22 of the case Manuata, Juan Jose C/ Embajada De La Federacion Rusa S/
Danos Y Perjuicios.
73. Id. at 211.
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instance, such a contact would not appear as an inappropriate forum, but is
justified in the special nature of the action.74
In the consumption relationships, justification is undeniable. In
this sense the consumer can file a complaint in his habitual residence
invoking lex fori (the identification forum, which has undeniable
advantages beginning with the judge's knowledge of the proper law, and of
undeniable importance of public order as a reservation clause).7"
Not doubting that the solutions based on such an identification have
received favorable opinion of qualified wisdom, Professor Von Mehren has
suggested that whoever believes that in the multinational private law cases,
satisfactory results in terms of Standards of Justice can be obtained, like in
those reached in purely internal cases, is condemned to deception.7 6
This delicate problem is centered on the consideration that on the
one hand, there is an inequality between the foreign right and the lexfori at
the moment of the resolution of a multinational private law case.77 The
public order exception, to veto the foreign rules of decision, has been taken
by Professor Juenger as an ending point in which one is forced to trust the
multilateralism as much the unilateralism: the preference of the forum to
avoid inequitable results. 78
On the other hand, when the matters
understood in the cases, are based on the human person's fundamental
rights, the ingredient of principista international public order plays a
predominant role generating the need for homogeneous results in the
forum. The same considerations can come into play when the consumer is
sued.
E. Domicile of the Defendant
The interests of the consumer's co-contracting party when sued,
are preserved in the general jurisdictional contact:
domicile of the
defendant. It is one of the jurisdictional approaches universally accepted
and respectful of the fundamental right of defense at trial (which is also
74. See also Javier Torniollo, Jurisdiccion Internaccional Y Su Proyeccion Hacia El
Mercosur, REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS JURIDICAS Y SOCIALES DE LA UNL 154

(1995).
75.

C6D. CIV. art. 14, § 2.

76. Arthur Taylor Von Mehren, Choice of Law and the Problems of Justice, CHOICE OF
LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 21 (Spring 1977).
77. BOGGIANO, supra note 31, at 94. Boggiano puts accent in the function inspector of
the Norma of Conflict, manifested in the exception of Public Order that implies to not admit the

foreign solution that contradicts the principles of substantial justice in those that she/he settles the
juridical classification of the forum. The principles of international public order "they always
govern the cases"; "it is always necessary the material comparison." Id. at 94, 95.
78. Id. at 258.
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based on the National Constitution and International Treaties of Human
Rights. See previous point).
This contact is not foreign to the consumer's interests either.
When consumers are the plaintiffs, they can also choose lex fori if it is
favorable to them (the principal establishment of the co-contracting party).
F. The Place of Acquisition of the Product: The Reasonableness of
Lex Loci Delicti (article 5, C.P. C.C.N.) and Place of
Performance (Articles 1215 and 1216 of the Civil Code) as the
Consumer's Option
The lex loci delicti,79 may appear to be a reasonable contact to the
ends of international jurisdiction in the instances that they coincide with the
consumer's habitual residence, with the establishment of the co-contracting
party and finally with the place of acquisition of the product.
They should also be endowed of international jurisdiction, at the
consumer's option, if the judges of the place where the loss occurred
coincides with the place where the product was acquired. The consumer
would always be the plaintiff and thus, guarantee his/her access.
The same reasonable solution occurs, when we are faced with a
broad interpretation of the place of performance.' It would also be
presented as a contractual matter in the forum of the place of acquisition of
the product. This would allow the consumer as plaintiff to sue before
those judges and invoke lexfori, if it is procedurally reasonable.
The solution becomes difficult when consumers are sued in the
place of acquisition of the product because consumers may find themselves
outside of their habitual residence and forced to consent to the jurisdiction
in order to defend their rights. That fact alone justifies discarding such a
jurisdictional contact as infringing on the principle of international public
order; and with the consequential obstacle to the execution of the sentence
in the habitual residence of same.
It is impossible to discard such inconveniences, since the principle
of access to the jurisdiction to defend its rights, has an undisputed
hierarchy in the Argentine legal system.
XI.

JURISDICTION EXTENSION

The principle of freedom of the competent judge's election
foreseen by Article 1 of the C.P.C.C.N., presents some controversial
edges in this field. Naturally, any interpretation of the principle of
79.

C6D. PROC. CIV. Y COM. art. 5.

80.

C6D. CIv. arts. 1215, 1216.
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freedom foreseen by the aforementioned norm, does not have to neglect the
principle of guiding the weak party in the business transaction. The
freedom of choice usually belongs in contracts among parties with equal
negotiating power.
The situation is different when we deal, with
consumption relationships. The extension should be treated differently in
contracts with consumers. 81
A. The Commitment Clause
The commitment clause included in consumption contracts brings
us to the problem of its validity and effectiveness. It is also normal to
include adhesion contracts with predisposed clauses.
We should
distinguish, when the consumer is the defendant from when the consumer
is the plaintiff. The interpretation is always in the consumer's favor.
B. Sued Consumer (Proceduraland Substantive Obstacles)
In this instance, we should recall once again that the reality of the
consumption relationship involves an evident disparity in the negotiating
power of the parties and that for this reason, a new intervening right
appears to balance it. It has usually been sustained that the extension,
many times, establishes a clause of irresponsibility.'
In this sense, to
force the consumer to move to a distant country, can amount to one of the
abusive clauses forbidden in article 37 of law 24.240. Access to the
jurisdiction is hindered.83
It is also necessary to remember that among the limitations that
Article 1 of the C.P.C.C.N. sets out, is "the prohibition of the law"; and
the abusive clauses regulated in article 37 of law 24.240, is outright
ineffective for being "non conventional" without prejudice of the
integration of the contract by the Judge when she/he declares the partial
nullity. The implicit prohibition of the election clause, does not cease to

81. ANTONIo
BoGGIANO,
CONTRACTOS INTERNACCIONALES:
ESTUDIO DE LA CONVENCI6N INTERAMERICANA SOBRE DERECHO
CONTRACTOS INTERNACCIONALES (Depalma ed., 2d ed. 1995).

INTRODUCCION AL
APLICABLE A Los

82. J.C. REZZONICO, CONTRACTOS CON CLAUSAS PREDISPUESTAS 565 (Astrea ed.
1987); M.E. UZAL, SOLUCI6N DE CONTROVERSIAS EN EL COMERCIO INTERNACIONAL 32

(1992).
83. BOGGIANO, supra note 31, at 242. This author understands that should appreciate the
extension, by the light of the defense principle in trial, when it is placed to the adherent one in
situation indefensi6n, that is to say to be able to go to a reasonable jurisdiction.
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be an argument with serious foundations in our special legislation for
consumer protection.84
In the instance of international relationships of consumption, the
extension can not deprive the consumer from the access to the preindicated forums, neither can it limit the responsibility of the cocontracting party, nor place restrictions or denouncements on its rights. It
is highly unlikely that in an Argentine jurisdiction, an extension clause can
pass the test projected by the parameters of consumer protection.
On the other hand, the applicable right to this agreement, in order
for its validity, by the force of the protective dispositions and the
interpretive proposal of the system of norms of P.I.L., makes us think that
we should necessarily take into account the substantial systems of
protection:
of the habitual residence, or establishment of the cocontracting party or of acquisition of the product, a right elected by the
parties, at the consumer's option. The complications are evident.

C. Consumer as Plaintiff (the Permissive Character for the
Consumer)
The inconveniences of the situation previously described, would
seem not to play a role in this instance. The consumers could take
advantage of the extension clause if it is favorable to their interests, since it
would constitute one more forum to sue in and it implies a favorable
situation and is in accord with the principle of access to the jurisdiction.
The defendant, counterpart of the consumption relationship, who usually
predisposed the clause under its general conditions, would have no reason
to complain about such a choice by the consumer. Usually that is who
should carry the risks of the insertion of the clause.
It may be said then that the extension in the judges of the
consumer's habitual residence appear as a contact free from bad habits and
for the supplier, a degree of security and unbeatable certainty.
D. The

Commitment

(Extension Post Litem Natam) and its

Feasibility
The commitment (extension post litem natam) does not have the
same inconveniences, provided it takes place by expressed agreement, in
written form and properly subscribed by the consumer. An evident

84. FARINA, supra note 3, at 426. When it outlines the extension of internal competition,
it foresees the possibility that the consumer, invoking article 37, clause b of the law, happen
before the judges of their home.
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approach takes place, with the previously contemplated situation, when the
ability is granted to the consumer as plaintiff.
Without harm to it, we estimate that one of the less debatable and
sure ways, is the post litem natam for procedural agreement, that is to say,
"after having promoted the action," as prescribed by Montevideo Treaty of
International Civil Law 1940, article 56 .1 Such a situation does not stop
to come together with the elective principle in favor of the consumer.
Such a procedural agreement implies that the consumer has indeed chosen
the tribunal to which it appears and it preserves this way, the fundamental
right of access to the jurisdiction. This is a way of achieving the
extension, also and in a certain way, it avoids the inconveniences generated
by the applicable right to the extension agreement, since here, it rotates
around the right of the elected tribunal (to the one that indeed appeared).
Anyway, the projection of the solution toward the principle of effectiveness
always remains latent, in the instance that international cooperation is
necessary when the judgment must be recognized in another different legal
system.
XII. CONCLUSION
This P.I.L. system proposed for the consumer's international
protection, was devised starting from the time man became as consumer, in
a relationship of international consumption, with their needs, their

nimbleness, and their evident weakness. Beyond the contractual or noncontractual character in which the need for protection appears. This
general principle should constitute the axis for the solutions to
multinational private law cases, and for that sole reason, it deserves respect
for its dignity.

85.

Montevideo International Civil Rights Treaty (1940).
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I.
INTRODUCCI6N
Es necesario hacer algunas consideraciones preliminarias sobre esta
materia a la que el derecho internacional privado debe proporcionar
soluciones justas.
El derecho de los consumidores en el derecho privado se refleja
como un microsistema juridico de protecci6n del consumidor. En este
sentido, el Profesor Lorenzetti sefiala algunos puntos que evidencian la
gestaci6n del proceso de formaci6n de los microsistemas:
a) se instala un orden protectorio que deroga el principio
general de la igualdad de los ciudadanos. El orden
supletorio se torna imperativo, surgen las nulidades
virtuales y pretende el mantenimiento del prop6sito
prdctico perseguido por los contratantes . . . m6dulos
abiertos para la calificaci6n de clfusulas contractuales
abusivas, el listado de cldusulas negras y -grises, el
control administrativo previo, el desechaniento de
algunas cliusulas manteniendo el negocio y
redisefidndolo, aunque no son muy frecuentes en el
Derecho Comin; y
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b) existe un apartamiento del principio de efectos
relativos de los contratos, al sugerir la imputaci6n de
dafios al fabricante, al distribuidor, al mayorista, al
titular de la marca que no han celebrado contrato
alguno con el consumidor como ocurre en la ley
brasilefia 8078/90.1
Asimismo, prosigue el autor, se conceden acciones al consumidor, al
usuario, a miembros del grupo familiar, a las asociaciones de
consumidores, que tampoco han tenido vinculos convencionales previos.
En la Reptiblica Argentina, la reforma constitucional de 1994, en
el articulo 42, ha producido la constitucionalizaci6n de derechos del
consumidor, en la Relacion De Consumo, como la protecci6n de su salud,
seguridad e intereses econ6micos, a una informaci6n adecuada y veraz, a
la libertad de elecci6n y a condiciones de trato equitativo y digno. Busca,
al decir del Profesor Farina, la conciliaci6n entre los fines individuales y
sociales que se realice sobre la base del reconocimiento, el respeto y el
rango preferente que en la jerarquia de valores corresponde a la persona
3
humana.
Nos encontramos sin duda frente a un derecho privado tuitivo,
cargado de valores, por lo que el Derecho Internacional Privado no puede
mantenerse asdptico, sino que debe constituirse en una herramienta apta
para el desarrollo de finalidades bisicas fundamentales, cual es la
protecci6n del consumidor. Todo el enfoque metodol6gico debe orientarse
hacia este valor sustancial en juego.
II.

DIFICULTAD PARA DEFINIR EL CONCEPTO DE CONSUMIDOR Y LA
NECESARIA AMPLITUD DEL MISMO EN EL D.I.P.r.

La definici6n del concepto de consumidor debe ser lo
suficientemente amplia para comprender las variadas situaciones
necesitadas. Es preciso destacar las dificultades que surgen de la casuistica
para estructurar cualquier concepto, sin perjuicio de la inevitable y
potencial circunstancia, generada por la intervenci6n de Tribunales
nacionales con diferentes interpretaciones sobre el tema. La importancia
no es minima ya que el concepto del consumidor constituye el drmbito
1.

RICARDO LORENZETTI, LAS NORMAS FUNDAMENTALES DE DERECHO PRIVADO

16

(Rubinzal Culzoni, ed., 1995).
2. Id. a 16. Adems sefiala que el ejemplo mds evidente es el del Brasil, que ha
considerado el tema a nivel constitucional, dictAndose la ley 8078 que es un c6digo de defensa
del consumidor lo que permite coherencia, homogeneidad a determinada rama del derecho,
posibilitando su autonomfa.
3.

JUAN M FARINA, DEFENSA DEL CONSUMIDOR Y DEL USARIO 5 (Astrea ed., 1995).
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material de aplicaci6n del principio de tutela y del r6gimen especial
previsto para el mismo.
La doctrina ha destacado distintas coordenadas para definir al
consumidor: el destino final de los bienes (uso familiar, personal o
domdstico); la naturaleza profesional o no de la actividad del consumidor
al concluir el contrato (si favorece o no la reintroducci6n del bien en el
Mercado); la integraci6n o no de los bienes al proceso productivo: destino
final de la producci6n (aunque el destino final sea el consumo; ej.,
contrataci6n de bienes y servicios con un destino final inmediato, pero
mediatamente integran prestaci6n a terceros: la compra de un equipo de
computaci6n o contrataci6n de servicio de comidas); o simplemente, el
hecho juridico de "consumir" en una relaci6n de consumo o en funci6n de
ella. Veamos algunas propuestas legislativas:
La Convenci6n de Roma de 1980 sobre Ley Aplicable a
Obligaciones Contractuales estA en vigor desde el 1991 en la Comunidad
Europea, en su articulo 5, define los contratos concluidos con
consumidores, como los suministros o abastecimientos hechos a una
persona "para un uso que pueda considerarse ajeno a su actividad
profesional. "'
Similar definici6n negativa adopta la Convenci6n de Bruselas,
Lugano de 1978, dependiendo entonces del int6rprete, si el uso podria ser
considerado como ajeno a la actividad profesional del beneficiario
(articulo 13).
Es problemitica la delimitaci6n subjetiva, como indica el Profesor
Esplugues Mota con relaci6n a este instrumento europeo. En cuanto
implica, la necesidad de apreciar el hecho diferencial que desencadena la
aplicaci6n de la normativa de sistema especial de protecci6n previsto por
los articulos 14 y 15. La no profesionalidad del adquirente de bienes y
servicios se yuxtapone a la consideraci6n teleol6gica del destino, uso,
final; o sea que el destino particular se verifica a partir de la negaci6n del
uso profesional. 5
Esta configuraci6n subjetiva del convenio ha sido interpretada por
el Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Europea, excluyendo la aplicaci6n
del sistema especial del mismo a individuos no necesitados de protecci6n;
como por ejemplo, cuando acttian en forma profesional. Conferencia la
sentencia en la causa Bertrand c/ Ott KG del 21 de junio de 1978; pero con
posterioridad fue m~is restrictiva, en la causa Hutton c/ TVB de 19 de
4. Vea Carlos Esplugues Mota, Los Convenios De Bruselas y De Roma y La Protecci6n
De Los Conswnidores En Europa, REVISTA INSTITUTOS DE DERECHO COMERCIAL ECON6MICO
Y EMPRESARIAL 10 (1994).

5.

Id. a 10.
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enero de 1993, en la que una empresa era cesionaria de derechos de un
consumidor, no fue considerada por el tribunal como consumidor ya que
"el demandante acttia como profesional y por lo tanto no tiene la condici6n
de consumidor, parte de uno de los contratos enumerados en el primer
pirrafo de dicha disposici6n (el articulo 13)" ya que "s6lo refiere al
consumidor final privado, no involucrado en operaciones mercantiles o

profesionales.

"6

La legislaci6n suiza combina el uso personal con la naturaleza
profesional o no profesional de la actividad desarrollada por el consumidor
al concluir el contrato. El articulo 120 de la Ley Suiza de Derecho
Internacional Privado de 1987,1 habla de "prestaci6n corriente de consumo
destinada a un uso personal o familiar del consumidor y que no tiene
relaci6n con la actividad profesional o comercial del consumidor.
En el Proyecto de la Haya de 1980, sobre "Convenci6n sobre
ciertas ventas a los consumidores" se defini6 al consumidor como "aquella
persona que adquiria mercaderias principalmente para uso familiar
personal o dom6stico," afiadiendo la exigencia de que el vendedor actie
"en el curso de sus negocios o profesi6n."9
La Convenci6n de Viena de 1980, sobre contrato de Compraventa
Internacional de Mercaderias, excluye "el uso personal, familiar o
dom6stico . . ." salvo que "el vendedor, en cualquier momento antes de la
celebraci6n del contrato o en el momento de su celebraci6n, no hubiera ni
debiera haber tenido conocimiento, de que las mercaderias se compraban
para ese uso." 10
El Protocolo de Buenos Aires sobre Jurisdicci6n Internacional en
Materia Contractual excluye de su .rnbito material de aplicaci6n "las
ventas al consumidor." Esta estrechez del imbito material ha sido tambidn
criticada."

6. Vea LUIS CARILLO POZO, COMENTARIO AL CONVENIO DE BRUSALES RELATIVO A
LA COMPETENCIA JUDICIAL Y A LA EJECUCI6N DE RESOLUCIONES JUDICIALES EN MATERIA
CIVIL Y MERCANTIAL 274, 275 (Alfonso-Luis Calvo Caravaca, ed., 1995) Este autor adems,
es de la opini6n que tal perspectiva formalista, que s6lo protege a quien no contrata en ejercicio
de su profesi6n, deja sin protecci6n al pequefio comerciante que contrata con una gran empresa
dominante en el mercado. . . . Se disefia asi el control a dos niveles sucesivos, delimitando el
aspecto subjetivo, con la triple exigencia de que se trate de consumidor final, de contrato
tipificado, y parte del proceso. Id. a 279.
7. Swiss Law of Private International Law, art. 120 (1987).
8. Id. a 120.
9. Hague Project, arts. 1, 2 (1980).
10. Vea generalmente Vienna Convention (1980) (nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).
11. Vea JAVIER TONIOLLO, REFLEXIONES ACERCA DE LA FUNCI6N JURISDICCIONAL EN
EL MERCOSUR en la obra DEL MERCOSUR 246 (1996).
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De todos modos, la idea que debe gravitar a los fines de establecer
un concepto es la amplitud, y el principio que debe guiar la tarea del
int6rprete es la finalidad tuitiva. La necesidad de protecci6n de la parte
d6bil de la relaci6n de consumo y por su condici6n de inferioridad frente a
la otra es que justifica la utilizaci6n de t6rninos amplios, que faciliten la
posterior tarea de aplicaci6n del derecho tuitivo. Que un eventual
problema de calificaciones no entorpezca, ni dificulte la protecci6n. La
propuesta de construcci6n de un concepto de D.I.P.r. a partir de la
consideraci6n de los sistemas juridicos con que el caso presenta conexi6n,
nos conduce siempre a la posibilidad de utilizar como punto de partida el
que tenga mayor amplitud para luego pasar a adoptar, naturalmente, el que
mis favorezca a sus intereses.
Es de sumo inter6s destacar que en el Ambito del Mercosur se ha
propuesto una def'mici6n lo suficientemente amplia, acorde con la finalidad
tuitiva. Se considera como consumidor, a "toda persona fisica o jurfdica
que adquiere o utiliza productos o servicios como destinatario final en una
relaci6n de consumo o en funci6n de ella. Equipirase a consumidores a
las demds personas, determinables o no, expuestas a las relaciones de
consumo. "12

En suma, la defmici6n que debe adoptarse es la que tenga la
amplitud necesaria como punto de partida y para el correcto
funcionamiento del principio de protecci6n del consumidor como parte
dfbil de la relaci6n de consumo, ampliando por supuesto el concepto de la
lex fori si fuere mls estrecho que el proporcionado por las legislaciones
mds pr6ximas a la relaci6n de consumo en cuesti6n.
Nos acercamos a la propuesta metodol6gica de la Profesora Uzal
que propone definirlo por las caracteristicas de las partes que intervienen
en la negociaci6n en que le atribuye tal papel, como por el uso de las
mercaderias adquiridas o servicios comprometidos. 3 Los problemas de
calificaciones deben ser orientados hacia la soluci6n que brinde mayor
protecci6n al consumidor.

I.

Los AMBITOS DE PROTECCI6N Y LA FUENTE DE LA RELACION DE
CONSUMO: ACTOS UNILATERALES, EL CONTRATO Y LOS HECHOS
LICITOS E ILCITOS

"En el Derecho Privado Interno, en el Proyecto boliviano, por
ejemplo, se incluye junto a los contratos los actos (comportamientos)
12. Vea Richards Lorenzetti, La Relaci6n De Consumo: Conceptualizaci6nDognmdtica En
Base Al DerechoDel Area RegionalMercosur, LA LEY (Dec. 3, 1996).
13. Vea Maria E. Uzal, Protecci6n Al Consumidor En El Derecho InternacionalPrivado,
R.D.C.O. 242 (June 1991).
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unilaterales que crean una expectativa razonable sobre calidad o precio de
un bien o servicio destinado a ser consumido.""
El acto econ6mico de consumir es un hecho juridico: quien utilize
el servicio es consumidor,'" quien es usuario puede no ser contratante, o
puede ser que el titular de un grupo familiar o social no sea consumidor y
haya usado el producto.6 Puede haber hechos ilicitos que den lugar a una
relaci6n de consumo: cuando los productos o servicios suninistrados por
el importador o titular de la marca, causen dafto y generen la obligaci6n de
indemnizar, suponiendo que el suministrador no sea contratante.
El
derecho del consumo tiende a suprimir de la distinci6n entre
responsabilidad contractual y extracontractual."
El Derecho Internacional Privado debe tambi6n tender a superar tal
dicotorrfa (que pueden conducir a soluciones diferentes) y brindar
protecci6n por el acto dafioso en virtud de la existencia de una relaci6n de
consumo, haya o no contrato. El derecho del consurno, dice el Profesor
Lorenzetti, forma parte de una concepci6n que, tomando en cuenta el acto
de consumo en el mercado, no se basa en la contemplaci6n de una sola de
sus partes. Se trata entonces de una regulaci6n del mercado."8
Simplemente, se trata de la necesidad de "proteger la propia economia de
mercado," ya que "un consumidor fortalecido implica un mercado mAs
s6lido y dinimico;"19 "no es una revuelta contra el mercado," sino "una
corriente a favor del mercado. . que corrige los desvios que amenazan la
confiabilidad y estabilidad de las relaciones de intercambio.",0
Lo que debe evitarse es que la soluci6n a este eventual problema de
calificaciones (responsabilidad contractual o extracontractual) sea utilizado
para privar al consumidor de adecuados niveles de protecci6n, ya que
tradicionalmente las normas positivas del D.I.P.r. en materia de hechos
ilicitos, son mds rigidas que las contractuales.

supra nota 1, a 5.

14.

LORENZETT1,

15.

CODIGo DE DEFENSA DEL CONSUMIDOR DE BRAZIL § 8078, art. 2.

16. Ley 24.240, art. I (22/1X/1994); BOLETN OFICIAL 27/1X/1994.
17. LORENZETTI, supra nota 1, a 5

18. Id. a 3.
19. FARINA, supra nota 3, a 13.
20. Antonio Benjamin, Protecci6n Del Consumidor y Patentes:
Medicamentos, III JA 689 (1994).
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IV. PAUTAS METODOLOGICAS PARA BRINDAR SOLUCIONES
ADECUADAS AL PRINCIPIO DE PROTECCION

Se tratari de buscar un sistema de Derecho Internacional Privado
que supere la dicotomia responsabilidad contractual y extracontractual,
para pasar a reglamentar unitariamente, la relaci6n internacional de
consumo. Se procederg al anflisis de la fuente interna con la f'malidad de
realizar una tarea interpretativa e integrativa del sistema, procurando
preservar el principio general de protecci6n de la parte d~bil de la relaci6n
internacional de consuno.
Es preciso partir de la interpretaci6n de las normas de Derecho
Internacional Privado Contractual contenidas en los articulos 1205 al 1214
del C6digo Civil.2 1 Las normas distinguen entre contrato con contacto
argentino y sin contacto argentino, aunque nuestra propuesta se centrard en
la superaci6n del mismo.
V.

CONTRATOS CON CONTACTO ARGENTINO: LA LEY DE LA

RESIDENCIA HABITUAL (ARTICULOS 1209,
CODIGO CIVIL)

1210, 1212, Y 1213 DEL

A. El Sistema a Regular
La interpretaci6n de tales normas debe tener en cuenta la
naturaleza especial del Microsistema del Derecho del Consumo. En este
sentido, si analizamos la naturaleza de las obligaciones que surgen de las
relaciones contractuales de consumo debemos indicar que existe una
debilidad manifestada de una de las partes frente a la otra por la que el
legislador interviene, con una f'malidad tuitiva y en t6rminos mds
generales, con la raz6n de mantener un mercado sano, basado en el
principio de solidaridad.Y
Como acertadamente lo ha destacado el Profesor Mosset Iturraspe,
se produce un giro copernicano del derecho civil hacia la protecci6n de los
d~biles de la sociedad civil, caracterizando al consumidor como el torpe, el
adolescente del mercado, que se mueve con necesidades insatisfechas, falta
de poder de negociaci6n, inexperiencia, falta de conocimientos, etc. Es
necesario crear un microsistema, prosigue el autor, que contemple las
debilidades y lo proteja, que contenga normas y principios especiales

21. C6D. CIv. arts. 1205-1214.
22.

Vea generalmente Jorge Mosset Iturraspe, Introducci6n Al Derecho Del Consuidor,

REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO Y COMUNITARIo 5.
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algunas veces diversos a los del C6digo Civil o de Comercio y otras,
23
contrarias a ellos.
Se trata naturalmente de un Microsistema "cargado de valores"u y
es preciso "comunicarlos armoniosamente por el vehiculo de la
interpretaci6n e integraci6n del sistema de D.I.P.r. "2 Debemos tener en
cuenta la advertencia del Profesor Von Mehren en el sentido de que la
legitimidad de las decisiones de casos iusprivatistas descansa sobre la
justicia sustantiva del resultado y no sobre la legitimidad formal (similar
situaci6n a los casos de orden juridico interno)?2
La tradicional regla de conflicto neutral debe ser ajustada por
valores sustantivos y requerimientos en el contexto de proteger a la parte
considerada d6bil.' La tradicionales metas conflictuales de armonia de
leyes y soluciones, en la reflexi6n del Profesor Vischer, han perdido un
cierto grado de prioridad y abren camino hacia otras consideraciones,
como las de coherencia sustantiva sobre la base, por ejemplo, de la
prioridad de los derechos constitticionales, cuando los casos tienen
suficiente contacto con el foro.2
B. Descartando la Teoria de la Prestaci6n Caracteristica
En virtud de las normas conflictuales argentinas, reguladoras de
los contratos con contacto argentino, la ley sobre lugar de cumplimiento es
decisiva. 29 Ahora bien, la definici6n del lugar de cumplimiento que brinda
el articulo 1212 del C6digo Civil,10 entre sus posibilidades interpretativas,
contiene referencias al domicilio del deudor.
La teoria de la prestaci6n caracteristica del Profesor Schnitzer, fue
propuesta por el Profesor Boggiano, como criterio interpretativo y
armonizador de las posibilidades que brinda el articulo 1212 del C6digo
Civil; como aquella teoria que tiene virtualidad localizadora; precisando
ademis, que no prevalece el lugar donde fisicamente se debe cumplir la

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
R.C.D.I.
29.

Vea d.
Id.
Id.
Vea Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgements, R.C.D.I. (1980).
Vea Antonio Boggiano, InternationalStandardContracts, R.C.D.I. 59 (1981).
Vea Arthur Taylor Von Mehran, General Course on Private International Law,
95 (1986).
COD. CIV. arts. 1209, 1210.
30. Id.art. 1212.
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prestaci6n caracteristica, sino el lugar del domicilio del deudor que debe
cumplir la prestaci6n caracterfstica.1'
La teorfa de la prestaci6n caracteristica, desde la aguda 6ptica
realista del Profesor Juenger, nacia como un "desempate (tie-breaker) para
satisfacer el anhelo de obtener un factor objetivo simple de conexi6n que
funciona bien en el supuesto de domicilio comfin de las partes o de
negocios simples ..
."1
La ecuaci6n era expresada por el prestigioso
profesor: "A mayor complejidad, menor provecho se obtiene de la
teoria. "I'
Ahora bien, el punto mi.s comprometedor de la teoria, en tal
visi6n, es que tiende a conferir injustificados privilegios: el proveedor de
mercaderias o servicios profesionales estA usualmente en mejor posici6n de
evaluar los riesgos que implican la realizaci6n de negocios internacionales
y de aislarlos por cliusulas de elecci6n de ley. Otorgar a tales empresas
ventajas adicionales de tener su propia ley domiciliar de control, sirve para
dar mis fuerza a su poderosa situaci6n.' La soluci6n que logremos va a
colocar en cabeza del proveedor la obligaci6n de preveer los sistemas
juridicos vigentes en el lugar de comercializaci6n de sus bienes y servicios.
C. La Interpretaci6nAdecuada a los Fines del Sistema
Es preciso, entonces, interpretar el articulo 1212 del C6digo Civil
partiendo de la naturalezade las obligaciones. En la relaci6n de consumo
no se debe perder de vista el elemento calificante, tipificante, y decisivo,
que lo distingue de todo otro contrato y a los fines de someterlo a un
r6gimen especial para brindarle la protecci6n juridica; esto es, el destino
final de los bienes o servicios, o sea, el consumo final y ello es asi desde
que existen consumidores en la contrataci6n.
Es entonces decisivo el derecho de la residencia habitual del
consumidor. Esta soluci6n coloca en la parte fuerte de la relaci6n la
obligaci6n de conocer las normas protectivas de la residencia habitual de
los consumidores, donde normalmente se producen los actos de consumo,
31.

Vea ANTONIO BOGGIANO, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 719 (1983).

Este

autor reconoce, no obstante, observaciones a tal teorfa, respecto a la pretendida funci6n de
conexi6n del contrato con el kmbito socioecon6mico de un pals; as! por ejemplo: el precio de una

compraventa no es menos gravitatorio que la mercaderia.

Ver tambiin CONTRATOS

INTERNACIONALES 47 (Depalma ed.): las crfticas y dificultades que presenta la teoria de la

prestaci6n caracterfstica, afirma el valor innegable para establecer una localizaci6n funcional del
contrato, posibilitando razonable certeza, armonla internacional de decisiones y efectividad.
32. K.F. Juenger, General Course on Private International Law, R.C.D.I. 180 (1984)
(menciona ejemplos de contratos de distribuci6n). (Nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
33. Id. a 180 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
34. Id. a 181.
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destino final de los bienes, y servicios. Sin perjuicio de ello, como
veremos, tambi6n debe conocer las normas del lugar si los actos de
consumo se producen fuera de la residencia habitual del consumidor.
VI. HACIA LA LEY DEL ESTABLECIMIENTO PRINCIPAL 0 RESIDENCIA
DEL PROVEEDOR: FACULTAD ELECTIVA DEL CONSUMIDOR
La teoria de la prestaci6n caracteristica le brinda al proveedor la
posibilidad de aplicaci6n del derecho de su centro de vida comercial.
En tal lugar, el proveedor se encuentra naturalmente comprometido
con la normativa tuitiva de los consumidores locales. No existe raz6n por
la que el consumidor, no domiciliado en tal lugar, no pueda invocar tal
derecho, si le es mds favorable a sus intereses. El solo hecho de que el
consumidor se encuentre residiendo en otro Estado que el de su
establecimiento principal no es 6bice para que pueda escaparse el
proveedor de la ley local. Por supuesto, si es mas favorable al consumidor
con residencia en el extranjero.
Las normas de tal sistema acompafian naturalmente la producci6n y
comercializaci6n de bienes y servicios desde el establecimiento principal
del proveedor. Asi, por ejemplo, un vendedor con establecimiento en
Brasil que contrata con un consumidor con residencia habitual en
Argentina, frente a la opci6n de 6ste t6ltimo, por el derecho del
establecimiento (el derecho brasilero). No existe raz6n para pretender, el
proveedor, la inaplicabilidad de tal derecho, por la circunstancia de que el
consumidor resida en otro mercado que el nacional. Si es su deber como
parte fuerte de la relaci6n y por encontrarse en mejores condiciones de
hacerlo, prever la legislaci6n de la residencia habitual del consumidor, con
mayor raz6n debe hacerlo con la ley local de su establecimiento principal.
La posici6n de superioridad en la relaci6n contractual carga sobre
sus espaldas la obligaci6n de prever los riesgos que implica realizar
negocios internacionalmente. El principio general de la Buena Fe que debe
reinar en las relaciones contractuales impide que por un contrato, el
contratante poderoso pueda desligarse de su estatuto naturalde derecho del
consumo si es mds favorable al consumidor que otros vinculados
estrechamente.
La elecci6n no puede ser neutral, por lo que se pregona el
establecimiento de contactos alternativos fundados en la interpretaci6n de
nuestras normas de fuente interna, frente a los que puede optar el
consumidor, descartando naturalemente el establecimiento de un punto de
conexi6n simple. La naturaleza de las obligaciones implicadas asi lo
exige.
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VII. CONTRATOS CON CONTACTO ARGENTINO 0 SIN EL: HACIA LA LEY
DEL LUGAR DE ADQUISICION DEL PRODUCTO COMO FACULTAD
ELECTIVA DEL CONSUMIDOR

A. Lugar de Cumplimiento Como Lugar de Adquisici6n del
Producto
El lugar de cumplimiento de la prestaci6n del proveedor (la entrega
del bien o prestaci6n del servicio) puede encontrarse fuera de los puntos
anteriormente descritos (residencia habitual del consumidor y
establecimiento principal del proveedor).
Correlativamente, esto implica la recepci6n o adquisici6n del
producto por consumidor (acto de consumir). No se puede descuidar esta
circunstancia al interpretar el lugar de cumplimiento teniendo en cuenta "la
naturaleza de las obligaciones" implicadas.1" El lugar de adquisici6n del
producto representa un punto de inflexi6n entre la obligaci6n del proveedor
(acto de comercializaci6n) y el derecho del consumidor de acceder al
consumo (acto de consumo). Se debe tener en cuenta el lugar de
adquisici6n del producto en el catdlogo de opciones del consumidor.
B. Lugar de Celebraci6n como Lugar de Adquisici6n del Producto
Es preciso ademAs, considerar la soluci6n que brinda el articulo
1205 del C6digo Civil,3" la que nos conduce al contacto del lugar de
celebraci6n, lex loci celebrationis. La tendencia a focalizar, al decir del
Profesor Juenger, las acciones manifestadas por las partes en los contratos,
como por ejemplo, la firma de un papel o costumbres sociales seguidas por
las partes con la celebraci6n del negocio, determin6 a parte de la doctrina
cldsica a inclinarse por la lex loci celebrationis,que proviene de Bartolus.31
En nuestros dias, la celebraci6n se realiza por fax, cables,
television, Internet, "siendo imposible averiguar cual de las
comunicaciones es decisiva" o simplemente "puede realizarse en un
vuelo," por lo que el lugar de celebraci6n puede lucir como enteramente
fortuito."1 Advi~rtase que los supuestos en cuesti6n tienen un alto grado de
proximidad con el lugar de adquisici6n del producto y cuando el mismo se
adquiere en el extranjero, fuera de la residencia habitual del consumidor y
del establecimiento principal del proveedor (por ejemplo; consumidor
domiciliado en el Brasil que contrata un servicio en ocasi6n de sus
35. Id.
36. C6D. CIV. art. 1205.
37. Id. a 175.
38. Juenger, supra nota 32, a 181 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).
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vacaciones en el Uruguay de una empresa mayorista con establecimiento
principal en Espafia).
Pareceria justificada y adecuada la aplicaci6n de la ley del lugar de
celebraci6n, la cual es normalmente el lugar de adquisici6n. Aunque bien
puede no coincidir el lugar de celebraci6n con el lugar de adquisici6n
material del producto (por ejemplo, tomando el caso anterior, si el servicio
se vincula con Chile). En este supuesto el lugar de celebraci6n pierde
fuerza localizadora, por lo que aparece aquel lugar como fortuito, por lo
que es de aplicaci6n en tal supuesto la ley del lugar de adquisici6n del
producto.
Debe entonces realizarse una interpretaci6n del articulo 1205 del
C6digo Civil 9 siempre a favor del consumidor, como el lugar de
adquisici6n del producto cuando coincida con el lugar de celebraci6n y sea
posible identificar este filtimo.
De lo contrario y en todo caso, cobra siempre importancia la ley
del lugar de adquisici6n del producto, como facultad electiva del
consumidor. Ello implica tambi6n una obligaci6n del proveedor de
preveer las legislaciones vigentes del lugar de comercializaci6n de bienes y
servicios.
C. Acerca de la Irrazonabilidadde la Distinci6n en Cuanto a la
Soluci6n 1205, 1209 y 1210 del C6digo Civil
Sin embargo, cabe ain evaluar la razonabilidad de tal soluci6n
prevista por el codificador. LEs razonable mantener la dualidad basada en
la sola circunstancia del contacto argentino? Pareceria una soluci6n
irrazonable y discriminatoria si tenemos en cuenta la flexibilidad de los
factores de conexi6n previstos para los contratos con contacto argentino,
que como vimos puede funcionar de manera mis adecuada a los fines de
brindar tutela a la parte d~bil de la contrataci6n.
Es evidente que no respeta los minimos standards de justicia de
que hablaba el Profesor Lipstein, produciendo discriminaciones
irrazonables. Por lo que brindamos la misma protecci6n internacional
tenga o no contacto argentino el contrato internacional de consumo.
Integramos asi la protecci6n en el sistema previsto 1205, 1209, y 1210 del
C6digo Civil sin discriminaci6n por el contacto.

39. C6D. CIV. art. 1205.
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VIII. DESPLAZAMIENTO DE LA SOLUcION DEL ARTICULO 1214 DEL
CODIGO CIVIL

Con tal interpretaci6n, quedarfa sin sustento el articulo 1214 del
C6digo Civil. El lugar de cumplimiento en todo caso estaria determinado
por via de lo expresado anteriormente, lo que .desplazaria per se la
posibilidad de aplicaci6n del artfculo 1214 del C6digo Civil.
A. La autonomia de la voluntad y sus limites
El D.I.P.r. argentino admite la autonomia de la voluntad en sus
dos formas: conflictual y material.: Es preciso aclarar que tal facultad
reconoce como limites generales: a) El Orden Piblico del Juez; y b) Las
normas de poliza o rigurosamente imperativas del juez o las extranjeras
que presenten vinculos estrechos con el contrato.
Sin descuidar
limitaciones generales, se debe interpretar tal facultad de las partes a la luz
del principio de protecci6n de la parte d~bil de la contrataci6n: el favor
debilis.
La opci6n de excluir la autonomia cuenta con mds inconvenientes
que ventajas: por si misma no resuelve el desequilibrio y si atenta contra el
grado minimo de seguridad y previsibilidad jurfdicas exigibles en el trifico
1
comercial, incluso en los contratos con condiciones generales.
B. Acuerdo de Elecci6n de la Ley: Forma Expresa o Implicita.
Acuerdo Real, no Hipot~tico
La elecci6n de alcance restringido en forma implicita, surge de la
potestad de las partes en el marco del articulo 1212 del C6digo Civil: "de
designar el lugar de cumplimiento."42 La elecci6n de alcance amplio surge
de la potestad de las partes de elegir un juez o drbitro con fundamento en
el articulo 1 del C6digo Procesal Civil y Comercial de la Naci6n
(CPCCN): al elegir un tribunal extranjero, se elige el sistema de D.I.P.r.
del tribunal y si pueden elegir este tiltimo, pueden elegir el Derecho
Privado rector del negocio, argumento a maiore ad minus.
La elecci6n de un derecho (sin imponer lIfmite de conexi6n
razonable o suficiente) en forma expresa o tdcita, surge tambi~n del

40.

Boggiano, supra nota 27, a 23.

41. Santiago Alvarez Gonzalez, Condiciones Generales En La ContratacionInternacional,
LA LEY 159 (1992) (quien propone la construcci6n de un sistema basado en la idea de protecci6n

de la confianza, que pugna por la consideraci6n de la ley del entorno contractual o social de la
pane d~bil: o sea, sobre labase de ley de la residenciahabitual o del domicilio de dicha parte).
42.

C6D. CIv. art. 1212.

43.

BOGGIANO, supra nota 31, a 696.
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articulo 7 de la Convenci6n de La Haya sobre ley aplicable a los Contratos
de Compraventa Internacional de Mercaderias de 1986; Sancionada y
Promulgada por ley 23.916." La incorporaci6n de la Convenci6n importa
tambi6n la de sus principios al D.I.P.r. interno positivo. Pero es preciso
destacar que este principio de libertad tiene limites precisos: normas
internacionalmente imperativas (normas de policia exclusivas y
excluyentes) y el Orden Ptiblico (principios de orden p~iblico).
No
obstante, debemos interpretar la autonomia en este drea con finalidad
protectora. Tal resultado se logra partiendo de su permisi6n, pero en
forma condicionada, a los niveles de protecci6n que se le brindan al
consumidor en su residencia habitual, en el establecimiento principal del
proveedor y el lugar de adquisici6n del producto.
En este sentido el Profesor Boggiano entiende que el principio de
autonomia se encuentra limitado especialmente en los contratos
intemacionales, cuando una de las partes es tipicamente dibil.4 1 Asi, el
inter6s del productor, dice el Profesor Boggiano, puede encontrarse
encaminado a brindar niveles de protecci6n mayor, como politica de ventas
internacionales, sujetando entonces la autonomia a ciertos linites minimos
de protecci6n como los que brinda el derecho del comprador o del
vendedor."
Estimamos asi que las partes pueden elegir un derecho para regir
su contrato, pero esta facultad no puede ir en desmedro de los niveles de
protecci6n que brindan los derechos de la residencia habitual del
consumidor ni los del establecimiento principal de su co-contratante, ni los
del lugar de adquisici6n del producto, todo, naturalmente, siempre a
opci6n del consumidor.
Esta soluci6n rige aiin en los casos de elecci6n de derecho por via
de contratos por adhesi6n a clusulas predispuestas: respetando los niveles
de protecci6n existentes en el "entorno espacial o contractual del
adherente;" esto es, su "residencia habitual o domicilio. "
Ahora bien, siempre cabria plantearse la posibilidad de aplicaci6n
de las normas de policia o rigurosamente imperativas del derecho con el
44. Id.
45. Vea Gonzalez, supra nota 41, a 55.
46. Id. a 59. Plantea entonces, la autonomfa de la voluntad como un vehiculo de elevaci6n
de los niveles de equidad en la protecci6n de la parte tipicamente d6bil.
47.

Id. a 165.

La propuesta de este autor es relativa a los contratos con condiciones

generales predispuestas en general, y limitada al domicilio o residencia habitual del contratante
d6bil. La excepciona, cuando en el conjunto de circunstanciassurja otra cosa. Brinda ejemplo la
existencia de relaciones contractuales previas entre las partes o negociaciones previas que
pudieran determinar una soluci6n distinta. Sin estas circunstancias, la ley de la residencia
habitual o del domicilio debe ser tenida en consideraci6n por el proponente. Id. a 104.

1998]

Toniollo

883

cual el contrato tiene vinculos estrechos."' Los contactos que aparecen
como suficientemente estrechos en los contratos de consumo son: lugar de
celebraci6n; adquisici6n del producto; residencia habitual del consumidor;
establecimiento principal del co-contratante; y lugar de efectivizaci6n del
destino final (normalmente el lugar del dafio).
Pero cabe destacar que, como se propone en este dmbito, el
consumidor siempre puede optar entre las soluciones mds favorables; por
lo que la opci6n que realice, tiene suma importancia a los fines de la
aplicaci6n del derecho rigurosamante imperativo del ordenamiento juridico
elegido por el consumidor al fundar la acci6n.
Las normas de policia del foro, tambi6n serian de aplicaci6n, a
condici6n de que las extranjeras, por las que opt6 por el consumidor para
fundar la acci6n, no sean mds favorables, naturalmente, siempre sujeto al
control de orden pfiblico del foro, realizado por el juez.
C. La Autonomia Material
La posibilidad de incorporaci6n al contrato de cliusulas materiales,
excluyentes de las normas coactivas de derecho privado interno, es
afirmada y reconocida por nuestra doctrina y jurisprudencia.49 Es preciso
aclarar que la exclusi6n es parcial: de no mediar incorporaci6n sustancial,
las normas coactivas del derecho privado competente no son desplazadas.
Es evidente que rigen tanto las limitaciones generales como las
especiales: a) Orden PNiblico del Juez; b) Normas de policfa del Juez o
Extranjeras con vinculaci6n estrecha con el contrato, jugando un
importante papel la facultad de opci6n del consumidor; y c) Se podria
decir, entonces, que la autonomfa material se enfrenta con el orden pfiblico
minimo, constituido por los niveles minimos de protecci6n de la residencia
habitual del consumidor, del establecimiento principal de su co-contratante,
del lugar de adquisici6n del producto y del elegido por las partes, a opci6n
del consumidor.
Las normas de derecho privado rigurosamente imperativas, por
reflejar ese orden pfiblico minimo de protecci6n, constituyen una
limitaci6n cierta al ejercicio de tal autonomia material, que su ejercicio
debe tender a mejorar, nunca empeorar la situaci6n juridica del
48. C6D. CIV. art. 1208; Boggiano, supra nota 27, a 325 (quien lo define como una
"conexi6n econ6mica decisiva" del contrato con la ley que se pretende evadir); Id. a 716.
49. BOGGIANO, supra nota 31, a 700; este autor justifica su ejercicio, a partir de la
posibilidad que tienen las partes de excluir integramente las normas coactivas del derecho
privado elegido por el legislador, por la elecci6n de otro derecho que el elegido por el legislador,
pueden tambidn excluir parcialnente normas coactivas, mediante el ejercicio de la autonomfa
material.

884

ILSA Journalof Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 4:867

consumidor en la relaci6n de consumo. La naturaleza de la cuesti6n
regulada que en algunos sistemas tiene sus raices en principios
fundamentales, constitucionalizados, nos hace pensar en el fuerte
ingrediente de imperatividad, fruto de conquistas similares a las producidas
en el campo de derecho laboral.
Ademds, en los contratos de adhesi6n a cliusulas predispuestas, la
incorporaci6n de las mismas al negocio, proviene indudablemente del
ejercicio de la autonomia material." Y la soluci6n no es distinta. Las
cuestiones referidas a interpretaci6n, validez, y eficacia, se sujetan a las
limitaciones generales y especiales indicadas supra, cuando aparecen
insertas en las relaciones contractuales de consumo.
Los complicados problemas referidos a la validez y eficacia de las
clusulas predispuestas deberdn estar orientados por el principio tuitivo de
la parte d6bil de la contrataci6n, por lo que las limitaciones preindicadas
juegan un importante papel de control.
Es de suma importancia asi entenderlo, pues la superioridad
contractual del proveedor de bienes y servicios coloca sobre sus espaldas el
riesgo de la comercializaci6n internacional, debiendo prever las
legislaciones tuitivas de los estados donde la comercializaci6n se efectiviza.
La posibilidad de opci6n brindada al consumidor constituye un adecuado
mecanismo de protecci6n de sus intereses y, ademis, se manifiesta como
un paso previo hacia la nivelaci6n en los sistemas tuitivos superiores.
Lo contrario, no es mis que legitimar el lucro obtenido, a partir de
la diversidad que existe en la tutela juridica de la parte d6bil en la relaci6n
de consumo.
IX. LA PUBLICIDAD U OFERTA EN EL PAlS DE LA RESIDENCIA
HABITUAL DEL CONSUMIDOR (ARTfCULO 5, CLAUSULA 2 DEL
CONVENIO DE ROMA DE 1980)
Se ha dicho que las nuevas t6cnicas de marketing y de publicidad
han impulsado el desarrollo del hombre consumidor."1 El marketing,
constituye el vehiculo adecuado destinado a acercar el producto al
consumidor, por ofertas en ventas domiciliarias, publicidad mediante
medios masivos de comunicaci6n, Internet, etc.
Tales medios producen un flujo de infonnaci6n que supera las
fronteras polfticas de los estados, acortando las distancias y penetrando
directamente en la residencia del consumidor.

50. Id.
51. MANUEL SANTELLA, INTRODUCCI6N AL DERECHO DE LA PUBLICIDAD 282 (Civitas
ed., 1982).
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Es de evidente normalidad, la situaci6n de que la publicidad Ilegue
y penetre en la residencia habitual de la parte d6bil de la contrataci6n,
alentando el consumo, generando necesidades, con lo cual el tal contacto,
cobra mayor fuerza localizadora, mis alib del lugar donde se celebre el
contrato adquiriendo el producto.
A. La Necesidad de Armonizar Normas Sustanciales Para la
Efectiva Protecci6n Internacionaldel Consumidor
Las unificaciones materiales son conquistas del legislador
internacional, pero necesariamente limitadas a materias en las que existe un
fondo comtin de principios.5 2 La cooperaci6n y solidaridad entre paises,
basadas en la valoraci6n de ideas de justicia superiores, justifica la lucha
por la adopci6n de soluciones justas uniformes.13 En esta rama de derecho
tuitivo, con iltima ratio en la dignidad humana, justifica plenamente
cualquier intento de unificaci6n.
Pero como ha enfatizado el Profesor Benjamin, el fruto de la tarea
de unificaci6n del Derecho del Consumo en el Mercosur, no lo veremos en
este siglo.5 Si bien es cierto que la tarea es tan necesaria como dificil,
pero en todo caso, no es del todo imposible35 No obstante, y en todo caso,
siempre es necesario desarrollar un sistema de D.I.P.r. uniformal que
acompafie tales unificaciones sustanciales.6 La tarea entonces debe ser
comtin: iusprivatistas e internacionalistas iusprivatistas.
B. Supuestos de Hechos llicitos
Existe una laguna en la fuente interna respecto a la regulaci6n de
los hechos ilicitos.17 La laguna debe colmarse con la analogia y los
principios generales del derecho.n
El Tratado de Derecho Civil
Internacional de Montevideo de 1940, en su articulo 43 manda a aplicar la
lex loci delicti. Conocidas son las criticas que se le han realizado a dste

52.

BOGGIANO, supra nota 31, a 120.

La independencia e igualdad de los sistemas

juridicos nacionales se oponen a la unificaci6n.
53.

Id. a 121.

54.

Id.

55.

Vea LORENZETri, supra nota 1. Donde nos informa la tarea del Comit6 T(cnico nota

7.
56. Vea Fawcett, Products Liability in PrivateInternationalLaw: A European Perspective,
R.C.D.I. 228 (1994) (donde plantea los problemas que surgen en el espacio europeo, ante la falta
de ratificaci6n por parte de algunos estados, de la Convenci6n de La Haya de 1973).
57.

BOGGIANO, supra nota 31, a 1160.

58.

C6D. CIV. art. 16.
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contacto rigido: la ilamada "Revoluci6n Conflictual" en Estados Unidos
contra este sistema es buena prueba de ello. s9
Por lo que es preciso tener en cuenta las orientaciones materiales
de favor, y con mayor raz6n ain, ante la necesidad de colmar tal laguna
debemos construir una norma de conflicto que responda a los "principios
generales del derecho. "60
Y en la relaci6n de consumo, las victimas son los consumidores,
erigi6ndose como la parte d6bil de tal relaci6n, con la natural necesidad de
protecci6n (en los sistemas como el nuestro, sus derechos fueron
6
reconocidos como fundamentales) . 1

Cualquier construcci6n que realicemos, no debe perder de vista
esta finalidad tuitiva, ni ser diferente de la propuesta en materia
contractual. Veamos una propuesta en la fuente internacional.
C. Soluci6n de la Convenci6n de la Haya sobre Ley Aplicable a la
Responsabilidadpor el Hecho de los Productos
En la Convenci6n de La Haya sobre Ley Aplicable a la
Responsabilidad por el hecho de los productos del 2 de octubre de 1973
(convenci6n que entr6 en vigor el 1 de octubre de 1977 ), la residencia
habitual de la persona directamente damnificada y el lugar del hecho
dafioso juegan un papel preponderante, frente al lugar de adquisici6n del
producto o del establecimiento principal del demandado responsable. Ello
se determina del andlisis de los supuestos de coincidencia de la residencia
habitual: a) con la ley del lugar donde se ha producido el hecho daftoso; y
b) con la ley del establecimiento principal de la persona cuya
responsabilidad ha sido invocada; o c) con el lugar de adquisici6n del
producto por la persona directamente damnificada.62
La jerarquia de los factores de conexi6n estA dada s6lo por dos de
los cuatro: predominan el lugar de la residencia habitual y el de producci6n
del dafio. El establecimiento principal de la persona cuya responsabilidad
ha sido invocada y el lugar de adquisici6n del producto son "factores de

59. Vea K.F. Juenger, Balance Y Perspectiva De La Decada En Los Estados Unidos,
CUARTAS JORNADAS DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 37 (June 4, 1993); RAMON
CARANDE, PRINCIPIOS OBJECTIVOS Y METoDos DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO:
BALANCE Y PERSPECTIVAS DE UNA DECADA (1995).

60.
61.

d.
CONST. ARG. art. 42.

62. La Convenci6n de La Haya tiene mas que suficiente Icy aplicable a las responsibilidad
por el hecho de los productos del 2 de octubre de 1973.
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conexi6n subordinados," y si 6stos coinciden, no conduce a la aplicaci6n la
ley del establecimiento principal. 3
Existe ademds una jerarquia de combinaciones en los supuestos que
la residencia habitual del damnificado coincida con el establecimiento
principal o con el Estado de adquisici6n del producto.6 Resulta entonces
que cuando el dafto se produzca fuera de la residencia habitual del

damnificado, por ejemplo cuando se encuentra de vacaciones en otro
estado, no es de aplicaci6n el articulo 4, sino el articulo 5 de citada

Convenci6n.0
La posibilidad de elegir el derecho aplicable surge del articulo 6,
cuando ninguna de las leyes designadas en los articulos 4 y 5 resulte
aplicable. Manda a aplicar la ley del lugar del establecimiento de la
persona cuya responsabilidad se invoca, pudiendo el actor optar en forma
subsidiaria por la ley del lugar del hecho dafioso.

D. Soluci6n en la Fuente Interna: la Residencia Habitual del
Damnificado Coincidente con Lex Loci Actus
La residencia habitual del damnificado, consumidor, debe
privilegiarse como punto de partida de la construcci6n de la Norma de
Conflicto. Es el lugar donde el mismo tiene el centro de vida y se produce
la armonizaci6n con la soluci6n contractual, que ante la falta de soluci6n
especifica en nuestra fuente interna, podemos integrarla con los mismos
principios del D.I.P.r. en el irea contractual.

63. Fawcet, supra nota 56, a 141; este prestigioso autor, cita un fallo de la Corte
Holandesa de Alkmaar en el caso Nieuw Rotterdam Schade NV v. Baier & Koeppel Gmb H &
Co Nota. Es necesaria la combinaci6n de los dos principales con los subordinados. Asf, es
aplicable laLey del Lugar de residencia habitual si coincide: a) con lugar del hecho; o b) con
elestablecimiento principal de lapersona cuya responsabilidad se invoca; o c) ellugar de
adquisici6n del producto por la persona directamente damnificada.
64. Hague Convention, art. 5.
65. Fawcett, supra nota 56, a 141. Este autor analiza la Convenci6n desde una
perspectiva europea y nos hace importantes precisiones. Se encuentra en vigor en cuatro
miembros de la CEE: Francia, Luxemburgo, Los Paises Bajos, Espafia; y entre dos del EFTA:
Noruega y Finlandia; ha sido signada y no ratificada por B61gica, Italia y Portugal. Existen
pocos casos registrados de laConvenci6n. La falta de armonizaci6n de normas de D.I.P.r. en el
drea europea de hechos ilicitos proyectada hacia laresponsabilidad por elproducto, dificulta
certeza y seguridad de las soluciones. El punto en cuesti6n es: ZComo operan las normas de
D.I.P.r. relativas a hechos ilicitos, en materias de responsabilidad por elproducto.elaborado en
paises no ratificantes de la Convenci6n de La Haya? Este autor nos da cuenta de propuestas de
creaci6n de normas de D.I.P.r., para que funcionen en el Ainbito material de las Directivas
Comunitarias, con el consiguiente peligro que representarfa contar con dos reglas de D.I.P.r.:
una para los casos contemplados en las Directivas, donde existirfa armonizacf6n, y otra para el
resto, donde no existirfa armonizaci6n. Id. a 228-40.
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Asi, la tradicional lex loci actus" cobrarfa justificaci6n, en tanto y
en cuanto coincida con la residencia habitual de la victima. Y deberia
constituirse en la conexi6n principal cuando asi fuera (similar al supuesto
del articulo 4, clausula a, del Convenio de La Haya sobre Responsabilidad
por el Producto de 1973).
E. Soluci6n Electiva a Favor del Consumidor: Establecimiento
Principal de la Persona que se Pretenda Atribuir
Responsabilidad;Lugar de Adquisici6n del Producto
No obstante, es importante introducir en la metodologia la facultad
de la victima de elegir alternativamente entre los derechos:
a) del
establecimiento principal de la persona a la que se le pretende atribuir
responsabilidad; y b) del lugar de adquisici6n del producto (estas tiltimas
posibilidades son las contempladas en Suiza: articulo 135, 1 (a) y (b) de la
ley Suiza Derecho Internacional Privado de 1987).
En suma, se propone la identificaci6n de los regimenes de D.I.P.r.
en orden a la superaci6n de la dicotomia (responsabilidad contractual y
extracontractual).
No encontramos justificaci6n axiol6gica a que la soluci6n sea
diferente a la planteada en materia contractual y por la sola circunstancia
de que no exista contrato previo entre el eventual responsable y el
consumidor damnificado.
La finalidad tuitiva que debe presidir la soluci6n, en el sentido de
producir tal superaci6n.
X.

LIMITES AL DERECHO APLICABLE

Por las caracteristicas del derecho privado tuitivo y las soluciones
proyectas, es de suma importancia, en primer lugar, la opci6n brindada al
consumidor y en segundo lugar, el orden pfiblico del juez. Las normas
rigurosamente imperativas del foro siempre se mantienen como limite
minimo de protecci6n.
A. El Ambito de las Normas Rigurosamente Imperativas del Juez y
de las ExtranjerasEstrechamente Conectadas con el Caso
Las normas de policia, como se ha sostenido supra, constituyen un
limite al derecho aplicable que excluyen todo tipo de posibilidad de
aplicaci6n, siempre encapsuladas bajo el principio de favor y en la opci6n
del consumidor. Las normas de policia a que hacemos referencia, son las

66. Treaty of Montevideo, art. 43 (1940).
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del juez y las extranjeras con vinculos, estrechos con la relaci6n de
consumo.17
Naturalmente, que del funcionamiento preindicado surge que las
normas de policia extranjeras son aplicables a condici6n de que no violen
los principios de orden pdiblico del ordenamiento juridico argentino. No
obstante, la existencia de una norma de policia Argentina no se constituiria
en un limite a la aplicaci6n de la norma de policia extranjera si esta es mds
favorable al consumidor (en virtud del principio de interpretaci6n a favor
de la parte d~bil). El principio de favor es un principio general" de orden
pfiblico internacional argentino.69 Si el derecho rigurosamente imperativo
extranjero (la norma de policia extranjera) es mis favorable al consumidor,
que el del foro (norma de poliza del foro) deberiamos dar prioridad al
extranjero, salvo que se violenten asi principios fundamentales de orden
pdiblico del juez argentino.
Hay que examinar si el apartamiento de la norma de policia
argentina violenta otros principios fundamentales del foro (por ejemplo; el
orden pfiblico econ6mico).
B. La Dimensi6n del Orden Ptiblico Internacionaly la Funci6n de
los Jueces en la Protecci6nInternacionaldel Consumidor
Los principios de orden ptiblico internacional, juegan un papel
preponderante en la fiscalizaci6n de las soluciones en los casos
iusprivatistas multinacionales. La funci6n tuitiva en el sistema de D.I.P.r.
proyectado para la protecci6n internacional del consumidor, se despliega
en tres formas: a) elecci6n de un sistema conectado con la relaci6n,
otorgando la facultad de opci6n al consumidor por el mds favorable; b)
enmarcando las autonomias en el principio de favor; y c) siempre juega la
consideraci6n del derecho rigurosamente imperativo mds favorable al
consumidor (en el que funda la demanda o el del foro si asi fuera).
Toda la propuesta, se sujeta a condici6n de que no se vean
violentados los principios de orden pfiblico internacional argentino.
Cuando hablamos de legislaciones tuitivas, la protecci6n del consunidor
representa la f'malidad de materializar una serie de valores fundamentales,
que tienen como filtima ratio el respeto de la dignidad humana.
La ley 24.240, en su articulo 65 declara que la presente ley es de
orden ptiblico. Naturalmente, que tal declaraci6n hace referencia al orden
ptiblico interno, no al internacional.

67. COD. CIV. art. 1208.
68. Id. art. 16.
69. Id. art. 14; CONST. ARG. art. 42.

890

ILSA Journalof Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 4:867

Pero no debemos descuidar la circunstancia de que la citada ley,
tiene bases en el articulo 42 de la Constituci6n Nacional, que comienza
hablando de la "relaci6n de consumo" y establece los derechos de los
consumidores y usuarios:
a) a la protecci6n de su salud;
b) a la protecci6n de su seguridad e intereses econ6micos;
c) a una informaci6n adecuada y veraz;
d) a la libertad de elecci6n; y
e) a condiciones de trato equitativo y digno.
Expresa adends el texto que las autoridades proveerdn a la
protecci6n de esos derechos, a la educaci6n para el consumo, a la defensa
de la competencia contra toda forma de distorsi6n de los mercados, al
control de los monopolios naturales y legales. Sin duda la ley 24.240
contiene par.metros tuitivos sobre los que se asienta la protecci6n de los
consumidores en relaciones de consumo internas. Ahora bien, derechos
bdsicos como la protecci6n de los riesgos que puedan afectar la salud o
seguridad de los consumidores de sus legitimos intereses econ6micos y
sociales, la adecuada informaci6n, la libertad de elecci6n; constituyen, el
respeto de su dignidad como principio fundamental de la persona humana.
Son principios bisicos, que cualquier soluci6n extranjera o brindada por el
ejercicio de la autonomfa de la voluntad, no puede desconocer.
Sobre 6stos principios debe construirse el sistema de D.I.P.r.
argentino de protecci6n del consumidor. He aquf la importancia de la
funci6n jurisdiccional en la protecci6n internacional del consumidor: La
tarea comparativa de los jueces que contactan la soluci6n extranjera o
pactada por las partes con estos principios, que necesariamente se
proyectan sobre la misma.
C. La Funci6n Jurisdiccionalen la Protecci6n Internacionalde los
Consumidores
Los contactos jurisdiccionales a los fines de tutela, deberian
superar tambi6n la diversa fuente de la relaci6n internacional de consumo
(contractual o extracontractual). La jurisdicci6n internacional debe tener
como pilar fundamental el acceso a la jurisdicci6n, que es un derecho
humano con jerarquia constitucional. A la luz de 6ste derecho deben
interpretarse las normas de jurisdicci6n internacional argentinas.70

70.

Vea TONIOLLO, supra nota 11.
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D. La Residencia Habitual del Consumidor
Constituye un foro que goza de innegables ventajas a los fines
tuitivos. La interpretaci6n del articulo 1215 del C6digo Civil permite
llegar a tal conclusi6n. Al contacto lugar de cumplimiento, debe
entend6rselo en sentido amplio, cualquier lugar de cumplimiento,
facilitamos el acceso a la justicia, principio internacional que goza de
jerarquia constitucional."7

En este sentido, y cuando el consumidor es actor se facilita
notablemente el acceso a la justicia. Acceso, que por otra parte, tiene su
raiz en derechos fundamentales reconocidos por tratados internacionales de
Derechos Humanos con jerarquia constitucional en nuestro pais. 7
El foro del actor s6lo se justificaria, al decir del Profesor Vischer,
en materias donde se persigue facilitar la ejecuci6n. 7 Por lo que tal
contacto no apareceria como un foro impropio sino justificado en la
especial naturaleza de la acci6n.'4

En las relaciones de consumo la justificaci6n es innegable. En este
sentido, el consumidor puede accionar en su residencia habitual invocando
la lex fori (la identificaci6n forum, ius tiene innegables ventajas partiendo
del mejor conocimiento del derecho propio por parte de los jueces y de la
innegable importancia que cobra el orden pfiblico como cliusula de
reserva) .71
A no dudar que las soluciones basadas en tal identificaci6n han
recibido opini6n favorable de calificada doctrina. El Profesor Von Mehren
ha sugerido que quien suponga que en los casos iusprivatistas
multinacionales se pueden preservar resultados que satisfagan en t6rminos
de standards de justicia, como en aquellos alcanzados en casos puramente
76
intemos, estA condenado a la decepci6n.

71. Werner Goldschmidt, ensefiansas sobre Derecho Internacional Privado, en la
conferencia de Derecho De La Tolerancia (1982).
72. CONST. ARG. art. 75, § 22; The American Convention of Human Rights of San Jose,
Costa Rica, National Supreme Court of Justice, Dec. 22, 1994, especialmente el voto del Dr.
Fayt, consideraciones 21 y 22 del caso Manuata, Juan Jose c/ Embajada De La Federaci6n Rusa
s/ Danos y Perjuicios.
73. Id. a211.
74. Vea tambien Javier Torniollo, Jurisdicci6n Internaccional y Su Proyecci6n Hacia el
Mercosur, REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS JURIDICAS Y SOCIALES DE LA UNL 154

(1995).
75. C6D. CIV. art. 14, § 2.
76. Arthur Taylor Von Mehren, Choice of Law and the Problems of Justice, CHOICE OF
LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 21 (Spring 1977).
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Este delicado problema, se centra en la consideraci6n de por un
lado, la falta de igualdad entre el derecho extranjero y la lex fori al
momento de solucionar un caso iusprivatista multinacional."
La excepci6n de orden pfiblico, para "vetar" las reglas extranjeras
de decisi6n, ha sido tomada por el Profesor Juenger como punto final en el
que se yen forzados a confiar tanto el multilateralismo como el
unilateralismo:
la preferencia del foro para evitar resultados
inequitativos." Por el otro, cuando las materias comprendidas en los
casos, se basan en derechos fundamentales de la persona humana, el
ingrediente de orden ptiblico internacional principista juega un papel
preponderante, generando en el foro la necesidad de soluciones
homogdneas. Las mismas consideraciones pueden realizarse cuando es
demandado el consumidor.
E. Domicilio del Demandado
Los intereses del co-contratante del consumidor cuando es
demandado se yen preservados en el contacto jurisdiccional general:
domicilio del demandado.
Es uno los criterios jurisdiccionales
universalmente aceptado y respetuoso del derecho fundamental de defensa
en juicio (que tambi6n tiene basamento en la Constituci6n Nacional y en
Tratados Internacionales de Derechos Humanos, ver punto anterior).
Este contacto tampoco es ajeno a los intereses del consumidor,
cuando es actor, que puede elegir tambi6n la lex fori si le es favorable (del
establecimiento principal del co-contratante).
F. El Lugar de Adquisici6n del Producto: La Razonabilidad de Lex
Loci Delicti (articulo 5 del CPCCN) y Lugar de Cumplimiento
(articulos 1215 y 1216 del C6digo Civil) Como Opci6n del
Consumidor
La lex loci delicti,79 puede aparecer como contacto razonable a los
fines de jurisdicci6n internacional en los supuestos en que coincidan con la
residencia habitual del consumidor, con el establecimiento de su cocontratante y finalnente con el lugar de adquisici6n del producto.

77. BOGGIANO, supra nota 31, a 94. Quien pone acento en la ftnci6n "fiscalizadora" de
la Norma de Conflicto, manifestada en la excepci6n de Orden Pblico, que implica no admitir la
soluci6n extranjera, que contradiga los principios de justicia sustancial en los que se asiente el
ordenamiento jurfdico del foro.... Los principios de orden pdiblico internacional siempre rigen
los casos, "siempre es necesaria ia comparaci6n material." Id. a 94, 95.

78. Id. a258.
79. C6D. PROC. Civ. Y COM. art. 5.
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Deberian estar dotados tambi6n de jurisdicci6n internacional, a
opci6n del consumidor, los jueces del lugar de producci6n del dafto cuando
coincida con el lugar de adquisici6n del producto. Siempre el consumidor
seria el actor y se garantizaria su acceso.
Igual soluci6n razonable concurre cuando nos enfrentamos a una
interpretaci6n amplia del "lugar de cumplimiento."'* Se abrirfa en materia
contractual tambi6n el foro del lugar de adquisi6n del producto, lo que le
permitiria al consumidor como actor, demandar ante esos jueces, e invocar
la lex fori, si ello es procedente.
La soluci6n se dificulta cuando el consumidor es demandado: el
lugar de adquisici6n del producto puede encontrarse fuera de su residencia
habitual, con lo cual el consumidor podria verse gravemente dificultado a
acceder a la jurisdicci6n para defender sus derechos, lo que por si solo
justifica desechar tal contacto jurisdiccional como violatorio a un principio
de orden ptiblico internacional y con el consiguiente obstlculo a la
ejecuci6n de la sentencia en la residencia habitual del mismo.
No es dable descartar tales inconvenientes, ya que el principio de
acceso a la jurisdicci6n para defender sus derechos tiene jerarqufa
indiscutida en el sistema juridico argentino.
XI. PR6RROGA DE JURISDICCION
El principio de libertad de elecci6n del juez competente previsto
por el articulo 1 del CPCC de la Naci6n, presenta en este campo algunas
aristas controvertidas.
Naturalmente, cualquier interpretaci6n que
realicemos del principio de libertad previsto por la citada norma, no tiene
que descuidar el principio de tutela de la parte d6bil de la contrataci6n. La
libertad de elecci6n, tiene lugar normalmente en contratos entre partes con
igual poder de negociaci6n.
La situaci6n es distinta cuando nos
enfrentamos a las relaciones de consumo. La pr6rroga debe tener distinto
tratamiento en los contratos con consumidores.8
A. La Cdusula Compromisoria
La clfusula compromisoria incluida en los contratos de consurno
nos enfrenta al problema de su validez y eficacia. Es normal tambi~n que
sea impuesta en contratos por adhesi6n a cliusulas predispuestas.
Debemos distinguir cuando el consumidor aparece como demandado, del

80. COD. CIV. arts. 1215, 1216.
81. ANTONIO BOGGIANO,
ESTUDIO DE LA CONVENC1ON

CONTRACTOS INTERNACCIONALES:
INTRODUCCION AL
INTERAMERICANA SOBRE DERECHO APLICABLE A Los

CONTRACTOS INTERNACCIONALES (Depalma ed., 2d ed. 1995).
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supuesto de que aparece como actor. La interpretaci6n es siempre en favor
del consumidor.
B. ConsumidorDemandado (Obstdculos Procesalesy Sustanciales)
En este supuesto, debemos recordar una vez mIs que la realidad de
la relaci6n de consumo implica una evidente disparidad del poder
negociador de las partes y que, en raz6n de ella, aparece de este nuevo
derecho interviniendo para nivelar. Normalnente se ha sostenido que la
pr6rroga importa muchas veces el establecimiento de una cldusula de
irresponsabilidad.82
En este sentido, obligar al consumidor a trasladarse a un pais
distante, puede importar una cliusula abusiva de las prohibidas por el
articulo 37 de la ley 24.240. Se le dificulta el acceso a la jurisdicci6n.8 3
Cabe recordar tambi6n, que entre las limitaciones que impone el
articulo 1 del CPCCN., aparece la prohibici6n de la ley; y las clatisulas
abusivas reguladas en el articulo 37 de la ley 24.240 son ineficaces de
pleno derecho, teni6ndose por "no convenidas" sin perjuicio de la
integraci6n del contrato por el Juez cuando declare la nulidad parcial. La
prohibici6n implicita de la clusula de elecci6n, no deja de ser un
argumento con serios fundamentos en nuestra legislaci6n especial de
protecci6n de los consumidores. 8'
En el supuesto de las relaciones internacionales de consumo, la
pr6rroga no puede privar al consumidor del acceso a los foros
preindicados, ni tampoco puede limitar la responsabilidad del cocontratante, ni importar restricciones o renuncias a sus derechos. Es
altamente improbable que en jurisdicci6n Argentina una clusula de
pr6rroga pueda pasar la prueba proyectada por los parknetros de
protecci6n del consumidor.
Por otra parte, el derecho aplicable a 6ste acuerdo, en orden a su
validez, por la fuerza de las disposiciones tuitivas y la propuesta
interpretativa del sistema de normas de D.I.P.r., nos hace pensar que
necesariamente deberiamos tener en cuenta los sistemas sustanciales de
protecci6n: de la residencia habitual o establecimiento del co-contratante
82. J.C. REZZONICO, CONTRACTOS CON CLAUSAS PREDISPUESTAS 565 (Astrea ed.
1987); M.E. UZAL, SOLUCI6N DE CONTROVERSIAS EN EL COMERCIO INTERNACIONAL 32
(1992).
83. BOGGIANO, supra nota 31, a 242. Este autor, que debemos apreciar la pr6rroga, a la
iuz del principio de defensa en juicio, cuando se coloca al adherente en situaci6n indefensi6n, o
sea para poder acudir a una jurisdicci6n razonable.
84. FARINA, supra nota 3, a 426. Cuando plantea la pr6rroga de competencia interna,
preve laposibilidad de que el consumidor, invocando el artfculo 37, clausula b) de la ley, ocurra
ante los jueces de su domicilio.
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o de aquisici6n del producto, derecho elegido por las partes, a opci6n del
consumidor. Las complicaciones son evidentes.
C. Consumidor Como Actor (el Cardcter Facultativo Para el
Consumidor)
Los inconvenientes de la situaci6n anteriormente descripta
parecerian no jugar en 6ste supuesto. El consumidor podrfa prevalerse de
la clusula de pr6rroga, si le es favorable a sus intereses, desde que
constituiria un foro mds donde acudir a demandar y ello implica una
situaci6n favorable y acorde con el principio de acceso a la jurisdicci6n.
El demandado, contraparte de la relaci6n de consumo, quien normalmente
predispuso la cliusula en sus condiciones generales, no tendria raz6n para
quejarse de tal elecci6n por parte del consumidor. Normalmente aqu6l es
quien debe cargar los riesgos de la inserci6n de la clusula.
Podria sostenerse, entonces, que la prorroga en los jueces de la
residencia habitual del consumidor aparece como un contacto libre de
vicios, y para el proveedor, un grado de seguridad y certeza inmejorables.
D. El Compromiso (Pr6rrogaPost Litem Natam) y su Factibilidad
El compromiso (pr6rroga post litem natam) no tiene los mismos
inconvenientes siempre y cuando se produzca por acuerdo expreso, en
forma escrita y debidamente suscrito por el consumidor. Se produce un
evidente acercamiento, con la situaci6n contemplada en el punto anterior,
cuando se concede la facultad al consumidor como actor.
Sin perjuicio de ello, estimamos que una de las formas menos
discutible y segura es la post litem natam por acuerdo procesal, o sea
"despu6s de promovida la acci6n," como lo prescribe el Tratado de
Derecho Civil Internacional de Montevideo de 1940.8
Tal situaci6n no deja de comulgar con el principio electivo a favor
del consumidor. Tal acuerdo procesal implica que el consumidor ha
elegido efectivamente el tribunal al que compareci6 y resguarda asi, de este
modo, el derecho fundamental de acceso a la jurisdicci6n.
Esta forma de lograr la pr6rroga, tambi6n y en cierta forma, evita
los inconvenientes generados por el derecho aplicable al acuerdo de
pr6rroga, desde que aqui gira en torno al derecho del tribunal elegido (al
que efectivamente compareci6). De todos modos, queda siempre latente la
proyecci6n de la soluci6n hacia el principio de efectividad, en el supuesto
que sea necesaria la cooperaci6n internacional cuando la sentencia deba ser
reconocida en otro sistema juridico diferente.
85. Montevideo International Civil Rights Treaty (1940).

896

ILSA Journalof Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 4:867

XII. REFLEXION FINAL

Este sistema de D.I.P.r. propuesto para la protecci6n internacional
del consumidor, fue ideado a partir del hombre como consumidor, inserto
en una relaci6n internacional consurno, con sus necesidades, sus ligerezas
y su evidente debilidad. Mis all del caricter contractual o extracontractual en el que aparezca la necesidad de protecci6n. Este principio
general debe constituir el eje de las soluciones a los casos iusprivatistas
multinacionales y por su tinica condici6n, es que merece el respecto a su
dignidad.
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SETTING FORTH THE PROBLEM

Starting from Ouro Preto's Protocol (O.P.P.) it is certain that
Mercosur has international legal subjectivity,' becoming in this respect an
intergovernmental organization with international legal subjectivity. In
achievement of their quest, which is that of consolidating a common
market and a free trade union among its members and possibly the
associated States, 2 the O.P.P. endowed the Mercosur with diverse organs
which are as follows: a) The Council of the Common Market; b) The
Common Market Group; c) The Commission of the Trade of Mercosur; d)
The Combined Parliamentary Commission; e) The Socio-Economic
Advisory Forum; and f) The Administrative Secretary of the Mercosur. 3
Of the organs mentioned, the first three have decisive capacity4 and their
formal expressions of will, called respectively Decisions, Resolutions, and
Directives, which are obligatory for the States,, thereby becoming a legal
right encompassing the States. This work seeks to analyze the validity and
obligation for country members of the constituent norms of the Mercosur
system, to elucidate if they conform a plexus of International Public Right
or of Community Right; the necessity or not of previous internalization of
the emanated dispositions of its organs whose execution is reputed as
obligatory for the States regarding its application in the domestic
environment of each one of them; and finally, the legal nature of that
normative or law, everything by the light of the rules of the International
Public Right that is applicable and, insofar as possible, to those of the
internal right of its member countries, especially, those of the Argentinean
Right.
II.

To WHAT LEGAL SYSTEM DOES THE MERCOSUR NORMATIVE
CORRESPOND?

It is not a Community Right,6 because none of Mercosur's
constituent instruments creates organs that are multinational. The Council
of the Common Market, the Common Market Group and the Commission
of Trade of the Mercosur, are intergovernmental organs that adopt
decisions by consensus. The rules emanated by these organs link the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Ouro Preto's Protocol art. 34.
See generally Treaty of Asuncion, art. 5.
Ouro Perto's Protocol art. 1.
Id. art. 2.
Id. arts. 9, 15, & 20.
See generally HEBER ARBUET VIGNALI, LAS

RELACIONES ENTRE LA NORMATIVA DEL
MERCOSUR Y LOS SISTEMAS INTERNOS DE SUS ESTADOS MIEMBROS (1997).
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countries in the international environment, carrying the responsibility for
nonfulfilment, and possibly, according to the nature and content of the
norm that it is, it can also generate an internal right for each State
according to the dispositions of the legal system of each one of the
countries. If it were a system of Community Right it would have its own
organs which would possess attributes of multinationality with capacity of
creating norms to watch over their execution and to sanction their
offenders, becoming the obligatory decisions of the same ones for the
States, prevailing over the internal norms and the immediate and direct
execution.'
It is important to affirm here that the attribute of multinationality in
the Argentinean legal system can not be presumed or detected tacitly.
Article 75 clause 24 of the National Constitution, modified in 1994,
authorizes the national government "to approve integration treaties that
delegate competitions and jurisdiction to organizations that are
multinational in conditions of reciprocity and equality, and they respect the
democratic order and the human rights," adding that those norms have
superior hierarchy to the laws., The second section of article 75, clause 24
establishes a need for a quantified majority of the members of each house
of legislature for the approval of treaties of that nature. 9 This disposition,
that establishes taxative conditions for the recognition of the multinational
status and determines a rigorous legislative procedure before the entrance
in validity of the treaties that give life to organizations with such powers,
does not leave any place for doubts that the multinationality status is an
attribute that should be conferred formally and expressly.
The creative instruments of the Mercosur system are norms of
International Public Right, coinciding our opinion with those that think that
it constitutes a special system inside of it. For the legal system of
Mercosur, we should understand the sources mentioned by article 41 of the
O.P.P.,' ° and they are composed of Asunci6n's Treaty, their protocols or

7.

Dr. Elias Bluth, mentioned in JORGE PIREZ OTERMIN'S MERCADO COMON DEL SUR

refers to the thought of Dr. Eduardo Jim6nez of Ar6chaga in the sense that the direct application
does not constitute an exclusive and novel attribute of the community right and citing it textually
states that this "direct application to the individuals and societies of norms of conventional origin,
is admitted in the International Right and is consecrated in an advisory opinion of the Permanent
Court of International Justice that dates from 1923. Since then it is accepted by most of the
doctrine (except for the dualist authors) and for the international practice that the treaties can
force directly by themselves people with physical and judicial individuality, whenever the treaty
possesses the necessary concretion degree." Id. (Editorial note: translated from Spanish).
8.
ARG. CONST. art. 75, cl. 24.
9. Id.
10. Ouro Preto's Protocol art. 41.
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additional or complementary instruments, the complementary agreements
taking place in their jurisdiction and their protocols and the decisions of the
Council, the resolutions of the Group and the directives of the
Commission."

Article 42, 2nd Part of the

O.P.P.,12

after pointing out that the

organs with power of decision inside the system are intergovernmental,
establishes that their obligatory decisions will be incorporated into the
national legal system by the procedures foreseen in the legislation of each
country, provided this is necessary. This demonstrates that the process of
incorporation of the Mercosur norms is that of the International Public
Right with some peculiarities that we will analyze in this work. The
uniform practice of the States that have approved incorporation according
to the procedure regulated by their own legal systems for the approval of
the treaties, the Treaty of Asunci6n, the Protocol of Brasilia and the
O.P.P., is consistent with our evaluation of the system as one based on an
International Public Right. Article 40 of the O.P.P. "I leaves very clear the
non-community nature of the right generated by the Mercosur organs,
establishing that the necessary measures to incorporate it into the internal
systems will be known by the Administrative Secretary of the organization.

III. THE FOUNDATION OF THE VALIDITY OF MERCOSUR LAWS FOR
I

THE MEMBER STATES

According to the General International Public Right to which they
are linked, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay have expressed their consent
(ratification) in being obligated by the dispositions of the Convention of
Vienna on the Right of Treaties, signed March 23, 1969, admitting the
general principle of responsibility for nonfulfillment established by article
27, with the limitation of article 46 of the same Convention.
Brazil has not ratified The Convention of Vienna on the Right of
Treaties. Yet having celebrated Asunci6n's Treaty and expressed its
consent validly in being linked by the same, Brazil can not ignore its
obligatory nature nor ignore the normative inherent in its consequence

11. We consider important to clarify in this point that in our opinion, the fundamental right
of a community and constituent system of their organs, should not be conceptualized as original
community right. We understand that this denomination is misleading because the fact that a
community system is constituted by an international treaty does not make the community system
lose its intrinsic nature as a source of international public right.
12. Ouro Preto's Protocol art. 42, § 2.
13. Id. art. 40.
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without violating the principle of good faith and of non-contradiction and
without incurring international responsibility."1
According to the internal right of the States contracting, the Magna
Cartas of the four States comprising the Mercosur system recognize the
international treaties as formal sources of their own legal systems. They
are identified as follows: Constitution of Brazil article 102; Constitution of
Paraguay articles 137 clause 1 and 141; Constitution of Uruguay articles 6
and 85 clause 7; and the Constitution of Argentina article 31 and article
75, clauses 22 and 24.
However, the coincidence among the fundamental norms of the
domestic legal systems of the contracting countries of Asunci6n's Treaty
about the individualization of the treaties as a source of their own legal
right, is nevertheless not symmetrical to the constitutional laws of each one
of them regarding the hierarchical location of the treaties in relation to the
rest of the sources of the local legal order. Indeed, while the Constitutions
of Argentina and Paraguay grant prevalence to treaties over their own
national laws," the constitutions of Brazil and Uruguay do not mention
anything in this respect, thereby always leaving this point open to the
interpretation of the highest tribunals in each State, which to the present
have always exhibited an erratic jurisprudence.16
14. If an abstraction was made of the principle of good faith, the international right would
fall from its base since it constitutes the inspiring nucleus of what Kelsen denominated the
fundamental hypothetical norm, and with this reach it considers its repeated jurisprudence of the
International Court of Justice, among which will mention for its clarity, the one seated in the case
of Namibia, 1971 in the one that sustained on this matter: "One of the basic principles that
govern the creation and execution of judicial obligations, be it whatever source, it is the good
faith. The reciprocal trust is an inherent condition to the international cooperation, especially in
a time that cooperation is more and more indispensable." (Editorial note: translated from
Spanish). For the concrete case of Brazil it should also be noted that this State is a member of
the UN and of the OAS, and that principle results in an obligatory imposition of article 2, clause
2 and 3 (c) of the respective constituent letters of those international organizations, without
forgetting that Resolution 2625 A.G. of the UN leaves clear that the same one not only links in
relation to the obligations obtained from the letter, but to all international obligation. As for the
possibility of exempting from the execution of an international obligation foreseen by article 46
of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the right of the treaties, it is generally admitted that the
State that refutes the validity of a treaty or its norms for constitutional reasons can only invoke
those that are patent or absolutely evident for the other States, and in the same sense resolves the
question the Constitution of Argentina according to the interpretation of article 27 of their text in
that it formalizes the failure of the National Supreme Court of Justice in the case of Caft la
Virginia, which determines that the constitutional norms that have principles of public right
prevail over those of the international treaties that are in contrast.
15. Ouro Preto's Protocol art. 75, § 22; art. 137, § 1.
16. See generally VIGNALI, supra note 6, in his work that we have mentioned previously,
tells us that the Uruguayan jurisprudence sustained the equality in rank between the treaty and the
law up to 1970 and during the decade of the 90's; and the supremacy of the treaty over the law
during the decade of the 70's and in some recent shortcomings. Brazil in general sustained
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IV. THE ORGANS OF MERCOSUR
A. Legal Nature
Concomitantly with what we have presented already, since
Mercosur is an intergovernmental international organization with legal
international subjectivity, we must conclude that their organs with power
of decision, the Council, the Group and the Commission of Trade, are
intergovernmental according to articles 2, 3, 4, 11, and 17 of O.P.P."7 It is
necessary to highlight in this topic that among the organs with decisive
power, the council distinguishes itself as being the organ that has the
corresponding legal representation of the whole system.18
B. Competencies
The Mercosur organs have competencies attributed to them
specifically by the O.P.P. and they are determined in what concerns the
Council by articles 3 and 8, in what it refers to the Group, by articles 10
and 14 and in what it concerns the Commission, by articles 16, 19, and
21.
C. The Legal Nature and Hierarchical Order of the Norms
Emanatedfrom the Mercosur Organs
We reiterate that we share the opinion of those that think that the
norms generated by activity of the Mercosur organs (Decisions,
Resolutions and Directives) constitute a source of Special International
Public Right, of positive nature, whose distinctive characteristic note is its
consent genesis among the representatives of the States according to the
organ from which they come. 9 In this point, we need to mention that the
contracting parties have inscribed to Asunci6n's Treaty in the ALADI as a
partial agreement number 18, ratifying the legal nature of International
Public Right of the normative of Mercosur.2
In what relates to the question of the hierarchical order among the
derived norms of the different organs, we understand that in practical
equality in rank between the treaty and the law; that is to say that the latter prevails over the
previous one, although more recently its jurisprudence sustained that the law does not abolish the
treaty but rather it only suspends its application.
17. See generally Jorge P6rez Otermin, El Mercado Comiin del Sur. Desde Asunci6n a
Ouro Preto. Aspectos Jurldico-Institucionales,DE FUNDACIN DE CULTURA UNIVERSITARIA DE
MONTEVIDEO (1995).

18. Ouro Preto's Protocol art. 8, cl.3.
19. Id. art. 37.
20.

Cafes laVirginia C.J.S.N. (1992).
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terms it is difficult because of the different attributes and functions
assigned to them, and because the O.P.P. does not contain any applicable
rule in this respect, it is reasonable to argue that a degree of preference
between them exists, the Decisions, being the source of more hierarchy,
continued in second and third order by the Resolutions and Directives.
Given the quality of the political-institutional representation that each State
has in the Mersosur Council (Ministers of R. E. and of Economy) and the
functions and attributions that it assigns article 8 of the O.P.P., especially
the one of exercising the legal ownership of the system, there are no
doubts that the resulting norms of their activity occupy a higher hierarchy
among those that originate through the Organs of the Mercosur. In turn, it
is logical that the Directives have less hierarchy than the Resolutions
because the Commission is an organ in charge of assisting the Common
Market Group.,,
V.

APPLICATION OF THE GENERATED NORMS BY THE MERCOSUR

ORGANS IN THE INTERNAL LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF EACH MEMBER

STATE
According to article 42 of the O.P.P., "the emanated norms of the
organs of Mercosur foreseen in article 2 of this Protocol will have
obligatory character and, when it is necessary, they will be incorporated
into the national legal systems by means of the procedures foreseen by the
legislation of each country."2 The Decisions, Resolutions and Directives
being sources of international rights for the particular States that are part of
the system, their incorporation and applicability in the internal environment
will be in principle conditioned by the previous improvement of the
approval procedure or internalization foreseen by the classification of each
one of them. It is logical to reason that in attention to their nature and
reach, it would not be appropriate to demand for all the normative derived
from the Mercosur organs, the approval according to the domestic
procedures used to incorporate international treaties, since the traditional
legislative delays in these steps would convert a good part of the normative
into an inopportune and inadequate law. The inscription of Asunci6n's
Treaty in the framework of the ALADI partially reached agreement No. 18
demonstrates that the member States have been internationalized by
Mercosur norms because that legal framing emanates the possibility to
incorporate the right gestated by the organs of the system by acts of the

21. Ouro Preto's Protocol art. 16.
22. Id. art. 42.
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Executive Powers as agreements in simplified form of execution of a treaty
that has already drawn the respective internal steps of approval.2Y
What has been exposed here, by the general principle arrived at on
this topic, sustains that the Mercosur normative should be incorporated into
the legal classification particular to each State, if it is demanded in this
way, and following the procedure for them foreseen according to the
nature and importance of the Mercosur dispositions to internalize. 1 We
believe that to incorporate into the internal right the derived norms of the
Mercosur organs in an opportune and effective way, it is a legal duty of
the member States, turning out to be as such a specific content of the
generic duty of completing a treaty in good faith, and it forces them
already as a positive right contained in article 26 of the Treaty of Vienna
on the right of the Treaties (in Argentina's, Uruguay's and Paraguay's
case), or a norm of general international right (in Brazil's case who did not
ratify the aforementioned Convention).
It seems clear that article 42 of the O.P.P., when conditioning the
duty of each state to incorporate into their own legal classification by
means of the procedures foreseen by the legislation of each country, to the
fact that it is necessary, it admits the possibility of the direct application of
these norms to the legal order particular to some of the States that allows it
this way. However, it is necessary to wonder if suppositions exist in that
the Mercosur norms that can be directly applicable without executing the
incorporation step ruled previously by the internal right of each State.
Assisting the objective and end of Asunci6n's Treaty, the necessary
consent so that the organs of the system generate norms and the obligation
the States recognize such as same, we think that this supposition of
immediate and direct application exists and that it can become from the
expressed convention to this respect regarding the representatives of the
States that are contracting, or of the factual circumstance in that they
contain at least the following requirements:
1. That the norm regulates a matter of the Mercosur organ
unequivocally with decisive capacity of which it emanates;

23. See VIGNALI, supra note 16; see also supra note 6.
24. None of the constitutions of the States provide the agreements in a simplified form.
The Jurisprudence of Argentina admitted the applicability of the agreements in simplified form of
the execution of a mark treaty in the case of Caf6 la Virginia C.J.S.N (1992) and in the
expression of the vote separated by Minister Antonio Boggiano that said: "Although the consent
of the State was shown in simplified form, without any intervention of the Congress, this took
place previously by means of the legislative approval of the Tratatado of Montevideo 1980 (law
22.354) that allows the concentration of this type of agreements." (citation omitted) (Editorial
note: translated from Spanish).
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That the norm is self-sufficient and operative, understanding
from this that all subjects are explicit and clear in what it
reaches and the content of the right or the obligation that it
consecrates; and
3. That there are no national norms preexisting that regulate the
same matter.
It is appropriate to question what would happen in the event that a
State omits to incorporate the Mercosur normative in absence of
disposition that it determines a certain term to make. It seems that this is a
topic not resolved by the O.P.P. and we think that the appropriate
conclusion should be of qualifying the behavior illegal, in common with
what was held by the Supreme Court of Argentina in the case "Ekmedjian"
C.J.S.N. (1992) in opinion 16 of the vote for the majority that textually
says "[t]he violation of an international treaty can happen so much for the
establishment of internal norms that they prescribe a behavior professedly
contrary, as much as for the omission of establishing dispositions that
make possible its execution. Both situations are contradictory with the
previous international ratification of the treaty ...."2
VI. THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT APPLICATION OF THE MERCOSUR
NORMS IN THE ARGENTINEAN LEGAL SYSTEM
The reforms introduced to the National Constitution in 1994
through the text of the new article 75, clauses 22 and 24, that grant to the
international treaties and the agreements superior hierarchy to that of the
law, seems to open the door to the possibility that the Mercosur are of
direct and immediate application in the Argentinean legal system. Indeed
when constituting the Mercosur normative regarding the Special
International Public Right of identical nature to that of the agreements of
partial reach inscribed in ALADI, it would be directly applicable for the
Argentinean judges and with primacy over the national laws according to
25. In equal sense, although saving distances, the Tribunal of the CE in the case
Francovich established that a State member can not oppose other states because of a
nonfulfilment of a directive, be it for an action or omission. It is a supposition of direct
application, since although the directive can not be invoked to demand the execution of the State
or of a third State, it can be made to claim the repair of the damages suffered by the omission of
sanctioning norms.
According to the European doctrine, the essential characteristic of the directives,
community norms of harmonization, is the existence of a certain term for their incorporation,
otherwise, they base, the State could invoke its freedom of election of the moment of execution.
Although it is certain that the granted terms give certainty and judicial security, we do not
believe that its absence grants indiscriminate liberty. The limit to liberty from incorporating the
normative of the Mercosur that arises of the juridical duty of making it, is given by the necessity
of the incorporation of the norm is opportune and effective.
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the jurisprudence sustained by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation
in the case Cafe La Virginia, C.J.S.N. (1994) (appeal denied). It is
important to conclude in practice and in the Argentinean legal system, that
it would be demandable by the parties involved in the application of the
emanated norms of the Mercosur organs on behalf of the national judges,
without caring if they have or have not mediated formal acts of
incorporation to the national laws.
We consider appropriate to mention here that the primacy of the
Mercosur norms over the laws does not involve the National Constitution,
and that in the event of normative opposition, it should be proceeded to
conform to the principle settled down by article 27 of same, whose correct
interpretation takes to maintain the primacy of the constitutional norm
which is a safeguard or receipt of a principle of Public Right, a
circumstance which will always be of legal definitive value.
This
interpretation conforms with the acceptable exception to be subtracted from
the execution of an emanated international obligation of a treaty by
opposition with fundamental norms of the legal system internally foreseen
by article 46 of the Convention of Vienna on the Right of Treaties of 1969.
We think that among the principles of Public Right that are
contained in the constitutional norms, article 121 stands out (clause of
Reservation), which establishes that the States conserve all the power not
delegated by the Constitution to the Federal Government, therefore the
application of the Mercosur norms that regulate matters of exclusive
incumbency of the States, should have previously relied on the formal and
expressed adhesion to its content for a legislative State act, like it has
happened recently at times when the Federal Argentinean government has
proposed normative unification in the whole national territory of laws that
involve unequivocal stately abilities, those mentioned are the Federal
Fiscal Pact and the new National Law of Traffic that matched their validity
in the jurisdictions of states to the previous approval of local law.
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I. PLANTEAMIENTO DEL PROBLEMA
A partir del protocolo de Ouro Preto (P.O.P.) es indudable que el
Mercosur tiene subjetividad juridica internacional,l resultando ser en este
respecto una organizaci6n intergubernamental con subjetividad juridica
internacional. Para el logro de sus fines, que no son otros que los de
consolidar un mercado comtin y una uni6n aduanera entre sus miembros y
posiblemente los estados asociados, el P.O.P. dot6 al Mercosur diversos
6rganos: a) El .Consejo del Mercado Comtin; b) El Grupo Mercado
Comfin; c) La Comisi6n del Comercio de Mercosur; d) La Comisi6n
Parlamentaria Conjunta; e) El Foro Consultivo Econ6mico-Social y f) La
Secretaria Administrativa del Mercosur 3 De los 6rganos individualizados
precedentemente, los tres primeros tienen capacidad decisoria4 y sus
expresiones formales de voluntad, llamadas respectivamente: Decisiones,
Resoluciones y Directivas, las cuales son obligatorias para los estados,' por
ello constituy~ndose en derecho vinculante para los mismos. Este trabajo
pretende analizar la validez y la obligatoriedad para los paises miembros de
las normas constitutivas del sistema Mercosur, para dilucidar si conforman
un plexo de Derecho Internacional lNblico o de Derecho Comunitario; la
necesidad o no de internalizaci6n previa de las disposiciones emanadas de
sus 6rganos, cuyo cumplimiento estA reputado como obligatorio para los
estados con respecto a su aplicaci6n en el Ambito domestico de cada uno de
ellos; y finalmente, la naturaleza juridica de esa normativa, todo a la luz de
las reglas del Derecho Internacional liiblico que resulten aplicables y, a la
medida posible, a las del Derecho Interno de sus paises miembros,
especialmente, las del Derecho Argentino.
II.

A QUE SISTEMA JURIDICO CORRESPONDE LA
NORMATIVA MERCOSUR?
No es Derecho Comunitario,6 porque ninguno de los instrumentos
constitutivos de Mercosur crean 6rganos supranacionales. El Consejo del
Mercado Comfin, el Grupo Mercado Comtin y la Comisi6n de Comercio
del Mercosur, son 6rganos intergubernamentales que adoptan decisiones
por consenso. Las reglas emanadas de estos 6rganos vinculan a los paises
1.

Ouro Preto's Protocol art. 34.

2.

Vea generalmente Treaty of Asuncion, art. 5.

3.

Ouro Perto's Protocol art. 1.

4.

Id. art. 2.

5.

Id. arts. 9, 15, & 20.

6.
Vea generalmente HEBER ARBUET VIGNALI, LAS RELACIONES ENTRE LA NORMATIVA
DEL MERCOSUR Y LOS SISTEMAS INTERNOS DE SUS ESTADOS MIEMBROS (1997).
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en el dimbito internacional, acarreando la responsabilidad por
incumplimiento, y posiblemente, segfin la naturaleza y el contenido de la
norma que se trate, puede tambi6n generar derecho interno para cada
estado conforme a las disposiciones del ordenamiento juridico particular de
cada uno de los paises. Si fuese un sistema de Derecho Comunitario
tendria 6rganos propios poseedores del atributo de la supranacionalidad
con capacidad de crear normas, para vigilar su cumplimiento y sancionar a
sus infractores, resultando las decisiones de los mismos obligatorias para
los estados, prevalentes sobre las normas internas y la aplicaci6n inmediata
y directa.1
Es importante afirmar aqui que el atributo de la supranacionalidad
en el sistema juridico argentino no se puede presumir ni detectar
tfcitamente. El articulo 75, clusula 24 de la Constituci6n Nacional,
modificada en 1994, autoriza al gobierno nacional a "aprobar tratados de
integraci6n que deleguen competencias y jurisdicci6n a organizaciones
supraestatales en condiciones de reciprocidad e igualdad, y que respeten el
orden democrdtico y los derechos humanos," agregando que esas normas
tienen jerarquia superior a las leyes.8 El segundo apartado de la cliusula
24 del articulo 75 precitado, establece una mayoria calificada que debe ser
prestada por los miembros de cada cimara para la aprobaci6n de Tratados
de esa naturaleza. 9 Esta disposici6n, que establece condiciones taxativas
para el reconocimiento del status supranacional y que determina un
procediniento de aprobaci6n legislativa riguroso previo a la entrada en
vigencia de los tratados que dan vida a organizaciones con tales potestades,
no deja lugar para dudas que la supranacionalidad es un atributo que debe
conferirse formalmente y expresamente.
Los instrumentos creativos del sistema Mercosur son normas del
Derecho Internacional PNiblico, coincidiendo nuestra opini6n con aquellos
que piensan que constituye un sistema especial dentro del mismo. Para el
sistema Juridico de Mercosur, deberiamos entender las fuentes citadas por

7.
El Dr. Elias Bluth, citado POR JORGE PEREZ OTERMIN en su obra el MERCADO
COMON DEL SUR refiere el pensamiento del Dr. Eduardo Jimdnez de Ar~chaga en elsentido de
que la aplicaci6n directa no constituye un atributo exclusivo y novedoso del derecho comunitario
y citAndolo textualmente dice: "Pero esta aplicaci6n directa a los individuos y sociedades de
normas de origen convencional, es admitida en elDerecho Internacional y consagrada ya en una
opini6n consultiva de la Corte Permanente de Justicia Internacional que data de 1923. Desde
entonces se acepta por la mayor pane de la doctrina (salvo los autores dualistas) y por la prictica
internacional, que los tratados pueden obligar directamente y por sf a las personas fisicas y
jurfdica individuales, siempre que eltratado posea el necesario grado de concreci6n." Id.
8.

ARG. CONST. art. 75, cl.24.

9.

d.
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el articulo 41 del P.O.P.1° y se componen de: el Tratado de Asunci6n, sus
protocolos o instrumentos adicionales o complementarios, los acuerdos
complementarios tomando lugar en su jurisdicci6n y sus protocolos y las
decisiones del Consejo, las resoluciones del Grupo y las directivas del la
Comisi6n."
El articulo 42, Segunda Parte del P.O.P.,12 despues de sefialar que
los 6rganos con poder de decisi6n dentro del sistema son
intergubernamnentales, establece que sus decisiones obligatorias deberan ser
incorporadas en los ordenamientos juridicos nacionales mediante los
procedimientos previstos en la legislaci6n de cada pais, siempre y cuando
esto sea necesario. Esto demuestra que el proceso de incorporaci6n de las
normas Mercosur es el del Derecho Internacional Nblico con algunas
peculiaridades que analizaremos en este trabajo. La prictica uniformal de
los estados que han aprobado la incorporacion conforme al procediniento
regulado por sus regimenes juridicos propios para la aprobaci6n de los
tratados, el Tratado de Asunci6n, el Protocolo de Brasilia, y el P.O.P., son
consistentes con nuestra valoraci6n del sistema como el del Derecho
Internacional Pdiblico. Tambi6n el articulo 40 del P.O.P.13 deja claro la
naturaleza no comunitaria del derecho generado por los 6rganos Mercosur,
estableciendo que las medidas necesarias para incorporarlo dentro de los
sistemas internos seran conocidas por la Secretaria Administrativa de la
organizaci6n.
III.

FUNDAMENTO DE LA VALIDEZ DE LAS NORMAS
MERCOSUR PARA LOS ESTADOS MIEMBRO
Segfin el Derecho Internacional Ptiblico General al que estdn
vinculados:
Argentina, Uruguay, y Paraguay han expresado su
consentimiento (ratificaci6n) en quedar obligados por las disposiciones de
la Convenci6n de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados, firmada el 23
de marzo de 1969, admitiendo el principio general de responsabilidad por
incumplimiento establecida por el articulo 27 con la limitaci6n del articulo
46 de la misma Convenci6n.

10. Ouro Preto's Protocol art. 41.
11. Consideramos importante aclarar en este punto que en nuestra opini6n, el derecho
fundacional de un sistema comunitario y constitutivo de sus 6rganos, no debe conceptualizarse
corno derecho comunitario originario. Entendemos que esa denominaci6n es equivocada porque
el hecho de que un sistema comunitario se constituya por un tratado internacional no lehace
perder a este iltimo su naturaleza intrfnseca de fuente de Derecho Internacional Ptiblico.
12.

Ouro Preto's Protocol art. 42, § 2.

13. Id. art. 40.
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Brasil no ha ratificado la Convenci6n de Viena sobre el Derecho de
los Tratados. Sin embargo, ya que Brasil ha celebrado el Tratado de
Asunci6n y ha expresado vdlidamente su consentimiento en quedar
vinculado por el mismo, no puede desconocer su obligaci6n ni la
normativa emanada en su consecuencia sin violentar el principio 14de buena
fe y de no contradicci6n sin incurrir responsabilidad internacional.
Segfin el Derecho Interno de los Estados contratantes las Cartas
Magnas de los cuatro Estados concernidos por el sistema Mercosur
reconocen a los tratados internacionales como fuente formal de sus propios
sistemas juridicos. Estos se identifican a continuaci6n: la Constituci6n del
Brasil articulo 102, la Constituci6n del Paraguay articulo 137, clfusula 1 y
141, la Constituci6n del Uruguay articulo 6 y 85, clfusula 7; y la
Constituci6n Argentina articulo 31 y 75, clfusula 22 y 24.
Sin embargo, la coincidencia entre las normas fundamentales de
los sistemas jurfdicos dom~sticos de paises contratantes del Tratado de
Asunci6n acerca de la individualizaci6n de los tratados como fuente de su
propio derecho, no es sintrica a la normativa constitucional de cada uno
de ellos en el neurdlgico punto de la ubicaci6n jerdrquica de los tratados
con respecto al resto de las fuentes del orden juridico local. En efecto,
mientras que las Constituciones de Argentina y Paraguay otorgan a los
tratados prevalencia sobre sus propias leyes nacionales," las Constituciones
de Brasil y Uruguay no dicen nada al respecto, dejando asi este punto

14.

Si se hiciera abstracci6n del principio de buena fe, el Derecho Internacional caerfa por

su base puesto que constituye el nicleo inspirador de Io que Kelsen denomin6 la norma hipot~tica
fundamental, y con este alcance io considera repetida jurisprudencia de la Corte Internacional de
Justicia, entre la que mencionaremos por su claridad, la asentada en el caso de Namibia (1971)
en la que sostuvo sobre este particular: "Uno de los principios bisicos que rigen la creaci6n y la
ejecuci6n de obligaciones juridicas, sea cual sea su fuente, es la buena fe. La confianza
recfproca es una condici6n inherente a la cooperaci6n internacional, especialmente en una 6poca
en la que la cooperaci6n es cada vez ms indispensable." Para el caso concreto de Brasil debe
tenerse ademds presente que este Estado es miembro de ONU y de OEA, y que ese principio le

resulta obligatorio por imposici6n de el articulo 2, clfusulas 2 y 3 apartado c) de las respectivas
cartas constituvivas de esas organizaciones internacionales, sin olvidar que la Resoluci6n 2625
A.G. de ONU deja claro que el mismo vincula no s6lo en relaci6n a las obligaciones devenidad

de la Carta, sino a toda obligaci6n internacional. En cuanto a la posibilidad de excepcionarse del
cumplimiento de una obligaci6n internacional prevista por el articulo 46 de la Convenci6n de
Viena de 1969 sobre derecho de los tratados, es generalmente admitido que el Estado que

impugna la validez de un tratado o sus normas por razones constitucionales s6lo puede invocar
las que resulten patentes o absolutamente evidentes para los demds Estados, y en el mismo
sentido resuelve la cuesti6n la Constituci6n Argentina segtin la interpretaci6n del articulo 27 de
su texto que formaliza el fallo de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n en el caso Caft La

Virginia, por la que determina que las normas constitucionales que sean resguardo de principios
de derechopiiblicoprevalecen sobre las de los tratados intemacionales que las contratrfen.
15.

Ouro Preto's Protocol art. 75, § 22; art. 137, § 1.

912

ILSA Journalof Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 4:907

abierto a la interpretaci6n de los ms altos tribunales de cada estado, los
cuales hasta el presente han exhibido una jurisprudencia erritica."
IV. LOS ORGANOS DE MERCOSUR
A. NaturalezaJuridica
Concomitantemente con lo ya sostenido, ya que Mercosur es una
organizaci6n intemacional intergubernamental con subjetividad juridica
internacional, corresponde concluir que sus 6rganos con poder decisorio,
el Consejo, el Grupo, y la Comisi6n de Comercio, son
intergubernamentales conforme a los articulos 2, 3, 4, 11, y 17 del
P.Q.P." Es necesario destacar en este t6pico que entre los 6rganos con
poder decisorio el consejo se distingue como el organo a qui6n corresponde
la representatividad juridica de todo el sistema.'8
B. Competencias
Los 6rganos Mercosur tienen competencias que le atribuyen
especificamente por el P.O.P. y que estin determinadas en lo que
concieme al Consejo por los articulos 3 y 8, en lo que se refiere al Grupo,
por los articulos 10 y 14 y en lo pertinente a la Comisi6n, por los articulos
16, 19, y 21.
C. La Naturaleza Juridica y el Orden Jerdrquico de las Normas
Emanadas de los Organos Mercosur
Reiteramos aqui que compartimos la opini6n de los que piensan
que las normas generadas por actividad de los Organos Mercosur
(Decisiones, Resoluciones, y Directivas) constituyen fuente de un Derecho
Internacional Piiblico especial, de naturaleza positiva, cuya nota
caracteristica distintiva es su g6nesis de consenso entre los representantes

16.

Vea generalmenteVIGNALI, supra nota 6, en el trabajo de su autora que hemos citado

precedentemente, nos dice que la jurisprudencia uruguaya sostuvo la igualidad de rango entre
tratado y ley hasta 1970 y durante la d6cada del 1990; y la supremacia del tratado sobre la ley
durante la d6cada del 1970 y en algunos fallos recientes. Brasil en general fue uniforme al
sostener la igualdad de rango entre tratado y ley; es decir que la norma posterior deroga la
anterior, aunque ms recientemente su jurisprudencia sostuvo que la ley no deroga al tratado sino
que s6lo suspende su aplicaci6n.
17. Vea generalmenteJorge P6rez Otermin, El Mercado Comin del Sur. Desde Asunci6n
a Ouro Preto. Aspectos Juridico-Jnstitucionales, DE FUNDACION DE CULTURA UNIVERSITARIA
DE MONTEVIDEO (1995).

18. Ouro Preto's Protocol art. 8, cl. 3.
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de los Estados segfin el 6rgano del cual provengan.' 9 En este punto,
corresponde mencionar que las altas partes contratantes han inscripto al
Tratado de Asunci6n en la ALADI como acuerdo parcial No. 18
ratificando la naturaleza juridica del Derecho Internacional Ptiblico de la
normativa Mercosur.20
En lo relativo al tema del orden jerrquico entre las normas
derivadas de los distintos 6rganos, entendemos que en terminos pricticos
resulte dificultoso que se contravengan en virtud de la cara diferenciaci6n
entre las atribuciones y funciones que le fueron asignados, y de que el
P.O.P. no contenga ninguna regla aplicable al respecto, es razonable
argumentar que existe un grado de prelaci6n entre ellas, siendo la fuente de
mayor jerarquia, las Decisiones, seguidas en segundo y tercer orden por
las Resoluciones y las Directivas. La calidad de representaci6n polfticainstitucional que cada estado tiene en el Consejo Mercosur (Ministros de
R. E. y de Economfa) y las funciones y atribuciones que le asigna el
articulo 8 del P.O.P., especialmente la de ejercer la titularidad juridica del
sistema. No hay dudas acerca de que las normas resultantes de su
actividad ocupan una mayor jerarquia entre las que se originan por
intermedio de Organos Mercosur. A su vez, es l6gico que las Directivas
tengan menos jerarqufa que las Resoluciones, ya que la Comisi6n es un
6rgano encargado de asistir al Grupo Mercado Comtin.2'
V. APLICACION DE LAS NORMAS GENERADAS POR LOS
ORGANOS MERCOSUR EN EL AMBITO JURIDICO INTERNO
DE CADA ESTADO PARTE
Segdin el articulo 42 del P.O.P., "las normas emanadas de los
6rganos del Mercosur previstos en el articulo 2 de este Protocolo tendrdn
cardcter obligatorio y, cuando sea necesario, deberin ser incorporadas a
los ordenamientos juridicos nacionales mediante los procedimientos
previstos por la legislaci6n de cada pais."" Resultando las Decisiones,
Resoluciones, y Directivas fuentes de derecho internacional particular para
los Estados parte del Sistema, su incorporaci6n y aplicabilidad en el Ambito
interno estari en principio condicionada por la previa superaci6n del
procedimiento de aprobaci6n o internalizaci6n previsto por el
ordenamiento de cada uno de ellos. Resulta l6gico razonar que en atenci6n
a su naturaleza y alcance, no serfa apropiado exigir para toda la normativa
19. Id. art. 37.
20. Cafes la Virginia C.J.S.N (1992).
21. Ouro Preto's Protocol art. 16.
22.

Id. art. 42.
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derivada de los 6rganos Mercosur la aprobaci6n segtin los procedimientos
dom6sticos utilizados para incorporar tratados internacionales, puesto que
las demoras legislativas tradicionales en estos trdmites convertirian en
inoportunas e inadecuadas a buena parte de la misma. La inscripci6n del
Tratado de Asunci6n en el marco de la ALADI como Acuerdo de Alcance
Parcial No. 18 demuestra que los estados miembros han sido
internacionalizados por normas de Mercosur, porque de ese marco juridico
emana la posibilidad de incorporar el derecho gestado por los 6rganos del
sistema por actos de los Poderes Ejecutivos como acuerdos en forma
simplificada de ejecuci6n de un tratado marco que ya ha trazado los
respectivos tr-nites internos de aprobaci6n.3
Por lo expuesto, el principio general al que arribamos sobre este
t6pico, sostiene que la normativa Mercosur debe ser incorporada al
ordenamiento juridico particular de cada estado, si este asi lo exige y
siguiendo el procedimiento por ellos previsto conforme a la naturaleza e
importancia de las disposiciones Mercosur a internalizar. 2 Estimamos que
incorporar al derecho interno las normas derivadas de los 6rganos
Mercosur de manera oportuna y eficaz, es un deber juridico de los estados
Miembros, resultando ser como tal un contenido especifico del deber
gen6rico de cumplir un tratado en vigor de buena fe, y que los obliga sea
ya como derecho positivo contenido en el articulo 26 del Tratado de Viena
sobre derecho de los Tratados (para el caso de Argentina, Uruguay, y
Paraguay), o bien como norma de derecho internacional general (para el
caso de Brasil que no ratific6 la precitada Convenci6n).
Ahora bien, parece claro que el artfculo 42 del P.O.P., al
condicionar el deber de cada estado de incorporar a su propio
ordenamiento juridico mediante los procedimientos previstos por la
legislaci6n de cada pais, al hecho de que sea necesario, admite la
posibilidad de la aplicaci6n directa de estas normas a el orden juridico
particular de algunos de los estados que asi lo permiten. Sin embargo, es
necesario preguntarse si existen supuestos en los que las normas Mercosur
pueden resultar directamente aplicables sin complementar previamente el
trdmite de incorporaci6n reglado por el Derecho Interno de cada estado.
23.

Vea VIGNALI, supra nota 16; vea tambign supra nota 6.

24. Ninguna de las Constituciones de los Estados parte preveen los acuerdos en forma
simplificada. La Jurisprudencia Argentina admiti6 la aplicabilidad de los acuerdos en forma
simplificada de la ejecuci6n de un Tratado marco en el caso Caf6 La Virginia C.J.S.N. (1992) y
en la expresi6n del voto separado del Ministro Antonio Boggiano que dijo: "Aunque el
consentimiento del Estado se haya manifestado en forma simplificada, sin intervenci6n alguna del
Congreso, 6sta tuvo lugar con anterioridad mediante la aprobaci6n legislativa del Tratatado de
Montevideo de 1980 (ley 22.354) que permite ia concentraci6n de este tipo de convenios."

(citacion omitida).
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Atendiendo el objetivo y fin del Tratado de Asunci6n, al consenso
necesario para que los 6rganos del sistema generen normas y a la
obligaci6n que los Estados reconocen como las mismas, pensamos que esta
suposici6n de aplicaci6n inmediata y directa existe y que puede devenir de
la convenci6n expresa a este respecto de los representantes de los estados
contratantes, o bien de la circunstancia fictica en la que confluyan al
menos los siguientes requisitos:
1. Que la norma regule inequivocamente una materia de
competencia del 6rgano Mercosur con capacidad decisoria de
la que emane;
2. Que la norma sea autosuficiente y operativa, entendiendo por
esto que explique con claridad los sujetos a los cuales alcanza y
el contenido del derecho o la obligaci6n que consagra; y
3. Que no existan normas nacionales preexistentes que regulen la
misma materia.
Es apropiado cuestionar que sucederia si un estado omite
incorporar la normativa Mercosur en ausencia de una disposici6n que
determine cierto plazo para hacerlo. Esto parece ser un tema no resuelto
por el P.O.P. y pensamos que la conclusi6n adecuada debe ser la de
calificar la conducta como antijuridica, en conmitancia con lo que resolvi6
la Corte Suprema Argentina en el caso Ekmedjian c/Sofovich (1992) en la
opinion 16 del voto por la majoria que textualmente dice "[1]a violaci6n de
un tratado internacional puede acaecer tanto por el establecimiento de
normas internas que prescriban una conducta manifiestamente contraria,
cuanto por la omisi6n de establecer disposiciones que hagan posible su
cumplimiento. Ambas situaciones resultan contradictorias con la previa
ratificaci6n internacional del tratado ....

25 En igual sentido, aunque salvando distancias, el Tribunal de la CE en el caso
Francovich estableci6 que un Estado miembro no puede oponer a los particulares el
incumplimiento de una directiva, sea por acci6n u omisi6n. Se trata de un supuesto de aplicaci6n
directa, ya que si bien la directiva no puede ser invocada para exigir el cumplimiento del Estado
o de un tercer pais, puede ser para reclamar la reparaci6n de los perjuicios sufridos por la
omisi6n de sancionar normas.
Segdin ia doctrina europea, la caracteristica esencial de las directivas, normas
comunitarias de armonizaci6n, es la existencia de un plazo determinado para su incorporaci6n, de
lo contrario, fundamentan, el Estado podrfa invocar su libertad de elecci6n del momento de
ejecuci6n. Si bien es cierto que elplazo determinado otorga certeza y seguridad jurfdica, no
creemos que su ausencia otorgue libertad indiscriminada. El limite a la libertad de incorporar la
normativa del Mercosur que surge del deber jurfdico de hacerlo, estA dado por la necesidad que

laincorporaci6n de la norma sea oportuna y eficaz.
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VI. LA POSIBILIDAD DE APLICACION DIRECTA DE LAS
NORMAS MERCOSUR EN EL SISTEMA JURIDICO
ARGENTINO
Las reformas introducidas a la Constituci6n Nacional en 1994 a
trav6s del texto del nuevo articulo 75, chdusula 22 y 24, que otorgan a los
tratados internacionales y a los acuerdos jerarquia superior a la de la ley,
parecen abrir la puerta a la posibilidad de que las normas Mercosur
resulten de aplicaci6n directa e inmediata en el sistema juridico argentino.
Efectivamente al constituir la normativa Mercosur Derecho Internacional
PNiblico Especial de id6ntica naturaleza al de los acuerdos de alcance
parcial inscriptos en la ALADI, resultaria directamente aplicable por los
jueces argentinos y con primacia sobre las leyes nacionales segiin la
jurisprudencia sostenida por la Cone Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n en
el caso Cafi La Virginia S.A. s/Apelaci6n por denegaci6n de repetici6n, el
10 de octubre de 1994. Lo manifestado importa concluir en la prdctica que
en el sistema juridico argentino, seria demandable por los particulares la
aplicaci6n de las normas emanadas de los 6rganos Mercosur de parte de
los jueces nacionales, sin interesar si han mediado o no actos formales de
incorporaci6n al ordenamiento nacional.
Consideramos apropiado mencionar aquf que ]a primacia de las
normas Mercosur sobre las leyes no involucran a la Constituci6n Naeional,
y que en caso de contraposici6n normativa, deberia procederse conforme al
principio establecido por el articulo 27 de la misma, cuya interpretaci6n
correcta lleva a mantener la primacia de la norma constitucional
contrariada si dsta es salvaguarda 6 resguardada de un principio de
Derecho Niblico, circunstancia que siempre ser de valor judicial
definitivo. tsta interpretaci6n es conforme con la excepci6n admisible
para sustraerse del cumplimiento de una obligaci6n internacional emanada
de un tratado por contraposici6n con normas fundamentales del
ordenamiento juridico interno previsto por el articulo 46 de la Convenci6n
de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados de 1969.
Pensamos que entre los principios del Derecho PMiblico que
contienen las normas constitucionales, se destaca el articulo 121 (Clusula
de Reserva) que establece que las Provincias conservan todo el poder no
delegado por la Constituci6n del Gobierno Federal, raz6n por la que la
aplicaci6n de normas Mercosur que regulen materias de exclusiva
incumbencia de las Provincias, deberian contar previamente con la
adhesi6n formal y expresa a su contenido por acto legislativo provincial,
como de hecho ha sucedido recientemente en ocasi6n de que el Gobiemo
Federal Argentino ha propuesto unificaciones normativas en todo el
territorio nacional de temlticas que involucran inequivocas facultades
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provinciales, en las que por caso citamos al Pacto Fiscal Federal y la nueva
Ley Nacional de Trdnsito que condicionaron su vigencia en las
jurisdicciones de los estados a su previa aprobaci6n de ley local.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

International Economic Law can be analyzed on three different
levels:,

* Candidate for LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center (1998); J.D. from the
University of Mendoza, in Mendoza, Argentina (1996), graduated with honors; previously
published in Revista Idearium at the University of Mendoza (Mar. 1996).
1. See generally J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 7-8; STEPHEN
ZAMORA & RONALD A. BRAND, BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW ix

(CCH Int'l, Chicago 1990).
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The level of private transactions among private juridical persons,
the level of national governmental regulations and its international effect
and finally, the level of the inter-governmental international regulations.
Of the aforementioned three levels, we have chosen the second for
the purpose of commenting on the development of the economic law in
Argentina, and its autonomy or dependency of other branches of
legislation, as well as its contents and scope. In the first section and
second parts of the paper, we will make a synthesis of the great importance
that this branch of law has had and still has, in our country through the so
called reformation of the State. The paper will conclude with a short
comment on the new law for financial institutions.
II.

ECONOMIC LEGISLATION AT A FIRST THEORETICAL GLANCE

A. An Outline of the Issue
The extent gradually reached by the substantive commercial law,
its socioeconomic repercussions, and the growing power of certain
business enterprises, as well as the necessary influence which the State
exerts on economic activities, has led many experts to believe that
commercial law has fulfilled its historical duty and must now give place to
a new branch such as economic law. The question can be posed as to
whether economic law is actually a new science, or are we simply faced
with yet another facet of commercial law or mercantile law, as interpreted
by different nations?
This concept would be flawed from its inception since its
application would be too vast due to the amount of juridical regulations of
an economic nature that would encompass the present so-called fields of
commercial, tax, labor, and civil laws.
In accordance with the idea of understanding economic law as a
kind of macro-legislation, and comprehending all juridical relations of an
economic nature, we find, Ferraz Augusto, among others, expresses the
idea that: economic law is the instrument for realization of social justice
and national expansion, in accordance with principals set up
constitutionally.2 In keeping with this theory of the Brazilian writer,
included in the field of this law would be the control of environmental
pollution caused by industrial activities (which would properly fall within
the power of administrative policy) as well as the legal regulations on
archaeological and prehistoric landmarks.

2.: See generally ANA M. FRRAZ AUGUSTO, SISTEMATIZACAO PARA CONSOLIDACAO DAS
LEIS BRASILEIRAS DE DIREITO ECON6MICO 410-411.
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On the other hand, economic law has been discussed not as a
group of regulations of juridical content, but as a juridical idea that is
basically political, which subordinates the institutions to the economic
organization imposed by the government. Those who support this idea
maintain that: economic law is not a branch of legislation with a special
agenda, object and duties, but a transformation of the principles which
inspire all patrimonial laws driven by a movement, that, in the face of the
ideology of the last century, superimposes that which is collective to that
3
which is individual and, that which is public, to that which is private.
Other authors believe that economic law is a specific branch and
not an extensive interpretation of several juridical regulations with
economic contents, but at the same time restrict their opinion with the
pretension of limiting it -to its own laws in an economy guided, or at least
4
organized, by the state.
Thus, within those quoted, the most distinguished theorist,
Hedemann, perceives economic law as an autonomous discipline of law,
and above all as the basis for an economy which is planned, ordered, and
headed by the state in a linked economy.,
In another line of opinion, economic law should be at present the
correct name for commercial law; but even with this frame of thought,
there are those that propose making another addendum: private economic
law, with which they are implicitly asserting the existence of a public
economic law.
We widely disagree with all of the above stated theories, since to
economic law can be attributed its own contents and objectives, which
would make it a specific branch and not limited to those countries with a
planned or directed economy.
Our opinion is based on the historical origins of economic law.
Following the excellent work of Satanowsky,'6 we observe that the
forerunners of economic laws as the legislation of an organized economy,
were the Germans, Heymann and Lehmann. It originated as positive
legislation as a war law during the hostilities of 1914 and 1918, and later
became a peace law favored by some countries with certain political
3.
See generally Jesfis Rubio, Sobre el concepto de derecho econ6mico, REVISTA DEL
DERECHO MERCANTIL 353.
4. See generally VON GIERKE, DERECHO COMMERCIAL Y DEL LA NAVEGACI6N 13,
citing JUAN M. FARINA, EN CONTRATOS COMERCIALES MODERNOS 34 (1993); HEDEMANN,
DEUTSCHES WIRTSCHARFTSRECHT (1939); GUSTAVO RADBRUCH, INTRODUCCION A LA CIENCIA
DEL DERECHO 109.

5.
(1989).
6.

See generally HEDEMANN, in SATANOWSKY, TRATAO DE DERECHO COMERCIAL 171
HEDEMANN, supra note 5, at 170, citing FARINA, supra note 4, at 35.
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tendencies as a movement for the organization of the economy, in the
interest of the community and for the modification of the whole mercantile
institution concentrated therein.
This doctrine of economic law, or, better said, its systematization
is due to Hedemann, who between the years of 1922 and 1930 conceived it
as a new spirit in the -juridical system; as a simple style, a special
vibration, an accent of feature fundamental to an era; characterized and
described by economic dominion in the same manner as natural law
characterizes the juridical postulates of the eighteenth century.
In his last theory, post 1930, Hedmann maintains that the state
governs the economy; that economic law is a completely new juridical
subject in which the elements, both public and private, interact closely.
Based on the aforementioned, it may be said that without setting
aside a strong current of opinion which perhaps opened roads on the
subject, and which considered economic law as belonging to economy
managed or at best planned, encompassing both modification of the
intervention of the American government in the New Deal's policy and the
militarization of the German economy under the heading of the great chiefs
of industry during the Nazi regime. 7 It is also convenient to speak of
economic law in countries under a liberal economy, but even these
countries have regulations for the purpose of fitting within a framework the
activities of private parties and the state, since there does not exist a
country that in some manner or another does not regulate its economic life.
Even the lack of mandatory rules constitutes a manner of manifestation of
the law, since the lack of such regulations indicate all that is tolerated,
contrary to that which appear as mandatory or forbidden by the legislation
in other countries. Thus, we would be subject to an expression of the
universal principal of legality, which in our case is established by Article
19 of the National Constitution.
When laws of a country are silent regarding the sale of
technologies or regulating the investment of foreign capital, this means that
in that country these acts can be carried out freely and at the same time the
interested parties are subject to the changes in the market and to said
country's appropriate regulations regarding their rights and obligations.
It has therefore been suggested that the approach to be given to the
subject of economic law should be different and independent since it is not
the study of a science or art, but rather the methodical analysis of the
juridical regulations that endeavor to channel the phenomenon of a
country's economy.
7.
See generally Farjat, Las Enseaanzas de medio siglo, in CUADRA, ESTUDIOS DE
DERECHO ECONOMICO 21.
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As expressed by Farjat: in these circumstances, the jurists have a
responsibility. 8 When addressing the obstacles and problems of economic
laws, it is necessary to consider the real part, which corresponds to
economic law, and that which corresponds to ideologies and social forces;
thereby, dividing the portion that corresponds to the law and the jurists. 9
B. Definition and Contents of Economic Law
Having confined the field within which the economic law has been
placed, we must then express an idea of our knowledge in the subject
matter, for which we follow Farina's idea, who maintains that economic
law: is the set of regulations that rule the organization of the economy of
public powers and regulates the economic activities of private persons
versus the state as a political power in accordance with ideology adopted in
respect thereto.' 0 De Souza states that: it is the set of regulations of
economic contents which by the principal of economics insures the defense
and harmony of the individuals and collective interests defined by the
ideology adopted by the juridical order and which regulates the activities of
the respective subjects for the application of the economic policy adopted
for the realization of such ideology."
Economic law is therefore linked to the ideology adopted by the
state on matters of economic policies. For this purpose there are, at least
theoretically, two basic sets of economic laws: the economic laws of the
countries with capitalistic market economy and the socialist market
economy. Michael E. Porter, professor at Harvard School of Business
believes that it would behoove the jurists to make distinctions between
liberal economies on absolute terms, neoliberalism, and planned
economies.' 2
C. Basic Characteristicsof an Economy
A large number of authors classify economic law as a
1)
combination of public and private law. The majority of authors tend to
place economic law within the realm of public law, since it really refers to
the relationship that exists between the state and its citizens and its effect
on the economy of the country.

8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.at 37.
Id.
Id.
See generally De Souza, Primeiraslinhas de direitto econ6mico, WASH. POST, at 1.

12. Michael E. Porter, La ventaja competitiva de las naciones, in MARIANO GRONDONO,
EL POSTLIBERALISMO 150 (1992).
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2)
The great flexibility of this body of law is due to a large
degree to the result of changes in government policies, thus making the job
of juridical analysis a very delicate one.
3)
The flexible features of economic law within an economy
are evidenced by the law's acclamation to the changing conditions of the
system within which it evolves.
4)
The important distinctions between regulations of different
countries hinge upon the nature and stage of development of their
respective economic systems.
5)
The economy's regulations produced by the changes in
criteria adopted by the establishment on policies to be adopted on economic
matters.
Autonomy, even if we agree with De Souza," in that it is
6)
always delicate to speak of autonomy in regards to a branch of law, since
law is presented as a whole body, rather than a collection of separateparts.
D. Contents of Economic Law
A short analysis of economic law in countries where the economy
of the market place is predominantly private business, specifically
Argentina, the economic policy is expressed in the following manner:
1)
Industrial Promotion:
The tendency for industrial
promotion becomes evident in the developing countries, i.e. Latin
American countries, where the policy that attempts to promote the
establishment and growth of the industrial concerns is applied by means of
granting direct incentives (tax reductions or exemptions, credit subsidies,
etc.).
It should be noted that the systems of industrial promotion
implemented during the last decade in Argentina, specifically in the regions
of San Luis, San Juan, and La Rioja, reveal an ever-increasing
preoccupation for the selective granting of incentives.
2)
Financial Policy: It is presumed that all credit and
financial activity is a public service, which the state grants directly or
delegates upon individuals such as banks, consumer credit associations and
financial associations. If we add the fact that Argentina has retained the
power to issue currency and all of the so-called activities of the depository
bank, the logical conclusion is that all of these activities are, therefore, a
public service. In other words, a service that should be provided, but that
the state may also delegate to individuals in attempts to promote
efficiency.4

13. De Souza, supra note 11, at 19.
14. CARLOS G. VILLEGAS, RIGIMEN LEGAL DE BANCOS 12 (1989).
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3)
Insurance Activity: Insurance activity can be regulated
according to the following criteria: 1) complete freedom; 2) monopoly by
the state; 3) private enterprise subject to state regulations and inspections;
4) or joint efforts between public and private entities. In Argentina, the
system of complete freedom existed until 1938. Since 1938, with the
adoption of the National Superintendence of Insurance, the system of
private insurance subject to state regulation and inspection was
concurrently established with insurance activities handled by the
government. This system was established by statute 20.091 of 1973 with
amendments 23.488 (1986) and 23.962 (1991)."
4)
Investment of foreign capital: Liberal regulations framed
the policies on foreign investments and fulfilled a large part of the
objectives of encouraging the establishment of such investments in
developing countries. The participation of foreign investors in national
industries grew rapidly until 1960 when participation reached its maximum
proportions in the more dynamic industrial sectors.
Economic law that was made applicable to foreign investments was
not neutral with respect to the aforementioned policies. At the beginning,
there were conflicts of authority, lack of control and organization, and no
set working criteria. But as time went on, rules and regulations worked
themselves out and stabilized in matters concerning exchange of national
currency, credits, taxes, and price control.
5)
Transfer of technology: The legislation shall always
attempt to route contracts transferring technology while maintaining
national interests as a priority.
6)
Control of economic power: Starting with financial
reforms initiated in Latin America at the end of the 1980's, there appears
to be a rapid growth of financial groups which adhere to the universal
system of banking, or multi-banking. Although not necessarily with
services under the same roof, banks are authorized to make investments in
stocks; broker mutual funds; operate leasing businesses; manage credit
card and financing consultant firms. It thus becomes necessary for
economic law to take action through several statutory amendments.
Countries that have made such statutory amendments are Argentina, in the
1977 Reform Act; Chile, in 1986; Mexico, in 1990; Peru, in 1993; El

15.

JORGE OSVALDO ZUNINO,

CONCORDADA (1994).
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Salvador, as of May, 1991; and reform also occurred in Brazil and
16
Venezuela in 1993, respectively.
7)
Stock Company formation: The methods, by which
companies can be formed may vary depending on the type of company ( its
nature and purpose) and the system that is used. There are essentially two
types of systems. The first type is called the liberal system, which merely
requires that the company adheres to the rules regulated by the
Commercial Code and makes virtually no distinctions between the types of
corporations formed. The other type, that which is used in our country,
7
pursuant to statute 19.550, is the regulative or normative system.
In summary, economic law, and its application in accordance with
the aforementioned, can be classified pursuant to the Argentinean model,
into the following groups:
1) economic growth;
2) industrial promotion and development;
3) the promotion of imports;
4) regulation of exportations;
5) regulation of private business performing public functions;
6) regulation of anti-trust;
7) promote free market competition; and
8) regulate and control economic power. 8
III. ECONOMIC LAW IN ARGENTINA'S REALITY
At the beginning of the 1990's, Argentina attempted to renew the
relationship between its citizens and the State. The renewed attempt
occurred through two reformations, that of the State, and that of the
Constitution.
The reformations were due to the State's failed attempt at total
control. The neoliberal advance towards integration of countries has
forced the State to assume a new posture and hence, a new role in
government.
In accordance with this, economic law is made up of juridical
regulations (laws, decrees, and resolutions) by virtue of which the State,
through its corresponding bodies, establishes mandatory regulations, which
are to be followed by businesses (private, public, or a combination of

16. Herrtn G. Sommerville Senn, Competitividadde la Banca Latinoamericanafrentea la
Globalizaci6n, disertaci6npronunciada con ocasi6n de las 6tas, JORNADAS BANCARIAS DE LA
REPOBLICA ARGENTINA (July 1995).
17.

CARLOS G. VILLEGAS, DERECHO DE LAS SOCIEDADES COMERCIALES 30-31 (1985).

18. FARINA, supra note 4, at 47.
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both). The usefulness of this law in our country during this period of
renewal thus becomes clear.
The great process of reform can be divided into two large phases:
first, the approval of a powerful body of laws which include the Law of
Reform of the State (23.696); the Law of Economic Emergency (23.697);
decrees and laws of deregulation and economic demonopolization (228491) (2488-91); and the Law of Convertibility of the Austral (23-928); and
second, more importantly the reformation of the Argentinean Constitution
passed on August 22, 1994, 19as a result of the Law of Declaration of the
Need for a Reform of the National Constitution,2 which originated in the
Pacto de los Olivios, between the leaders of the two major political parties
of the country. '
We will only study the first phase of this reformation process,
without ignoring the important influence that economic law had on the
reformation of our Magna Carta, especially Articles 75, 18, 19 and 124,
where mention is made of the new regime adopted for the purpose of
economic integration with other countries. 2
A. Laws of the Reformation of the State and Economic Emergency2
The process of reformation of the State that was started in our
country by the passing of the aforementioned statute (23.696 or A Ley
Dromi)2' resulted in the State reviewing its functions in relation to the
satisfaction of public interests. Thus, the rendering of public services was
entrusted, by means of concessions or licenses, to public parties. The
Provinces also followed this tendency.
The transfer of economic activities to the private sector were kept
within constitutional limits, and reserved to the State the direct
responsibility matters of public functions which are unable to be delegated,
and indirect responsibility in matters of transferred public services.

19. B.O. 23/08/94; second publication ordered by Law 24.430, anc. Dec. 15, 1994, prom.
Jan. 3, 1995; B.O., (Oct. 1, 1995).
20.

ARG. CONST. Sanc. Y.

21. Uni6n Civica Radical (U.C.R.) y Partido Justicialista, also known as Peronismo, in
honor of its founder, Juan d. Per6n (P.J.).
22. EDUARDO MENEM Y ROBERT DROMI, LA CONSTITUCION REFORMADA COMENTADA
INTERPRETADA Y CONCORDADA 92 (1994).
23.

ROBERTO DROMI, DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO (4ed., Ediciones Cidudad Argentina

1995).
24. In honor of Dr. Roberto Dromi, the famous Argentine public administrator who
idealized almost all of the basic laws of this legal revolution.

928

ILSA Journal of Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 4:919

The law at issue declared the financial economic situation of the
national public administration, both centralized and decentralized, to be in
a state of emergency. That declaration included other organizations in
which the State, or any of its bodies, held total or majority control in
capital investment or corporate decisions.
B. Discrete-Laws of Deregulation and Anti-Monopoly for the
Economy (228/91 & 2488/91)
The Law of Reformation of the State includes in its two
amendments the list of enterprises and the course of action to be followed
in all cases since the possibilities offered do not end with privatization
itself. The following list of tools in order to carry out the reform is only
suggestive in that they may be utilized individually or in any combination.
They are: privatization, concession, licenses and permits, municipalization,
provincialization, and programs of shared ownership.
The Law of
Economic Emergency Statute 23.697 also accompanied the legal security
of the whole process. This set in action the power of the emergency police
of the State; suspended for a fixed time all subsidies and allowances;
regulations of industrial promotion; regulation of mining promotion and the
regulation of national purchases.25
C. Law 23.928 of Convertibility of the Austral"
This statute is an important part of economic law. Statute 23.928,
effective April 1, 1991, sets out the conversion formula of our currency to
the United States dollar, establishing a fixed rate of one peso per one dollar
where previously the exchange of currency required 10,000 Austral per
one dollar United States. The law of convertibility is inspired on the
healthy economical political principal that, as stated by Kleidermacher, 27
expenses should not exceed income. For this, the State must obtain the
legitimate funds required for its functions by way of tax collection,
privatization, sales of dispensable and unattached assets, loans, and
placement of bonds or valuables in general, and negotiations of loans. But
expenditures that exceed the amount of available resources can not be
covered by false currency not backed by the corresponding exchange that
would maintain the parity or fixed rate established. As of the effective

25. Law of Economic Emergency Statute § 23.697, arts. I, II, III, & IV.
26. Sane. y prom. 27/111/1991; B.O., 28 111/1991. Enforcement commenced on (Jan. 4,
1991).
27. See generally Arnold Kleidermacher, Fiscalla De Regreso a la Conversi6n y el
Nominalismo, 16 DERECHo ECONOMICO 343.
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date of this law, no currency can be made if there are insufficient reserves
available within the budget of the incumbent officials. One of the more
important aspects of the law is the prohibition of adjustments due to
inflation, as set out in Article VII of Statute 23.928 as follows: The debtor
of a certain sum of Austral complies with his obligation on the date of
maturity the nominal amount expressed. In no case would monetary
actualization be permitted, indexing of prices, variation of costs or
revaluation of obligations, whatever their origins, whether there is default
on the part of the debtor or not prior to April 1, 1991 when the
convertibility of the Austral becomes effective.
All legal provisions and regulations are hereby revoked and
contractual and conventional provisions contrary to the above are not
applicable.
Lastly, it should be noted that the effective date of April 1, 1991
for conversion of the system is obligatory for all, without exception, and
applies to
retroactively.
Upalltocontracts
this moment, and thanks to superhuman efforts on
the part
of the Argentinean people accompanied by the iron hand of the Ministry of
Economics, the plan is going forth having already achieved the desired
stability.
D. Banking and FinancingReform Law 24.14428
Since the restoration of democracy in 1983, there was a general
desire for the reformation of the legislation on banking activities
implemented in the country in 1977 by means of reform to the Organic
Charter of the Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina, and Statute
21.526 on financial enterprises (amended and completed by Statute 25.501
of 1979, 22.267 of 1980, and 22.529 of 1982).
In 1990 the Executive placed before Congress the official project
for the new Organic Charter of the Central Bank. Before the end of the
1992 term, the National Parliament passed Statute 23.144,29 which
establishes important reform to three juridical regulations of great
importance; A) Organic Charter of the Central Bank; B) Law of Finical
Enterprises; and C) Penal Tributary Law.
This law introduces important reforms to the legal regulation of
nation banking and financial activity, which should be analyzed from the
juridical viewpoint, but also, as is the case with all legal regulations on

28.

CARLOS GILBERTO VILLEGAS, LA REFORMA BANCARIA Y FINANCIERA (1993).

29.

B.O., 22/X/1992.
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economic and financial matters, the affect that such reforms can cause in
the national economy.
E. Organic Charter of the Central Bank of the Republic of
Argentina
The most important reforms of the Organic Charter are as follows:
Establishment of the autonomy of the Central Bank of the Republic
a)
of Argentina, which will no longer subject it to the nation's Ministry of
Economics.
Establishment of the primary and basic function of the Central
b)
Bank of the Republic of Argentina, which is the preservation of the value
of the currency.
The creation of a Superintendence of Financial and Exchange
c)
Enterprises placed under a superintendent and a vice-superintendent who
will be in charge of supervising financial and exchange activities. These
positions will be held by directors of the Central Bank of the Republic of
Argentina recommended by the President of the Central Bank and
appointed by the President of the Republic.
d)
Discounts and advances granted to entities by reason of temporary
lack of solvency, will only be for thirty successive days, and will not
exceed, in total, the net value of the entity. Advances will be granted
against the guarantee of public titles or other goods and valuable, with
security collateral, or by special or general encumbrances of certain assets.
Funds loaned to entities will under no circumstance lack collateral
guarantees, nor will unsecured loans be granted by way of overdrafts in
checking account.
The Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina can require that the
e)
entities make available certain portions of their deposits, in national or
foreign currency, for the purpose of regulating the general liquidity and the
best functioning of the financial market.
F. Law for FinancialEnterprises
All matters relating to bank confidentiality are modified, limiting
a)
same to liability operations made by the entities (deposits and other
obligations). In this manner the obligation of secrecy does not apply to
investment of funds (loans and credits in general) and services (collections
and payments in general, handling of business operations, powers, etc.).
b)
All codes relative to sanctions and resources which add new
elements for consideration to by the Central Bank before applying
sanctions are modified.
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c)
The system of liquidation and bankruptcy of enterprises is
modified. The liquidation will always be juridical and will be handled by
an officer (liquidator) appointed by the corresponding judge.
d)
The system of guaranteed deposits, provided by the previous law,
is repealed.
e)
The Central Bank is empowered to establish the terms and
conditions under which financial entities can use systems of reproduction
such as photographs, microfilms, and any other electronic reproduction of
documents which are kept in light of their legal value. For the purpose of
best evidence, copies may be authenticated provided officials who are
responsible for their custody certify them.
All checks must show the codified taxable identification number
f)
(CULT). In cases where the identification number is omitted the number of
the document identifying the holder of a checking account in accordance
with the provisions of the Central Bank must be shown.
G. Penal Exchange Law
The Penal Exchange Law 19.359 is also modified in taking away
from the Central Bank the powers for applying penalties. In all cases, the
Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina will only draw up the
indictment and the case will go to a court of first impression for Economic
Penalties in the Federal Capital or to a federal judge at the corresponding
province.
Finally, the following are additional modifications to this law: The
repeal of Statute 21.572 creating the Account for Monetary Regulation and
the repeal of decree 4611/58 ratified by law 14.467 of Fiscalization of the
Exchange System of the Central Bank.
IV. CONCLUSION
Through this writing, we have attempted to give an overview of
the state in which economic law presently exists in Argentina and to
express to what point it has been lived and experienced by the inhabitants
of our country through the radical reforms introduced by our government.
It is self-evident by the birth of this new branch of law that
economy and law do not advance in separate lanes, that they are not like
water and oil. Both are social sciences capable of coexisting but that as
social sciences it must be taken into account that their laboratory is society
itself and not just a piece of paper which may be erased or crossed off
during a cabinet meeting. We therefore recommend that the individual, the
person, not be considered just another factor when an account does not
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balance, but that they be considered an integral part of that to which we all
aspire, the common good.
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INTRODUCCION
La ley econ6mica internacional puede analizarse en tres niveles
diferentes:' el nivel de transacciones privadas entre las personas jurfdicas
privadas; el nivel de regulaciones gubernamentales nacionales y su efecto
internacional; y finalmente, el nivel de las regulaciones internacionales
entre-gubernamentales.
De los tres niveles mencionados, nosotros hemos escogido el
segundo con el prop6sito de hacer un comentario sobre el desarrollo de la
Ley Econ6mica en Argentina, su autonomia o dependencia de otras ramas
de legislaci6n, sus indice y alcance, en la primera secci6n de nuestro
papel. En la segunda parte nosotros haremos una sintesis de la gran
importancia que esta rama de la ley ha tenido y todavia ti6ne en nuestro
pais a trav6s de la ilamada Reforma del Estado, y terminard con un
comentario breve en la nueva ley para las instituciones financieras.
PARTE I:

UNA PRIMERA MIRADA TEORICA A LA LEGISLACION

ECON6MICA

1. Un Contomo del Tema
La magnitud gradualmente alcanzada por el derecho comercial
substantivo, sus repercusiones socio-econ6micos, y el poder creciente de
ciertas empresas comerciales, asi como la influencia necesaria que el
estado ejerce en actividades econ6micas, ha determinado que muchos
expertos creen que el derecho comercial ha cumplido su deber hist6rico y
debe dar lugar ahora a una nueva rama tal como la ley econ6mica. ,Puede
proponerse la pregunta acerca de si la ley econ6mica realmente es una
nueva ciencia, o nos enfrentamos nosotros simplemente con todavia otra
faceta de derecho comercial o la ley mercantil, como interpretado por
naciones diferentes?
Este concepto se agrietaria de su principio porque su aplicaci6n
seria demasiado vasto debido a la cantidad de regulaciones juridicas de una
indole econ6mica que abarcaria los campos presentemente ilamados
comercial, impuestos, laboral, y derechos civil.
De acuerdo con la idea de ley econ6mica comprensiva como un
tipo de macro-legislaci6n, comprendiendo todas las relaciones juridicas de
una indole econ6mica, nosotros encontramos que, Ferraz Augusto, entre
otros, expresa que: la ley econ6mica es el instrumento para la realizaci6n
1.

Vea generalmente J. JACKSON,
& RONALD A. BRAND,

STEPHEN ZAMORA

LAW ix (CCH Int'l, Chicago 1990).

WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GAIT 7-8;
BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
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de justicia social y la expansi6n nacional, de acuerdo con principales
Siguiendo esta teoria del escritor
preparados constitucionalmente.2
Brasilefio, incluy6 en el campo de esta ley seria el mando de poluci6n
medioambiental causado por actividades industriales (qu6 caeria
propiamente dentro del poder de polftica administrativa) asi como las
regulaciones legales en hitos arqueol6gicos y prehist6ricos.
Por otro lado, la ley econ6mica no se ha discutido como un
conjunto de regulaciones de indice juridico, pero como una idea juridica
bdsicamente politica que subordina las instituciones a la organizaci6n
econ6mica impuesta por el Gobierno. Aqu6llos que apoyan esta idea
mantienen que la ley econ6mica no es una rama de legislaci6n con una
agenda especial, objeto y obligacion, pero una transformaci6n de los
principios que inspiran todas las leyes patrimoniales manejadas por un
movimiento que, ante la ideologia del tiltimo siglo, sobrepone lo que es
colectivo a lo que es individual y, lo que es piiblico, a lo que es privado.3
Otros autores creen que la ley econ6mica es una rama especifica y
no una interpretaci6n extensa de varias regulaciones juridicas con indices
econ6micos; pero a la vez, restrinjen su opini6n con la pretensi6n de
limitarlo a sus propias leyes en una economia guiada, o por lo menos
4
organizada, por el Estado.
Asi, dentro de aqu~llos citados, el te6rico mIs distinguido,
Hedemann, percibe la ley econ6mica como una disciplina aut6noma de ley,
sobre todo como la base para una economia que es planeada, ordenada, y
encabezada por el estado en una economia unida.En otra linea de opini6n, la ley econ6mica debe ser el nombre
correcto en la actualidad para el derecho comercial; pero hay aqu6llos que
proponen haciendo otro aditamento incluso con este marco de pensamiento:
ley econ6mica privada con la que ellos estAn afirmando la existencia de una
ley econ6mica pfiblica implicitamente.
Nosotros discrepamos extensamente con todas las teorias
declaradas anteriores, ya que a la ley econ6mica puede atribuirse sus

2. Vea generalmente ANA M. FRRAZ AUGUSTO, SISTEMATIZACAO PARA CONSOLIDACAO
DAS LEIS BRASILEIRAS DE DIREITO ECON6MICO 410-411.
3.

Vea generalmente Jests Rubio, Sobre el concepto de derecho econ6mico, REVISTA

DEL DERECHO MERCANTIL 353.
4.
Vea generalmente VON GIERKE, DERECHO COMMERCIAL Y DE LA NAVEGACION 13,
citando JUAN M. FARINA, EN CONTRATOS COMERCIALES MODERNOS 34 (1993); HEDEMANN,
DEUTSCHES WIRTSCHARFTSRECHT (1939); GUSTAVO RADBRUCH, INTRODUCCION A LA CIENCIA
DEL DERECHO 109.

5.

Vea generalmente HEDEMANN, en SATANOWSKY, TRATAO DE DERECHO COMERCIAL

171 (1989).
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propios contenidos y objetivos, que la haria una rama especifica y no
limitarian a esos paises con una economia planeada o habierta.
Nuestra opini6n es basada en los origenes hist6ricos de la Ley
Econ6mica.
Siguiendo el trabajo excelente de Satanowsky,'6 nosotros
observamos que los precursores de las leyes econ6micas como la
legislaci6n de una economia organizada, fueron de German Heymann y
Lehmann. Origin6 como una legislaci6n positiva como una ley de guerra
durante las hostilidades de 1914 a 1918, a mis tarde volverse la ley de una
paz favorecida por algunos paises con ciertas tendencias politicas como un
movimiento para la organizaci6n de la economia, en el inter6s de la
comunidad y para la modificaci6n de la entera instituci6n mercantil
concentrada en ello.
Esta doctrina de ley econ6mica, o, mejor dicho, su systematizacion
es debido a Hedemann quien entre los aflos de 1922 y 1930 To concibi6
como un nuevo espiritu en el sistema juridico, como un estilo simple una
vibraci6n especial, un acento de principio del rasgo a una era,
caracterizado y descrito por dominio econ6mico de la misma manera como
la ley natural caracteriza los postulados juridicos del XVIII siglo.
En su tiltima teoria, despues del 1930, Hedemann, mantiene que el
estado gobierna la economia; esa ley econ6mica es completamente un
nuevo asunto juridico en el que los elementos, ptiblico y privado, actan
reciprocamente cerca.
Basado en To previamente mencionado puede decirse que sin poner
una corriente fuerte de opini6n al lado que quizAs abri6 caminos en el
asunto, y qu6 consider6 ley econ6mica como pertenecer a la economia
manejada o mejor planeada, abarcando ambos modificaci6n de la
intervenci6n del gobierno americano en la politica del Nuevo Trato y la
militarizacion de la economia alemana bajo el titulo de los grandes jefes de
industria durante el r6gimen Nazi.7 Tambi6n es conveniente hablar de la
ley econ6mica en paises bajo una economia liberal, pero incluso estos
paises tienen regulaciones con el objeto de encajar dentro de un armaz6n
las actividades de fiestas privadas y el estado, ya que no existe un pais que
de alguna manera o otro no regula su vida econ6mica. Incluso la falta de
reglas obligatorias constituye una manera de manifestaci6n de la ley, ya
que la falta de tales regulaciones indica todo To que se tolera
contrariamente a To que aparece como obligatorio o prohibido por la
legislaci6n en otros paises; nosotros estariamos sujeto a una expresi6n del

6.

7.

supra nota 5, a 170, citando FARINA, supra nota 4, a 35.
Vea generalinente Farjat, Las Ensefianzas de medio siglo, en CUADRA,

HEDEMANN,

DERECHO ECON6MIco 21.
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principio universal de legalidad que en nuestro caso es establecido a trav6s
del articulo 19 de la Constituci6n Nacional.
Cuando las leyes de un pais est~n mudas con respecto a la venta de
tecnologias o regulando la inversi6n de capital extranjera, esto significa
que en ese pais estas acciones pueden ilevarse fuera libremente y al mismo
tiempo los partidos interesados estn sujeto a los carnbios en el mercado y
a las regulaciones apropiadas del pais con respecto a sus derechos y
obligaciones.
Se ha sugerido que el acercamiento al asunto de ley econ6mica
deba ser diferente y independiente ya que no es el estudio de una ciencia o
arte, sino el anlisis met6dico de las regulaciones juridicas que se esfuerza
por los conductos el fen6meno de la economfa de los paises.
Como expresado por Farjat en estas circunstancias, los juristas
tienen una responsabilidadA Al dirigirse a los obstfculos y problemas de
leyes econ6micas, es necesario considerar la parte real que corresponde a
la ley econ6mica, y la qu6 corresponde a las ideologias y las fuerzas
sociales, por eso dividiendo la porci6n que corresponde a la ley y los
juristas.9
2. La Definici6n y Contento de la Ley Econ6mica
Habiendo limitado el campo dentro del que la ley econ6mica se
puso, nosotros debemos expresar una idea de nuestro conocimiento
entonces en la materia; para la que nosotros seguimos a Farina, que
mantiene que la ley econ6mica es la colecci6n de regulaciones que
gobiernan la organizaci6n de la economia de poderes pfiblicos y regulan las
actividades econ6micas de personas privadas contra el estado como un
poder politico de acuerdo con la ideologia adoptado en respeto a eso.'0 De
Souza dice que es la colecci6n de contento de indice econ6micos que por el
principio de economia asegura la defensa y armonia de los individuos y
intereses de colectividad definidas por la ideologia adoptada por el orden
juridico y qu6 regula las actividades de los asuntos respectivos para la
aplicaci6n de la politica econ6mica adoptada para la realizaci6n de tal
ideologia."
La ley econ6mica es por lo tanto unida a la ideologia adoptada por
el estado en los asuntos de politicas econ6micas. Para este prop6sito hay,
por lo menos te6ricamente, dos colecci6nes bdsicas de leyes econ6micas:
8.

Id. a 37.

9.

Id.

10. Id.

11.

Vea generalmente De Souza, Primeiraslinhas de direitto econ6mico, WASH. POST, a
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las leyes econ6micas de los paises con economia del mercado sistema
capitalista y la economia del mercado socialista. Michael E. Porter,
profesor de Harvard School of Business cree que corresponderii a los
juristas hacer distinciones entre las economfas liberales en trminos
12
absolutos, neoliberalismo, y economias planeada.
3. Caracteristicas Bisicas de Una Econornia
a)
Un nimero grande de autores clasifica la ley econ6mica
como una combinaci6n de ley ptiblica y privada. La mayoria de autores
tienden a poner la ley econ6mica en el reino de ley pfiblica, ya que
realmente se refiere a la relaci6n que existe entre el estado y sus
ciudadanos y su efecto en la economa del pais.
b)
La gran flexibilidad de este punto de ley es debida a un
grado grande como resultado de los cambios en politicas gubernamentales,
asi haciendo el trabajo de andlisis juridico uno muy delicado.
c)
Las caracteristicas flexibles de la ley econ6mica dentro de
una economia son evidenciados por la aclamaci6n de la ley a las
condiciones cambiantes del sistema dentro del que evoluciona.
d)
Las distinciones importantes entre las regulaciones de
diferentes paises depende en la naturaleza y fase de desarrollo de sus
sistemas econ6micos respectivos.
e)
Las regulaciones de la economia producidas por los
cambios en el criterio adoptado por el establecimiento en las polfticas que
seran adoptadas en materias econ6micas.
f)
Autonomia, aun cuando nosotros estamos de acuerdo con
3
De Souza,' en que siempre es delicado hablar de autonomia respecto a una
rama de ley, ya que la ley se presenta en entidad conjunta, en lugar de una
colecci6n de partes separadas.
4. Contento de la Ley Economica
Un andlisis corto de la ley econ6mica en paises donde la economfa
del lugar del mercado es el negocio predominantemente privado,
especificamente Argentina, la politica econ6mica se expresa de la manera
siguiente:
a)
Promoci6n Industrial. La tendencia para la promoci6n
industrial se hace evidente en los paises en vias de desarrollo, i.e., paises
Latinoamericano, donde la politica que intenta promover el establecimiento
y crecimiento de los asuntos industriales se aplica por medio de conceder
12. Michael E. Porter, La ventaja competitiva de las naciones, en MARIANO GRONDONO,
EL POSTLIBERALISMO 150 (1992).
13. DeSouza, supranota 11, a 19.
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incentivos directos (reducciones de impuesto o exenciones, subsidios de
cr6dito, etc.). Debe notarse que los sistemas de promoci6n industrial
lievados a cabo durante la tiltima d6cada en Argentina, especificamente en
las regiones de San Luis, San Juan, y La Rioja, revelan una preocupaci6n
creciente por conceder incentivos selectivamente.
b)
Politica Financiera. Se supone que todo el cr6dito y la
actividad financiera es un servicio ptiblico que el estado concesiona
directamente o delega a los individuos como bancos, asociaciones de
cr6dito de consumidor y asociaciones financieras. Si nosotros agregamos
el hecho que Argentina ha retenido el poder para emitir dinero y todas de
las actividades del banco depositario, la conclusi6n 16gica es que todas
estas actividades son, por consiguiente, un servicio ptiblico. En otras
palabras, un servicio que debe proporcionarse, pero que el estado tambi6n
puede delegar a los individuos para promover la eficacia. "4
c)
La Actividad de Seguro. La actividad de seguro puede
regularse conforme segun el criterio siguiente:
1) la libertad completa;
2) monopolio por el estado;
3) la empresa privada sujeto a las regulaciones estatales y
inspecciones; o
4) los esfuerzos de la juntura entre entidades pfiblicas y
privadas.
En Argentina, el sistema de libertad completa existi6 hasta el 1938.
Desde 1938, con la adopci6n del Superivisor Nacional de Seguro, el
sistema de seguro privado sujeto a la regulaci6n estatal y inspecci6n
establecido concurrentemente con las actividades de seguros manejados por
el gobierno. Este sistema fue establecido por estatuto 20.091 de 1973 con
enmendaduras 23.488 (1986) y 23.962 (1991).'
d)
Inversi6n de Capital Extranjera. Las regulaciones liberales
idearon las polfticas en inversiones extranjeras y cumplieron una gran parte
de los objetivos de animar el establecimiento de tales inversiones en paises
en vias de desarrollo.
La participaci6n de inversores extranjeros en
industrias nacionales creci6 rdpidamente hasta el 1960 cuando la
participaci6n alcanz6 sus mdximas proporciones en los sectores industriales
mds dindmicos.
La ley econ6mica que se hizo aplicable a las inversiones
extranjeras no era neutral con respecto a las politicas mencionadas. Habia
conflictos de autoridad al principio, falta de control y organizaci6n, y
14.

CARLOS G. VILLEGAS, REGIMEN LEGAL DE BANCOS 12 (1989).

15.

JORGE OSVALDO ZUNINO,

CONCORDADA (1994).

RfGIMEN DE SEGUROS LEY 17.418 COMENTADA Y
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ningfin criterio del funcionamiento fijo. Pero, con el tiempo, las reglas y
regulaciones funcionaron y se estabilizaron en materias acerca del
intercambio de dinero nacional, crdditos, impuestos, y regulador del
precio.
e)
Transferencia de tecnologia.
La legislaci6n siempre
intentard dirigir contratos que transfieren tecnologia mientras manteniendo
intereses nacionales como una prioridad.
f)
Control de Poder Econ6mico. Empezando con reformas
financieras iniciadas en Am6rica Latina al final de los 1980's, alli parece
ver un crecimiento ripido de grupos financieros que adhieren al sistema
universal de banca o multi-banca. Aunque no necesariamente con servicios
bajo el mismo tejado, los bancos son autorizados hacer inversiones en
acciones; agentar los fondos mutuos; operar de negocios arrendandos;
manejar tarietas de cr6dito y empresas de consultor financiero. Se hace
necesario que la ley econ6mica tome acci6n a trav6s de varias
enmendaduras estatutarias. Paises que han hecho tales enmendaduras
estatutarias son: Argentina, en el 1977 Acto de la Reforma; Chile, en
1986; M6xico, en 1990; Perd, en 1993; El Salvador, a partir de mayo,
1991; y reforma tambi6n ocurri6 en Brasil y Venezuela en 1993,
respectivamente. 16
g)
Formaci6n de la Compaftfa Accionaria. Los m6todos por
los cuales pueden formarse compafffas pueden variar dependiendo en el
tipo de compafia (su indole y prop6sito) y el sistema que se usa.
Esencialmente, hay dos tipos de sistemas. El primer tipo se llama el
sistema liberal, que requiere meramente que la compafifa adhiera a las
regulaciones del C6digo Comercial y no hace virtualmente ninguna
distinci6n entre los tipos de corporaciones formados. El otro tipo, que se
usa en nuestro pais, consiguiente a estatuto 19.550, es el sistema regulativo
o el normativo.17
En resumen la ley econ6mica, y su aplicaci6n de acuerdo con lo
previamente mencionado, puede ser clasificada consiguiente al modelo
argentino, en los grupos siguientes:
1) crecimiento econ6mico;
2) promoci6n y desarrollo industrial;
3) promoci6n de importaciones;
4) regulaci6n de exportaciones;

16. Hernin G. Sommerville Senn, Competitividadde la Banca Latinoamericanafrentea la
Globalizaci6n, disertaci6npronunciada con ocasi6n de las 6tas, JORNADAS BANCARIAS DE LA
REPOBLICA ARGENTINA (July 1995).
17.

CARLOS

G. VILLEGAS,

DERECHO DE LAS SOCIEDADES COMERCIALES 30-31 (1985).
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5) regulaci6n de negocios privados que realiza funciones
pfiblicas;
6) regulaci6n de anti-trust;
7) promover competici6n del mercado libre; y
8) regular y controlar poder econ6mico.'8
PARTA II:
LEY ECON6MICA EN LA REALIDAD DE ARGENTINA
Al principio de los 1990's, Argentina intent6 renovar la relaci6n
entre sus ciudadanos y el Estado. El esfuerzo renovado ocurri6 a trav6s de
dos reformas: el del Estado, y el de la Constituci6n.
Las reformas eran debidas al fracasado esfuerzo del estado al
control total. El adelanto neoliberal hacia la integraci6n de parses ha
obligado al estado asumir una nueva postura y por lo tanto, un nuevo papel
en gobierno.
De acuerdo con esto, la ley econ6mica se compone de regulaciones
juridicas (leyes, decretos, resoluciones) en virtud de que el estado, a trav6s
de sus cuerpos correspondientes, establece regulaciones obligatorias que
serin seguidas a trav6s de negocios (privado, ptiblico, o una combinaci6n
de ambos). La utilidad de esta ley en Argentina durante este periodo de
renovaci6n, de este modo, se hace claro.
El gran proceso de reforma puede ser dividido en dos fases
grandes: primero, la aprobaci6n de una entidad poderosa de leyes que
incluye la Ley de Reforma del Estado (23.696); la Ley de Emergencia
Econ6mica (23.697); los decretos y leyes de dereglamentaci6n y la
demonopolizacion econ6mica (2284-91) (2488-91); y la Ley de
Convertibilidad del Austral (23-928); y segundo, mis pretenciosamente la
reforma de la Constituci6n Argentina pasada el 22 de agosto de 1994,19 a
consecuencia de la Ley de Declaraci6n de la Necesidad para una Reforma
de la Constituci6n Nacional20 que origin6 en el Pacto de los Olivios, entre
los lideres de los dos partidos politicos mayores del pafs.2 '
Estudiaremos s6lo la primera fase de este proceso de la reforma,
sin ignorar la influencia importante que la ley econ6mica tuvo en la
reforma de nuestra Magna Carta, sobre todo los Articulos 75, 18, 19, y

FARINA, supra nota 4, a 47.
19. B.O. 23/08/94; con una segunda publicaci6n ordenada por Ley 24.430, anc. 15 de
diciembre de 1994, prom. 3 de enero de 1995; B.O., (1 de Oct. de 1995).
20. ARG. CONST. Sanc. Y.
21. Uni6n Civica Radical (U.C.R.) y Partido Justicialista, tambi6n conocido como
Peronismo, en honor a su fundador, Juan D. Per6n (P.J.).

18.
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124, donde la menci6n se hace del nuevo r6ginen adoptado con el
prop6sito de la integraci6n econ6mica con otros paises.2
1. Leyes de la Reforma de la Emergencia Estatal y Econ6mica2
El proceso de reforma del Estado que empez6 en nuestro pais por
el paso del estatuto mencionado (23.696 o La Ley Dromi)2' resulto en el
Estado repasando sus funciones en relaci6n a la satisfacci6n de intereses
ptiblicos. Asi, el dar servicios ptiblicos fue confiado, por medio de
concesiones o licencias, a partidos pfiblicos. Esta tendencia tambi6n fue
seguida por las Provincias.
La transferencia de actividades econ6micas al sector privado fue
guardado dentro de los limites constitucionales, y reserv6 al Estado asuntos
de responsabilidad directa de funciones pfiblicas que son incapaces de ser
delegadas, y responsabilidad indirecta en asuntos de servicios ptiblicos
transferidos.
La ley en disputa declar6 la situaci6n econ6mica financiera de la
administraci6n ptiblica nacional, ambas centralizadas y descentralizadas,
estar en un estado de emergencia.
Esa declaraci6n incluy6 otras
organizaciones en que el Estado, o cualquiera de sus cuerpos, sostenian
control total de la mayoria en inversi6n capital o decisiones de los
incorporados.
2. Leyes Discreta de Dereglamentaci6n y Anti-Monopolio Para La
Economia (228/91 & 2488/91)
La Ley de Reforma del Estado incluye en sus dos enmendaduras la
lista de empresas y el curso de acci6n a ser seguido en todos los casos ya
que las posibilidades ofrecidas no acaban con privatizaci6n. La lista
siguiente de instrumentos para llevar a cabo la reforma es s6lo sugestiva en
que pueden utilizarse individualmente o en cualquier combinaci6n. Estos
son: la privatizaci6n, concesi6n, licencias y permisos, municipalizaci6n,
provincializaci6n, y programas de propiedad compartido. La seguridad
legal del proceso entero tambi6n fue acompafiada por la Ley de
Emergencia Econ6mica Estatuto 23.697. Esto puso en acci6n el poder de
la policia de la emergencia del Estado; suspendi6 durante un tiempo fijo
todos los subsidios y concesiones; las regulaciones de promoci6n

22. EDUARDO MENEM Y ROBERT DROMI, LA CONSTITUCION REFORMADA COMENTADA
INTERPRETADA Y CONCORDADA 92 (1994).
23.

ROBERTO DROMI, DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO (4ed., Ediciones Ciudad Argentina

1995).
24. En " " .Roberto Dromi, el famoso administrador ptiblico argentino que idealiz6
casi todas las leyes bdsicas de esta revoluci6n legal.
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industrial; la regulaci6n de promoci6n minera, y la regulaci6n de compras
nacionales. 25
3. Ley 23.928 de Convertibilidad del AustraP
Este estatuto es una parte importante de la ley econ6mica. Estatuto
23.928, eficaz el 1 de abril de 1991, contiene la f6rmula de la conversi6n
de nuestro dinero al d6lar de los Estados Unidos, estableciendo una
proporci6n fija de un peso por un d6lar de los Estados Unidos donde
previamente el intercambio de dinero requiri6 10,000 Australs por un d6lar
de las Estados Unidos. La ley de convertibilidad estA inspirada en el
principio politico saludable economico que, como declarado por
Kleidermacher, 26 los gastos no deben exceder ingreso. Por esto, el Estado
debe obtener los fondos legitimos requeridos para sus funciones por via de
la colecci6n de impuesto, privatizaci6n, las ventas de dispensable y los
recursos sueltos, prdstamos, la colocaci6n de ataduras o valuables en
general, y negociaciones de pr6stamos. Pero gastos que exceden la
cantidad de recursos disponibles no pueden ser cubiertos por dinero falso
no retrocedido por el intercambio correspondiente que mantendria la
paridad o la proporci6n fija establecida. A partir de la fecha eficaz de esta
ley, ningfin dinero puede hacerse si hay reservas insuficientes disponible
dentro del presupuesto de los oficiales apoyados. Uno de los aspectos mis
importantes de la ley es la prohibici6n de ajustes debido a inflaci6n, como
expresado en Articulo VIIde Estatuto 23.928 como sigue: El deudor de
una cierta suma de Australs obedece su obligaci6n en la fecha de madurez
que la cantidad nominal expres6.
En ningfin caso se permitird
actualizaci6n monetaria, indice de precios, variaci6n de costo o
revaluaci6n de obligaciones, cualquiera sus origenes, si hay
incumplimiento por parte del deudor o no antes del 1 de abril de 1991
cuando la convertibilidad del Austral se hace eficaz.
Se revocan todas provisiones y regulaciones legales presente y no
aplican las provisiones contractuales y convencionales contraria a lo
anterior. Por filtimo, debe notarse que la fecha eficaz del 1 de abril de
1991 para la conversi6n del sistema es obligatoria para todos, sin
excepci6n, y aplica retroactivamente a todos los contratos.
Hasta este momento, y gracias a un esfuerzo sobrehumano por
parte de las personas argentinas, acompafiadas por la mano f6rrica del
25.

Law of Economic Emergency Statute § 23.697, arts. I, II, III, & IV.

26. Sanc. y prom. 27/111/1991; B.O., 28 111/1991. Comenzo a ser ejecutado-el 4, de
enero, de 1991.
27. Vea generalmente Arnold Kleidermacher, Fiscalta De Regreso a la Conversi6n y el
Nominalismo, 16 DERECHo ECONWMIco 343.
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Ministerio de Economia, el plan va adelante ya habiendo logrado la
estabilidad deseada.
4. Ley de Reforma 24.144-Banca y Financiar
Desde la restauraci6n de democracia en 1983, habia un deseo
general para la reforma de la legislaci6n en actividades bancarios llevadas
a cabo en el pais en 1977 por medio de la reforma a la Carta
Constitucional Orgdrica del Banco Central de la Repfiblica de Argentina, y
Estatuto 21.526 en empresas financieras (enmendado y completado por
Estatuto 25.501 de 1979, 22.267 de 1980, y 22.529 de 1982).
En 1990 el Ejecutivo present6 ante el Congreso el proyecto oficial
para la nueva Carta Constitucional Orgdnica del Banco Central. Antes del
t6rmino extremo del 1992, el Parlamento Nacional pas6 Estatuto 23.144 2
que establece reforma importante a tres regulaciones juridicas de gran
importancia; a) la Carta Constitucional Orginica del Banco Central; b) la
Ley de Empresas de Financiero; y c) la Ley Tributaria Penal.
Esta ley presenta reformas importantes a la regulaci6n legal
bancaria de naci6n y actividad financiera que debe analizarse del punto de
vista juridico; pero tambi6n, como es el caso con todas las regulaciones
legales en materias econ6micas y financieras, el afecto que tales reformas
pueden causar en la economia nacional.
5. Carta Constitucional Orginica del Banco Central de la Reptiblica
de Argentina
Las reformas m.s importantes de la Carta Constitucional Orginica
son las siguientes:
a)
Establecimiento de la autonomia del Banco Central de la Reptiblica
de Argentina que ya no lo sujetard al Ministerio de Economia de la naci6n.
b)
Establecimiento de la funci6n primaria y bisica del Banco Central
de la Reptiblica de Argentina que es la preservaci6n del valor del dinero.
c)
La creaci6n de un Supervisor de Empresas Financiero e
Intercambio bajo un superintendiente y un vice-superintendiente quienes
estarin a cargo de dirigir actividades f'mancieras y del intercambio. Estas
posiciones serin postenidas por directores del Banco Central de la
Repfiblica de Argentina recomendados por el Presidente del Banco Central
y serin fijadas por el Presidente de la Repfiblica.
d)
Los descuentos y adelantos concedidos a las entidades por causa de
la falta temporal de solvencia s6lo ser,.n durante treinta dias sucesivos y no

28.

CARLOS GILBERTO VILLEGAS, LA REFORMA BANCARIA Y FINANCIERA (1993).

29. B.O., 22/X/1992.
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excederdn, en total, el valor del precio neto de la entidad. Se concederdn
adelantos contra la garantia de titulos ptiblicos o otro g6nero y valioso, con
garantia subsidiaria de seguridad, o por estorbos especiales o generales de
ciertos recursos.
Fondos prestados a las entidades bajo ninguna
circunstancia carecera de colaterales, ni se concederin pr6stamos que no
sean segurados por via de sobregiros en cuentas corrientes.
e)
El Banco Central de la Repfiblica de Argentina puede requerir que
las entidades hagan ciertas porciones de sus dep6sitos disponibles, en el
medio circulante nacional o extranjero, con la utilidad de regular la
liquidez general y lo que funcione mejor del mercado f'manciero.
6. Ley Para las Empresas Financieras
a)
Todos los asuntos relacionandos con la confidencialidad bancaria
son modificadas, linitando el mismo a los funcionamientos de obligaci6n
hechos por las entidades (dep6sitos y otras obligaciones). De esta manera
la obligaci6n de secreto no aplica a la inversi6n de fondos (pr6stamos y
creditos en general) y servicios (colecciones y pagos en general,
manejando de funcionamientos comerciales, poderes, etc.).
b)
Todos los codicos relacionados a sanciones y recursos que agregan
nuevos elementos para consideraci6n por el Banco Central antes de aplicar
sanciones son modificados.
c)
El sistema de liquidaci6n y bancarrota de empresas es modificado.
La liquidaci6n siempre seri juridica y serd manejada por un funcionario
(liquidador) fijado por el juez correspondiente.
d)
El sistema de dep6sitos garantizados, dado por la ley anterior, es
revocado.
e)
El Banco Central es autorizado para establecer los tdrminos y las
condiciones por la cual las entidades f'mancieras pueden usar sistemas de
reproducci6n como las fotografias, microfilmes, y cualquier otra
reproducci6n electr6nica de documentos que se guardan en luz de su valor
legal.
Con el prop6sito de la evidencia mejor, las copias pueden
autenticarse con tal de que sean certificadas por oficiales que son
responsables de su custodia.
f)
Todos los cheques deben mostrar el ntimero de identificaci6n
sujeto a impuestos codificado (CUIT). En casos donde el nfniero de
identificaci6n se omite, el nimero del documento que identifica al
poseedor de una cuenta corriente de acuerdo con las provisiones del Banco
Central debe mostrarse.
7. Ley del Intercambio Penal
La ley del Intercambio Penal 19.359 tambi6n es modificada
llevdndose del Banco Central los poderes de aplicar multas. En todos los
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casos, el Banco Central de la Repiiblica de Argentina preparar! s6lo la
acusaci6n y el caso iri a una corte de primera impresi6n por las Multas
Econ6micas en la Capital Federal o un juez federal en la provincia
correspondiente.
Finalmente, lo siguiente son modificaciones adicionales a esta ley:
la revocaci6n de Estatuto 21.572 que crea la Cuenta para la Regulaci6n
Monetaria y la revocaci6n de decreto 4611/58 ratificada por ley 14.467 de
Fiscalizaci6n del Sistema de Intercambio del Banco Central.
CONCLUSION
Atrav6s de esta escritura, nosotros hemos intentado dar una
apreciaci6n global del estado en el que la ley econ6mica existe
presentemente en Argentina, y expresar a qu6 punto se ha vivido y ha sido
experimentado por los habitantes de Argentina a trav6s de las reformas
radicales introducidas por el gobierno.
El mismo es evidente por el nacimiento de esta nueva rama de ley.
La economia y ley no adelantan en sendas separadas, y no estdn como el
agua y aceite. Los dos son ciencias sociales capaz de coexistir, pero que
como ciencias sociales debe tenerse en cuenta que su laboratorio es la
sociedad y no s6lo un pedazo de papel que puede borrarse o puede
cruzarse durante una reuni6n ministerial. Nosotros recomendamos por
consiguiente que el individuo, la persona, no sea considerado simplemente
otro factor cuando una cuenta no equilibra, pero que sean considerado una
parte integra al que todos nosotros aspiramos el bien comtin.
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I.

OUTLINE OF THE ANALYSIS

The law of economics is one of the most current and complex
demonstrations of the spectrum of law for our time. In its modem form it
is a series of ideological factors which transcended through the years and
appear as it originally did. The daily constant fact of dictation in positive
legal norms creates serious implications when it treated an institution
rooted in the postulates of the economic law.
The law, independently of complying with its primary mission of
regulating, symbolically appears as the top of an iceberg stemming out of
turbulent waters made of human conceptions, an irreproachable testament

to the ideas that have not submerged.
* The Author is a member of la Asociaci6n Internacional de Estudiantes de Abogacia,
(A.I.E.A.), located in Mendoza, Argentina. In 1996 he obtained his Juris Doctor degree at the
University of Mendoza in Mendoza, Argentina.
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This paper will attempt to give a comprehensive meaning to the
topic discussed and then attempt to look deeply in search of a systematic
explanation.
II. THE SOCIAL PROBLEM AND THE LEGAL SOLUTION
In our Argentina's recent history, one of the principle social
problems in requirement of a solution is the shortage of housing. A
solution is necessitated because the problem generates complex negative
social implications, principally due to its reputation as a continuous
deterioration.
Basing itself on the fundamental principles of a social welfare
state, Article 14 of the National Constitution of the Argentine Republic,
within what are known as social rights, contains the right to a dignified
life. Several legislative attempts have been made in order to convert this
high principle in text into functional and operational laws.
In this context, around the end of 1994, the National Executive
Branch sent to the National Congress a legal project that basically called
for the carrying forward of a housing financing plan that would be
accessible to the majority of the people, and at the same time, would
significantly absorb the unemployed and underemployed labor force.'
Without a doubt, these are real legal problems of the Argentinean Society.
In addition to the predicated social goals, the legislative body was
pursuing competitive financing for the construction industry, long term
financing for the buyers through a mortgage system, and the creation of a
secondary market for mortgages.
After an intense parliamentary debate, the project was finally
approved in January of 1995 (National Law 24.441, Financing for Housing
and Construction.) 2
The effect of the cited law is to incorporate certain institutions into
our legal system - property rights, leasing, common funds for real estate
investment, even though these were not used or unknown in the local
judicial system. The reason for its previous disuse was the lack of detailed
regulations that guaranteed a legal safety framework with respect to such
operations.
Locating itself in the margin of discrepancies involving legislative
policy matters that relate to the formulation of the law and its finalization,
the event which was brought out in debates of both houses of the National

1. Jorge Saager y Amolia Cortina et at., s/ ejecuci6n hipotecaria,Dictamen del Fiscal de
CamaraDr. Carlos R. Sanz, REV. EL DERECHO, Feb. 19, 1996, at 2.
2. See generallyLegislaci6n Argentina 63 TOMO A REV. EL DERECHO (1995).
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Congress, coincidentally pointed out the need for regulating institutions
that handle and execute legislation.
A cumbersome execution procedure, generating uncertainties about
the terms of recovering the capital invested through this legislation, it has
been viewed as one of the principal factors that contribute to the high
interest rates of housing loans., In the new system, management of the
sales of properties and of the cancellation of debt is the creditor's
responsibility. The defenses and admissible related laws work in favor of
the protection of the debtor through the judicial organ from the possible
excessiveness which could be committed by the executing creditor.
It is in this manner that the special procedure for execution, which
is carried out directly by the creditor, eliminates the need of a judicial
order. In this sense, article 57 states that after verifying the state of the
real property, the creditor will order, without judicial intervention, the sale
of the affected property in a public auction secured by means of the
auctioneer that the creditor designates and in accordance with the usual
normal customs.
As, of course, the part of the logic of such a plan, article 54
permits creditors to request that a judge verify the present status of the
property before the mortgage matures. If the property is occupied, an
eviction notice will be ordered under provisions which permit the use of
public force.
It should be clarified that the incorporated execution provisions
contain various guarantees some of which permit several judicial
interventions to assure the protection of the indebted.
The first and
foremost is the voluntary nature of the special procedure; it only begins
operating when the parties have agreed and at the moment of constituting
the mortgage guarantee. Second, it is the judge who orders the monitoring
and verification of the present status of the property (article 54), grants the
creditor possession of the property (article 65), and approves the
liquidation conducted by the creditor (article 60). The debtor can,
furthermore, interfere under a limited number of exceptions to demonstrate
certain facts that would make the sale of the property in public auction
improper: that there is no debt; that the debtor has kept up with his
payments; that no agreement was made as to the methods elected by- the
creditor; and so forth.
Finally, the system relies heavily on the possibility that the original
debtor may re-acquire the property for the amount in which it was taken
away (plus a three percent increase to cover costs and honorariums) within
30 days of the auction.
3.

REV. ANTECEDENTES PARLAMENTARIOS 110 nn.4, 38 (1995).
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From the procedural and systematic point of view, the central line
of the law is focused on separating the essential aspects from the non
essential aspects of the judicial process. Together with other instruments
such as mediation and notary procedures, these practices struggle to
decongest judicial traffic, to improve the access to judicial services, and to
reduce the high costs of the current legal procedures. In general, it could
be said that this flexible process consists of trying to suppress the legal or
conventional rigidities in order to adapt to new realities. Instead of
flexibility, Ramiro Podetti preferred to call it adaptability which, in some
instances, causes deregulation and in others more regulation."'
A. ParliamentaryDiscussion
The principal question of the legislation referred to previously was
the unconstitutionality of the mortgage executions. Another issue was that
it was perceived as a mere copy of the majority of jurisdictions in the
United States.
If what is intended is to apply in our country is solutions used in
others, indicated Senator Aguirre Lanari during discussions of the project
in the Argentine Senate, "those which are sought could probably be
incorporated in our constitution. If the argument is that our judicial system
is slow, he continued, the road that has been followed would suggest that
there may not be a justice at all . . . .
The argument of the unconstitutionality of the mortgage execution
procedure is based on Article 17 of the National Constitution which states
that nobody can be deprived of property but by virtue of a judgment of
law. Such prohibition shelters the owner against any improper deprivation
of his property, as long as any deprivation originates from the public, the
6
state, and its organs.
The arrangement from Article 17 of the Argentine Constitution is
not equivalent to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
In the United States no one can be deprived of their property without legal
due process. Deputy Leconte states that such provisions of legal process
rights transmit a different concept in relationship to the necessity of
procedural guarantee in different environments. 7
4. Humberto Podetti, Reforma Laboral: Adaptabilidad Jurldica a la Realidad Actual,
REv. GERNCIA 73 (1995).

5.

PARLAMENTARIOS, supra note 3, at 117, nn.4, 227 (editorial note:

translated from

Spanish).
6.

SEGUNDO LINARES QUINTANA TRATADO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 85 nn.

3886, 3887 (Tomo V 1972).
7.

PARLAMENTARIOS, supra note 3, at 117, nn. 4, 87.
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Constitutionally consecrated, the procedural guarantee should
become an integral part of the national public order, a concept that an
Argentine Civil leader defined as an eminent principle, religious, moral,
political, and economic, to those established social organizations to which
a dignified sustenance is linked.'
Elena Highton supports this in one of the most advanced studies on
the new legal problems: that the non-adhesion to Article 17 of the
National Constitution stems from the exigency of a previous agreement to
maintain public order which requires the establishment of such new
procedures. She adds that the public order is not jeopardized, since it
would be possible to submit the converted problems of the public to other
methods of solutions, without infringing on the basic standards of the
country's legal system.9
B. Area of ContractualFreedom
American law, in mortgage matters, applies the principle of sale
foreclosures, a rule that grants the authorization or power that the debtor
has to his or her creditor as a way for the creditor to proceed to an extrajudicial sale of the property and concluding the credit relationship that links
them. 10
Contractual freedom in the United States, and in the countries that
apply common law, is broader than in those of the Latin tradition." What
is apparent and logical is that the prevailing value system in each country
differs profoundly.12
For example, in the United States, the New Jersey Supreme Court
had to deal with a case that involved a married couple that was incapable
of having children. The couple entrusted a young woman to conceive a
child with the husband in exchange for a sum of money. After the contract
was formalized, and the child had been born, the biological mother
changed her mind and did not want to give up her child to the couple.

8.

JORGE J. LLAMBIAS, TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL, PARTE GENERAL 158 (Tomo I,

Ed. Zavalia 1986).
ELENA HIGHTON ET AL., REFORMAS AL DERECHO PRIVADO 328 (1995).
10. See generally Elena Highton, Panorama del Regimen de las Garantiasen el derecho

9.

Estadounidense119 REV. DE DERECHO PRIVADO Y COMUNITARIO (1993).

11. See generally Camille Spinosi Jauffret, Juge le Juge Angalis? DROITS, REVUE
n.9.

FRANCAISE DE THEORIE JURIDIQUE 56

12.

MATrHIAS STORME, THE VALIDITY AND THE CONTENT OF CONTRACTS, TOWARDS A

EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 159 (Martinus Nijhoff ed., 1994).

952

ILSA Journalof Int ' & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 4:947

However, the court held that having a voluntary agreement, the biological
mother was obligated to comply with the contract and give up the baby. 3
It is further pointed out, in support of the differences in the value
systems, that while in Argentina, slavery was abolished in 1813, in the
United States it was not abolished until 1860." Such historical facts would
also indicate a certain type of ideological and chronological relationship
between both cultures.
It seems to be then that contractual freedom, an imminent legal
concept, requires a deep penetration into the philosophical plan of each
nation in order to search for the substance of such legal concepts.
It happens to be that it is not within the definitive dominance of the
law, or of the judgment, where the real truth reigns, but rather in the
abstract fields, and certainly within polemics, of the principles that sustain
those institutions of law.
C. PhilosophicalConsiderations
As the central idea of his thesis, an outstanding Argentinean
political analyst uses an explanation of the dichotomy of
development-underdevelopment, to point out that the canon moral ideas
determine the course towards which a society directs its dynamics." As
part of a wider cultural phenomenon, the difference between the developed
and underdeveloped societies also includes a moral difference.
The
developed societies only demand a moral or average mean: that each
individual pursue their own objectives without violating the rights of
others. Since such a moderate goal is set, it is generally reached. The
underdeveloped societies, on the other hand, have a higher moral standard
which demands its members to give all of themselves on behalf of high
ideals, the solidarity, God, or the State, unfolding a defined space between
the moral that is proclaimed, all, and the moral that is fulfilled, little or

nothing.
The right, as a normative system, is no more than a reflection of
the prevailing moral system in a society that is determined by historical
moments.
Thus, the Anglo-Saxon world based its political concepts,
economical concepts, and logically its legal concepts, on the original and
powerful idea of the individual. It relied on the individual and instituted it
as the shaft around which the world should turn. The corollary nature of
13.

See generally 88 REv. ANTECEDENTES PARLAMENTARIOS 117, nn.4 (1995).

14. Id. at nn. 4, 87.
15.
1988).

MARIANO GRONDONA, BAJO EL IMPERIO DE LAS IDEAS MORALES, (Sudamericana ed.
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such ontological trust could not be anything other than an attitude
measured by the community in respect to the individual, translated into
limits imposed on freedom.
It was understood, through a deep historical reflection, that an
ideal cannot be sustained while concomitantly denying necessary
consequences; and since the bet was for the individual, one had to let him
act and only deny the possibilities when his own conduct denied others the
realization of his own plans for life."
The explanation of the adoption of this individualistic
anthropologism is nourished with certain religious roots: the difference,
according to history, between philosophy and religion. Modernism burst
upon the Old World like imminent enthusiasm, like a purified synthesis of
the imminent apathy of the Greeks serene adaptation to this world, passive
contemplation in the search of the original causes,17 and the transcendent
enthusiasm of the Medieval, concrete action in this world but searching for
access to a superior world. 8 The continent ended drenched in modernity,
but the paths traveled were difficult since many obstacles had to be
overcome. Meanwhile in Continental Europe, the modem spirit is born
against the prevailing religion; in the Anglo-Saxon world, it grows with it.
Modernism is there a revolutionary break, while here it is tradition.9
While thinking in Continental Europe was oscillating abruptly
between the cult of the omnipotent God and the cult of the rational
individual, Anglo-Saxon Europe was immutable to such changes. The
Supreme Being was not forgotten in the name of science, nor was salvation
rejected as the ultimate end for man; what was scorned was earthly
sacrifice as a way to reach it. When it is impossible to persuade God
through prayer, in order to alter one's destiny, the only possible option is
to persuade oneself to act according to God's will to obtain success in life,
success earned in this life.
Salvation, the basis of the earthly existence for the spirits of the
great theologians of Christianity, will be reached, now, by the common
man, the concrete man, and in this world? ° In this way, the moral
revolution of Puritanism arms and equips the ideal character of economic

16.

ROBERT NOZICK,

PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS,

THE BELKNAP

PRESS

OF

HARVARD (University Press, 1981).
17. Julian Marias, Historia de la Filosofia, 45 REVISTA DE OCCIDENTE (1956).
18. JUAN CARLOS SMITH, EL PENSAMIENTO IUSFILOS6FICO MEDIEVAL,
DESAROLLO DE LAS CONCEPCIONES IUSFILOS6FICAS 53 (Abeledo-Perrot, 1980).

EN
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19. GRONDONA, supra note 15, at 103.
20.

MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Charles

Scribner's Sons ed., 1976).
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development.
By not having to attack religion, the Anglo-Saxon
puritanical culture managed to pass from the transcendence to the
imminence without trauma and without blame.
The logical evolution takes a position on the postulates of the
human existence which presently is relied on by Abraham Maslow who, in
certain ways, today symbolizes medieval Anglo-Saxon culture. 2' The old
Latin term Salus no longer means salvation but health.

III. THE ARGENTINEAN POSITION IN THE WORLD OF IDEAS
Our country, on the other hand, by way of its more notable
intellectuals, received the ideas of the Enlightenment, and made bombastic
statements in support of a freedom that it had never experienced. While in
France they spoke of liberty, in South America they thought of
independence: either everyone free or everyone as slaves, those were the
choices.
Juan Bautista Alberdi, the primary creator of the Argentine
constitutional order, signaled that freedom, ontologically considered, can
be separated into three different planes: the individual freedom of each
subject; individual autonomy, as a fact of dictating norms of proper
conduct; the freedom of the inner political community; collective
autonomy, understood as power to organize oneself in a convenient
manner; and the exterior freedom of the political community,
independence, referring to its non-submission with respect to other political
communities.
Latin America, by a historical imperative, always trailed behind; it
felt obligated to declare itself independent to undertake the challenge of
self government. And as the independence had been obtained through the
use of arms, it was quite logical to suppose that in this same way interior
freedom could also be achieved.
Our land raised itself under the explosions of cannons and
sometimes of the less grandiose, but more effective automatic weapons.
Whatever the flag to be defended, it is certain that the ideas, which were
impregnated with the smell of gunpowder, require, so that they last in
people's consciousness, the smell not to wear off.
All ideas imposed, either by way of dogma or by arms, derive
from paternalism.
The moral is transformed from substantially an
individual phenomenon into a derivative phenomenon, derivative from
anomalous sources from other cultural influences: from a party, from a
church, and from the state. It is in this way that in underdeveloped
21. ABRAHAM H.MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING (Van Nostrand Reinhold
Company, 1968).
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societies the fact that someone dictates to others the behavioral norms
blocks the formidable expanse of energy that is born from individual
motivation.
A. Latin America and IndividualLiberty
Domingo Sarmiento, Agustin Alvarez, and Francisco Bulnes were
some of the pens that took care of reminding the world that the Latin
American man, blacks, mulattos, and mestizos occupied an inferior place
to those in the north in the Darwinian scale.2 It was malleable material,
requiring instruction and advice, whether or not they were conscious of
that necessity. Enrique Dussel would say that "the dependence of Latin
America is, before economics, ontological: the Latin American man is an
23
oppressed, colonial, and ontologically dependent human being."
The majority of Latin American countries were considered or
considered themselves as minorities, always needing a commander to guide
them, and indicate in which direction to fire their weapons or direct their
statements. Those who shared their ideas and followed their steps were
free, the others were enemies.
It was not strange then, that in actions, never in writings,
individual freedom was forgotten. It was a curious fact that an individual
capable of doing all those things not affecting the public order, morals, or
the good habits 4 would seem continuously threatened by the ideological
trident that Leviathan was brandishing to control its passions, to guide it
always beforehand by the road of a conceived common good.
From Hobbes to Lenin, the paternalistic authorities consider the
human being as a minor whom a guardian must protect and discipline.
From Von Misses to Ayn Rand, the ultraliberals think that the human
being knows very well what interests him, and he should be allowed to be
completely self autonomous, because each individual's search for his own
good coincides with the general public's good.
None of these extreme views coincide with the actual feelings of
the Argentinean man. The challenge of our days does not consist of
cutting the chains of a paternalistic state and throwing ourselves hastily
toward the opposite extreme in a frantic race, but rather to fine tune our
ability to adjust, by delineating our own solution in a world in which the
22.

JUAN J. SEBRELI, EL ASEDIO A LA MODERNIDAD 296 (Sudamericana ed., Buenos

Aires, 1992).
23.

ENRIQUE DUSEL, PARA UNA FUNDAMENTACION

DIALCTICA DE LA LIBERACI6N

LATINOAMERICAN, STOMATA 79, n.1 (Universidad del Salvador, 1972).
translated from Spanish).
24.

ARG. CONST. art. 19.

(Editorial note:
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solutions stem less and less from individual ideas and more from ideas
which are induced.
The nations, asserts Michael Porter, will be what they themselves
decide to be, since, "the matters of each country, as well as the ways of
approaching them are unique."" There is no question that the decisions
are no longer unilateral. It is-not about seeking the Argentinean essence in
the ways of the intellectuals of the South,16 but instead analyzing and
assuming our differences in order to make us fully conscious of the reality,
crude, but reality until the end of our time.
B. Again About the Role of the State
The analysis returns, it seems unavoidably, to the dissolution of the
position which the state should assume for the individual, a discussion that
is as ancient as it is prominent.
The topic was already approached in 1776 by Adam Smith in The
Wealth of Nations and its central argument was simple: it did not support
that the state was managing the economy incorrectly, but instead that
because of its very nature, it could not handle managing the economy.2 It
did not support, for example, that an eagle flies better than an elephant, but
that an elephant, because of his very nature, could never fly.
The distinction becomes important when, as Peter Drucker& well
observed, the discussion has turned in these last years, on the basis of what
the state should do, forgetting to determine what it can do.
And when duties are assumed that cannot be fulfilled, the result
should not be auspicious. It is like saying, in spite of everything, the
elephant flies.
In Argentina, the State, in converting into a direct economic actor,
intended to replace the absent competitive middle class by creating a
gigantic and deformed mechanism. The same mess that was used before to
create that interventionist State, is intended to be imposed today to
propagate the destruction of the market.
"Might the moment have
arrived," questions Mariano Grondona, "of seeking an equilibrium, of
undertaking the march toward an equidistant point from one extreme to the
29
other, there where we Argentineans can find what is reasonable?"

25. MICHAEL PORTER, POR GRONDONA, MARIANO; EL POSLIERALISMO 158 (Planeta ed.,
1992). (Editorial note: translated from Spanish).
26. JUAN J.SEBRELI, EL ASEDIO A LA MOIDERINIDAD 303 (Sudamericana ed., 1992).

27. See generally, Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1977).
28.

PETER DRUCKER, THE NEW REALITIES 60 (Harper & Row Publishers 1989).

29.

MARIANO GRONDONA, LA CORRUPC16N (Planeta ed., 1993).
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It is known that absolute answers do not exist on this subject, since
it is territory of individual transactions. Getting rid of interventionism and
libertarianism does not seem to signify any type of contribution: the debate
tries to establish which of the extremes we should direct ourselves towards
without losing sight of, and using as a guide, that certain equidistant point
which can only be reached by using a civic maturity which we do not
presently possess but for which we have already begun to search.
Understand that what Andres Ollero has called permissible
statehood, that which consists according to its own characterization, "in
that the state permits individuals absolute freedom in the field of hedonistic
satisfactions. .

.,

but reserves strictly to itself everything that has to do

with the control of public opinion, the managing of the political machine
and education's ideological orientation."30

No, the state should not be a fugitive whose emptiness is to be
filled by the chaos of complete freedom, but a strategist: Porter 3' indicates
that the secret of competitive nations is that their state has plotted a plan
that compels its private corporations to compete, since otherwise its
incentives would inevitably fail. This type of intervention is called indirect
intervention: subtle, but effective.
C. Argentina and the Free Market
Jorge Dominguez, a teacher of Latin American Studies at Harvard
Law School, has elaborated the thesis that the lag of Latin American
countries in economic development is due to their obsession about
economic development, which leads them to neglect ethical, political, and
institutional factors that are presumed for it.
Thus, in the name of that supreme end, any plan that promised to
shorten the road was applauded or, in any event, accepted with resignation.
It has been the urgency for economic development, that still subsists with
full force, that has compelled Argentina to adopt the model of the free
market.
In the contemporary world, the what is hardly discussed whether the free market or some alternative option - instead the how is
what is discussed: how to arrive to the free market, how to soften its
crudeness, how to instill in society a change of mental attitude necessary so
that it really can be erected as a social engine, and so it will not be
ideologically criticized or looked upon unfavorably.

30. Massini Correas, Carlos Ignacio; La Filosofia de los Derechos Humanos y la
Rgulaci6n Jurdicade la Familia, 7 EN BOLETIN EL DERECHO DEL (Oct. 12, 1990).
31.

PORTER, supra note 25, at 157.
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However, we should not lose sight of the fact that even though it is
intended to be made dogma (in the manner of the liberal Argentine
economists inspired by Ludwig von Mises) the economic model is but
convenient.
John Stuart Mill said that while in the political spectrum freedom is
imperative, in the economic spectrum it is a mere convenience.1 2 Inother
words, the economic model subordinates itself, ontologically and
chronologically, to the political conception of a society. Because of this,
in order for the economic model, understanding the option for a free
market as a method of assigning resources more conveniently, to operate
correctly, it must necessarily respect the political purposes that precede it
and the moral principles contained in these, since these are its
nourishment.
IV.

ARGENTINEAN SYLLOGISM

First premise: It just so happens that this tool which has been
termed the free market, on which is predicated so many virtues and sins, is
an institution in which the canons of economic liberalism are profoundly
instilled.
Second premise: Liberalism, as a humanistic concept, in the
political spectrum gives rise to the complete freedom of the individual, the
accomplishment of his personal aspirations, that can be understood by no
one but oneself with certainty that which is in one's best interest. "That
which the individual is capable of doing for himself," sustains Robert
Nozick, "no one should do for him."" It supposes, furthermore, a
pre-option in the area of moral values that dictates the rules of work be
automatically established.
Conclusion: Argentina's adoption of an economic system based on
the free market is not a consequence of philosophical coherence, since it
does not answer to clear and individual conceptions but instead to external
imperatives.
Economics, though it seems a Marxist type paradox,
determines, in our country, what is political.
Perhaps this affirmation seems harsh, but truth emerges as much
from serious analysis as it does from an article in a newspaper. History
compels us once more to walk disorderly toward a destiny like the paths
which others have begun, to accept results before waiting for the
consequences. Seneca said that if a peasant plants his field with wheat but
instead flowers grow, this is a result but not a consequence, since it lacks a

32. Id.
33.

NOZICK, supra note 16.
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logical sequence. The peasant did not plant wheat to have flowers grow,
but this is the results of having cultivated the field with wheat.
Therefore, the issue to be solved, if one actually wants to interfere
with the national syllogism, what is in reality, considered logically, is not
so, in a manner in which the conclusion is a real consequence and not a
mere result.
Once the decision of whether or not to bet on coherence is firmly
adopted, the great question will be, which of those terms to vary. Should
we abandon the market so that the political speeches and the moral
dilemmas will finally recover their grandiose words and inefficiency of
facts? Perhaps Mario Benedetti words are correct when he asserts that
"Latin America does not want to be a first world country, but wants to be
allowed to be a third world country with propriety and without hunger,
with dignity and without a dagger in the throat." 14
However, the north compass of the world as well as the clear and
insoluble message of democracy of popular vote seem to indicate to us it is
not the road, that the sea bass live without hunger is not enough. Thus,
the most reasonable option that remains is to learn from foreign
experiences from scrutinizing "the ideas or values that push toward the
development of the first as well as the ideas or values that retain in the
underdevelopment to the last of those worlds." 3
Max Weber was asked why capitalism was born in Europe in the
Fifteenth and Sixteenth centuries if it had already existed. He arrived at
the conclusion that the phenomenon is explained by the emergence, to the
par of the economic dimension of those societies, of ethics, the puritan,
that preached the contracting of work, the search for economic success.
These factors generated the original accumulation of conditions that
permitted the development of the free market, the one which appears thus
strongly bound to a socio-moral context that favored it. Other stages, on
the other hand, did not do it. Therefore, there is no reason to assert that
the free market has to last indefinitely.
Today, nevertheless, it is,
paraphrasing Mill, the more convenient option.
Such effort for progress will demand a predetermination clearly
with the intention of helping in the gradual and slow process of change, of
definitely resigning to the generation's spontaneous utopias. Just as
slavery was, in its time, progress with respect to previous situations,
before, the prisoners were directly executed, the wild capitalism denounced
by Marx represented a great advance with respect to the feudal society of
34. MARIO BENEDETri, PERPLEJIDADES DE FIN DE SIGLO 191 (Seix Barral 1993)
(editorial note: translated from Spanish).
35. GRONDONA, supra note 15, at 13 (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
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the landowners, in Argentina, of the large agricultural producers. In the
current markets, the great fortunes of the few rich exploiters who
constituted the great capitalists of long ago have been replaced by the
modest contribution, though structural, of the working man's pension

funds .

6-

Argentina has been demonstrating, for a while, a firm intention to
change in that direction; not -only has it been inclined by a strong
revitalization of its laws, 7 but it has also opened its doors to the national
constitution, which had been reserved and jealously kept, to allow in new
air, and give real meaning to ideas which before were only known on
paper. This process in which we are immersed, must be stressed
progressively, so that the intentions are translated into action.
A. Implications of the Adoption of a StrangeLegal Institute
Having used an imminent legal issue as an instrumental excuse to
approach the analysis of topics that underlie what is legal, the positives and
negatives of the proposed institution will have to be studied in light of the
concrete experiences that stem from its application.
However, it is not the operation of the institution that is of
concern, but the attitude that acceptance or repudiation implies.
What is decisive, is understanding that when it is intended to move
an institution from one legal system to another, the goal is not to copy
every letter of the twenty or the thirty articles exactly, but instead to share,
in some form, with transformed morals, certain anthropological concepts
that follow some time when the institution will be adopted and regulated in
another environment.
Consecrating an executory procedure foreign to protectionist mores
of the destitute individual implies, an attitude, warning that from now on it
will have to be more careful in managing their interests. The State will
watch over the education of its children and over their medical attention
but will not tell them when and how one can get into debt.
Echoes that speak out against those who consider absolute
economic ends of the institution, against the inflexible adoption of "a legal
and economic instrument, that attends only to the part of legal businesses
that it plans to regulate, the capitalist, under the appearance of legislative
modernization.""

36. DRUCKER, supra note 28, at 178.
37.

ROBERTO DROMI, DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO 14 (Ciudad Argentina 1994).

38. Carlos A.Ghersi, La Ley 24.441 de Financiamientoy Constuccion de Viviendas, EN
REV. LA LEY 1112 (1995) (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
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Wrathful legal sarcasms were drawn, in similar attitude, with
relation to the reform of the regime carried forward by law 23.264,31 in
which there is almost total comparison between legitimate and illegitimate
children. By the same token, an author indicated that "the common good
of the family relinquishes in the face of the individual good of its
members" upon commenting on the new arrangement incorporated into the
Civil Code, article 236, that permits a child born out of wedlock to
investigate his maternity "when it is to attribute the son to a married
woman."-,
Flagrant attempts against the national identity of the Argentineans
are denounced, and are seen as direct assaults to our idiosyncrasies and to
our traditions. In terms of extremists, Jorge Carrizo says: "[m]any
intellectuals in our country preach the need to not only adapt to the
requirements imposed by the current globalization process, but also to
finish with the debate about our national identity in order to facilitate our
transition to the first world. "41
Concluding, he asserts that, "the
interdependence, the internalization of the economy, and the policy which
the nuclear powers have not been able to express without stressing, at the
same time, the dependency and increasing lag levels of the weakest
nations, without the pretension of imposing on them cultural dominance,
emptying their history, liquidating their traditions and their identity." 4 2
It is postulated that even the directing classes, colonized by foreign
ideas, gradually displace real culture, that is believed in the society in
which one lives and which one belongs to, by the culture of what is
imaginary, "that is built of aspirations-to change realities, a very different
aspirations to that of changing reality.-,3
It is not a strange result, however, to hear such demands, in a
measure in which adoption of such legal instruments was not preceded by
an actual analysis by the Argentinean society about the real and concrete
implications that the world has supposedly wanted and claimed.
The central issue does not pass through the national identity, but
rather by way of conceiving it. "To succeed in the solutions, one will

39.

See generally REV. EL DERECHO LEGILCION ARGENTINA 184 (1985).

40. Jorge A.Mazzinghi, Components Ideologicos de al Reforma Legislativa en Materia de
Filiacion,EN BOLETIN EL DERECHO 1 (Oct. 30, 1986) (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
41. Jorge H.Carrizo, Construccion de la identidad nacional y proceso historico en la
Argentina, en Globalizacion, Itegracion e Identidad Nacional, 355 LATINOAMERICANO,
COLECCION ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES (1994) (editorial note: translated from Spanish).

42. Id. at 356 (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
43.

BATALLA BONFIL, GUILLERMO, PENSAR NUESTRA CULTURA 16 (Alianza 1991)

(editorial note: translated from Spanish).

ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law

[Vol. 4:947

have to separate oneself of the ominous roads of the servile limitation of
what is foreign, so much as to the sterile and distrustful confinement."" It
has to do with observing, criticizing, experiencing, and not only using our
rich national experience, but also using all the available elements that
provide us with the unavoidable reality of an increasingly interdependent
world. It actually has to do with "not losing the capacity to elaborate on a
4
horizon that makes sense.""
When trying to explain the reasons for our country not being able
to compete with others, or at least why it can not compete with the
possibility of success, its intent is to exalt certain national characteristics
that are not carried well with the efficiency, the smallest effort, the state
privilege, the native quickness, is accepted, as an attitude, that we will not
be able to aspire to the same standard of living as those. The solution does
not consist of a blind stubbornness to maintain such characteristics and a
systematic frustration because the same results can not be reached, but in
assuming fully an analysis of the fact that a preference excludes the other.
"The native schizophrenic," says Jorge Bustamante, "that intends to
preserve our vices and aspire to consequences of foreign virtues will
almost inevitably lead to collective unhappiness."4
We live in times of definition. Argentina today needs discussions
to be clear and have specific direction. It must get rid of, once and for all,
reverences toward certain philosophical concepts that, condemned by a
negative emotive load, generate spontaneously adverse feelings. Because
the terms of the social speech, teaches Jurgen Habermas, should not only
be known, but also understood by all the speakers regardless of the
conclusion arrived at.
B. Assimilating Different Legal Systems
Bouncing between the extremes of this dichotomy of inverted
terms shows a disoriented judicial order, disoriented because it never
understands if the function that actually competes is that of regular realities
such as are presented, the way postulated by Savigny, or if it must, on the
44. Cristian Buchruker, Notas Sobre la ProblematicaHistorico-Ideologicade la Indentidad
Nacional Argentina, en Globalizacion, Integracion e Identidad
LATINOAMERICANO,
COLECCION ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES (1994)
translated from Spanish).

Nacional, 324
(editorial note:

45. NORBER LECHNER, Los PATIOS INTERIORES DE LA DEMOCRACIA 118 (Fondo de
Cultura Economica, Santiago de Chile, 1991) (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
46. JORGE E.BUSTAMANTE, LA RESPUESTA LIBERAL 96 (Privada 1988) (editorial note:
translated from Spanish).
47.
1988).

CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, INTRODUCION AL ANALISIS DE DERECHO 269 (Astrea
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other hand, be erected, as was sustained by Bentham, as a moralizing
instrument, an instigator of habits and valuable practices, stimulating at the
same time new expectations.
It can be asserted, in this regard, that the changes produced in
society are reflected, sooner or later, in the legal order, and this at the
same time, tends to serve as a promoter of new social standards.
Today what is legal is conceived, in short, as an instrument to
organize the social life according to the moral principles and prevailing
political ideas in the community. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that
more fluid intercommunication of ideas and principles of other cultures
will bring a deeper contact between the positive institutions instead of
limiting the legal spectrum of the respective systems.
"In all the large legal problems," notes a great Argentinean jurist,
"it should be observed that all the laws are guided toward two or three
possible solutions and that within each one of them the legal solutions are
similar. The greater intercommunication between people has stressed a
trend toward uniformity." 48
In the same sense, and during the parliamentary discussion that
proceeded the approval of law 24.441, Deputy Crostelli indicated that,
"[flor a world where distances have been shortened and exchanges
intensified, the approximation of the various systems of law without
49
change in the vernacular structure, undoubtedly shows an interest."
We speak of consequences of the logically infallible products of
We gradually abandon old fundamental ideas for serious
history.
objectives that lead to change. The time of opposing the Latin American
spirit in favor of a mercantilism without the spirit of the North, in the way
of Ariel by Jose Enrique Rodo, has passed.
The law, cultural object of excellence, can not stay foreign to the
process. In the words of Frederick Maitland, "[a]nyone that decides to
actually possess that which has been called historical sense must, in my
opinion, abstain from considering that a rule or an idea can survive
forcefully. An anachronism thus would not offend not only its reason, but
also its tact." 0
However, the assimilation is gradual, since it implies a kind of
ideological transaction, loathe to renounce the absolutely certain axiomatic

48.

Guillermo Borda, Tratado de Derecho Civil, I, DERECHO DE FAMILIA 191 (Perrot

1989) (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
49. See generally REV. ANTECEDENTES
(editorial note: translated from Spanish).
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principles that nestle the minds structured pursuant to them. In the Europe
of our days quite removed already of that extra baggage of moral
principles with which it educated us where all seems common, voices
scream out claiming, "the rise of legal nationalism that to a large extent
characterizes our consciousness .... "5
Today, Argentina lives in what would be called a crisis of
All crisis situations generate strong processes of
uncertainty. 2
destructurization of reality and of its codes of interpretation and action, but
also create new forms of structure. It calls for a rereading of the present
state and the past. It demands a full analysis of disciplinary actions
permitting an understanding and incorporation of what is new and deserves
to be incorporated.

C. The Challenge of the Prosecutor
The classic theory of judicial activity, which originated in the
school of French exegesis and the German concepts of jurisprudence,
characterizes this as a mechanical application of certain rules to cases to be
considered today improved.5 3 Alf Ross teaches that evolution has produced
two different systems: that of beliefs and that of attitudes. 5'
The ideal of understanding completely the laws applicable to a case
and the complete knowledge of the relevant facts that should be judged,
has been replaced by the acceptance of the fact that the knowledge of the
procedures and the knowledge of the facts is, generally, imperfect and by a
trend to make the cost in all the decisions a series of political order
circumstances, social and economic, that surrounded the sanction of the
legal procedures as well as the production of the examined fact.
In the domain of attitudes, the neat formal legal conscience that
demanded the strict application of the law competes today with the material
legal conscience of the judges, that is to say, with the desire of arriving to
a solution acceptable in what is personal.
"The study of the possibility of social changes through rights has
been concentrated generally," asserts Carlos Nino, "in the creation of legal

51.

RICHARD ZIMMERMAN, ROMAN LAW AND EUROPEAN LEGAL UNITY, IN TOWARDS A

EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 67 (Martinus Nijhoff ed., 1994).
52. MARTA NAVARRO Y LILIA SERVETIrO, DE LA IDENTIDAD EN LOS AROS INCIERTOS 0
DE ESTAT INCIERTA IDENTIDAD LAITNOAMERICANA, EN EL NUEVO ORDEN MUNDIAL Y
NOSOTROS, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS PARA LA INTEGRACION LATINO AMERICANA (San Juan

1993).
53.
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procedures by the legislative branches."" However, the application judges
make of the legal procedures to concrete cases does not have less relevancy
concerning the possible social consequences. Whether it contains it or
stimulates it, the magistrate has a decisive influence in all social processes
of change.
Several states forbid the extrajudicial sale of mortgaged property,
and others admit adopting a critical attitude toward the figure that is
manifested in the trend of the courts to allow it without effect before the
most minimal irregularity. A jurisprudential position of this type generates
a great insecurity and adds to discredit and loose acceptance for the
procedure.
It is necessary to delineate the position that our courts should take
as compared to an unknown institution up to now at least as to its practical
operation, 1 since it is not already part of the Argentinean legal system.
The first failures have taken apart the unconstitutional position of the
mortgage execution procedure by understanding that the great letter has
been assaulted neither in its letter nor in spirit.5 ' Therefore, waste for a
concordant attitude in what is relation to the appraisal of the formalisms,
for the purpose of achieving the adequate coordination between the powers
of the state that suggest a conjunctive determination of common course.
V. CONCLUSION
The strict legal analysis of the institutions that compose the
Economic Law is indispensable to determine with clarity the conduct and
attitudes that will have to be originated concomitantly in the bosom of the
community. It is required in our days, more than ever, the establishment
of game rules transparent to those which we would be able to abide.
However, so that such legal analysis will be actually rigorous it can not be
omitted to deal with the real institutional basis and rules, in as much as
these are not but simple instruments sculpted on the decisions previously
adopted.
The avatars that are sought to regulate and to guide through the
dictation of a law are before anything a social phenomenon. A law that
proposes, as in the case in question, to offer a solution to a highly social
problem as is that of the housing will have to be preceded by a discussion
that, far from being stemmed in purely economic terms, is projected to the
55. NINO, supra note 47, at 302 (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
56. Manuel H. Castro Hernandez, Ejecuciones Hipotecariasa la Luz de la ley 24.441, EN
EL BOLETIN EL DERECHO DEL 1 (Feb. 1996).
57. Cam. Nac. Civil, Sala M, 08-10-1995, Saager, Jorge y otro c. Cortina, Amalia
slejecucion hipotecaria,EN REV. EL DERECHO 1 (Feb. 1996).
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underlying aspects. The deletion of these will permit the acceptance or the
rejection of those, but as consequence then of a coherent reasoning, of the
conscious adoption of a firmly structured position.
To analyze and to understand precisely such previous adoption
process of decisions is the challenge that each new institution requests the
committed jurist to actually know. For those who seek to transcend the
mere mechanical application of the legal precept and, those who
fundamentally, aspire to mediate with their decisions between the
relationships, to humanize from the high pedestal of a court, they will have
to be submerged in the deep waters of the fundamental reasons.
Only then will the jurists attitude have the complete meaning to
trigger coherence. Only then will it be able to give its words a strict and
real meaning, since it will have accomplished, through the deep reflection
of the ideas, its structural contribution to the solution of the Argentine
Syllogism.
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Contorno del Anilisis

La ley de economia es una de las demostraciones mis actuales y
complejas del espectro de ley de nuestra 6poca. En su forma moderna es
una serie de factores ideol6gicos que transcendieron a trav~s de los afios y
aparecen como surgieron originalmente. El hecho diario y constante
dictado en las normas legales y positivas crea implicaciones serias cuando
trata una instituci6n arraigada en los postulados de la ley econ6mica.
La ley, independientemente de obedecer su misi6n primaria de
regular, aparece simb6licamente como la cima de una montafia de hielo
que proviene de aguas turbulentas hecha de concepciones humanas, un
testamento irreprochable a las ideas que no han sumergido.
* El Autor es un miembro de la Asociacion Internacional de Estudiantes de Abogacia,
(A.I.E.A.), localizada en Mendoza, Argentina. En 1996 61 obtuvo su titulo de juris doctor en la
Universidad de Mendoza en Mendoza, Argentina.
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Este papel intentari dar un significado comprensivo al tema
discutido y despu6s tratara de buscar profundamente explicaciones
sistemdticas.
II. El Problema Social y La Soluci6n Legal
En la reciente historia de nuestro pais, uno de los principales
problemas sociales que requiere una soluci6n es la escasez de albergue.
Una soluci6n se hace necesaria porque el problema genera complejas y
negativas implicaciones sociales, principalmente, debido a su reputaci6n
como una deterioraci6n continua.
Basado en los principios fundamentales de un estado de bienestar
social, el articulo 14 de la Constituci6n Nacional de la Reptiblica
Argentina, dentro de lo que se conoce como derechos sociales, proteje el
derecho a una vida digna. Se han hecho varios esfuerzos legislativos para
convertir este principio, elevado en texto, en leyes funcionales y
operacionales.
En este contexto, a fines de 1994, la Rama Ejecutiva Nacional envi6
al Congreso Nacional un proyecto legal que bisicamente pedia Ilevar a cabo
un plan de financiamiento de albergue que fuera accesible a ia mayoria de
las personas y al mismo tiempo, absorberia significativamente la fuerza
obrera desempleada y subdesempleada.' Sin duda, 6stos son problemas
realmente legales de la Sociedad Argentina.
Ademis de las metas sociales predicadas, el cuerpo legislativo
buscaba financiamiento competitivo para la industria de la construcci6n,
financiamiento a largo plazo para los compradores a trav6s de un sistema
de hipoteca y la creaci6n de un mercado secundario para hipotecas.
Despu~s de un intenso debate parlamentario, el proyecto fue
f'malmente aceptado en enero de 1995 (Ley Nacional 24.441,
2
Financiamiento para Albergues y Construcci6n).
El efecto de la ley citada implica la incorporaci6n de ciertas
instituciones a nuestro sistema legal:
derechos de propiedades;
arrendamiento; fondos comdines para la inversi6n de bienes raices, aunque
6stos no eran usados ni desconocidos en el sistema judicial local. La raz6n
de su desuso anterior fue debido a la falta de regulaciones legales
detalladas que garantizaran un armaz6n de seguridad legal respecto a tales
funcionamientos.
Localizindose en el margen de desigualdades que involucra
asuntos de p6liza legislativa relacionado con la formulaci6n de la ley y su
1. Jorge Saager y Amalia Cortina et at., si ejecucion hipotecaria, Dictamen del Fiscal de
camaraDr. CarlosR. Sanz, REV. EL DERECHO, Feb. 19, 1996, a 2.
2.

Vea generalmente LegislacionArgentina 63.ToMo A REV. EL DERECHO (1995).
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finalidad, el caso que salio a relucir en debates de ambas casas del
Congreso Nacional, coinciden en sefialar la necesidad de regular las
instituciones que manejen y ejecuten la legislaci6n.
Un procedimiento
de ejecuci6n embarazoso,
generando
incertidumbres en cuanto a los t~rminos de recuperar el capital invertido a
trav~s de esta legislaci6n, aparece como uno de los factores principales que
contribuyen a las proporciones de altos interns de pr~stamos de albergue. 3
En el nuevo sistema, la administraci6n de las ventas de propiedades y de la
cancelaci6n de deuda es la responsabilidad del acreedor. Las defensas y
las leyes relacionadas funcionan a favor de la protecci6n del deudor a
travds del 6rgano judicial del posible exceso que podria ser cometido por el
acreedor.
Es de esta manera que el procedimiento especial de ejecuci6n que
se Ileva a cabo directamente por el acreedor, elimina la necesidad de una
orden judicial. En este sentido, articulo 57 sefiala que despuds de verificar
el estado de la propiedad, el acreedor pedird, sin la intervenci6n judicial, la
venta de la propiedad afectada en una subasta pfiblica asegurada por medio
del subastador que el acreedor designe y de acuerdo con las costumbres
usuales.
Naturalmente, la parte 16gica de semejante plan es que el articulo
54 permite a los acreedores pedir que un juez verifique el estado presente
de la propiedad antes de que la hipoteca llegue a su vencimiento. Si la
propiedad esti ocupada, un aviso de evicci6n se pedird bajo provisiones
que permiten el uso de fuerza ptiblica.
Debe aclararce que las provisiones de ejecuci6n incorporadas
contienen varias garantias, algunas de las cuales permiten varias
intervenciones judiciales, para asegurar la protecci6n del deudor. Ante
todo esta la naturaleza voluntaria del procedimiento especial, s6lo empieza
a funcionar cuando las personas llegan a un acuerdo y en el momento de
constituir la garantia de la hipoteca. Segundo, es el juez qui6n: 6rdena la
inspecci6n y comprobaci6n del estado presente de la propiedad, el articulo
54 concede al acreedor la posesi6n de la propiedad, articulo 65 y aprueba
la liquidaci6n dirigida por el acreedor, articulo 60. El deudor puede,
ademis, interferir bajo un nfimero limitado de excepciones para demostrar
ciertos hechos que harian la venta de la propiedad en subasta ptiblica
impropia: que no hay deuda; que el deudor se ha mantenido al ritmo de
sus pagos; que no se hizo ningfin acuerdo acerca de los m6todos elegido
por el acreedor y demis.
Finalmente, el sistema confia profundamente en la posibilidad de
que el deudor original pueda re-adquirir la propiedad por la cantidad en la
3.

Vea generalmente REV.

ANTECEDENTES PARLAMENTARIOS 110

nn.4, 38 (1995).
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que se vendi6 (mis un tres por ciento para cubrir costos y honorarios)
dentro de 30 dias de la subasta.
Desde el punto de vista procesal y sistemdtico, la lIfnea central de
la ley se enfoca en separar los aspectos esenciales de los aspectos no
esenciales del proceso judicial.
Junto con otros instrumentos como
mediaci6n y procedimientos del notario, estas prdcticas se esfuerzan para
descongestionar el trdfico judicial, para mejorar el acceso a los servicios
judiciales y para reducir los costos altos de los procedimientos legales
actuales. En general, podrfa decirse que este proceso flexible consiste en
intentar suprimir la rigidez legal o convencional para adaptar nuevas
realidades. En lugar de flexibilidad, Ramiro Podetti prefiri6 llamarle
"adaptabilidad la cual, en algunos casos, causa dereglamentaci6n y en
otros mds regulaci6n."'
A. Discusi6n Parlamentaria
La pregunta principal de la legislaci6n referida previamente fue la
inconstitucionalidad de las ejecuciones de hipotecas. Otro asunto es que
fue percibido simplemente como una copia de la mayoria de jurisdicciones
en los Estados Unidos.
Si lo que se intenta es aplicar en Argentina soluciones usadas en
otros, indico el Senador Aguirre Lanari durante discusiones sobre el
proyecto en el Senado Argentino, "aqu6llas que se busquen probablemente
podrian incorporarse en la Constituci6n de Argentina. Si el argumento es
que nuestro sistema judicial es lento, continu6, el camino que se ha
seguido sugeriria que no pueda haber justicia en lo absoluto. . . .
El argumento de la inconstitucionalidad del procedimiento de
ejecuci6n de hipoteca es basado en el Articulo 17 de la Constituci6n
Nacional el cual indica que: nadie puede privarse de propiedad sin virtud
de un juicio. Tal prohibici6n protege al duefio contra cualquier privaci6n
de su propiedad, mientras que la privaci6n surga del piiblico, el estado, y
sus 6rganos.6
El arreglo del Articulo 17 de la Constituci6n Argentina no es
equivalente a la Quinta Enmienda de la Constituci6n de los Estados
Unidos. En los Estados Unidos nadie puede privarse de su propiedad sin
el proceso debido legal. El diputado Leconte sefiala que dichas provisiones

4.
Humberto Podetti, Reforma Laboral: Adaptabilidad Jurldica a la Realidad Actual,
REV. GERNCIA 73 (1995).
5.

PARLAMENTARIOS, supra nota 3, a 117, nn.4, 227.

6.
SEGUNDO LINARES QUINTANA TRATADO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 85 nn.
3886, 3887 (Tomo V 1972).

1998]

Longhin

de derechos del proceso legal transmiten un concepto diferente en relaci6n
7
a la necesidad de garantia procesal en ambientes diferentes.
Constitucionalmente consagrado, la garantia procesal debe volverse
una parte integra del orden ptiblico nacional, un concepto que un lider civil
argentino defini6 como: un principio eminente, religioso, moral, politico,
y econ6mico, a aqullas organizaciones sociales establecidas a las que un
sustento dignificado se une. 8
Elena Highton apoya esto en uno de los estudios mds avanzados en
los nuevos problemas legales: que la no-adherencia al articulo 17 de la
Constituci6n Nacional surgio de la exigencia de un acuerdo anterior de
mantener orden piblic.o que requiere el establecimiento de dichos nuevos
procedimientos. Ella agrega que el orden ptiblico no se expone, ya que
seria posible someter los problemas convertidos del pfiblico a otros
m6todos de soluciones, sin infringir en las normas bdsicas del sistema legal
del pafs. 9
B. Area de Libertad Contractual
La ley americana en materias de hipoteca aplica el principio de
exclusiones de la venta, una regla que concede la autorizaci6n o poder que
el deudor tiene a su acreedor como una manera para que el acreedor pueda
proceder a una venta extra-judicial de la propiedad y concluya la relaci6n
del crddito que los une.10
La libertad contractual en los Estados Unidos y en los paises que
aplican derecho consuetudinario, es mas amplia que en aqu6llos de la
tradici6n latina." Lo que estA claro y l6gico es que el sistema de valor
2
prevaleciente en cada pais difiere profundamente.'
Por ejemplo, en los Estados Unidos, la Corte Suprema de Nueva
Jersey tuvo que tratar con un caso que involucr6 un matrimonio no
capacitados para tener nifios. La pareja confi6 en una mujer joven para
concebir a un nifio con el marido a cambio de una suma de dinero.
Despuds de que el contrato fue formalizado y el nifio habia nacido, la

7.

PARLAMENTARIOS, supra nota 3, a 117, nn. 4, 87.

8.

JORGE J. LLAMBIAS, TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL, PARTE GENERAL 158 (Tomo I,

Ed. Zavalia 1986).
9.

ELENA HIGHTON ET AL., REFORMAS AL DERECHO PRIVADO 328 (1995).

10.

Vea generalmente Elena Highton, Panorama del Regimen de las Garantias en el

derecho Estadounidense, 119 REV. DE DERECHO PRIVADO Y COMUNITARIO (1993).
11.

Camille Spinosi Jauffret, Juge le Juge Angalis?, DROITS, REVUE FRANCAISE DE

THEORIE JURIDIQUE 56 n.9.
12.

MATTHIAS STORME, THE VALIDITY AND THE CONTENT OF CONTRACTS, TOWARDS A

EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 159 (Martinus Nijhoff ed. 1994).
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madre biol6gica cambi6 de opini6n y no quiso entregar a su niflo a la
pareja. Sin embargo, la corte sostuvo que habiendo un acuerdo voluntario,
la madre biol6gica es obligada a obedecer el contrato y a entregar al beb .'
Ademas se sefiala, en apoyo a las diferencias en los sistemas de
valores que mientras la esclavitud en Argentina se aboli6 en 1813, en los
Estados Unidos no se aboli6 hasta los 1860. 4 Tales hechos hist6ricos
tambi6n indican un cierto tipo de relaci6n ideol6gica y cronol6gica entre
ambas culturas.
Entonces parece ser que la libertad contractual, un concepto legal
inminente requiere una penetraci6n profunda en el plan filos6fico de cada
naci6n para buscar la substancia de tales conceptos legales.
Apesar de que no estA dentro de la dominaci6n def'mitiva de la ley
o del juicio donde la verdad reina, sino en los campos abstractos y
ciertamente dentro de las poldmicas de los principios que sostienen esas
instituciones de ley.
C. Consideraciones Filos6ficas
Como la idea central de su tesis, un excelente analista politico
argentino usa una explicaci6n de la dicotomia del desarrollo-subdesarrollo,
para sefialar que el cafi6n de las ideas morales determinan el curso hacia el
cual una sociedad dirige sus dinmicas." Como parte de un fen6meno
cultural mds amplio, la diferencia entre las sociedades desarrolladas y las
sociedades subdesarrolladas tambi6n incluye una diferencia moral. Las
sociedades desarrolladas s6lo exigen una moral promedio; que cada
individuo siga sus propios objetivos sin violar los derechos de otros.
Puesto que semejante meta moderada es establecida, generalmente se
alcanza. Las sociedades subdesarrolladas, por otro lado, tienen una norma
moral m~s alta, la cual exige a sus miembros entregarse todos en nombre
de ideales altos la solidaridad, Dios, o el Estado, revelando Un espacio
def'mido entre la moral que es proclamada, toda, y la moral que se cumple,
poca o nada.
El derecho, como un sistema normativo, no es mIs que una
reflexi6n del sistema moral prevaleciendo en una sociedad que es definida
por momentos hist6ricos.
Asi es que el mundo Anglosajon bas6 sus conceptos politicos, los
conceptos econ6micos y 16gicamente sus conceptos legales en la idea
original y poderosa del individuo, confi6 en el individuo y lo instituy6
13.

Vea generalmente 88 REV. ANTECEDENTES PARLAMENTARIOS 117, nn.4 (1995).

14. Id. a nn. 4, 87.
15.

1988).
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Longhin

1998]

como el eje alrededor del cual el mundo debe girar. La naturaleza del
corolario de tal confianza ontological no podria ser mas que una actitud
medida por la comunidad en respeto al individuo, traducido en limites
impuestos en la libertad.
Se comprendio, a trav6s de una reflexi6n hist6rica profunda, que
un ideal no puede sostenerse mientras concomitantemente niega
consecuencias necesarias; y como que la apuesta era para el individuo, uno
tenfa que permitirle actuar y s6lo negar las posibilidades cuando su propia
6
conducta niega a otros la realizaci6n de sus propios planes para la vida.
La explicaci6n de la adopci6n de este anthropoligism individualista
se nutre con ciertas raices religiosas: la diferencia, segfin la historia, entre
la filosofia y la religi6n. El modernismo estall6 en el Viejo Mundo como
entusiasmo inminente, como una sintesis purificada de la apatia inmanente
de los griegos, la adaptaci6n serena a este mundo, contemplaci6n pasiva en
la bfisqueda de las causas originales, 7 y el entusiasmo transcendente del
Medieval, acci6n concreta en este mundo pero buscando acceso a un
mundo superior.'8 El continente acab6 empapado de modernidad, pero los
caminos recorridos fueron dificiles porque hubo que superar muchos
obstdculos. Entretanto en Europa continental, el espiritu moderno nace
contra la religi6n prevaleciente, en el mundo Anglosajon, crece con 61. El
modernismo es alla una oportunidad revolucionaria, mientras aqui es una
tradici6n. 19
Mientras en Europa Continental estaba oscilando abruptamente
entre el culto del Dios omnipotente y el culto del individuo racional,
Europa Anglosajon era immutable a esos cambios. El Ser Supremo no se
olvid6 en nombre de la ciencia ni se rechaz6 la salvaci6n como el filtimo
extremo para el hombre, lo que se desdefi6 fue sacrificio terrenal como una
manera de alcanzarlo. Cuando es imposible persuadir a Dios a travds de la
oraci6n para poder alterar nuestro destino, la (inica opci6n posible es
persuadirse a si mismo para actuar segdin el deseo de Dios para obtener
6xito en la vida. Exito en esta vida.
Salvaci6n, la base de la existencia terrenal de los espfritus de los
grandes te6logos de Cristianidad se alcanzarA, ahora, por el hombre
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comfin, el hombre concreto, y en este mundo.2 De esta manera, la
revoluci6n moral del Puritanismo arma y equipa el cardcter ideal de
desarrollo econ6mico. No teniendo que atacar la religi6n, la cultura
puritana Anglosajona pudo sobresalir a la calidad y estado de inmanente
sin trauma y sin reproche.
La evoluci6n 16gica toma una posici6n en los postulados de la
existencia humana en la que presentemente confia Abraham Maslow quitn,
de ciertas maneras, hoy simboliza cultura Anglosajona medieval. 21 El viejo
tdrmino latino Salus ya no significa salvaci6n, sino salud.
III. La Posici6n Argentina en el Mundo de Ideas
Por otro lado, Argentina recibi6 las ideas del Esclarecimiento e
hizo declaraciones ampulosas en apoyo a la libertad que nunca habia
experimentado por via de sus intelectuales mds notables.
Mientras
estubieron en Francia hablaron de libertad, en Amdrica del Sur pensaron
en independencia: todos libre o todos esclavos, 6sas eran las opciones.
Juan Bautista Alberdi, el creador primario del orden constitucional
argentino, sefialo que la libertad, ontologicamente considerada, puede
separarse en tres diferentes planos: la libertad individual de cada tema,
autonomia individual, como un hecho de dictar normas de conducta
apropiada, la libertad de la comunidad politica interna, autonomia
colectiva, entendida como el poder para organizarse a si mismo de una
manera conveniente y la libertad exterior de la comunidad politica,
independencia, refiriendose a su no sumisi6n con respecto a otras
comunidades politicas.
America Latina, por un imperativo hist6rico, siempre arrastr6
detrds; se sintio obligada a declararse independiente para emprender el
desaffo de gobierno propio. Y como la independencia se habia obtenido a
travis del uso de armas, result6 bastante 16gico suponer que de esta misma
manera la libertad interior tambitn podria lograrse.
Argentina se levant6 bajo las explosiones de cafiones y a veces de
las armas automdticas menos grandiosas pero mds eficaces. Cualquier sea
la bandera defendida es cierto que las ideas que se impregnaron con el olor
a p6lvora, requieren, para que se mantengan en la conciencia de las
personas, que el olor no se desgaste.
Todas las ideas impuestas, por via de la dogma o por armas, deriva
en paternalismo. La moral se transforma substancialmente en un fen6meno
20.

MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Charles

Scribner's Sons ed., 1976).
21.

ABRAHAM H.MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING (Van Nostrand Reinhold

Company, 1968).
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individual a un fen6meno derivativo. Derivativo de las fuentes an6malas
de otras influencias culturales: de una personal, de una iglesia, del estado.
Es de estA manera que en sociedades subdesarrolladas el hecho de que
Alguien, en maytiscula, dicte a otros las normas de conducta bloquea la
extensi6n formidable de energia que nace de la motivaci6n individual.
A. Amdrica Latina y Libertad Individual
Domingo Sarmiento, Agustin Alvarez, y Francisco Bulnes fueron
algunas de las plumas que se responsibilizaron en recordar al mundo que el
hombre latinoamericano, negro, mulatos, y mestizos ocupaban un lugar
inferior a los del norte en la balanza de Darwinian. 22 Era material
maleable; que requeria instrucci6n y consejo, aunque ellos estaban
concientes de esa necesidad. Enrique Dussel decia que "la dependencia de
Am6rica Latina es, antes de la economia, ontological: el latinoamericano
es oprimido, colonial y un ser humano ontologicalmente dependiente. " 23
La mayoria de paises latinoamericano eran considerados o se
consideraban como minorias; siempre necesitando a un comandante para
guiarlos e indicarles en que direcci6n disparar sus armas o dirigir sus
declaraciones. Aqullos que compartieron sus ideas y siguieron sus pasos
eran libres, los otros eran enemigos.
En ese entonces no era extraflo, que en acciones, nunca en
escrituras, la libertad individual se olvido, el hecho curioso que un
individuo capaz de hacer todas esas cosas que no afectan el orden pdblico,
la moralidad o los buenos hdbitos24 parecerian continuamente amenazados
por el tridente ideol6gico que Leviatan estaba blandiendo para controlar
sus pasiones, para siempre guiarlo de antemano por el camino de un bien
comfin concebido.
De Hobbes a Lenin, las autoridades paternalistas consideran al ser
humano como un menor a quien un guardidn debe proteger y disciplinar.
De Von Misses a Ayn Rand, los ultra liberales exagerados piensan que el
ser humano sabe muy bien lo que le interesa y deben permitirle ser
completamente aut6nomo, porque la bfisqueda de cada individuo de su
propio bienestar coincide con el bienestar general ptiblico.
Ninguna de estas opiniones extremas coinciden con los
sentimientos reales del hombre argentino. El desaffo de nuestros dias no
consiste en romper las cadenas de un estado paternalista y tirarnos
22. JUAN J. SEBRELI, EL ASEDIO A LA MODERNIDAD 296 (Sudamericana ed., Buenos
Aires, 1992).
23.

Enrique Dusel,
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LATINOAMERICAN, STOMATA 79, n. 1 (Universidad del Salvador, 1972).
24. ARG. CONST. art. 19.
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apresuradamente hacia el extremo opuesto en una competencia fren6tica.
Pasa, mds bien, afinando nuestra habilidad de adaptarnos, delineando
nuestra propia soluci6n en un mundo en el cual las soluciones provienen
cada vez menos de las ideas individuales y mds de ideas que son inducidos.
Las naciones, afirma Michael Porter, serdn las que decidan ser,
como son, "las situaciones de cada pais, asi como las maneras de lidiar con
ellas son tinicas."2 No hay duda que las decisiones ya no son unilaterales.
No estA en buscar la esencia Argentina en la manera de los grupos
intelectuales del Sury sino en analizar, y asumir, nuestras diferencias para
ponernos totalmente conscientes de la realidad, cruda, pero realidad hasta
el final, de nuestra dpoca.
B. De Nuevo Sobre el Papel del Estado
El anilisis vuelve, parece inevitable para la disoluci6n de la
posici6n que el estado debe asumir para el individuo, una discusi6n que es
tan antigua como es prominente.
El tema fue tratado en 1776 por Adam Smith en La Riqueza de
Naciones y su argumento central fue simple: no apoy6 que el estado
estaba manejando la economia incorrectamente, sino que debido a su
naturaleza no podria encargarse de manejar la economiaY2 No apoy6, por
ejemplo, que un dguila vuela mejor que un elefante, sino que un elefante,
debido a su naturaleza, nunca podria volar.
La distinci6n se hace importante cuando, como Peter Drucker,2
claramente observ6, la discusi6n ha cambiado, en estos tiltimos ahos, en
base a lo que el estado debe hacer, olviddndose de determinar lo que puede
hacer.
Y cuando los deberes asumidos no se pueden cumplir, el resultado
no debe ser prometedor. Es como decir que a pesar de todo el elefante
vuela.
En Argentina, el estado, al convertirse en un actor econ6mico
directo, intento reemplazar la clase media competitiva ausente creando un
mecanismo gigantesco y deformado. El mismo enredo que se us6 antes
para crear ese Estado Intervencionista, se intenta imponer hoy para
propagar la destrucci6n del mercado. "iPodria haber llegado el momento,
pregunta Mariano Grondona, de buscar un equilibrio, de emprender la
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marcha hacia un punto equidistante de un extremo al otro, alli d6nde los
argentinos pueden encontrar lo que es razonable?" 29
Se sabe que las respuestas absolutas no existen en este asunto,
Liberarse de
porque es territorio de transacciones individuales.
intervencionismo y libertinaje no parece significar ningun tipo de
contribuci6n: el debate intenta establecer al extremo que nosotros debemos
dirigirnos sin perder de vista y usando como una guia ciertos puntos
equidistantes que s6lo pueden ser alcanzados usando una madurez civica
que nosotros no poseemos presentemente pero la cual ya hemos empezado
a buscar.
Entienda que lo que Andr6s Ollero ha Ilamado estadidad
permisible, aquella que consiste segiin su propia caracterizaci6n, "en que
el estado les permite libertad absoluta a los individuos en el campo de
satisfacciones del hedonismo .. pero se reserva estrictamente todo lo que
tiene que ver con el mando de la opini6n piiblica, el manejo de maquinaria
poliftica y la orientaci6n ideol6gica de educaci6n."0
No, el estado no debe ser un fugitivo cuyo vacio se Ilena por los
caoses de libertad completa, sino una estrategia: Porter3' indica que el
secreto de las naciones competitivas es que su estado trace un plan que
oblige a sus corporaciones privadas a competir, puesto que de otra manera
sus incentivos fallarian inevitablemente. Este tipo de intervenci6n se llama
intervenci6n indirecta, sutil, pero eficaz.
C. Argentina y el Mercado Libre
Jorge Dominguez, maestro de estudios latinoamericanos en la
Escuela de Derecho de Harvard, ha elaborado la tesis que el retraso de los
paises latinoamericanos en desarrollo econ6mico es debido a su obsesi6n
sobre el desarrollo econ6mico que los Ileva a descuidar factores 6ticos,
politicos, e institucionales que son presunto para esto.
Asi, en nombre de ese fin supremo, cualquier plan que prometi6
acortar el camino se aplaudi6 o, en todo caso, se acept6 con resignaci6n.
Ha sido la urgencia para desarrollo, econ6mico, que todavia subsiste con
fuerza plena, que ha obligado a Argentina a adoptar al modelo del mercado
libre.
En el mundo contempordneo, el por.que apenas se discute, si el
mercado libre o alguna opci6n alternativa, en cambio el c6mo es lo que se
discute: c6mo llegar al mercado libre, c6mo ablandar su crudeza, c6mo
29. MARIANO GRONDONA, LA CORRUPCI6N

(Planeta ed., 1993).

30. Massini Correas & Carlos Ignacio; La Filosofia de los Derechos Humanos y la
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31.
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instilar en la sociedad un cambio de actitud mental necesario para que
realmente pueda erugirse como un motor social y asi no se critique
ideol6gicamente o paresca desfavorable.
Sin perder de vista, sin embargo, aunque se intentaque sea dogma,
de la manera de los economistas argentinos liberales inspirados por Ludwig
Von Mises, el modelo econ6mico no es mas que conveniente.
John Stuart Mill dijo que aunque en el espectro politico la libertad
es indispensable, en el espectro econ6mico es solo una conveniencia.32 En
otras palabras, el modelo econ6mico se subordina, ontol6gicamente y
cronol6gicamente, a la concepci6n politica de una sociedad. Debido a
esto, para que el modelo politico, comprendiendo la opci6n de un mercado
libre como un m6todo de asignar recursos mds convenientemente, pueda
operar correctamente, es necesariamente respetar los prop6sitos politicos
que proceden y los principios morales contenidos en 6stos, como si dstos
fueran su nutrici6n.
IV. Silogismo Argentino
Primera premisa: Pasa que esta herramienta a la que se le llama
mercado libre, de la cual se predica tantas virtudes y pecados, es una
instituci6n en la que se instilan profundamente los canones de liberalismo
econ6mico.
Segunda premisa: el Liberalismo, como un concepto humanistico,
en el espectro politico da lugar a la libertad completa del individuo, el
logro de sus aspiraciones personales que solo se entiende por si mismo,
con certeza de que es en su mejor inter6s. "Aquello que el individuo es
capaz de hacer por si mismo, sostiene Robert Nozick, nadie debe de hacer
por 61. "1 Supone, ademds, una pre-opci6n en el drea de valores morales
que dicta que las reglas de trabajo sean establecidas automdticamente.
Conclusi6n: la adopci6n de un sistema econ6mico en Argentina
basado en el mercado libre no es una consecuencia de coherencia
filos6fica, porque no contesta concepciones individuales claras pero en
cambio a los imperativos externos. Economia, aunque parece que es una
paradoja del tipo Marxista, determina, en nuestro pais, lo que es politico.
Quizds esta afirmaci6n parece severa, pero la verdad surge tanto
del andlisis serio como de un articulo en un peri6dico. La historia nos
obliga una vez mds a caminar desordenados hacia un destino como los
caminos que otros empezaron; para aceptar resultados antes de esperar por
las consecuencias. Seneca dijo que si un campesino siembra su campo con
trigo pero en cambio crecen flores, dsto es un resultado no una
32. Id.
33. NOZICK, supra nota 16 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).
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consecuencia, porque le falta una sucesi6n l6gica. El campesino no
sembro trigo para que crecieran flores, pero 6ste es el resultado de haber
cultivado el campo con trigo.
Por lo tanto, el problema que se debe resolver, si realmente
queremos interferir con lo que es en realidad el silogismo nacional,
considerada l6gicamente, no es asi de una manera en la que la conclusi6n
es una consecuencia real y no solo un resultado.
Una vez la decisi6n de apostar o no en coherencia se adopte
firmemente, la gran pregunta serd, cual de esos t6rminos variar.
LDebemos abandonar el mercado para que los discursos politicos y los
dilemas morales recuperaren sus palabras grandiosas e ineficacia de
hechos? Quiz~s las palabras de Mario Benedetti son correctas cuando 61
afirma que "Am6rica Latina no quiere ser un pais del primer mundo, pero
quiere que se le permita ser un tercer pais mundial con conveniencia y sin
hambre, con dignidad y sin una daga en la garganta. "1'
Sin embargo, el compls Norte del mundo asi como el mensaje
claro e insoluble de democracia de voto popular parece indicarnos que no
es el camino; que los bajos del mar viven sin hambre no es suficiente. Asi
que la opci6n ms razonable que resta es aprender de experiencias
extranjeras de escrutar "las ideas o valores que empujan hacia el desarrollo
del primero asi como las ideas o valores que retienen en el subdesarrollo al
tiltimo de esos mundos.-35
A Max Weber se le pregunto por qu6 el capitalismo naci6 en
Europa en los siglos decimoquinto y decimosextos si ya habia existido. El
lleg6 a la conclusi6n que el fen6meno se explica por la aparici6n, a la
equivalencia de la dimensi6n econ6mica de esas sociedades, de una 6tica,
el puritano, que predic6 el contrato de trabajo, la bfisqueda de 6xito
econ6mico.
Estos factores generaron la acumulaci6n original de
condiciones que permitieron el desarrollo del mercado libre, el que parece
fuertemente limitado a un contexto sociomoral que lo favoreci6. Otras
fases, por otro lado, no lo hicieron. Asi que no hay ninguna raz6n por la
cual afirmar que el mercado libre tiene que durar indef'midamente. No
obstante hoy es, parafraseando a Mill, la opci6n mAs conveniente.
Tal esfuerzo para el progreso exigiri una predeterminaci6n
claramente con la intenci6n de ayudar en el proceso gradual y lento del
cambio, de definitivamente resignar a las utopias espontdneas de la
generaci6n. Asf como fue la esclavitud, en su tiempo, un progreso en
respeto a las situaciones anteriores, antes, los prisioneros eran ejecutados
directamente, el capitalismo salvaje denunciado por Marx represent6 un
34.

MARIO BENEDETrI, PERPLEJIDADES DE FIN DE SIGLO 191 (Seix Barral 1993).

35. GRONDONA, supra nota 15, a 13.

980

ILSA Journalof Int ' & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 4:967

gran adelanto con respecto a la sociedad feudal de los hacendados, en
En los mercados
Argentina, de los productores agricolas grandes.
actuales, las grandes fortunas de los pocos explotadores ricos quienes
constituyeron al gran capitalista desde hace tiempo han sido reemplazado
por la contribuci6n modesta, aunque estructural, de los fondos de la
pensi6n del hombre1 6
Argentina ha estado demostrando, durante algfin tiempo, una
intenci6n firme de cambiar en esa direcci6n; no s6lo ha sido inclinada por
una fuerte revitalizaci6n de sus leyes, 7 sino que tambidn ha abierto sus
puertas a la constituci6n nacional, que habia sido reservada y celosamente
guardada para permitir nuevo aire y darle significado real a las ideas que
antes solo eran conocidas en papel. Este proceso en el que nosotros nos
sumergimos debe enfatizarse progresivamente para que las intenciones se
traduzcan en acci6n.
A. Implicaciones de la Adopci6n de un Instituto Legal Extrafto
Yo confieso haber usado un problema legal inminente como una
excusa instrumental para acercarme al arlisis de temas que estdn por
debajo de lo legal. Lo positivo y negativo de la instituci6n propuesta
tendrdn que ser estudiados a 14 luz de las experiencias concretas que
provienen de su aplicaci6n.
Sin embargo, la preocupaci6n no es el funcionamiento de la
instituci6n, sino la actitud que la aceptaci6n o la repudiaci6n implica.
Lo que es decisivo, es entender que cuando se intenta cambiar una
instituci6n de un sistema legal a otro, la meta es no copiar cada letra de los
veinte o las treinta articulos exactamente, sino compartir, en alguna forma,
con una moral transformada, ciertos conceptos antropol6gicos que siguen
algdinas veces cuando la instituci6n se adoptard y se regulard en otro
ambiente.
Consagrando un procedimiento ejecutorio extranjero al mores del
proteccionista del individuo destituido implica, una actitud, advirtiendo que
de hoy en adelante tendrin que tener mfds cuidado en manejar sus intereses.
El estado cuidara de la educaci6n de sus nifios y de su atenci6n m6dica
pero no'les diri cuando y c6mo uno pueden endeudarse.
Ecos que hablan contra aqu6llos que consideran extremos
econ6micos absolutos de la instituci6n, contra la adopci6n inflexible de,
"un instrumento legal y econ6mico, que s6lo asiste a la parte de negocios

36.

DRUCKER, supra nota 28, a 178.

37.

ROBERTO DROMI, DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO 14 (Ciudad Argentina 1994).
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legales que planea regular, al capitalista, bajo la apariencia de la
modernizaci6n legislativa."38
Los sarcasmos legales coldricos eran arrastrado, en actitud similar,
con relaci6n a la reforma del r6gimen lievada adelante por ley 23.26439 en
la cual hay comparaci6n casi total entre los nifios legitimos e ilegitimos.
De la misma manera, un autor indic6 que "el bien comtin de la familia es
abandonado ante el bienestar individual de sus miembros" (citaci6n
omitida) al hacer un comentario sobre el nuevo arreglo incorporado en el
C6digo Civil, articulo 236, que permite a un nifio nacido fuera de
matrimonio investigar su maternidad "cuando es para atribuir al hijo a una
mujer casada."°
Se denuncian esfuerzos flagrantes contra la identidad nacional de
los argentinos y aparecen como ataques directos a nuestras idiosincrasias y
a nuestras tradiciones. En t6rminos de extremistas, Jorge Carrizo dice:
"[m]uchos intelectuales en nuestro pais predican la necesidad de no s6lo
adaptarse a los requisitos impuestos por el proceso actual de la
globalizaci6n, sino tambi6n para terminar con el debate sobre nuestra
identidad nacional para facilitar nuestra transici6n al primer mundo."',
Concluyendo, 61 afirma que, "la interdependencia, la internalizacion de la
economia y la polfza que los poderes nucleares no han podido expresar sin
enfatizar, al mismo tiempo, la dependencia y aumentando retraso nivel de
las naciones mds d6biles, sin la pretensi6n de imponer en ellos la
dominaci6n cultural, vaciando su historia, liquidando sus tradiciones y su
identidad. "4 2
Se postula que incluso las clases, colonizadas por ideas extranjeras,
cambian gradualmente la cultura real, que se cree en la sociedad en cudl
uno vive y a la cuAl pertenece, por la cultura de lo que es imaginario, "eso
se construye de aspiraciones para cambiar realidades, unas aspiraciones
3
muy diferentes a las de cambiar la realidad.-"
Sin embargo, no es un resultado extrafio, oir esas exigencias en
una medida en la que la adopci6n de tales instrumentos legales no fue

38. Carlos A.Ghersi, La Ley 24.441 de Financiamientoy Construccion de Viviendas, EN
REV. LA LEY 1112 (1995).
39.

Vea generalmente REV. EL DERECHO LEGILCION ARGENTINA 184 (1985).

40. Jorge A. Mazzinghi, Componentes Ideologicos de la Reforma Legislativa en Materia
de Filiacion, EN BOLETIN EL DERECHO 1 (Oct. 30, 1986).

41. Jorge H.Carrizo, Construccion de la identidad nacional y proceso historico en la
Argentina, en Globalizacion, Itegracion e Identidad Nacional, 355 LATINOAMERICANO,
COLECCION ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES (1994).
42. Id. a 356.
43.

GUILLERMO BATALLA BONFIL, PENSAR NUESTRA CULTURA 16 (Alianza 1991).
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precedida por un anlisis real por la sociedad Argentina sobre las
implicaciones reales y concretas que el mundo supuestamente ha querido y
exigido.
El problema central no atraviesa la identidad nacional, sino por via
de concebirlo. "Para tener 6xito en las soluciones, uno tendrd que
separarse de los caminos ominosos de la limitaci6n servil de lo que es
extranjero, tanto como del encierro estdril y desconfiado."" Tiene que ver
con observar, criticar, experimentar y no s6lo usando nuestra rica
experiencia nacional, sino tambi6n usando todos los elementos disponibles
que nos proporcionan la realidad inevitable de un mundo en aumento
interdependiente. Realmente tiene que ver con "no perder la capacidad de
elaborar en un horizonte que tiene sentido."4
Al intentar explicar por cuales razones nuestro pais no puede
competir con otros o por lo menos por qu6 no puede competir con la
posibilidad de tener 6xito, se intenta exaltar ciertas caracteristicas
nacionales que no se Ilevan a cabo con eficacia, el esfuerzo ms pequefto,
el privilegio estatal, la rapidez nativa, se acepta, como una actitud que
nosotros no podremos aspirar a la misma norma de vida de otros. La
soluci6n no consiste en una obstinaci6n ciega para mantener tales
caracteristicas y una frustraci6n sistemdtica porque los mismos resultados
no pueden alcanzarse, asumiendo un andlisis total del hecho que una
preferencia excluye al otro. "El esquizofr6nico nativo," dice Jorge
Bustamante, "que intente conservar nuestros vicios y aspirar a las
consecuencias de virtudes extranjeras conducira casi inevitablemente a

infelicidad colectiva. "4
Vivimos en tiempos de defmici6n. Argentina hoy necesita que las
discusiones sean claras y tengan direcci6n especifica. Debe librarse, por
fin, de reverencias hacia ciertos conceptos filos6ficos que, condenado por
adversos
generan sentimientos
negativa,
carga
emotiva
una
espontdneamente." Porque los tnninos del discurso social, ensefia Jurgen
Habermas, no s6lo deben conocerse, sino tambi6n entenderse por todos los
portavoces sin tener en cuenta la conclusi6n. (Citacion omitida).

44. Cristian Buchruker, Notas Sobre la ProblematicaHistorico-Ideologicade la Indentidad
Globalizacion, Integracion e Identidad Nacional, 324
Nacional Argentina, en
LATINOAMERICANO, COLECCION ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES (1994).
45. NORBER LECHNER, LOS PATIOS INTERIORES DE LA DEMOCRACIA 118 (Fondo de
Cultura Economica, Santiago de Chile, 1991).
46. JORGE E. BUSTAMANTE, LA RESPUESTA LIBERAL 96 (Privada 1988).
47.

1988).

CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, INTRODUCCION AL ANALISIS DE DERECHO 269 (Astrea
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B. Asimilando Diferentes Sistemas Legales.
Rebotando entre los extremos de esta dicotomia de tdrminos
invertidos se ve un orden judicial desorientado. Disorientado porque
nunca entiende si la funci6n que realmente compite es la de realidades
regulares como se presenta, de la manera postulada por Savigny o si debe,
por otro lado, ser erugido, como fue sostenido por Bentham como un
instrumento moralizando de hibitos y valiosas pricticas, estimulando al
mismo tiempo nuevas expectativas.
Puede afirmarse, en cuanto a esto, que los cambios producidos en
la sociedad se refleja, tarde o temprano, en el orden legal y esto al mismo
tiempo, tiende a servir como un promotor de nuevas normas sociales.
Hoy lo que es legal se concibe, para abreviar, como un
instrumento para organizar la vida social segin los principios morales y las
ideas politicas prevalecientes en la comunidad. Es por consiguiente l6gico
concluir que mas fluida intercommunicaci6n de ideas y principios de otras
culturas traerin un contacto mds profundo entre las instituciones positivas
en lugar de limitar el espectro legal de los sistemas respectivos.
"En todos los problemas legales grandes," nota un gran jurista
argentino, "debe observarse que todas las leyes se gufan hacia dos o tres
posibles soluciones y que dentro de cada una de ellas las soluciones legales
son similares.
El intercomunicaci6n mayor entre las personas ha
hacia uniformidad. "'
tendencia
una
enfatizado
En el mismo sentido, y durante la discusi6n parlamentaria que
procedi6 la aprobaci6n de la ley 24.441, el Diputado Crostelli indic6 que,
"[p]ara un mundo donde se han cortado distancias y los intercambios
intensificaron, la aproximaci6n de los varios sistemas de ley sin cambio en
la estructura vernicula, indudablemente muestra un inter6s. "4
Nosotros hablamos de consecuencias de los productos l6gicamente
infalibles de la historia. Nosotros abandonamos gradualmente viejas ideas
fundamentales por serios objetivos que llevan al cambio. El tiempo de
oponer al espiritu latinoamericano a favor de un mercantilismo sin el
espiritu del Norte, la manera de Ariel por Jos6 Enrique Rodo ha pasado.
La ley, objeto cultural de excelencia, no puede quedarse ajena al
proceso. En las palabras de Frederick Maitland, "[c]ualquiera que decide
realmente poseer eso que se ha llamado sentido hist6rico debe, en mi
opini6n, abstenerse en vista de que una regla o una idea puede sobrevivir

48. Guillermo Borda, Tratado de Derecho Civil, I DERECHO DE FAMILIA 191 (Perrot

1989).
49.

Vea generalmente REV. ANTECEDENTES PARALAMENTARIOS 107 nn. 4, 19 (1995).
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contundente. Un anacronismo asi no ofenderia no s6lo su raz6n, sino
tambi~n su tacto.""
Sin embargo, la asimilaci6n es gradual, como que implica un tipo
de transacci6n ideol6gica, la suerte para renunciar los principios
axiomdticos completamente ciertos que anidan a las mentes estructuradas
consiguiente a ellos. En la Europa de nuestros dias, bastante alejada ya de
ese equipaje extra de principios morales con los que nos educ6 donde todos
parecen comiines, voces gritan exigiendo, "el levantamiento de
nacionalismo legal que a una magnitud grande caracteriza nuestra
conciencia. .. .",
Hoy, Argentina vive en lo que se llamaria una crisis de
incertidumbre. 2 Todas las situaciones de crisis generan procesos fuertes
de destructurizaci6n de realidad y de sus c6digos de interpretaci6n y
acci6n; pero tambi6n crean nuevas formas de estructura. Requiere un
releyendo del estado presente y el pasado. Exige un anlisis completo de
acciones disciplinarias que permiten una comprensi6n e incorporaci6n de lo
que es nuevo y merece ser incorporado.
C. El Desaffo del Fiscal
La teoria clisica de actividad judicial que origin6 en la escuela de
ex6gesis francesa y los conceptos alemanes de jurisprudencia, caracteriza
esto como una aplicaci6n mecinica de ciertas reglas a los casos
considerados hoy mejores.11
Alf Ross enseia que la evoluci6n ha
producido dos sistemas diferentes; el de creencias y el de las actitudes.5 '
El ideal de comprender completamente las leyes aplicable a un
caso y el conocimiento completo de los hechos pertinentes que deben
juzgarse, ha sido reemplazado por la aceptaci6n del hecho que el
conocimiento de los procedimientos y el conocimiento de los hechos es,
generalmente, imperfecto y por una tendencia a hacer el costo en todas las
decisiones una serie de circunstancias del orden politico, social y

50.

H. A. FISHER, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM 486 (Maitland,

Brown eds. Gerbert & Sons ed. 1911) (nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).
51. RICHARD ZIMMERMAN, ROMAN LAW AND EUROPEAN LEGAL UNITY, INTOWARDS A
EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 67 (Martinus Nijhoff ed., 1994) (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
52. MARTA NAVARRO Y LILIA SERVETrO, DE LA IDENTIDAD EN LOS AlOS INCIERTOS 0
DE ESTAT INCIERTA IDENTIDAD LAITNOAMERICANA, EN EL NUEVO ORDEN MUNDIAL Y
NOSOTROS, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS PARA LA INTEGRACION LATINO AMERICANA (San Juan

1993).
53.

Vea generalmente ROSCOE POUND, INTRODUCCION A LA FILOSOFIA DEL DERECHO,

(Tipografica 1972).
54.

ALF ROSS, SOBRE EL DERECHO Y LA JUSTICIA 149 (Eudeba 1963).
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econ6mico, que rodea la sanci6n de los procedimientos legales asi como a
la producci6n del hecho examinado.
En el dominio de actitudes, la conciencia legal formal aseada que
exigi6 la aplicaci6n estricta de la ley compite hoy con la conciencia legal
material de los jueces es, con el deseo de llegar a una soluci6n aceptable a
lo que es personal.
"El estudio de la posibilidad de cambios sociales a trav6s de los
derechos generalmente se ha concentrado," afirma Carlos Nino, "en la
creaci6n de procedimientos legales por las ramas del legislativo."15 Sin
embargo, la aplicaci6n que hacen los jueces de los procedimientos legales
para solidificar casos no tiene menos pertinencia acerca de las posibles
consecuencias sociales. Si lo contiene o lo estimula, el magistrado tiene
una influencia firme en todos los procesos sociales de cambio.
Varios estados prohiben la venta extrajudicial de propiedad
hipotecada y otros admiten adoptar una actitud critica hacia la figura que se
manifiesta en la tendencia de las cortes para permitirlo sin efecto antes de
la irregularidad mis minima. Una posici6n prudencial juridica de este tipo
genera una gran inseguridad y agrega para desacreditar y perder aceptaci6n
del procedimiento.
Es necesario delinear la posici6n que nuestras cortes deben tomar
comparadas a una instituci6n hasta ahora desconocida al menos acerca de
su funcionamiento prfictico, ' como que todavia no es parte del sistema
legal argentino.
Los primeros fracasos han desmontado la posici6n
inconstitucional del procedimiento de ejecuci6n de hipoteca entendiendo
que la gran carta no se ha asaltado en su carta ni en espiritu.5 7 Por
consiguiente, desperdicio de una actitud armoniosa en lo que es
relacionado a la apreciaci6n de los formalismos, con el prop6sito de lograr
la coordinaci6n adecuada entre los poderes del estado que sugieren en una
determinaci6n conjunta de curso comdin.
V. Conclusi6n
El anglisis legal estricto de las instituciones que componen la Ley
Econ6mica es indispensable para determinar con claridad la conducta y
actitudes que tendrin que surgir concomitantemente en el pecho de la
comunidad.
Se requiere en nuestros dias, mis que nunca, el
establecimiento de reglas del juego transparente a aqu6llos que nosotros
55. NINO, supra nota 47, a 302.
56. Manuel H. Castro Hernandez, Ejecuciones Hipotecariasa la Luz de la ley 24.441, EN
EL BOLETIN EL DERECHO 1 (Feb. 1996).

57. Cam. Nac. Civil, Sala M, 08-10-1995, Saager, Jorge y otro c. Cortina, Amalia
slejecucion hipotecaria, EN REV. EL DERECHO 1 (Feb. 1996).
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seriamos capaces de la morada. Sin embargo, para que tal anMilisis legal
fuera realmente riguroso no puede omitirse para tratar con la base
institucional real y reglas, tanto como 6stos no son sino instrumentos
simples esculpos en las decisiones adoptadas anteriormente.
Los avatara que se procura regular y guiar a trav6s del dictado de
una ley son ante todo un fen6meno social. Una ley que busca como en el
caso en cuesti6n, ofrecer una soluci6n a un problema social como es el del
albergue que tendrd que ser procedido por una discusi6n que, lejos de
provenir en t6rminos completamente econ6micos, se proyecta a los
aspectos subyacentes. La tachadura de 6stos permitiri la aceptaci6n o el
rechazo de aqudllos, pero como consecuencia, entonces de un
razonamiento coherente, de la adopci6n consciente de una posici6n
firmemente estructurada.
Analizar y entender precisamente el proceso de adopci6n anterior
de decisiones es el desafio que cada nueva instituci6n le pide al jurista
comprometido que sepa realmente. Aqu6llos que buscan transcender no
mas la aplicaci6n mecd.nica del mandato legal y, aqullos que
fundamentalmente, aspiren mediar con sus decisiones entre las relaciones
humanice del pedestal alto de una corte, tendrd que ser sumergido en las
aguas profundas de las razones fundamentales.
S61o entonces podra su actitud tener el significado completo para
activar coherencia. S61o entonces podra dar un significado estricto y real a
sus palabras, como que habri logrado, a trav6s de la reflexi6n profunda de
las ideas, su contribuci6n estructural a la soluci6n del Silogismo
Argentino.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, mass media, with its unstoppable and astonishing
development, has reached a level of importance in our lives that was
unimaginable few years ago. This new situation is inherent in modem
societies. Without it, our lifestyle would be different; maybe better,
maybe worse, but certainly different from the way we know it today.
Digital newspapers, virtual reality experiences, digital signatures, and
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many other expressions of technology are all signs of the times, which
show us the undeniable reality of the digital society. We, as witnesses to
these deep, substantial transformations, must be prepared not only to enjoy
the comfort and the other positive spin-offs of these developments, but also
to solve the intricate ethical conflicts and legal questions that, undoubtedly,
will arise.
We do not want to, nor can we deny the important role the media
as well as freedom of speech and of the press play in a democratic society.
First, from a political and institutional point of view, the media acts as a
monitor of the governmental organs, legitimizing their actions; Second,
from a social and scientific point of view, it allows huge masses the access
to news and information, turning knowledge into humanity's heritage,
hence permitting sensational scientific and cultural developments.'
However, in spite of the aforementioned advantages, we can not
lose sight of the negative consequences often arising from the press'
activities. These consequences must be both prevented and repaired by the
law.
A depersonalization of information is occurring on all levels.2
Facts and mere speculations frequently go to press without due
corroboration. Bearing in mind that the value of this information is usually
directly proportional to the immediateness of its broadcasting, we can
understand the raw, ferocious battle currently fought by big media
entrepreneurs. A large percentage of newspapers and telivision stations
would rather publish news of dubious veracity than come in second place
after taking time to check the validity of the information.
Moreover, the universality of the information, together with its
public nature, renders the individual powerless and insignificant in
comparison to the huge power structure of the media. As a consequence of
the enormous influence the press has over people, not only are damages
monumental, but also the effects are often irreparable. For instance, it is
difficult to convince people that what appears in their news is wrong.
Besides, editors seldom acknowledge the falseness of their assertions, and
when they do (usually forced by judicial decisions), they do not place
nearly as much emphasis as was placed on the original information.

1. Umberto Eco believes that television is a cultural tool for underdeveloped countries,
showing them what is happening around the world, quoted by, CARLOS FAYT, LA
OMNIPOTENCIA DE LA PRENSA SU JUICIO DE REALIDAD EN LA JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA Y
NORTEAMERICANA. (Editorial La Ley 1994).
2.
RAMON PIZARRO,
COMUNICACION, HAMMURABI

RESPONSABILIDAD
253 (1991).
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It is indispensable, in order to avoid obstructing a person's full
development, to acknowledge the right to information as a fundamental
right. It is impossible to create a civil conscience according to ethical
rules, or for men to fully develop their intellectual capabilities if the right
to be freely informed is not guaranteed. Therefore, it is necessary to give
constitutional status to the right to information.
Nowadays, the right to choose and judge what one is going
to read, watch, or listen to has become the most important
freedom ... a right which imposes on the government the
duty of satisfying that same right . . . the passive right to
be informed . . . that contains in itself the question of
whether or not man will be able to have a thought of his
3
own ....
This does not imply unrestricted, irresponsible, or unlimited exercise of
this right, but quite the contrary. We believe that besides the economic
and moral injury that can be produced by the media's activities, legislation
must prevent other kinds of injuries that are encroaching on us everyday,
such as the injury caused to children by certain information.

II.

CONSTITUTIONAL MATTER AND COMPARATIVE LEGISLATION

In Spain, freedom of speech and the right to information are
expressly acknowledged in the 1978 constitution, article 20, which forbids
any kind of previous censorship. It also establishes limits to these rights:
freedom of speech and of the press must be exercised respecting every
other right contained in that constitution, especially the right to honor,
intimacy, self-image, and youth and childhood's protection.
In Germany, similar norms are found (German constitution's
article 5 is the source of the Spanish article 20). For many years, it was
thought that whenever a conflict between honor and freedom of speech
arose, it should be resolved in favor of the former. However, since the
leading case of LUTH,4 it is necessary to consider the conflict distinctly in
each and every concrete case. In 1961, the constitutional court decided
that "the reporter must fulfill the duty of veracity . . . but it is enough to
have carried out what is reasonably necessary to verify the information's
truthfulness . . . " to be exempted from liability.
3. FAYT, supra note 1 (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
4. Diego Rosario, El honor y la libertad de expresion (lecture given at Salamanca
University, Spain, Jan. 1996.)
5. FAYT, supra note 1 (editorial note: translated from Spanish).

ILSA Journal of Int'l & ComparativeLaw

990

[Vol. 4:987

Today, prevalent in European Union law, is the idea that freedom
of speech is superior to honor, etc., whenever it contributes to forming
public opinion. 6 Mufioz Machado states that "freedom of speech has
virtually no limit ....
In the United States, freedom of the press is guaranteed in the First
Amendment of the Constitution (1791) "Congress shall make no law . ..
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ... "8 In addition,
judicial thought is dominated by an interpretation that, undoubtedly, places
the media in a privileged situation. Since the landmark case of New York
Times vs. Sullivan," the Supreme Court of the United States has been
applying the actual malice doctrine, which relies on the principle that the
injured party has to prove that the information was given either "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not."'°
The Argentinean constitution guarantees freedom of the press in
article number 14 "[e]very inhabitant of the nation has the following
rights, according to the laws that regulate their exercise . . . to publish his
ideas in the press without previous censorship"" and "Federal congress
shall make no laws abridging freedom of the press nor establishing federal
jurisdiction on such matters ....
The Agreement of San Jos6, and the
International Treaty of Civil and Political Rights article 19 also provide
protection in such matters.
As far as the passive subject role is concerned, the Argentinean
Constitution makes no mention of it, but newly-incorporated treaties (such
as the Agreement of San Jos6, Costa Rica, now holding constitutional
status) certainly do, clearly stating that every person has the right to
receive, without previous censorship, information and ideas of any kind
and through different channels.
However, the Argentinean Supreme Court has said that "Freedom
of the press has a meaning greater than the mere exclusion of censorship

6. According to the European Union Treaty, 17th Declaration, the commission was to
present a report by 1993 regarding possible measures to improve the public's access to
information possessed by governmental institutions, SECRETARIA DE ESTADO PARA LAS
COMUNIDADES EUROPEAS 319 (1992).
8.

Rosario, supra note 4 (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.

9.

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

7.

10. Id. at 254.

11.

ARG. CONST. art. 14 (editorial note: translated from Spanish).

12.

ARG. CONST. art. 32 (editorial note: translated from Spanish).

source is the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
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and, therefore, constitutional protection must impose a careful handling of
rules and relevant circumstances in order to avoid obstructing the free
press and its essential functions .... " 3
But notwithstanding all these protective measures, "unfortunately
state legislatures pass unconstitutional laws all the time . . '

III.

CONFLICT BETWEEN RIGHTS

As was previously noted, many modem constitutions grant special
protection to freedom of speech, as they do with other rights. This is seen
especially in constitutions of western countries, which follow the liberal
tradition of John Locke's natural rights. However, they infrequently
establish a hierarchy among the rights or give any kind of priority list with
which to solve problems involving more than one constitutional right.
Argentina's Supreme Court has tried to clarify this issue by stating
that constitutional laws and the rights emerging from them differ from one
another hierarchically. If we follow this line of thought, we can conclude
that there is an axiological question; therefore, in each concrete case an
appraisal of the rights must be carried out, resolving the conflict in favor
of that right ranked higher in the hierarchy.
Bidart Campos understands that rules declaring rights have all, for
they are part of the same constitution, the same position and hierarchy.
But, the rights themselves, may have a different hierarchy.

IV.

CIVIL LAW AND ITS NEW ATTITUDE IN CONFRONTING THE PROBLEM

The new concept of civil law and consequently, the new attitude it
takes when dealing with damage suits, can not be isolated from the
aforementioned conflict of interests that is seen with increasing frequency
everyday. The law must not limit itself to prevention and indemnity.
Occasionally, it must assume a punitive function. It has been argued
whether this punitive side of civil law is constitutional. We believe it is, as

13. See generally opinion of the Supreme Court of Argentina interpreting the freedom of
the press provisions of articles 14, and 32 of the Argentinean Constitution. ARG. CONST. arts.
14, 32 (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
14. Joshua Quitmer, The Supreme Court, TIME MAGAZINE, March 31, 1997, at 4. The
article refers to the controversial Communications Decency Act, which restricted freedom of
speech in cyberspace. The Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional on June 26, 1997. See
Fred
Cate,
A
Law Antecedent And
Paramount, (last
visited
3/29/98)
<http://www.law.indiana.edu/FCLJ/v47/N02/Cate.HTML> as available on the Internet, for
examples of unconstitutional laws (concerning the First Amendment).
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long as it is not arbitrary. And, in our opinion, helps to fulfill the
preventive function, as will be noted in the conclusion.

V.

SoME TOPICS CONCERNING CIVIL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MASS

MEDIA
A. The Leading Case "Ponzettide Balbin '5
This case is a landmark in the evolutionary process of civil
responsibility in Argentina. The facts will be described briefly, as well as
the Court decision's most noteworthy points.
In September 1981, a popular magazine (similar to People, as far
as style and theme Are concerned) took, without permission, a picture of a
well know Argentine politician, Mr. Balbin, who was struggling for his
life in a hospital intensive care unit. A few hours later, the respected man
passed away and, almost immediately, the picture made it on the cover of
the magazine's next issue. The widow, Mrs. Ponzetti de Balbin, and her
son sued the magazine for moral damages stating that their right to
intimacy had been invaded.
Both the first and second verdicts condemning the publishers were
appealed. The case finally went all the way to the Supreme Court, which
upheld the previous decisions.
Justices Belluscio and Caballero said:
[Flamous people, public men have, as any other inhabitant,
constitutional shelter for their private life ... the public's
interest in Mr. Balbin's health did not require or justify an
intrusion into his most sacred sphere of privacy, as had
occurred with the publishing of this picture. The picture's
conspires against responsibility,
ignoble brutality
correctness, decency, and other estimable possibilities of
the information labor. The freedom the defendant has taken
to publish the picture, far exceeds the freedom protected
6
by the constitution.'

15. Indalia c/Editorial Atalntida S.A. s/dafios y perjuicios, at 306 (1839); FAYT, supra
note 1 (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
16. Id.
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B. Extracontractual(non contractual)Responsibility17
Different positions in South America:
1. Subjective imputability:"8 this position is based on the premise
that responsibility is only precedent when the defendant acted with
negligence 'or malice. It excludes objective imputability, 9 arguing that
Article 1113 is only applicable to cases in which objects have played an
important role.
The legal scholars and the courts supporting this position
distinguish between false information (a deliberate, -conscious act intended
to hurt, to cause damage, or dolus) and erroneous information
(unconscious act, not intended to hurt or damage; the journalist acts de
bonafide). In the first case, the media is fully responsible both civilly and
criminally. In the second, there would be no liability where the mistake
was excusable.
This position seems very restrictive, especially when the
newspapers and the journalist are not liable for false news, when the
importance of the source exonerates them from checking the information's
veracity or, when they reproduce the information exactly as it was given
for broadcasting by public authority.
Nevertheless, Argentina's Supreme Court has established that
simple negligence is enough to hold the media responsible, except when the
information concerns public affairs or interest. In this case, the doctrine of
actual malice is applicable.
The Supreme Court of the United States makes a distinction
depending on the injured party:
If it is a regular citizen (John Doe), simple negligence is enough,
but if the subject is a public official, then actual malice is necessary to
convict the media.'

17. This expression is used to convey the idea of civil responsibility linked to torts.
18. Subjective imputability means that the law makes a person responsible in the particular
case, with special consideration given to the subject's actions. The distinction between
negligence and malice is fundamental.
19. Objective imputability means that the law does not take into account the subject's
action when it determines responsibility. It is completely irrelevant whether the person acted with
negligence or malice. The responsibility rests on a different idea, such as created risk or the
legal duty of care. For instance, in a tort case involving a car accident where a pedestrian has
been run over by a car, the law makes the driver responsible regardless of whether he has acted
with negligence or not. Instead, the responsibility is based on the driver's legal duty of care
(alterum non laedere).
20. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) for the distinction between the regular
citizen and public figures.
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Admits the subjective base of the
Abuse of rights:
2.
responsibility, but emphasizes the fact that any abuse in the exercise of
freedom of the press (exceeding the goals the law had in mind when it
declared it) generates responsibility.
Kemelmajer de Carlucci and Parellada
Another theory:
3.
believe that responsibility of the media is objective, based on the legal duty
of care or in the risk created by its employees' activities, while the
The latter is
journalists have a subjective-based responsibility.
indispensable in order to hold the media responsible.
C. Minority Protection
The media's incessant hold over our private lives, taking up leisure
time or spare time traditionally occupied by other activities, surrounds us
with a rough sea of information, which many times we (the receptors) do
This constitutes an especially
not process or discern correctly.
troublesome problem for children in their formative years. In turn, this
influence commits us to a challenge we cannot neglect: to find the best way
to harmonize the free exercise of the right to information and children's
right to protection.
Should we allow children, who lack the ability to choose and judge
the information they receive, to be exposed to harmful, and sometimes
obscene manifestation that hinder their natural development and may affect
their mental health forever?
We do not believe so. The consequences are, unfortunately,
disastrous. For instance, in Germany most of the TV watching population
finds it difficult to distinguish between junk news and important news.
About fifty percent of children between the age of six and twelve believe
that murder is man's natural way of dying. That grotesque example
clearly illustrates television's reality-distorting influence on children. 2'
Before continuing further into this matter, it is of particular
importance to determine the active legitimization, or in other words, to
clearly establish whether or not someone can be a plaintiff in cases
regarding child protection, and whether or not someone can sue the media
on behalf of the child.
Basically there are, three possible scenarios:
1. Only those who have suffered moral damage (either directly or
indirectly); example of the latter: the father suing on behalf of his child is
legitimized by law to sue. This theory avoids some of the problems found
It
in the second option (see below), but is unacceptably restrictive.

21.

See FAYT, supra note 1.
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significantly limits the possibility of effective exercise of the right for the
benefit of children as a whole, There is no actual prevention, but, instead,
a mere indemnity of the damage. It does not provide social protection.
2. Any person may sue in defense of general interest:
This scenario offers a chance at both prevention and indemnity. It
obviously energizes the process of social protection, since surely at least
one of the millions of adults will be watching out for the children's wellbeing. However, its strength is its weakness; its virtues are precisely its
flaws.
How can it be so? Let us see. Up to what point can a subject (an
individual, the church, moral, religious or any other sort of association)
whose moral premises may not (in fact many times do not) coincide with
those of the population, use this plaintiff power to restrict.
Implementing such open criteria for legitimization may generate a
pathological situation in which an individual or, even worse (because of the
bureaucracy and the conflict of interest in all entities of corporate
character) an institution imposes censorship in defense of supreme general
interests or people's healthy morals, etc.
3. Restrictive legitimization with presumed damages:
Our preferred scenario would combine elements from these two
options limited legitimization (only those who have suffered injury may
sue), but establish a presumption of damages that should be overcome by
the media in order to be free from liability.
The legal process should not necessarily end up in a monetary
indemnity, but instead, whenever possible it should 'order preventive
measures (such as changing times of broadcast, etc.). In cases where such
measures are not possible, we propose a monetary indemnity (similar to a
fine) which would be given to charity.'
Even though this problem is solved mainly by writ of mandamus,
it fails in the preventive aspect because it does not generate liability, hence
the media has no reason to avoid future broadcasting.
D. The Controversy on the Extension of Redresses
Over the years, there has been an exhausting discussion on whether
judges should grant complete indemnities, fully comprehensive of the
injury done or, instead, give limited, more company-friendly redresses.

22. In Oregon, 60% of the amount of punitive damages must be paid to the state, up
20% may be paid to the plaintiff's lawyers and the plaintiff himself cannot receive any portion
it if he is found partially responsible, OREGON REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1993), Gladys Alvarez
al., Limitacion de la responsabilidad por dahios. Un enfoque socio-economico, LA LEY, May
1997.

to
of
et
6,

996

ILSA Journal of Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 4:987

This question involves on one side the victim's right to receive exactly
what has been taken from him/her, and, on the other side, the need for a
standard and economically efficient system based on fixed valuations of
damages. 23. So we wonder, is there a valid limit on indemnities? If so,
what is that limit? What kind of criteria should we apply in our search for
justice?
Granted, the victim is not entitled to a larger amount of money
than the quantity determined by the extension of the injury suffered
(otherwise, there would be an illicit enrichment). However, that is not the
only factor to be taken into account. First of all, every time a judge grants
an insufficient redress (covering the injury only partially, leaving the
remainder unrepaired), the victim's rights are violated. Modem civil law
imposes on the person responsible the duty of reestablishing the situation
of the victim (prior to the harmful action.) The sentence must be a return
to balance, neutralizing the unfairly suffered damage.' Second, we must
not forget that civil law has a preventive function, and that the whole
society is affected whenever this function is not fulfilled.
In comparative legislation, there are two opposing solutions to this
problem:
1. Systems based on limited responsibility (liability)
Such solutions tend to standardize damages, according to various
rules, in an attempt to avoid unfair indemnities.
After analyzing these limited liability systems, we quickly realize
that they fail to 'serve their purpose. They are, in fact, arbitrary because
they do not consider which factors have led to the injury in each specific
case. Therefore, the victim may be injured not only once, but twice
through unfair indemnity. The victim is the big loser of the process that
supposedly was meant to help him/her. Of course the system does have
some positive aspects. First, It allows insurance companies to make exact
economic calculations based on probabilities and, in doing so, the limited
responsibility system guarantees that the victim receives, at least, a portion
of what is owed to him/her.' Second, it makes insurance policies cheaper,
reducing costs for companies and lowering prices to the public.

23. From the economic point of view.
24. It is completely irrelevant whether the damage has been unfairly caused or not.
Whenever two people take part in a harmful action, one innocently causing it, the other
innocently suffering it, we have two innocent people. It doesn't seem fair to make the one who
unfairly suffered bear the damage (although the other person did not cause it unfairly).

25. Important authors have taken this position. For instance, Emilia Lioveras del 5to.
Congreso Internacional de Dafios, Universidad de Buenos Aires, (Apr. 25, 1997).
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Nevertheless, we agree with Mosset Iturraspe that a system that
establishes limited redresses, with a maximum amount to be given for each
type of injury (regardless of its real entity) is odious, capricious and it
breaks the general principles of law. Moreover, these systems take a
materialistic approach to the problem, which dehumanizes such an
important issue.
Pre-established maximum amounts (of money) seem to be
unfair to the victim. They discourage preventive action
(which is undeniably unfair to society); and, very likely,
litigation levels will increase due to these limits (either
their constitutionality will be attacked, or it will be tried
under malicious or negligent conduct in order to avoid the
limits).26

Such systems have been adopted in many legal systems around the
world.?7 In Spain a law enacted on November 8, 1995 establishes that the
total amount to be granted in moral damage cases is the same for every
victim.
2. Systems based on integral responsibility
In these kinds of systems, the focus is moved from the cause of the
injury to the injury itself and the person who suffers it. The main idea is
that every injury that has been unfairly suffered must be fully repaired,
regardless of whether it has been unfairly caused or not.?
The Constitution of Arizona, article 18, adopts this system: "The
right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated,
and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation."29
Some precedents of the International Court of Justice have imposed
punitive damages, for instance: Janes (1926), 4 RIAA, 81; Putnam
(1927), 4 RIAA, 151; Kennedy (1927), 4 RIAA, 194. These sentences
seem to have been inspired by the same reasons found in other systems.
This solution seems to be more benevolent to the victim, providing
relief for the injury, which is partially denied by limited liability systems.

26. Malice or negligence avoids the limitation, giving place to integral indemnities.
generally FAYT, supra note 1.

See

27. For instance: S.C. CODE ANN § 15.78.120 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN §
4.56.250 (Supp 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13.21.102.5 (1987); and N.H. REV. REV. STAT.
ANN § 508: 4-d (Supp. 1987).
28.

See Gertz, supra note 20.

29.

ARIZ. CONST. art. 18.
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We will not go deeper into these systems but it is this type of system we
endorse.
3. Punitive damages
Before entering the final part of this article, let's make a brief
review of the functions the redress must fulfill in today's civil law. First,
It must repair the injury completely: Second, It must prevent harmful
actions from happening again. Third, it must carry out a punitive function,
which is closely related to the preventive function.
Our concerns are centered around this last function. In those cases
where the injury has been caused maliciously, the amount of indemnity
should be increased, regardless of any consideration as to the extent of the
injury.30 We will explain this idea in the conclusion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Having previously explained how important the preventive function
of law is in this matter, we dare to venture into a field that, for us, is
particularly dark. Knowing that there is not a definite or perfect solution,
our intent is to find a fair solution and new alternatives because "the big
challenge of our time lies . . . not in determining which or how many
rights there are ... but in reaching suitable ways to guarantee them .
(citation omitted)
In many cases, the pecuniary compensation set by courts does not
adequately fulfill the laws preventive goal. This can clearly be seen
through an example: a newspaper is faced with the option of publishing
information known to be false, (or harmful to someone's honor), making
large amounts of money (which usually greatly exceed the total amount
granted by judges for damages) and paying the indemnity, or not
publishing, which releases it from paying any compensation but also
deprives it of immense earnings. In most cases the media will choose the
second alternative. In the example, the conviction does not give the
newspaper a reason to prevent it from repeating the same action in the
future. The sentence does not provide what the old Italian master,
Romagnosi, called 150 years ago, the controspinta.3 1
It would also be appropriate that in those cases where the injury
(which may or may not be illegal) occurred with evident eagerness for
30. Since it implies a punishment similar to criminal law's penalties, all guarantees
acknowledged in criminal trials (non bis in idern, in dubio pro reo, etc.) must be assured.
31. The spinta criminosa is the driving force of crime. The controspinta is the reason that
the punishment gives to the criminal to avoid a relapse. SEBASTIAN SOLER, DERECHO PENAL
ARGENTINO II 381 (Tipografica Editora Argentina, Ba As., 1953).
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economic gain and there is no criminal responsibility, to provide the
controspinta, the judge should establish a plus over the damage's
indemnity. He should take into account the probable profit the media may
obtain. By doing so, the sentence not only gives the media a very good
reason to avoid relapsing, but it becomes a warning for other members of
the media as well.
The goal of this proposal is to prevent a person's most intimate
rights from becoming profitable instruments of the powerful machinery
represented by modern mass media, as well as to instill a necessary
minimum standard of ethics in journalism, because, as Walter Williams
32
said "Nobody can write as a journalist what a gentleman cannot say."
That, and nothing more, is our goal.

32. PIZARRO, supra note 2. (editorial note: translated from Spanish).
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INTRODUCCION

Hoy dia, los medios masivos de comunicaci6n, con su
desarrollo imparable y asombroso, han alcanzado un nivel de
importancia en nuestras vidas que no se imaginaron hace unos afios.
*
Jos6 Sebastian Elias es un estudiante de ley, 61 estA en el tercer afto de escuela de
derecho en la Universidad de Mendoza en Mendoza, Argentina. Miembro de A.I.E.A.
(Asociacion Internacional de Estudiantes de Abogacia). Juan Cruz Diaz es un estudiante de ley,
61 estA en eltercer afio
de escuela de derecho en la Universidad de Mendoza en Mendoza,
Argentina. Miembro de Asociacion Internacional de Estudiantes de Abogacia.
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Esta nueva situaci6n es inherente en sociedades modernas, y sin ella,
nuestro estilo de vida seria diferente, quizis mejor, quiz~s peor,
pero ciertamente diferente de la manera que nosotros lo conocemos
hoy. Peri6dicos digitales, la experiencia de la realidad virtual, las
firmas digitales y muchas otras expresiones de tecnologia son todas
las sefiales de los tiempos que nos muestran la indisputable realidad
de la sociedad digital.
Y nosotros, como testigos de estas
transformaciones profundas, sustanciales, nos debemos preparar no
solo para disfrutar el consuelo y los otros cambios de acciones
positivas de estos desarrollos, pero tambitn para resolver los
conflictos 6ticos intrincados y las preguntas legales que,
indudablemente, surgirin.
Nosotros no queremos, ni podemos negar el papel importante
que los medios de comunicaci6n, asi como la libertad de expresi6n y
de la prensa juegan en una sociedad democrdtica: Primero, desde un
punto de vista politico y institucional, los medios de comunicaci6n
actuan como director de los 6rganos gubernamentales, dando
legitimidad a sus acciones; Segundo, desde un punto de vista social y
cientifico, permite el acceso a las masas a las noticias de
informaci6n, convirtiendo conocimiento en la herencia de la
humanidad, por lo tanto permitiendo desarrollos cientificos y
culturales sensacionales.'
Sin embargo, a pesar de todas, las antedichas ventajas, no
podemos perderles la vista a las consecuencias negativas producidas
a menudo por las actividades de la prensa. Estas consecuencias
deben ser ambas prevenidas y reparadas por la ley.
Una depersonalizacion de informaci6n est, ocurriendo en
todos los niveles .2 Los hechos y las especulaciones frecuentemente
entran en prensa sin la corroboraci6n debida. Teniendo presente que
el valor de esta informaci6n es normalmente directamente
proporcional a lo inmediato de su radiodifusi6n, nosotros podemos
entender la batalla cruda y feroz luchada corrientemente por

1. Umberto Eco entiende que la televisi6n es una herramienta cultural para los paises
subdesarrollados, mostr-,ndoles lo que estA pasando alrededor del mundo, citado por, CARLOS
FAYT, LA OMNIPOTENCIA DE LA PRENSA SU JUICIO DE REALIDAD EN LA JURISPRUDENCIA
ARGENTINA Y NORTEAMERICANA (Editorial La Ley 1994).
2.

RAMON

PIZARRO,

RESPONSABILIDAD

COMUNICACI6N, HAMMURABI 253 (1991).
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empresarios de los medios de comunicaci6n. Un gran porcentaje de
peri6dicos y estaciones de television prefieren publicar noticias de
veracidad dudosa que estan en segundo lugar despues de tomar
tiempo para verificar la validez de la informaci6n.
Es mis, la universalidad de la informaci6n, agregada a su
naturaleza pfiblica, muestra al individuo impotente insignificante
comparado con la estructura de poder de los medios de
comunicaci6n. Como consecuencia de la gran influencia que la
prensa tiene sobre las personas, no s6lo son los dafios y perjuicios
grandes, sino tambi6n los efectos son muchas veces irreparables.
Nadie negaria que es una faena dificil de convencer a las personas
que lo que aparece en las noticias, por ejemplo, es incorrecto.
Ademis, los editores rara vez reconocen la falsedad de sus
aserciones, y cuando lo hacen (normalmente forzados por decisiones
judiciales) no ponen el mismo 6nfasis en su correcci6n que en el
momento en que la informaci6n dafiosa se di6 a conocer.
Para evitar obstruir el desarrollo completo de una persona,
hay que reconocer el derecho a la informaci6n como un derecho
fundamental. No es posible crear una conciencia civil segfin las
reglas 6ticas, ni es posible para los hombres desarrollar totalmente
sus capacidades intelectuales si el derecho a ser informado
libremente no se garantiza. Por consiguiente es necesario dar estado
constitucional al derecho a la informaci6n.
Actualmente, el derecho de escoger y juzgar lo qud uno
va a leer, mirar, o escuchar se ha convertido en la libertad
ms importante... un derecho que impone en el gobierno
el deber de satisfacer ese mismo derecho . . . el derecho
pasivo a ser informado . . . que contiene en si mismo la
pregunta de si el hombre se podri reservar la posibilidad
de tener un pensamiento propio o no.... I
Esto no implica un ejercicio sin restricci6n, irresponsable, o
ilimitado de este derecho, sino todo lo contrario. Nosotros creemos
que ademAs de los dafios y perjuicios econ6micos y morales que
pueden ser producidos por las actividades de los medios de
comunicaci6n, una legislaci6n debe prevenir otros tipos de dafios y

3.

FAYT, supra nota 1.
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perjuicios que nos afectan todos los dias, como el dafio causado a los
nifios por cierta informaci6n.

II.

CONSTITUCIONALISMO Y DERECHO COMPARATIVO

En Espafia, se reconoce la libertad de expresi6n y el derecho
a la informaci6n expresamente en la Constituci6n de 1978, articulo
20 que prohibe cualquier tipo de censura previa. Tambi6n establece
limites a estos derechos: la libertad de expresi6n y de la prensa debe
ejercerse respetando cada otro derecho contenido en esa
Constituci6n, especialmente el derecho al honor, la intimidad, la
individualidad, juventud, y la protecci6n de la nifiez.
En Alemania, se encuentran normas similares (el articulo 5
de la constituci6n alemana es la fuente del articulo 20 espafiol). Por
muchos afios, se pens6 que siempre que un conflicto entre el honor y
la libertad de expresi6n surgia, debia resolverse favoreciendo el
primero. Sin embargo, desde el caso LUTH (1958),4 es necesario
considerar el conflicto en cada caso concreto. En 1961, la Corte
Constitucional decidi6 que "el periodista debe cumplir el deber de
veracidad . . . pero es suficiente haber ilevado a cabo lo que es
razonablemente necesario para verificar la veracidad de la
informaci6n. . . ."- para estar exento de responsabilidad.
Hoy, es prevaleciente en la ley de la Uni6n Europea la idea
que la libertad de expresi6n es superior a la del honor, etc., siempre
que contribuya a formar la opini6n ptiblica.6 Mufioz Machado
declara que "la libertad de expresi6n no tiene virtualmente ningiln
limite.. . ." 7
Se garantiza la libertad de la prensa en la Constituci6n de los
Estados Unidos, en su primer articulo (1791) (el Congreso "no hard
ninguna ley. .. limitando la libertad de expresi6n o de la prensa..

4. Diego Rosario, El honor y la libertad de expresion (discurso dado en la Universidad
de Salamanca, Espafia, enero 1996).
5.

FAYT, supra nota 1.

6. Segdn el tratado de la Uni6n Europea, Declaraci6n 17, la comision estaba por
presentar un informe antes del 1993 con respecto a las medidas posibles para mejorar el acceso
del pfiblico a informaci6n posefdas por instituciones gubernamentales, SECRETARIA DE ESTADO
PARA LAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEAS 319 (1992).
7. Rosario, supra nota 4.
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El pensamiento judicial tambidn esta dominado por una
interpretaci6n que, indudablemente, pone los medios de
comunicaci6n en una situaci6n privilegiada. Desde el caso principal
New York Times vs. Sullivan,9 la Corte Suprema de los Estados
Unidos ha estado aplicando la doctrina de la malicia real que
bdsicamente denota el principio que dice que la persona afectada
tiene que demostrar que la informaci6n se dio o "con conocimiento
que era falso o con descuido temerario de si era falso o no."1o
La Constituci6n Argentina garantiza libertad de la prensa en
articulos numeros 14 "todos los habitantes de la naci6n gozan de los
siguientes derechos conforme a las leyes que reglamentan su
ejercicio . . . de publicar sus ideas por la prensa sin censura
previa."" y "El congreso Federal no dictard leyes que restrinjan la
libertad de la prensa o establezcan sobre ella la jurisdicci6n federal.
"12 El acuerdo de San Josd de Costa Rica (articulol3) y el Tratado
Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Politicos (articulo 19) tambi6n
proveen protecci6n en tal cosas.
Respecto del papel del sujeto pasivo, La Constituci6n
Argentina no hace ninguna menci6n al respecto, pero tratados
recientemente incorporados (como el acuerdo de San Jos6 de Costa
Rica, ahora con jerarquii constitucional en nuestro pais) ciertamente
lo hacen, claramente declarando que cada persona tiene el derecho
de recibir, sin la censura previa, informaci6n e ideas de cualquier
tipo y por medios diferentes.
Sin embargo, la Corte Suprema de Argentina ha dicho que
"La libertad de la prensa tiene un significado mis amplio que la
simple exclusi6n de censura y, por consiguiente, la protecci6n
constitucional debe imponer un manejo cuidadoso de reglas y las
circunstancias pertinentes para evitar obstruir la prensa libre y sus
funciones esenciales. . . . "3
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
9.. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
10. Id. a 254 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
11.

ARG. CONST. art. 14.

12. ARG. CONST. art. 32. La fuente directa de este articulo es la Primera Enmendadura
de la Constituci6n de los Estados Unidos.
13. Vea generalnente la opinion de la Corte Suprema de Argentina interpretando la
libertad de la prensa en articulos 14, 32 de la Constituci6n de Argentina. ARG. CONST. arts. 14,
32.
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Pero no obstatante todas estas medidas proteccionistas,
"desgraciadamente
las
legislaturas
promulgan
leyes
inconstitucionales todo el tiempo ... ."

III. CONFLICTO ENTRE LOS DERECHOS

Como fue previamente mencionado, muchas constituciones
modernas conceden protecci6n especial a la libertad de expresi6n,
como con otros derechos.
Esto se ve, sobre todo, en las
constituciones de paises occidentales que siguen la tradici6n liberal
de esos derechos, mejores conocidos como derechos naturales en las
palabras de John Locke. Sin embargo, ellos ni establecen amenudo
una jerarquia entre los derechos ni le dan ningtin tipo de prioridad a
como resolver problemas que involucran mds de un derecho
constitucional.
La Corte Suprema de Argentina ha intentado clarificar este
problema declarando que las leyes constitucionales y los derechos
que surgen de ellos, difieren entre si jerirquicamente. Si nosotros
seguimos esta linea de pensamiento, podemos concluir que hay una
pregunta axiol6gica; por consiguiente, en cada caso concreto una
apreciaci6n de los derechos debe realizarse, resolviendo el conflicto
a favor de el derecho que tiene el grado mis alto en la apreciaci6n.
Bidart Campos entiende que las reglas que declaran derechos
todos tienen, porque son parte de la misma constituci6n, la misma
posici6n y jerarquia, pero los propios derechos pueden tener una
jerarquia diferente.
IV. EL DERECHO CIVIL Y SU NUEVA ACTITUD PARA CONFRONTAR
EL PROBLEMA

El nuevo concepto de derecho civil y por consiguiente, la
nueva actitud que toma al tratar con demandas por dafios, no puede
aislarse del conflicto del inter6s mencionado que se ve con
14. Joshua Quittner, The Supreme Court, TIME MAGAZINE, March 31, 1997, a 4. El
articulo se refiere al Acto de Decencia de Comunicaciones pol6mico que restringi6 la libertad de
expresi6n en cyberspace. La Cone Suprema lo declar6 inconstitucional el 26 de junio, 1997
(nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s). Vea Fred Cate, A Law Antecedent And Paramount, (last
visited 3/29/98) <http://www.law.indiana.edu/FCLJ/v47/NO2/Cate.HTML> disponible en
Internet, para ejemplos de leyes inconstitucionales (acerca de ia Primera Enmendadura) (nota
editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).

1998]

Elias

1007

frecuencia creciente todos los dias. La ley no debe limitarse a la
prevenci6n y a la indemnizaci6n solamente, de vez en cuando debe
asumir una funci6n punitiva. Ha sido disputado si el lado punitivo
de derecho civil es constitucional. Creemos que lo es, mientras no
sea arbitrario.
Y, se opina, que ayuda a cumplir la funci6n
preventiva; como se notari en la conclusi6n.

V.

ALGUNOS TEMAS QUE INVOLUCRAN RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL DE
LOS MEDIOS MASIVOS DE COMUNICACION

A. El caso "Ponzetti de Balbin"5
Este caso es un hito en el proceso evolutivo de
responsabilidad civil en Argentina.
Los hechos se describirdn
brevemente, asi como los puntos mds notables de la decisi6n
Judicial.
En septiembre de 1981, una revista popular (similar a
People, en cuanto a estilo y tema se refiere) tom6, sin permiso, una
fotografia de un politico argentino muy conocido (Sr. Balbin) qui6n
estaba esforzndose por su vida en un hospital en la unidad del
cuidado intensivo. Unas horas despu6s, el hombre falleci6 y casi
inmediatamente, la fotografia fue la cubierta de la pr6xima edicion
de la revista. La viuda, Sefiora Ponzetti de Balbin y su hijo,
demandaron la revista por dafios morales declarando que sus
derechos a la intimidad habian sido violados.
Se apel6 el primer y el segundo fallo que condenaron a los
publicadores y el caso fue finalmente a la Corte Suprema, la cual
sostuvo las decisiones anteriores.
Los Jueces Belluscio y Caballero dijeron:
[p]ersonas famosas, los hombres ptiblicos tienen, como
cualquier otro habitante, resguardo constitucional para su
vida privada . . . el inter6s del ptiblico en la salud del Sr.
Balbin no exigi6 ni justific6 una intrusi6n en su mas
sagrada esfera de aislamiento, como habia ocurrido con la
publicaci6n de esta fotografia. La brutalidad innoble de la
fotografia conspira contra la responsabilidad, exactitud,
15. Indalia c/Editorial Ataintida S.A. s/dafios y perjuicios, a 306 (1839); FAYT, supra nota
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decencia y otras posibilidades estimables de la labor
informaci6n y la libertad que el demandado ha tornado para
publicar dicha fotografia, excede la libertad protegida por
la constituci6n.' 6
B. La ResponsabilidadExtracontractual(no contractual)"7
Posiciones diferentes en Amdrica del Sur:
1. Imputabilidad subjetiva:1' esta posici6n representa la
premisa que la responsabilidad es s6lo precedente cuando el
demandado actu6 con negligencia o malivolamente. Excluye la
imputabilidad objetiva'9 sosteniendo que el articulo 1113 es s6lo
aplicable a casos en los que los objetos han jugado un papel
importante.
Los doctrinarios y las cortes que sostienen esta posici6n
distinguen entre la infornaci6nfalsa (un acto deliberado conciente
de prop6sito a herir, para causar un dafio, dolus) y la informaci6n
err6nea (acto inconsciente, sin intenci6n de herir o dafiar; el
periodista actdia de buena fe). En el primer caso, los medios de
comunicaci6n
son totalmente
responsables
civilmente
y
criminalmente. En el segundo, no habria obligaci6n cuando el error
es excusable.
Esta posici6n parece muy restrictiva sobre todo cuando los
peri6dicos y los periodistas no son responsables por las noticias
falsas, cuando la iinportancia de la fuente los exonera de verificar la
veracidad de la informaci6n o, cuando ellos reproducen la
informaci6n exactamente como se les dio para transmitir a trav6s de
autoridad ptiblica.
16. Id.
17.

Esta expresi6n se usa para expresar la idea de responsabilidad civil unida a los agravio

indemnizables.
18. Imputabilidad subjetiva quiere decir que la ley hace a una persona responsable en el
caso particular, considerando las acciones del asunto muy especialmente. La distinci6n entre la
negligencia y la malicia es fundamental.
19. Imputabilidad objetiva quiere decir que la ley no tiene en cuenta la acci6n del asunto
cuando determina responsabilidad. Es completamente no pertinente si lapersona actu6 con
negligencia o malicia. La responsabilidad estA de pie en una idea diferente, como riesgo creado o
el deber legal de garantia. Por ejemplo, en un caso de agravio indemnizable que involucra un
accidente de autom6vil donde un peat6n se ha corrido por un autom6vil, laley hace a ch6fer
responsable sin tener en cuenta si 61 ha actuado con negligencia o no. En cambio, la
responsabilidad es basada en el deber legal del (alterum non laedere).
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No obstante, la Corte Suprema de Argentina ha establecido
que la negligencia simple es suficiente para hacer responsable a los
medios de comunicaci6n, excepto cuando la informaci6n considera
asuntos o inter6ses pfiblicos. En este caso, la malicia real es la
doctrina aplicable.
La Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos hace una distinci6n
dependiendo del sujeto pasivo del daijo: si es ciudadano simple
(Fulano o Mengano), la negligencia simple es suficiente, pero si el
sujeto es un oficial pfiblico, entonces la malicia real es necesaria
para condenar a los medios de comunicaci6n.10
2. Abuso de derechos: Admite la base subjetiva de la
responsabilidad, pero da dnfasis al hecho que cualquier abuso en el
ejercicio de la libertad de la prensa (excediendo las metas que la ley
tenia en mente cuando lo declar6) genera la responsabilidad.
3.
Otra teoria: Kemelmajer de Carlucci y Parellada
entienden que la responsabilidad de los medios de comunicaci6n es
objetivo, basado en el deber legal de garantia o en el riesgo creado
por las actividades de sus empleados, mientras los periodistas tienen
una responsabilidad basada subjetivamente.
El filtimo es
indispensable para hacer a los medios de comunicaci6n responsables.
C. Protecci6nMinoritaria
El adelanto incesante de los medios de comunicaci6n sobre
nuestras vidas privadas, ocupando tiempo libre o tiempo
tradicionalmente ocupado a trav6s de otras actividades, nos rodea
con un mar ispero de informaci6n infmitamente diferente, que
muchas veces nosotros (los receptores) no procesamos ni
discernimos correctamente.
Esto indiscutiblement constituye un
importante factor en los aflos formativos de los niftos, y al mismo
tiempo (nos obliga a que aceptemos un desafio que nosotros no
podemos rechazar: para encontrar la mejor manera de armonizar el
ejercicio libre del derecho a la informaci6n y el derecho de los nifios
a protecci6n).
iDebemos permitirle a los nifios que les falta la habilidad de
escoger y exponer la informaci6n que ellos reciben, ser expuesto a

20. Yea Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) para ia distinci6n entre el ciudadano simple
y figuras del ptiblico.
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dafios, y a veces manifestaciones obscenas que impiden su desarrollo
natural y pueden afectar su salud mental?
son,
Las consecuencias
Nosotros no lo creemos.
Por ejemplo, en Alemania la
desgraciadamente, desastrosas.
mayoria de la poblaci6n que ve la televisi6n encuentra muy dificil
distinguir entre las noticias de basura y las noticias importantes.
Aproximadamente el cincuenta porciento de nifios entre la edad de
seis y doce creen que el asesinato es la manera natural de morirse.
Eso debe ser un ejemplo suficientemente grotesco para que nosotros
veamos claramente la realidad de la influencia que la televisi6n tiene
sobre los nifios.21
Antes de continuar con esta materia, es de importancia
particular determinar la legitimaci6n activa, o en otras palabras,
establecer claramente quidn puede ser el demandante en casos con
respecto a las protecciones de nifios, y qui6n no lo es; qui6n puede
demandar los medios de comunicaci6n en nombre de los nifios y
qui6n no puede.
Hay, tres posibles respuestas a esta pregunta:
1. Solo aqu6llos que han sufrido daiio moral (directamente o
indirectamente), ejemplo del filtimo: el padre que demanda en
nombre de su nifto es legitimo por ley para demandar. Esta teoria
evita alguno de los problemas que se encuentran en el segundo
ejemplo (ver a debajo), pero es inaceptablemente restrictivo,
limitando significativamente la posibilidad de ejercicio eficaz del
derecho. No hay ninguna prevenci6n actual, pero, en cambio, una
simple indemnizaci6n del dafio. No brinda protecci6n social.
2. Cualquier persona puede demandar en defensa del interns
general:
La prevenci6n e indemnizaci6n estAn favorecidas por esta
posici6n. Obviamente esto da energia al proceso de protecci6n
social, ya que hay una probabilidad alta de que alguien siempre est,
disponible para vigilar el bienestar de nuestros nifios. Pero su fuerza
es su debilidad; sus virtudes precisamente son sus fallas.
ZC6mo puede ser? iVeamos hasta qud punto puede un sujeto
(un individuo, la iglesia, moral, religioso o cualquier otra clase de
asociaci6n) de quien las premisas morales no pueden (en realidad
21.

Ver FAYT, supra nota 1.
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muchas veces no pueden) coincidir con aqu6llos de la poblaci6n,
tomar este poder que es muchas veces restrictivo del derecho a
informaci6n?
Llevando a cabo semejante criterio abierto para la
legitimaci6n puede generar una situaci6n patol6gica en la cual un
individuo o, peor (debido a la burocracia y la lucha del inter6s en
todas las entidades de caricter corporativo) una instituci6n aplica la
censura para defender los intereses generales supremos o las morales
saludables de personas, etc.
3. Legitimaci6n restrictiva con dafto presunto:
Otra soluci6n podria ser adoptar una tesis mixta. De la
primera tesis, debe tomar la legitimaci6n limitada (solamente
aqu6llos que han sufrido el dafio pueden demandar), pero
estableciendo una presunci6n de dafio que debe ser vencido por
medios de comunicaci6n para estar libre de responsabilidad.
El proceso legal no necesariamente debe terminar en una
indemnizaci6n monetaria, pero, en cambio, cuando es posible, debe
ordenar medida preventiva (como cambiando horas de transmisi6n,
etc.). En casos donde tales medidas no son posibles, nosotros
proponemos una indemnizaci6n monetaria (similar a una multa) qu6
se daria a caridad.Aunque este problema es resuelto principalmente imediante
un escrito de mandamus, falla en el aspecto preventivo, porque no
genera responsabilidad, por lo tanto los medios de comunicaci6n no
tienen ninguna raz6n para evitar radiodifusi6n en el futuro.
D. La Controversia en la Extensi6n de las Reparaciones
Durante los aflos, ha habido una discusi6n agotadora sobre si
los jueces deben conceder indennizaciones integrales, totalmente
comprensivas del dafio hecho o, en cambio, dar reparaciones
limitadas, mis amistosas a las compafias. Esta pregunta involucra
por un lado el derecho de la victima de recibir exactamente lo que se
ha tomado de 61 o 611a, y, por el otro lado, el sistema ciertamente

22. En Oreg6n, el 60% de la cantidad en concepto de dahos y perjuicios punitivos debe
pagarse al estado, hasta el 20% puede pagarse a los abogados del demandante y el demandante

no puede recibir ninguna porci6n de 61 si se encuentra que fie parcialmente responsable,
OREGON REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1993), Gladys Alvarez et al., Limitacion de la responsabilidad
por dahos. Un enfoque socio-economico, LA LEY, May 6, 1997.
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mds seguro y eficaz basado en las valoraciones fijas de dafios y
perjuicios.3 Asi que nosotros nos preguntamos, LHay un limite
vdlido para las indemnizaciones? ZEn ese caso cual es ese limite?
ZQu6 tipo de criterio debemos aplicar nosotros en nuestra btisqueda
de la justicia?
Concedido, la victima no se le da el derecho a una cantidad
de dinero mayor que la cantidad determinada por la extensi6n del
dafio sufrido (sino, habria un enriquecimiento ilicito). Pero, 6se no
es el tinico hecho para tener en cuenta. En primer lugar, cada vez
que un juez concede una reparaci6n insuficiente (s6lo cubriendo
parcialmente el dafio, dejando el resto sin reparar), los derechos de
la victima son violados. El derecho civil moderno impone en la
persona responsable el deber de reestablecer la situaci6n de la
victima (antes de la acci6n dafiosa). La sentencia debe ser un
retorno al estado anterior, neutralizando el dafio injustamente
sufrido. Segundo, no debemos olvidarnos que ese derecho civil
tiene una funci6n preventiva y que la sociedad entera es afectada
siempre que esa funci6n no se lleva a cabo.
En derecho comparado, hay dos soluciones opuestas a este
problema:
1. Los sistemas basados en responsabilidad limitada
Ellos tienden a regularizar los dafios y peruicios, segfin las
varias reglas, en un esfuerzo por evitar indemnizaciones injustas.
Despu6s de analizar 6stos sistemas de responsabilidad
limitada, rdpidamente nos damos cuenta que no alcanzan su meta.
Son arbitrarios porque no consideran cudles factores traen como
consecuencia del dafio en cada caso concreto. Por consiguiente, la
victima es dafiada no una vez, sino dos veces. La victima es el
perdedor principal del proceso que supuestamente lo ayuda. Por
supuesto el sistema tiene algunos aspectos positivos: Primero,
permite a las compafiias de seguros hacer cdlculos econ6micos
exactos basados en probabilidades y siendo asi, el sistema de

23. Del punto de vista econ6mico.
24. No es importante completamente si el dafilo ha sido causado injustamente o no.
Siempre que dos personas toman parte en una acci6n dafiosa, una innocentemente causandolo, el
otro innocentemente sufriendolo, tenemos dos inocentes. No parece justo hacer que el que
injustamente sufri6, sostenga el dafio (aunque la otra persona no lo caus6 injustamente).
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responsabilidad limitada garantiza que la victima reciba, por lo
menos, una porci6n de lo que se le debe.2 Segundo, hace que las
p6lizas de seguro sean mis baratas, reduciendo costos para las
compaiffas y bajando los precios al pfiblico.
No obstante, estamos de acuerdo con Mosset Iturraspe que un
sistema que establece reparaciones limitadas, con una cantidad
mixima para dar por cada tipo de dafio (sin tener en cuenta su
entidad real) es odioso, caprichoso y rompe los principios generales
de ley. Es mis, estos sistemas toman un acercamiento materialista,
contrario al problema, que des-humaniza semejante problema.
Sumas mdximas pre-establecidas (de dinero)
parecen ser injustas con la victima; desaniman la acci6n
preventiva (qu6 es indisputablemente injusto con la
sociedad); y es muy probable, los niveles de litigio
aumentardn debido a estos limites (o su constitucionalidad
se atacard, o se probard demostrar una conducta mal6vola
o negligente para evitar los lfmites).2
Se han adoptado tales sistemas en muchos sistemas legales
alrededor del mundo.27 En Espafia, una ley promulgada el 8 de

noviembre de 1995, establece que la cantidad total a ser concedida
en casos de daflo morales es la misma para cada victima.
2. Los sistemas basados en la responsabilidad integral
En estos tipos de sistemas, el enfoque se traslada de la causa
del dafto al dafio mismo y a la persona que lo sufre. La idea
principal es que cada dafio que ha sido injustamente sufrido debe
repararse totalmente, sin tener en cuenta si ha sido injustamente
causado o no.2
La Constituci6n de Arizona, articulo 18, adopta este sistema:
"El derecho de acci6n para recuperar dafios y perjuicios por las
25. Esta posici6n ha sido sostenida por autores importantes. Por ejemplo, Emilia Lloveras
del, 5to. Congreso Internacional de Dafios, Universidad de Buenos Aires, (Apr. 25,1997).
(citaci6n omitida).
26. Malicia o negligencia evitan lalimitaci6n, dando lugar a las indemnizaciones fntegras.
Vea generalnente FAYT, supra nota 1.
27. Por ejemplo: S.C. CODE ANN § 15.78.120 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN §
4.56.250 (Supp 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13.21.102.5 (1987); and N.H. REV. REV. STAT.
ANN § 508: 4-d (Supp. 1987).

28.

Vea Gertz, supra nota 20.

1014

ILSA Journalof Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 4:1001

lesiones nunca se abrogard y la cantidad recobrada no estard sujeta a
ninguna limitaci6n estatutaria."9 Algunos precedentes de la Corte
Internacional de Justicia han impuesto dafios y perjuicios punitivos,
por ejemplo: Janes (1926), 4 RIAA 81; Putnam (1927), 4 RIAA
151; Kennedy (1927), 4 RIAA 194. Estas sentencias parecen haber
sido inspiradas por las mismas razones que se encuentran en otros
sistemas.
Esta soluci6n parece ser mds bendvola con la victima,
manteniendo alivio por el dafio, que es negado parcialmente por
sistemas de responsabilidad limitados. No entraremos con mds
profundidad en estos sistemas pero desde ya nos escogemos el
mismo.
3. Daftos y perjuicios punitivos
Antes de entrar en la parte final del articulo, hagamos una
revisi6n breve de las funciones que la reparaci6n debe cumplir en el
derecho civil actual: Primero, debe reparar el dafio completamente;
Segundo, debe impedir que las acciones dafiosas ocurran de nuevo; y
Tercero, debe llevar a cabo una funci6n punitiva que se relaciona
junto a la funci6n preventiva.
Nuestras preocupaciones se centran alrededor de esta (iltima
funci6n. En esos casos donde el dafio se ha causado mal~volamente,
la cantidad de la indemnizaci6n debe aumentar, sin tener en cuenta
consideraci6n alguna sobre la extensi6n del dafio. ° Explicaremos
esta idea en la conclusi6n.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ya habiendo explicado la importancia de la funci6n
preventiva de la ley en esta materia, uno se atreve a aventurar en un
campo que es particularmente oscuro. Sabemos que no hay una
soluci6n definida y que habrd muchas interpretaciones distintas. La
finalidad es encontrar una soluci6n justa y nuevas alternativas porque
"el desaflo grande de nuestro tiempo queda . . .no determinando

29. ARIZ. CONST. art. 18 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl~s).
30. Ya que implica un castigo similar a las penalidades de la ley criminal, todos las
garantias reconocidas en juicios criminales (non bis in idem, in dubio pro reo, etc.) tienen que
ser asegurados.
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por cuales o cuintos derechos hay . . . sino alcanzando maneras
convenientes de garantizarlos. . . ." (citaci6n omitida)
En muchos casos, la compensaci6n pecuniaria determinada
por las cortes no cumple la funci6n preventiva de la ley
adecuadamente. Esto se ve claramente a trav6s de un ejemplo
simple: un peri6dico se enfrenta con la opci6n de publicar
informaci6n conocida por ser falsa, o dafiosa al honor de alguien,
haciendo cantidades grandes de dinero (que normalmente excede la
cantidad total concedida por jueces por los dafios y perjuicios) y
pagando la indemnizaci6n, o no publicando la informacion, que los
descarga de pagar cualquier compensaci6n pero tambi6n los priva de
inmensas ganancias. En la mayoria de los casos, los medios de
comunicaci6n escogerdn la segunda alternativa (ya que es
En el ejemplo, el peri6dico
econ6micamente conveniente).
condenado no encuentra en la sentencia una raz6n que le impida
repetir la misma acci6n en el futuro. La sentencia no provee lo que
el amo viejo italiano, Romagnosi, llam6 hace 150 afios, el
controspinta.1'
Tambi6n seria apropiado que en esos casos donde la acci6n
(que podrian ser ilegal o no) se Ileva a cabo con avidez evidente para
obtener beneficios econ6micos, y no hay responsabilidad criminal
para proporcionar el controspinta, el juez debe establecer un signo
de mds encima de la indemnizaci6n del dafio. El debe tener en
cuenta la ganancia probable a ser obtenida por los medios de
comunicaci6n. Siendo asi, no solo la sentencia da una raz6n muy
buena a los medios de comunicaci6n para evitar recaer, pero se
vuelve una advertencia tambi6n para otros miembros de los medios
de comunicaci6n.
La meta de esta propuesta es prevenir que los derechos
intimos de una persona se conviertan en instrumentos beneficiosos de
la maquinaria poderosa representada por los medios de
comunicaci6n masivos modernos, asi como introducir en el
periodismo un requisito minimo de dtica, porque, como WALTER

31.

La spinta criminosa es la fuerza del crimen. La contospinta es la razon por lo cual el

castigo se le da al criminal para evitar una recaida.

SEBASTIAN SOLER, DERECHO PENAL

ARGENTINO II, 381 (Tipografica Editora Argentina, Ba As., 1953).
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WILLIAMS dijo "[N]adie puede escribir como periodista lo que un

caballero no puede decir."32
Eso,

Y

NADA

32. PIZARRO, supra nota 2.

MAS,

ES

NUESTRA

META.

Microsoft Illustration
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ECUADOR
Judiciary
The court system of Ecuador includes a supreme court of 16 judges, 10
divisional courts, and numerous lower courts. Criminal cases are heard
before a "special jury," consisting of one judge and three members of the
bar. Capital punishment is prohibited.

Magistratura
El sistema judicial de Ecuador incluye una corte suprema de 16 jueces, 10
cortes divisional, y numerosas cortes mds bajas. Los casos delictivos se
oyen antes un "jurado especial," consistiendo de un juez y tres miembros
de la junta. La pena capital es prohibida.

GUI)ELINES FOR ALIEN AFFAIRS IN ECUADOR
(R.O. No. 382, December 30, 1971)
Maria CeciliaRomo-Leroux and Mario Alejandro Flor
The Alien Law and Regulations published in Official Register No.
382 on December 30, 1977, contains the provisions in force pertinent to
aliens. Aliens are defined therein as all individuals to whom the
Constitution and other laws of the Republic of Ecuador does not grant
Ecuadorian citizenship.

I.
ALIENS' LEGAL STATUS
Per the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution: "In general,
aliens have the same rights as Ecuadorian citizens with the limitations
provided in the Constitution and law. Aliens may not exercise political
rights."
Article 41 of the Civil Code states: "Persons are defined as all
human beings no matter what their age, gender or condition, divided into
Ecuadorians and aliens."
Article 42: "Ecuadorian citizens are those defined as such by the
Constitution. All others are aliens."
Article 43: "The Law does not recognize the difference between
Ecuadorian citizens and aliens with regard to acquisition and exercise of
civil rights regulated under this Code."

II.

TYPES OF ALIENS FOR ECUADORIAN IMMIGRATION
PURPOSES

Aliens are divided into immigrants and non-immigrants.

III. IMMIGRANT ALIENS
Defined as aliens entering the country legally and temporarily in
order to establish themselves and perform authorized activities determined
in each category and provided in Article 10 of the Alien Law.
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IV. NON-IMMIGRANT ALIENS

Per Article 12 of the Alien Law, for the purposes provided in each
category, non-immigrants are aliens residing in another State, entering
Ecuador legally and temporarily, who do not wish to establish themselves.
The main reason for the legal distinction between aliens that have
entered and registered as immigrants and non-immigrants is to regulate the
possession and exercise of aliens' rights through the legal residence system
in all cases whereby local legislation is recognized and applicable per
Article 20 of the Alien Law.
V.

ALIENS' RIGHTS

With the exceptions provided in the State's internal legislation as
per Article 14 of the Constitution and Article 2 of the Alien law, aliens
entering Ecuadorian territory shall be entitled to the same rights and
obligations as Ecuadorians.
A. Types of Immigrants
Except for transients, all aliens requesting entry into Ecuador as
immigrants or non-immigrants shall have a visa issued by an Ecuadorian
foreign service official working abroad at the place where the alien resides
or closest thereto.

B. Classes of Immigration
Immigrants are defined as all aliens entering the country legally
and temporarily in order to establish themselves and perform authorized
activities determined by each category listed here below:
1. To support themselves with deposits, the income they produce
or any other permanent income transferred to the country;
2. To invest their capital in the acquisition of real estate or in
State certificates, titles or bonds or in local credit institutions;
3. To invest their capital in any branch of industry, agriculture,
livestock or export business in a stable manner and separate from a
corporation;
4. To assume management, technical or specialized duties in
enterprises, institutions or corporations established in the country;
5. To exercise a liberal or technical profession arranged by or
regulated by the Law of Higher Education; and,
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6. To be an economic dependent of a spouse or blood relative up
to the second degree.
The Government of Ecuador may agree with Governments of
States about emigration or with international agencies recognized by
Ecuador as to the performance of physical and professional selection tasks,
moving and establishment of specialized individuals or high-level
technicians or middle-level specialists necessary for the country's
economic, social and cultural development and their nuclear families.
All aliens residing in another State entering the country legally and
temporarily who do not wish to establish themselves and for the purposes
determined in each category shall be defined as non-immigrants:
1. Diplomatic or consular officials, qualified international officials
from international agencies of which Ecuador is a member and
representatives of special missions accredited by the Ecuadorian
Government and their nuclear families;
2. High officials from other States and personalities covered under
diplomatic passports and their nuclear families;
3. Private and domestic employees of the individuals listed here
above and their nuclear families;
4. Displaced individuals because of wars or political persecution
in their countries of origin seeking to protect their lives or freedom;
5. Students who wish to start, complete or terminate their
instruction in official or private government-recognized establishments and
their nuclear families;
6. High technical level professionals or specialized workers
requested by enterprises, institutions or individuals established in the
country to perform temporary work in their specialties or for industrial
training purposes and their nuclear families;
7. Missionaries, whether volunteers or clergy, who belong to
organizations or orders recognized in their countries of origin and in
Ecuador who wish to perform assistance, teaching or missionary work;
8. Individuals covered by legally formed national agencies for the
development of cultural exchange programs;
9. Temporary visitors for such licit purposes as tourism, sports,
health, studies, science, art or doing business that do not include the
simultaneous import of goods for a period not exceeding three months
within a consecutive six-month period each year; and
10. Transients, included in the following subcategories:
a. Individuals disembarking in direct transit areas because
of a ship's or aircraft's technical stops who shall continue traveling on the
same craft or in those provided by the same enterprise;
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b. Individuals who enter national territory traveling to their
country of arrival to board a craft that shall transport them abroad or who
are driving vehicles performing international land transportation services;
c. Temporary visitors under the purposes provided in
Paragraph IX of this article for a period not exceeding three months each
year; and
d. Individuals residing in foreign populated areas adjacent
to Ecuador's borders requiring daily transit through national populated
areas on the border.

C. Alien registration
All aliens subject to local law and over eighteen years of age
entering as immigrants or non-immigrants except for transients shall
register with the Alien Register of the Consular Department of the
Ministry of Foreign Relations within thirty days following their arrival on
national territory.
Minors shall enter the country with their legal representatives and
shall receive the same status as the latter or when they register until they
are eighteen at which time they shall register separately within thirty days
thereafter.
Minors under eighteen years of age who enter alone shall be
registered by their legal representative residing in the country within thirty
days following their entry into the country.

D. Changes in immigrant type and category
No alien may sustain two or more immigrant categories
simultaneously.
Approval of the Immigration Consulting Council is
necessary for an alien who has entered legally and registered to change
his/her immigration type or category.

GUIA DE EXTRANJERIA PARA ECUADOR
(R.O. No. 382, de 30 de diciembre de 1971)
Por: Maria Cecilia Romo-Leroux y Mario Alejandro Flor

La Ley de Extranjeria y su Reglamento, publicados en el R.O. No.
382 del 30 de diciembre de 1971, contienen las disposiciones vigentes en
materia de extranjeria. Segin esta Ley se considera extranjero a toda
persona que la Constituci6n y demas leyes de la Reptiblica no le concedan
la calidad de ecuatoriano.

I.

CONDICION JURIDICA DE EXTRANJEROS

De conformidad con lo dispuesto en el Articulo 14 de la
Constituci6n Politica: "Los extranjeros gozan, en general, de los mismos
derechos que los ecuatorianos, con las limitaciones establecidas en la
Constituci6n y en la ley. Los extranjeros estAn excluidos del ejercicio de
los derechos politicos."
Articulo 41 del C6digo Civil: "Son personas todos los individuos
de la especie humana, cualesquiera que sean su edad, sexo, o condici6n.
Dividense en ecuatorianos y extranjeros."
Articulo 42: "Son ecuatorianos los que la Constituci6n del Estado
declara tales. Los demds son extranjeros."
Articulo 43: "La Ley no reconoce diferencia entre el ecuatoriano
y el extranjero en cuanto a la adquisici6n y goce de los derechos civiles
que regula este C6digo."

II.

CLASES DE EXTRANJEROS PARA EFECTOS MIGRATORIOS EN
ECUADOR
Los extranjeros se dividen en inmigrantes y no inmigrantes.
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EXTRANJEROS INMIGRANTE

Se le considera como tal a todo extranjero que se interna legal y
condicionalmente en el pais, con el prop6sito de radicarse y desarrollar las
actividades autorizadas que en cada categoria determinada y que se hallan
detalladas en el Articulo 10 de la Ley de Extranjeria.

IV. EXTRANJERO No INMIGRANTE

Consid6rase no inmigrante a todo extranjero con domicilio en otro
estado que se interna legal y condicionalmente en el pais, sin Animo de
radicarse y con los motivos que en cada categoria se detallan en el Articulo
12 de la Ley de Extranjeria.
La distinci6n juridica entre los extranjeros admitidos e inscritos en
calidad de inmigrantes y los no inmigrantes, tiene por objetivo fundamental
regular el goce y ejercicio de los derechos de los inmigrantes por el
sistema legal de domicilio en todos los casos en que se reconoce y aplica
en la legislaci6n nacional, conforme sefiala el Articulo 20 de la Ley de
Extranjeria.

V.

DERECHOS DE Los EXTRANJEROS

Los extranjeros que hubieran sido admitidos en el territorio
nacional, tendrin iguales derechos y obligaciones que los ecuatorianos, con
las excepciones previstas en la legislaci6n interna del Estado, conforme
hemos visto sefiala la Constituci6n Politica del Estado en su Articulo 14 y
el Articulo 2 de la Ley de Extranjeria.

A. CalidadesDe Inmigracion
Todo extranjero que solicite su admisi6n en el Ecuador en calidad
de inmigrante o de no inmigrante con excepci6n de los transetintes, deberd
estar provisto de una visa emitida por un funcionario del servicio exterior
ecuatoriano que preste servicios, en el lugar de domicilio del extranjero o
en su falta, el del lugar mis cercano.
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B. CategoriasDe Inmigraci6n
Consid6rase inmigrante a todo extranjero que se interna legal y
condicionalmente en el pais, con el prop6sito de radicarse y desarrollar las
actividades autorizadas que en cada categoria se determinan a
continuaci6n:
1. Para vivir de sus dep6sitos, de las rentas que 6stos produzcan o
de cualquier otro ingreso permanente que se traslade al pas.
2. Para invertir su capital en la adquisici6n de bienes raices o en
certificados, titulos o bonos del Estado o de instituciones nacionales de
cr6dito.
3. Para invertir su capital en cualquier rama de la industria,
agricultura, ganaderfa o del comercio de exportaci6n, en forna estable y
distinta a la de sociedad por acciones.
4. Para asumir indef'midamente funciones adminstrativas, t6cnicas
o de especializaci6n en empresas, instituciones o personas establecidas en
el pas.
5. Para ejercer una profesi6n liberal o una profesi6n tdcnica, con
arreglo o las normas de la Ley de Educaci6n Superior; y
6. Para vivir bajo la dependencia econ6mica del c6nyuge o de un
pariente consangufneo dentro del segundo grado.
El Gobiemo del Ecuador podri convenir con los Gobiernos
de los
Estados (de emigraci6n) o con organismos internacionales reconocidos por
el Ecuador, la realizaci6n de las tareas de selecci6n fisica y profesional, el
traslado y radicaci6n de personas especializadas o t~cnicos de alto nivel o
de t6cnicos o especialisatas de nivel medio que sean necesarios para el
desarrollo econ6mico, social y cultural del pais, y de sus familiares mi.s
cercanos.
Consid6rase no inmigrante a todo extranjero con domicilio en otro
estado que se interna legal y condicionalmente en el pais, sin Animo de
radicarse y con los motivos que en cada categorfa se determinan a
continuaci6n:
1. Funcionarios diplomiticos o consulares, funcionarios
internacionales calificados pertenecientes a organismos internacionales de
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los que sea miembro el Ecuador y los representantes de las misiones
especiales acreditadas ante el Goviemo del Ecuador y sus familiares mds
cercanos.
2. Altos funcionarios de otros estados y personalidades amparadas
con pasaportes diplomiticos y sus familiares mds cercanos.
3. Empleados privados y dom~sticos de las personas citadas en los
numerales anteriores y sus familiares mds cercanos.
4. Personas desplazadas como consecuencia de guerras o de
persecuciones politicas en su pafs de origen, para proteger su vida o
libertad.
5. Estudiantes que desean iniciar, completar o perfeccionar su
instrucci6n en establecimientos, oficiales o particulares con reconocimiento
gubernamental y sus familiares mds cercanos.
6. Profesionales de alto nivel t~cnico o trabajadores especializados
que sean Ilamados por empresas, instituciones o personas establecidas en el
pafs, para ejecutar labores temporales de su especialidad o con fines de
entrenamiento industrial y sus familiares mds cercanos.
7. Misioneros, voluntarios o religiosos pertenecientes a
organizaciones u 6rdenes reconocidas en su pais de origen y en el Ecuador
para dedicarse a labores asistenciales, docentes o de apostolado.
8. Personas asistidas por organismos nacionales constituidos
legalmente para desarrollar programas de intercambio cultural.
9. Visitantes temporales con fines licitos tales como turismo,
deporte, salud, estudio, ciencia, arte o para ejecutar actos de comercio que
no impliquen la importaci6n simult~nea de bienes, durante un periodo
mayor de tres meses dentro de un lapso consecutivo de seis meses en cada
afio; y,
10. Tansetintes, comprendidos en las siguientes subcategorias:
a. Personas que desembarcan hacia las zonas de trdnsito
directo con oportunidad de las escalas t~cnicas de las naves maritimas o
aeronaves para proseguir su viaje en la misma nave o en otras provistas
por la misma empresa.
b. Personas que ingresan al territorio nacional para
dirigirse al pais de destino, para abordar una nave que los transportard al
exterior o en cumplimiento de servicios en la conducci6n de vehfculos de
transporte terrestre internacional.
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c. Visitantes temporales con los fines previstos en el
numeral IX de este articulo, durante un periodo no mayor de tres meses en
cada afio; y,
d. Personas domiciliadas en las poblaciones extranjeras
conlindantes con las fronterizas ecuatorianas y que requieran transitar
diariamente en las poblaciones limitrofes nacionales.

C. Registro de extranjeros
Todo extranjero sujeto al fuero territorial y mayor de dieciocho
afios que hubiera sido admitido en calidad de inmigrante o de no
inmigrante con excepci6n de los transetintes, deber! inscribirse en el
Registro de Extranjeros del Departamento Consular del Ministerio de
Relaciones Exteriores, dentro de los treinta dias siguientes al de su
desembarque en el territorio nacional.
Los menores de edad que ingresen al pais junto con sus
representantes legales, quedardn amparados en la condici6n de ellos o con
la inscripci6n de 6stos, hasta la edad de dieciocho afios en que deberin
inscribirse por separado, dentro de los treinta dias siguientes.
Los menores de dieciocho aflos de edad que ingresen solos,
deberdn ser inscritos por su representante legal domiciliado en el pais,
dentro de los treinta dias siguientes al de su admisi6n en el pais.

D. Cambios de calidady categoramigratoria
Ningfin extranjero podrd conservar dos o mis calidades de
inmigraci6n sinult~neamente.
Para modificar la calidad o categorfa
migratorias de un extranjero legalmente admitido e inscrito, serd necesario
el dictamen favorable del Consejo Consultivo de Politica Migratoria.

REPEAL OF THE LAW FOR THE PROTECTION OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AGENTS OR DISTRIBUTORS
OF FOREIGN ENTERPRISES IN ECUADOR
(R.O. NO. 156, September 19, 1997)
The repeal of the Law for the Protection of Representatives,
Agents or distributors of Foreign Enterprises in Ecuador, Supreme Decree
No. 1038-A published in Official Register No. 245 on December 31, 1976
and Law No. 125 interpreting and amending Decree No. 1038-A published
in Official Register No. 982 on July 5, 1996 was published in Official
Register No. 156 on September 19, 1997.
Although these laws have been repealed, the rights and
obligations in contracts originating when Law 1038-A was in force
as well as judicial disputes brought prior to the effect period of this
special law have not extinguished or been altered.
According to this special law, private contractual
relationships between local citizens and foreigners shall be subject to
the principle of independent will and contractual freedom. For
resolution of disputes, judges shall submit to contractual clauses and
applicable legislation pertaining to these matters but the parties may
submit to Arbitration Boards under the respective law.

LA DEROGATORIA DE LA LEY DE PROTECCION A
LOS REPRESENTANTES, AGENTES 0
DISTRIBUIDORES DE EMPRESAS EXTRANJERAS
EN EL ECUADOR
(R.O. No. 156, de 19 de septiembre de 1997)
En el registro Oficial No. 156 del 19 de septiembre de 1997
apareci6 publicada la derogatoria de la Ley de Protecci6n a los
Representantes, Agentes o Distribuidores de empresas extranjeras en el
Ecuador. Esto se hizo mediante el Decreto Supremo No. 1038-A
publicado en el registro Oficial No. 245 que interpreta y reforma al
Decreto 1038-A y que fuera publicada en el Registro Oficial No. 982 de
julio 5 de 1996.
Estas derogatorias no extinguen los derechos y las obligaciones
derivados de los contratos ni alteran las situaciones juridicas originadas al
amparo de dicha Ley 1038-A como tampoco las controversias judiciales
que se hubieran planteado antes de la vigencia de 6sta Ley especial.
Segfin esta Ley especial las relaciones contractuales privadas entre
nacionales y extranjeros se sujetarin al principio de la autonomia de la
voluntad y libertad contractual. En la soluci6n de controversias, los jueces
se sujetarin a las clausulas contractuales y a la legislaci6n aplicable en
raz6n de la materia, pero las partes podrdn sujetarse a Tribunales
Arbitrales de conformidad con la respectiva Ley.

REGULATIONS FOR APPROVING UNIVERSITIES',
POLYTECHNIC SCHOOLS' AND PRIVATE
ENTERPRISES' ANALYSIS AND QUALITY
CONTROL LABORATORIES FOR THE
PREPARATION OF ANALYSES REQUIRED IN
ISSUING HEALTH REGISTRATIONS
(R.O. No. 156, September 19, 1997)
Regulations were issued on September 11, 1997, with the intent of
strengthening the Leopoldo Izquieta Perez National Institute of Hygiene
and Tropical Medicine and thus reaching optimum levels in the
performance of laboratory analyses required for controlling projects to be
covered by health registration.
According to the stipulations of the Health Registration
Regulations for Medicines in General, Medical Devices and Cosmetics,
Hygiene Products and Perfumes (please refer to Bustamante & Bustamante
Legal Report No. 2-1996), laboratory analyses required for issuing health
registrations are to be performed by the Leopoldo Izquieta Perez National
Institute of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. Under these new regulations,
this power is also extended to universities, polytechnic schools or local
private enterprises certified for this purpose.
According to the provisions of Articles 103 of the Ecuadorian
Health Code and 16, paragraph, j) of the Foreign Commerce and
Investment Law, the Ministry of Foreign Commerce, Industries and
Fishing is empowered to certify laboratories to perform the analyses
required and said Ministry shall promptly inform the Ministry of Public
Health of the names of the laboratories authorized for this purpose.
Results of the analyses performed by certified laboratories shall
remain in effect for a period of ninety days and shall be as legal as those
performed by the National Institute of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
Therefore, the Institute shall not re-analyze the products that have already
been examined by certified laboratories. However, it shall continue its
controls of customs, production laboratories or sales establishments.
During the health registration or renewal process, an interested
party may enclose with its application the results of an analysis performed
by one of the certified laboratories for analysis and quality control. When
this is the case the National Institute of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
shall verify if legal requirements are met within a period of fifteen days
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after the application is filed and shall send the documentation to the
General Health Directorate so that it may in turn issue the pertinent health
registration.
If the National Institute of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine does not
make a statement confirming the technical report or rejecting the
application within a period of fifteen days, it shall be understood that it is
automatically confirmed.
At the party's request the General Health
Directorate shall issue the health registration within eight days.

DECISION 418 OF THE CARTAGENA AGREEMENT COMISSION ISSUE OF
HEALTH REGISTRATION
(OFFICIAL GAZETTE DATED JULY 31, 1997)
This Decision shall go into effect on January 1, 1998 and covers
products registered in an Andean Pact Member Country requiring health
registration or recordal in order to market products in another Member
Country. Local authorities with jurisdiction shall guarantee their rejection
or approval of registration within thirty business days following submission
of the respective application.
Applicant shall respond within 15 days after the receipt of
observations filed against the health registration or recordal application,
and authorities with jurisdiction in turn shall have a 15-day term to resolve
whether or not to grant the health registration or recordal.
Once the deadlines have expired and the national authorized with
jurisdiction have not responded to them, it shall be understood that the
health registration or recordal has been approved and a document shall be
issued as proof. Prior to notifying their local Integration Agency, a
Member Country of each applicant may correspond with the Office of the
General Secretary of the Andean Community for verification of the
expiration of the deadlines via an affidavit of the interested party and issue
the respective proof. This procedure will not take more than seven
business days and releases the Member Country from responsibility for
compliance with terms.
If a health registration or recordal is denied or the terms provided
in this Decision are not met, then the interested party may request
qualification of the trade restriction at the General Secretariat of the
Andean Community.

REGLAMENTO PARA ACREDITAR LA
PARTICIPACION DE LABORATORIOS DE ANALISIS
Y CONTROL DE CALIDAD DE UNIVERSIDADES,
ESCUELAS POLITECNICAS Y DE EMPRESAS
PRIVADAS EN LA ELABORACION DE LOS
ANALISIS REQUERIDOS PARA LA EMISION DEL
REGISTRO SANITARIO
(R.O. No. 156, de 19 de septiembre de 1997)
El referido legal, Reglamento, se dict6 el dia 11 de septiembre de
1997, con el objetivo de propiciar el fortalecimiento institucional del
Instituto Nacional de Higiene y Medicina Tropical Leopoldo Izquieta P6rez
y asi alcanzar niveles 6ptimos en la realizaci6n de los andlisis de
laboratorio requeridos para el control de los productos sujetos a registro
sanitario.
De acuerdo con lo estipulado en el Reglamento de Registro
Sanitario para Medicamentos en General, Dispositivos Mddicos y
Cosm6ticos, Productos Higi6nicos y Perfumes (Bustamante y Bustamante,
Informe Legal No.2-1996), le corresponde realizar los andlisis de
laboratorio requeridos para la expedici6n del Registro Sanitario al Instituto
Nacional de Higiene y Medicina Tropical Leopoldo Izquieta P6rez en la
ciudad de Guayaquil. Con este reglamento esta facultad se extiende
tambi6n a los laboratorios de universidades, escuelas polit6cnicas o
empresas privadas nacionales acreditadas para el efecto.
En conformidad con lo dispuesto por los Articulos 103 del C6digo
de Salud Ecuatoriano y 16 parafo j) de la Ley de Comercio Exterior e
Inversiones se faculta al Ministerio de Comercio Exterior, la
Industrializaci6n y Pesca esta autorizada a acreditar los laboratorios para
realizar los andlisis requeridos, por lo cual dicha entidad ptiblica deberi
comunicar oportunamente al Ministerio de Salud Pdiblica el nombre de los
laboratorios autorizados para el efecto.
Cabe sefialar que los resultados de los andlisis efectuados por los
laboratorios acreditados estaran vigentes por el lapso de noventa dias y
tendrdn la misma validez legal de los realizados por el Instituto Nacional
de Higiene y Medicina Tropical; por lo tanto, este Instituto no volverd a
analizar los productos ya examinados por los laboratorios acreditados, sin
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embargo continuari haciendo los controles en aduanas, laboratorios de
producci6n o locales de expendio.
En el trmite de inscripci6n o reinscripci6n del Registro Sanitario,
el interesado podri adjuntar a la solicitud el anlisis afectuado previamente
por uno de los laboratorios de aMlisis y control de calidad acreditado, en
este caso el Instituto Nacional de Higiene y Medicina Tropical en un
t6rmino de quince dias a partir de la fecha de presentaci6n de la solicitud,
verificari si cumple con los requisitos legales y remitiri la documentaci6n
a la Direcci6n General de Salud para que emita el correspondiente registro
sanitario.
Si el Instituto Nacional de Higiene y Medicina Tropical no se
pronuncia convalidando el informe t6cnico o rechazando la solicitud en el
t~rmino de quince dfas se entenderi que lo convalida automdticamente y a
petici6n de partes, la Direcci6n General de Salud dentro de ocho dias
deberi emitir el registro sanitario.

DECISION 418 DE LA COMISION DEL ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA
EXPEDICION DE REGISTRO 0 INSCRIPCION SANITARIA
(GACETA OFICIAL DEL 31 DE JULIO

1997)

Esta Decisi6n entrard en vigencia a partir de 1 de enero de 1998
para los productos registrados en un Pais Miembro que requieran registro o
inscripci6n sanitaria para su comercializaci6n en otro Pafs Miembro. Por
lo cual las autoridades nacionales competentes deberin expresar su
negativa u otorgamiento dentro de los treinta dfas hAbiles siguientes a la
fecha de presentaci6n de la respectiva solicitud.
En el caso de que hubieran observaciones al trirnite de registro o
inscripci6n sanitaria, deberA haber una respuesta del solicitante dentro de
un t~rmino de quince dias desde la recepci6n de las observaciones y asi
tambi6n las autoridades competentes tendrf.n un t6rmino de quince dias
para resolver asuntos sobre el otorgamiento del registro o inscripci6n
sanitaria.
Fenecidos los t6rminos establecidos sin que hubiera respuesta de la
autoridad nacional competente, se entenderi que el registro o inscripci6n
sanitaria ha sido aprobado, y se deber! otorgar la respectiva constancia. El
Pais Miembro o cada solicitante antes de notificar a su Organismo
Nacional de Integraci6n, podri dirigirse a la Secretaria General de la
Comunida Andina a fin de que dsta, luego de verificar el financiamento de
los plazos mediante declaraci6n juramentada del interesado, emita la
respectiva constancia y este documento podri ser utilizado en los tr mites
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aduaneros en sustituci6n del certificado de registro. Este procedimiento no
podri tomar ris de siete dias hbiles y releva al Pais Miembro de la
responsabilidad por incumplimiento de los plazos.
En caso de negativa del registro o inscripci6n sanitaria o del
incumplimiento de los plazos previstos en estA Desici6n, el interesado
podrd pedir la calificaci6n de restricci6n al comercio a la Secretaria
General de la Comunidad Andina.

REGULATIONS FOR DECISION 344 OF THE
COMMISSION OF THE CARTAGENA ACCORD
(R.O. No. 145, September 4, 1997)
Regulations for Decision 344 were issued under Executive Decree
No. 447 dated July 8, 1997, effective on September 4, 1997. The
following is a brief summary of the relevant aspects of these regulations.

JURISDICTION FOR INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY MATTERS
For the purposes of Decision 344 of the Commission of the
Cartagena Accord, these regulations confirm the jurisdiction of the
Industrial Property Office, an agency of the Ministry of Foreign
Commerce, Industrialization and Fishing.

PATENTS
In addition to the protection provided in Decision 344 of the
Commission of the Cartegena Accord computer program patents shall be
protected when they are part of an invention with industrial applications
and that fall within the scope of pertinent claims. Patents shall be granted
for medical products or procedures, except those included in the schedule
of essential medicines of the World Health Organization.
Furthermore, it has been established that the complete international
class covering the invention must be specified on the application, according
to the international classification for patents provided by the Strasbourg
Agreement of 1971. Patents shall be declared null by Civil Judges.

PRIORITY
The legal instrument used as a basis for claiming priority shall be
specified on the application whether it be Decision 344, an international
convention that has been ratified, the Paris Convention or that the
diplomatic representative of the country that is not a member of the
aforementioned conventions certifies that there is reciprocity.
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INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS

Industrial design applications shall specify the international class
according to the international classification for industrial designs provided
under the 1968 Locarno Agreement and references to weights and
measures must be in accordance with the International Systems of
Measures (s.i.). Industrial designs shall be declared null by Civil Judges.

TRADE SECRETS

Notwithstanding criminal action, all civil action arising from
violation of trade secrets shall be heard by Civil Judges.

TRADEMARKS

Applications must establish the type of mark i.e., product, service,
collective, certification, place of origin and if it is graphic, a name or a
combination. Trademark registrations shall be declared null by Civil
Judges.
When there is no response to an observation, then it will be
understood as a pure and simple denial of the factual and legal grounds.
Registration of commercial names may be pursued via registration
and/or ratified international conventions or as established in the Trademark
Law, i.e. through use.

PRIORITY

The legal instrument used as a basis for claiming priority shall be
specified on the application whether it be Decision 344, an international
convention that has been ratified, the Paris Convention or that the
diplomatic representative of the country that is not a member of the
aforementioned conventions certifies that there is reciprocity.

RECOURSE

Final administrative acts and those hindering the continuation of a
procedure issued by a Patent and Trademark Office Director may be

1998]

Bustamnante

1041

appealed under the Statutes of the Legal and Administrative Regime of the
Executive Branch. The appeal shall be resolved by the same body that
issued the act, and appeals and review will be resolved by the Minister of
Foreign Commerce, Industrialization and Fishing. However, it shall not
be necessary to exhaust this administrative process in order to appeal to the
Administrative Litigation Court.
In accordance with the Arbitration and Mediation Law, all
conflicts or disputes arising over intellectual property matters may be
submitted to arbitration.

REGLAMENTO A LA DECISION 344 DE LA
COMISION DEL ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA
(R.O. No. 145, de 4 de septiembre de 1997)
Mediante Decreto Ejecutivo No. 447 del 8 de julio de 1997 fue
promulgado el Reglamento a la Decision 344 que entr6 en vigencia el 4 de
septiembre de 1997. El siguiente es un breve extracto de los aspectos
relevantes del mismo.

COMPETENCIA PARA LOS ASUNTOS DE PROPIEDAD INDUSTRIAL
El presente reglamento ratifica la competencia de la Direcci6n
Nacional de Propiedad Industrial, dependencia del Ministerio de Comercio
Exterior, Industrializacion y Pesca, para los efectos de la Decisi6n 344 de
la Comisi6n del Acuerdo de Cartagena.

PATENTES DE INVENCION
A mas de las protecciones establecidas en la Decisi6n 344 de la
Comisi6n del Acuerdo de Cartagena estarin protegidos por un patente los
programas de ordenador cuando formen parte de una invenci6n susceptible
de aplicaci6n industrial en el alcance de las reivindicaciones
correspondientes, asi como tambi6n se otorgard patente de producto o de
procedimientos para los medicamentos, excepto para aquellos que figuren
en la lista de medicamentos escenciales de la Organizacion Mundial de la
Salud.
Por otro lado, se establece que se deberi especificar en la solicitud
la clase. internacional completa a la que pertenece la invenci6n, segiin la
clasificaci6n internacional de patentes prevista por el arreglo de
Estrasburgo de 1971. La nulidad de un patente seri decretada por los
Jueces de lo Civil.
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PRIORIDAD

Para el caso de reivindicar prioridad se deberd sefialar en base a
qu6 instrumento juridico se hace, ya sea: la Decisi6n 344, un convenio
internacional ratificado, Convenio de Paris o que la representaci6n
diplomftica del pais no miembro de los mencionados convenios certifique
la reciprocidad.

DISENROS INDUSTRIALES
Es necesario incluir en la solicitud de disefio industrial la
especificaci6n de la clase internacional ajustada a la clasificaci6n
intemacional de disefios industriales prevista por el arreglo de Locamo de
1968 y, la referencia sobre pesas y medidad se expresard de conformidad
al sistema Internacional de Medidas (s.i.). La nulidad de los registros de
disefios industriales seri decretada por ls Jueces Civil.

SECRETOS INDUSTRIALES

Sin perjuicio de la acci6n penal, toda acci6n civil por violaci6n de
secretos industriales se tramitard ante un Juez Civil.

MARCAS
En la solicitud se deberd establecer el tipo de marca de lo cual se
trata el producto, servicio, colectiva, certificaci6n, denominaci6n de origen
y si es grifica, denominativa o mixta. La nulidad de registro de marcas
seri decretada por los Jueces Civil.
En cuanto a las observaciones, la falta de contestaci6n a 6stas se
entenderd como negativa pura y simple de los fundamentos de hecho y de
derecho.
Los nombres comerciales serin obtenidos ya sea mediante registro,
y/o segfin convenios internacionales ratificados; o segfin lo establecido en
la Ley de Marcas de Fibrica, esto es mediante uso.
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PRIORIDA

Para el caso de reivindicar prioridad se deberd sefialar en base a
qud instrumento juridico se hace, ya sea: la Decisi6n 344, un convenio
internacional ratificado, Convenio de Paris o que la representaci6n
diplomitica del pais no miembro de los mencionados convenios certifique
la reciprocidad.

RECURSOS

Los actos administrativos definitivos y aquellos que impiden la
continuacion del trimite, dictados por el Director Nacional de Propiedad
Industrial serin susceptibles de los recursos previstos por el Estatuto del
Rdgimen Juridico Administrativo de la Funci6n Ejecutiva. El recurso de
reposici6n seri resuelto por el mismo 6rgano del que eman6 el acto, los
recursos de apelaci6n y revisi6n, por el Ministro de Comercio Exterior,
Industrializaci6n y Pesca, sin embargo no seri necesario agotar esta vid
administrativa para acudir al Tribunal Distrital de lo Contencioso
Administrativo.
Cualquier conflicto o controversia en materia de propiedad
industrial podrd ser sometido a arbitraje de conformidad con la Ley de
Arbitraje y Mediaci6n.

LAW OF INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND
GUARANTEES
(R.O. No. 219, December 19, 1997)
The above-captioned law was issued on December 3, 1997. Its
purpose was to develop and promote local and foreign investment as well
as regulate investors' obligations and rights so that they effectively
contribute to the county's economic and social development within a stable
legal and institutional framework.

NATIONAL SYSTEM FOR PROMOTION OF INVESTMENTS AND LOCAL
ORGANIZATIONS WITH COMPETENT JURISDICTION

Under the provisions of the Law on Foreign Trade and
Investments, the Council on Foreign Trade and Investments, COMEXI, is
responsible for the formulation of national policies for the promotion of
investments.
The Ministry of Foreign Trade, Industrialization and Fishing, the
offices of the Commercial Service of Ecuador and the Ecuadorian Foreign
Service, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Finance
Corporation, the Chambers of Production, the Ecuador Foundation, and
the Provincial Commissions for the Promotions of Exports and Investments
shall participate in the execution phase.
The Ministry of Foreign Trade, Industrialization and Fishing is the
organization with competent jurisdiction in overseeing execution of the
National Policies for Promotion of Investments as well as the Decisions of
the Andean Community that serve as a framework for this law, especially
with regard to uniform regimes for Andean multinational enterprises,
treatment of foreign capital, trademarks, patents, licensing and royalties.
The Central Bank of Ecuador is the organization with competent
jurisdiction for recording foreign, subregional and neutral investments.
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DIRECT, SUBREGIONAL OR NEUTRAL INVESTMENT

Types of invesiments are defined in the provisions of Decision 291
of the Commission of the Andean Accord.
Transfers of capital may include: a) financial resources in freely
convertible currency; b) physical or tangible property; and c) intangible
technological contributions covered by agreements recorded with the
Ministry of Foreign Trade, Industrialization and Fishing.

GUARANTEES FOR DIRECT, SUBREGIONAL OR NEUTRAL FOREIGN
INVESTMENT

Once it is duly recorded, foreign investment is eligible for the
following guarantees: a) free expatriation of net profits in freely
convertible currency; b) free remittance of resources earned from the total
or partial liquidation of enterprises in which investment was made; c)
complete freedom in negotiating recorded investment; d) eligibility for the
advantages provided by the application of the Liberation Program of the
Andean Community and tariff preferences other countries have provided
Ecuador; e) free access to promotion, technical assistance, cooperation
mechanisms and the like; f) right to ownership; g) free access to the
currency market; h) tax stability.

LOCAL INVESTMENT

Local investment is defined as contributions in capital, physical
and tangible goods and intangible contributions made by Ecuadorian
private individuals or corporations.

TAX STABILITY

Local and foreign investments may be eligible for tax stability for
the periods indicated below. For the application of tax stability only
recorded investments in amounts equivalent in sucres to US $500,000 or
more on the recorded date or the effective date of the investment shall be
considered as having the right to such treatment.
Tax stability is defined as follows: a) a period of ten years for the
owners of new investment in existing enterprises not including the
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expansion of production; and, b) a period of twenty years for owners of
new investments in the development of new investment projects or the
expansion of production. Stability shall apply to the existing income tax
rate on the date the investment is made or recorded.

INVESTORS' OBLIGATIONS

Local or foreign investors shall observe and comply with the
country's laws, especially those regarding labor, social security,
environmental matters and provisions of the tax code.

INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS

Foreign investors have the option to request that an investment
agreement be executed via public deed with the Ministry of Foreign Trade,
Industrialization and Fishing. Such agreements may include treatment
provided, the term and use of same.

RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

The state and foreign investors may submit disputes arising over
the application of this law to arbitration tribunals or procedures stipulated
in bilateral or multilateral agreements of which Ecuador is a party to.
Treaties and agreements covering promotion and protection of investments
including those referring to double taxation shall comply with approval and
ratification requirements to be legal.

LEY DE PROMOCION Y GARANTIA DE LAS
INVERSIONES
(R.O. No. 219, de 19 de diciembre de 1997)
Esta ley se dicto 61 3 de diciembre de 1997, y tiene por objetivo
formentar y promover la inversi6n nacional y extranjera asi como tambien
regular las obligaciones y derechos de los inversionistas para que
contribuyan de manera efectiva al proceso de desarrollo econ6mico y
social del pafs, dentro de un marco legal e institucional estable.

SISTEMA NACIONAL DE PROMOCION DE INVERSIONES Y DE Los
ORGANISMOS NACIONALES COMPETENTES
La formulaci6n de las politicas nacionales de promoci6n de
inversiones le corresponderd al Consejo de Comercio Exterior e
Inversiones, COMEXI, de acuerdo a lo dispuesto en la Ley de Comercio
Exterior e Inversiones.
Son parte integrante del nivel de ejecuci6n del Sistema el
Ministerio de Comercio Exterior Industrializaci6n y Pesca, las
dependencias de Servicio Comercial de Ecuador y Servicio Exterior
Ecuatoriano, el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, la Corporaci6n
Financiera Nacional, las Climaras de la Producci6n, la Fundaci6n Ecuador
y las Comisiones Provinciales de Promoci6n de Exportaciones e
Inversiones.
El Ministerio de Comercio Exterior, Industrializaci6n y Pesca es el
organismo competente para velar por la ejecuci6n de las Polfticas
Nacionales de Promoci6n de Inversiones asi como de las Decisiones de la
Comunidad Andina que se ernarquen en el rmbito de la presente ley,
especialmente las referentes a los regimenes uniformes para empresas
multinacionales Andina, el tratamiento a los capitales extranjeros, marcas,
patentes, licencias y regalfas.
El Banco Central del Ecuador es el organismo competente para el
registro de las inversiones extranjeras, subregionales y neutras.
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INVERSION EXTRANJERA DIRECTA, SUBREGIONAL 0 NEUTRAL

Se entiende como tal a las inversiones previstas bajo la Decisi6n
291 de la Comisi6n del Acuerdo de Cartagena.
Las transferencias de capital podrin incluir: a) recursos financieros
en divisas libremente convertible; b) bienes fisicos o tangibles, y c)
contribuciones tecnol6gicas intangibles que se encuentren sustentados por
contratos registrados en el Ministerio de Comercio Exterior,
Industrializaci6n y Pesca.

GARANTIAS A LA INVERSION EXTRANJERA DIRECTA SUBREGIONAL 0

NEUTRAL

La inversi6n extranjera debidanente registrada goza de las
siguientes garantfas: a) libre transferencia al exterior de las utilidades
netas, en divisas libremente convertibles; b) libre remisi6n de los recursos
que se obtengan por la liquidaci6n total o parcial de las empresas en las
que se haya realizado la inversi6n; c) completa libertad para negociar la
inversi6n registrada; d) aprovechamiento de las ventajas derivadas de la
aplicaci6n del Programa de Liberaci6n de la Comunidad Andina y de las
preferencias arancelarias otorgadas por terceros paises al Ecuador; e)
libertad de acceder al sistema financiero nacional y al mercado de valores;
f) libre acceso a los mecanismos de promoci6n, asistencia t~cnica,
cooperaci6n y similares; g) derecho de propiedad; h) libre acceso al
mercado de divisas; y i) estabilidad Tributaria.

INVERSION NACIONAL

Es la que se realiza mediante aportes de capital, bienes fisicos
tangibles y contribuciones intangibles que realicen personas naturales o
juridicas ecuatorianas. Tambi6n podri realizar inversiones con cardcter de
nacional toda persona natural extranjera residente en el Ecuador en forma
legal.

ESTABILIDAD TRiBUTARIA
Los inversionistas nacionales y extranjeros podrin acogerse a la
estabilidad tributaria del impuesto a la renta por los perfodos sefialados mis
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adelante. Para el prop6sito de la aplicaci6n de la estabilidad tributaria s6lo
se considerardn con derecho a tal tratamiento las inversiones registradas a
partir de una cantidad equivalente en sucres a los US $500.000,00 a la
fecha de su registro o a la fecha efectiva de la inversi6n.
La estabilidad tributaria se considera de la siguiente manera: a)
por un periodo de diez aflos a los titulares de nuevas inversiones en
empresas existentes, que no consideren ampliaci6n de la producci6n; y b)
por un periodo de veinte aflos a los titulares de nuevas inversiones
destinadas al desarrollo de nuevos proyectos de inversi6n o a la ampliaci6n
de la producci6n. La estabilidad estari referida a la tarifa del impuesto a
la renta existente a la fecha de la realizaci6n o registro de la inversi6n.

OBLIGACIONES DE Los INVERSIONISTAS
Los inversionistas nacionales y extranjeros estAn sujetos a la
observaci6n y cumplimiento de las leyes del pais y en especial de las
relativas a los aspectos laborales, de seguridad social, medio ambiente y a
las disposiciones del r6gimen tributario.

CONTRATOS DE INVERSION
De forma opcional el inversionista extranjero podrd solicitar
suscribir un contrato de Inversi6n mediante escritura ptiblica con el
Ministerio de Comercio Exterior, Industrializaci6n y Pesca, en el que se
hard constar el tratamiento que se le otorga, el plazo y el destino de la
inversi6n.

SOLUCION DE CONTOVERSIAS Y CONVENIOS INTERNACIONLES
El estado y los inversionistas extranjeros podrdn someter las
controversias que se susciten por la aplicaci6n de esta ley a los tribunales
de arbitraje o a procedimientos estipulados por convenios bilaterales o
multilaterales de los que sea parte.el Ecuador; ademds, el estado respetari
plenamente los tratados y convenios que en materia de promoci6n y
protecci6n de inversiones se suscribieren incluyendo los referidos a doble
tributaci6n, los cuales deben cumplir con los requisitos de aprobaci6n y
ratificaci6n
para
su
legalidad.

LAW OF FOREIGN TRADE AND INVESTMENT
"LEXI"
(R.O. No. 82, June 9, 1997)
PatriciaPonce Arteta and Erika Alarc6n Araujo
The Law of Foreign Trade and Investment "LEXI" was published
on June 9, 1997. Its purpose is to regulate and encourage foreign trade
and direct investment, increasing competition in the local economy and
favoring efficient use of the country's productive resources aiming at
sustainable development and integrating the Ecuadorian economy into the
global economy and contributing to elevating the population's well-being.
Towards this end, the State shall design and execute its foreign trade
policies and fiscal, tariff, monetary, credit, foreign exchange, and
socioeconomic policies and pertinent regulatory systems codified under the
principle of fiscal neutrality in order to ensure transparency in the
development of export, import and investment activities.
Without prejudice to the prohibitions or limitations imposed as an
exception, this law forbids any administrative or economic practice or
provision that limits free competition or blocks development of foreign and
domestic trade and production of goods and services. Notwithstanding this
condition, corrective measures provided in the norms of the World Trade
Organization, WTO, may be applied.
With the exception of hydrocarbons, exports are exempt from all
taxes. Taxes shall not be imposed on exports except for customs tariffs, if
required, value added tax, special consumption tax, compensatory rights or
anti-dumping tax or the application of measures adopted to temporarily
safeguard against unfair commercial practices per WTO norms and fees on
services that are actually rendered.

ENTITY EXECUTING FOREIGN TRADE AND INVESTMENT
POLICY
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Industrialization and Fisheries
shall plan, manage, control and execute foreign trade policies for property,
services and technology, integration and direct investment.
It shall
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exercise these duties in close coordination with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and other public and private entities comprising the foreign trade
sector in order to contribute to the preparation of technical reports and
adoption of policies within the framework of their respective jurisdictions.
Among the important duties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Industrialization and Fisheries is overseeing compliance with norms and
procedures in the area of foreign trade and investment, evaluating and
applying policy for the prevention and correction of unfair, restrictive and
harmful foreign trade practices affecting domestic production as well as
applying norms pertinent to the existence and operation of free trade zones
in coordination with the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit.

NON-FINANCIAL PROMOTION OF EXPORTS AND DIRECT
INVESTMENT
The Foreign Promotion of the Ecuadorian System has been
structured for non-financial promotion of exports and investment in the
country and abroad and is made up of the Corporation for Promoting
Exports and Investments, CORPEI and its foreign network, the
Commercial Service through its representatives in those cities meriting
negotiation operations in trade policy and the cooperation of the Foreign
Service through its Embassies or Diplomatic Missions. The Corporation
shall be headquartered in the city of Guayaquil and shall be a private nonprofit institution with its own equity and funds whose operations shall be
regulated by Book IV, Title XXIX of the Civil Code which discussed Loan
Agreements and by its by-laws approved by the President of the Republic.
The Corporation's board of directors is made up of: a permanent
delegate from the ministers of Foreign Trade, Industrialization and
Fisheries, Foreign Affairs and Agriculture and Livestock, the General
Manager of the National Finance Corporation, a delegate from the
Ecuadorian Federation of Exporters, FEDEXPORT, a delegate from the
National Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Agriculture, Small
Industry and a delegate from the National Artisan Defense Board.
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FINANCIAL PROMOTION OF EXPORTS
Through the pertinent bodies, the Executive Branch shall adopt
measures for establishing a mechanism for Export Credit Insurance for the
purpose of covering risks of non-payment of goods or services sold
abroad.

LEY DE COMERCIO EXTERIOR E INVERSIONES
"LEXI"
(R.O. No. 82, de 9 de junio de 1997)
Por: PatriciaPonce Arteta y Erika Alarc6n Araujo
La Ley de Comercio Exterior e Inversiones "LEXI" fue publicada
el 9 de junio de 1997, y tiene por objetivo normar y promover el comercio
exterior y la inversi6n directa, incrementar la competitividad de la
economfa nacional, propiciar el uso eficiente de los recursos productivos
del Pais y propender a su desarrollo sostenible e integrar la economfa
ecuatoriana con la internacional y contribuir a la elevacion del bienestar de
la poblaci6n. Para lo cual el Estado disefiari y ejecutard sus polifticas bajo
los lineamientos de libertad, seguridad y coherencia entre las polifticas de
comercio exterior y las politicas fiscal, arancelaria, monetaria, crediticia,
cambiaria y de desarrollo econ6mico-social y los correspondientes
reginenes normativos, los mismos que se consagran bajo el principio de
neutralidad fiscal, para asegurar transparencia en el desenvolvimiento de
las actividades de exportacion, importacion e inversi6n.
La presente Ley prohibe cualquier prdctica o disposici6n
administativa o econ6mica que limite la libre competencia o impida el
desarrollo del comercio externo e interno y la producci6n de bienes y
servicios, sin perjuicio de las prohibiciones o limitaciones que se impongan
de manera excepcional. No obstante podrdn aplicarse medidas corectivas
en los casos contemplados en la normativa de la Organizaci6n Mundial del
Comercio, OMC.
Las exportaciones estdn exoneradas de todo impuesto, salvo las de
hidrocarburos. Las importaciones no estarin gravadas con mArs impuestos
que los derechos arancelarios, en caso de ser exigibles, el impuesto al
valor agregado, el impuesto a los consumos especiales, los derechos
compensatorios o antidumping o la aplicaci6n de medidas de salvaguardia
que con cardcter temporal se adopten para prevenir pricticas comerciales
desleales en el marco de las normas de la OMC y las tasas por servicios
efectivamente prestados.
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ORGANO EJECUTOR DE LA POLITICA DE COMERCIO EXTERIOR E
INVERSIONES

Corresponde al Ministerio de Comercio Exterior, Industrializaci6n
y Pesca, planificar, dirigir, controlar y ejecutar las politicas de comercio
exterior de bienes, servicios y tecnologfa, integraci6n e inversi6n directa,
funci6n que la ejercerd en estrecha coordinaci6n con el Ministerio de
Relaciones Exteriores, entidades del sector pfiblico y privado que
conforman el sector del Comercio Exterior a fin de contribuir a la
ejecuci6n de informes t~cnicos y adopci6n de polfticas en el d.Mbito de sus
respectivas competencias. Entre los principales deberes del Ministerio de
Comercio Exterior, Industrializaci6n y Pesca es el de vigilar el
cumplimiento de las normas y procedinientos en materia de comercio
exterior e inversiones, evaluar y aplicar la politica relativa a la prevenci6n
y correcci6n de pricticas desleales, restrictivas y lesivas de comercio
exterior que afecten a la producci6n nacional asi como tambidn aplicar las
normas sobre la existencia y funcionamiento de las zonas francas, en
coordinaci6n con el Ministerio de Finanzas y Cr~dito Nblico.
Promocion No Financiera De Las Exportaciones E Inversiones
Directas
Para la promoci6n no financiera de las exportaciones e inversiones
en el pais y en el extranjero, estructdrase el Sistema Ecuatoriano de
Promoci6n Externa, que estard integrado por la Corporaci6n de Promoci6n
Externa, que estard integrado por la Corporaci6n de Promoci6n de
Exportaciones e Inversiones CORPEI, y su red externa, el Servicio
Comercial mediante su representaci6n en aquellas ciudades que ameriten
funciones de negociaci6n en politicas comerciales y la colaboraci6n del
Servicio Exterior, por medio de sus Embajadas o Misiones Diplomdticas.
La Corporaci6n tendrd su sede en la ciudad de Guayaquil, la misma que
gozari de personeria juridica de derecho privado sin fines de lucro con
patrimonio y fondos propios cuyo funcionaniento se regird por el Libro
IV, Tituto XXIX del C6digo Civil que trata sobre los Colitratos de Mutuo
o Pr6stamo de Consumo y por su Estatuto aprobado por el Presidente de la
Repfiblica.
El Directorio de la Corporaci6n estari compuesto por: un
delegado permanente de los Ministros de Comercio Exterior,
Industrializaci6n y Pesca, Relaciones Exteriores y Agricultura y
Ganaderia, el Gerente General de la Corporaci6n Financiera Nacional, un
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delegado por la Federaci6n Ecuatoriana de Exportadores, FEDEXPORT,
un delegado de la Federaci6n Nacional de las Cdmaras de Comercio,
Agricultura, Pequefia Industria y un delegado de la Junta Nacional de
Defensa del Artesano.
Promocion FinancieraDe Las Exportaciones
La funci6n Ejecutiva, a travds de los 6rganos pertinentes, adoptard
las medidas que hagan factible el establecimiento de un mecanismo de
Seguro de Cr6dito a la Exportaci6n, con el objeto de cubrir los riesgos de
no pago del valor de los bienes o servicios vendidos al exterior.

BANKRUPTCY PREVENTION LAW
(R.O. No. 60, May 8, 1997)
PatriciaPonce Arteta and Erika Alarc6n Araujo
The National Congress approved the Bankruptcy Prevention Law
on April 24, 1997, whereby corporations incorporated in Ecuador subject
to the Superintendency of Companies' oversight and control, and with
assets exceeding four thousand CVUs (CONSTANT VALUE UNITS), or
with more than 100 permanent employees, and liabilities exceeding two
thousand CVU's cannot declare bankruptcy without having previously
attempted all bankruptcy prevention proceedings available from the
Superintendency of Companies. For the purposes of this Law, neither
amounts due partners or shareholders arising from unpaid profits, nor
dividends or credits in their favor, nor amounts due managers or board
members, nor capital and reserve accounts shall be defined as liabilities.
The object of bankruptcy prevention proceedings is to sign an
accord or agreement via public notary deed between debtor and creditors to
expedite terminating the Company's obligations, such as: 1. Capitalizing
all creditors' liabilities by offsetting credits. 2. Consolidating debts and
transforming short-, median-, and long term credits. 3. Granting new
credits for operating capital adapted to the debtor's rehabilitation scheme.
4. Writing off capital or interest payments, or reducing same. 5. Selling
property not necessary for the company's operations, and any other
property that would expedite payment of obligations.

SUSPENSION OF PAYMENTS
Suspension of payments constitutes an equity state for the debtor
indicated by : non-compliance for sixty days or more with commercial
obligations totaling 30% or more of total liabilities; when one or more
payment rulings or orders resulting from any court or administrative
proceeding have been enforced, is not paid and totals 30 % or more of total
liabilities; debts from obligations with less than two-year terms exceeding
80% of assets; using assets necessary for corporate activity for payments
that total 20% of the company's assets and losses totaling 50% or more of
corporate capital and total reserves.
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REQUEST AND APPROVAL OF BANKRUPTCY PREVENTION PROCEEDING

Debtor or any creditor may request that the Superintendent of
Company's order bankruptcy prevention proceedings when the status of the
debtor company's termination of payments within sixty days following any
of the causes for termination of payments may be summarily proven.
Documents provided by Law for this purpose shall be enclosed.

APPROVAL OF BANKRUPTCY PREVENTION REQUEST AND
PUBLICATION OF SAME

Within five days the superintendent of his/her delegate shall decide
on whether or not to approve bankruptcy prevention proceedings via
Resolution. This resolution may not be appealed, and the interested parties
and general public shall be notified via the extract to be published at debtor
company's expense or that of the company subject to prevention
proceedings in a newspaper published where the company's main offices
are located, and they shall be recorded with the respective Mercantile and
Property Registers.
The Superintendent or his/her delegate shall appoint one or more
supervisors to be responsible for examining, checking and verifying the
accuracy of the documents submitted under the agreement; determining for
themselves or with the assistance of specialized firms, whether or not the
basis for the proposed arrangement made in the request for prevention
proceedings is viable, supervising the cash flow of the company involved
in the procedures and immediately notifying the Superintendent or his/her
delegate if they discover irregularities, oversee compliance with the
decisions in the agreement, authorize with their signatures all of the
company's operations and documents for them to be valid, submit a
monthly report and whenever the Superintendent or his/her delegate
requests one.

LABOR CREDITS
Employees' rights legally recognized prior to the request for
bankruptcy prevention proceedings shall be paid according to the priority
provided under the law prior to executing any decision under the
agreement; and if unpaid labor obligations appear after the supervisors'
report legal provisions shall be invoked.
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TAX AND OTHER PUBLIC SECTOR CREDITS

Individuals obligated for payment of taxes, public service charges,
quotas, and other net obligations to public sector institutions may request
proceedings under the terms of this Law subject completely to the
decisions in the agreement to the highest authority with jurisdiction for
issuing resolutions in the final administrative instance in each institution
per se or through a delegate. Without prejudice to sanctioning the tax and
non-tax debtor with tax or non-tax debts payment terms may be granted tax
payers subject to proceedings for both tax and non-tax obligations. Entities
responsible for providing such public services as water, electricity,
telephones, and the like may not suspend the services they provide due to
debts prior to the date the proceedings have been accepted.
Acts and contracts arising from the signing of the agreement or its
amendments shall be exempt from taxes, special recording fees and the like
including government, municipal or special taxes in connection with the
sale and liens, on property and goods. Writing off capital or interest, or
reduction thereof by the creditor of the company subject to the proceedings
shall not require authorization from the General Revenue Directorate.
Therefore, income actually earned and as a special deduction from the
amount of capital written off shall be accepted for income tax purposes.

CREDITS FROM THE ECUADORIAN SOCIAL SECURITY INSTITUTE

In its capacity as collector of the obligations due from employers,
individuals, reserve funds, discount payments may provide payment terms
per its internal norms and regulations. Furthermore, according to the
Resolution of the lESS Superior Council, the term may be extended and
payment conditions established may be changed, restricting warranties and
initial payments.

EFFECTS OF APPROVAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS

1. Suspension of equity processing. 2. Forbidding initiation of
new equity processing. 3. Suspension of limits and expiration. 4. All
legal acts signed within one hundred eighty days prior to the date the
request for proceedings is submitted may not be opposed by creditors. 5.
Request for a proceeding or its processing shall not be cause for
terminating agreements previously adjudicated and in force.
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AMPLIFICATION, MODIFICATION OR INTERPRETATION OF THE
AGREEMENT

At any time, with a joint request from debtor and creditors
participating in the proceeding or their assignees representing at least 50%
of total unpaid credits, but admitted into the proceedings, may request that
the Superintendent convoke a meeting to adopt decisions necessary for
interpreting, amplifying or modifying the agreement or expediting its
compliance.
TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT

The agreement terminates due to compliance or non-compliance.
If the agreement has been complied with, then the debtor shall inform the
Superintendent of Companies to proceed to issue a Resolution declaring
that it has been complied with which shall be noted in the margin of the
document at the Mercantile Register and shall be published in the
newspaper where the debtor or company subject to proceedings is located.
If the agreement has not been complied with by the debtor, then the
Superintendent in his/her own right, or at the request of any creditor, shall
declare it terminated, and shall notify the company's legal representative
about the resolution, and publish it in the newspaper where the debtor of
company subject to proceedings is located.
If one or more of the creditors does not comply with the
agreement, which may be subject to judicial enforcement, the debtor may
sue in this manner for compensation for damages or in the case of a bank
or a financial institution, the National Finance Corporation at the request
of the Superintendency of Companies may terminate the financing term
granted for said bank or finance institution, and shall have the possibility
of discounting or rediscounting the obligations of companies that are part
of the agreement. The Monetary Board shall determine the conditions such
credits are subject to.

LEY DE CONCURSO PREVENTIVO
(R.O. No. 60, de 8 de mayo de 1997)
Por: PatriciaPonce Arteta y Erika Alarc6n Araujo
La Ley de Concurso Preventivo fue aprobada por el Congreso
Nacional el 24 de abril de 1997, mediante la cual las compafilas
constituidas en el pais, sujetas a vigilancia y control por la
Superintendencia de compaas, que tengan un activo superior a cuatro mil
UVC o mis de 100 trabajadores permanentes y con un pasivo superior a
dos mil UVC, no podrdn ser declaradas en quiebra sin que previamente
hayan agotado los trinites del concurso preventivo ante la
Superintendencia de Compafias.
Para efecto de esta Ley no se
considerard.n como pasivos las sumas adeudadas a los socios o accionistas
por concepto de utilidades o dividendos no pagados, ni los cr6ditos a favor
de 6stos, de los administradores, comisarios y tampoco los rubros de
capital y reservas.
El Concurso tiene por objetivo la suscripci6n de un acuerdo o
concordato celebrado mediante escritura pfiblica entre el deudor y sus
acreedores tendiente a facilitar la extinci6n de las obligaciones de la
Compafila, tales como: 1. Capitalizaci6n de los pasivos de cualquier
acreedor mediante la compensaci6n de cr6ditos. 2. Consolidaci6n de
deudas y la transformaci6n de cr6ditos de corto plazo, mediano y largo
plazo. 3. Otorgamiento de nuevos cr6ditos para capital de operaci6n que
se ajuste al esquema de rehabilitaci6n de la compafiia deudora. 4.
Condonaci6n de aporte del capital, intereses o rebajas de los mismos. 5.
Enajenaci6n de los bienes no necesarios para la actividad empersarial y
cualquier otro que facilite la extinci6n de las obligaciones.

CESACION DE PAGOS
Constituye cesaci6n de pagos un estado patrimonial del deudor que
se manifiesta por: el incumplimiento por mds de sesenta dias de una o mas
obligaciones mercantiles y que representen en total el 30% o mis del valor
del pasivo total; encontrarse ejecutoriados e insatisfechos uno o mis autos
de pago o providencias emitidas por cualquier procedimiento sea este
judicial o administrativo y cuya cuantia represente un 30% o mds del valor
del pasivo total; endeudamiento por obligaciones de plazo menor de dos
aflos y que exceda al 80% del valor de sus activos; dociones en pago de los
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activos necesarios para la actividad empresarial, que representen en
conjunto nids del 20% del activo de la empresa y las prdidas que alcancen
el 50% o mds del capital social y la totalidad de sus reservas.

SOLICITUD DE CONCURSO PREVENTIVO Y Su ADMISION
Podrin solicitar al Superintendente de Compaftifas el concurso
preventivo el deudor o cualquiera de sus acreedores que demustren
sumariamente el estado de cesaci6n de pagos de la compafifa deudora
dentro del plazo de sesenta dias siguientes de producidas cualquiera de las
causales de cesaci6n de pagos, adjuntando los documentos que para el
efecto sefiale la presente Ley.

ADMISION DEL CONCURSO PREVENTIVO Y PUBLICACION
El Superintendente o su delegado dentro del t6rmino de cinco dfas
declarari admitido o no el concurso preventivo mediante Resoluci6n, de la
cual no cabe recurso alguno, la misma que serd notificada a las partes
interesadas y al pdiblico en general mediante extracto que se publicard
acosta de la compafifa deudora o consursada en uno de los peri6dicos de
major circulaci6n del domicilio principal y se inscribird en los respectivos
Registros Mercantil y de la Propiedad.
El Superintendente o su delegado designard a uno o mis
supervisores, quienes tienen la obligaci6n de examinar, comprobar y
verificar la exactitud de los documentos presentados en el concordato;
determinar por si o con el asesoramiento de firmas especializadas, la
viabilidad de las bases de la propuesta de arreglo formulada en la solicitud
del concurso, supervisar el flujo de ingresos y egresos de la compafifa
concursada y dar aviso inmediato al Superintendente o su delegado si
observara irregularidades, velar el cumplimiento de las decisiones del
concordato, autorizar con su firma todas las operaciones y documentos de
la compafifa para que sean vlidas, rendir un informe mensualmente y cada
vez que lo solicite el Superintendente o su delegado.

CREDITOS LABORALES
Los derechos de los trabajadores reconocidos legalmente con
anterioridad a la solicitud del concurso preventivo serdn pagados con el
privilegio establecido en las leyes antes de ejecutar cualquier decisi6n
concordatoria; y, si posterior al informe de los supervisores apareciere la
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existencia de obligaciones laborales no satisfechas deberin constituirse las
provisiones legales.
CREDITOS TRIBUTARIOS Y OTROS DEL SECTOR PUBLICO

Los sujetos activos de obligaciones tributarias, tasas por servicios
pfiblico, contribuciones y demis obligaciones liquidas a favor de
instituciones del sector pfiblico, por intermedio de la ni-xima autoridad
competente para dictar resoluciones en Ailtima instancia administrativa en
cada instituci6n, por si o por delegado podrfn solicitar el concurso en los
t6rminos de esta Ley, sujetAndose en todo a la decisi6n concordataria,
ademis podrd.n conceder facilidades de pago al sujeto pasivo concursado
por obligaciones tributarias o no tributarias sin perjuicio de sancionar al
deudor de las acciones de ilicito tributario, asi como tambien podrin
admitir compensaciones de cr6ditos tributario o no tributarios con deudas
tributarias o no tributarias. Las entidades encargadas de la prestaci6n de
servicios pfiblicos, tales como agua, energia eldctrica, teldfono y otros
similares, no podrdn suspender los servicios que presten por deudas
anteriores a la fecha de admisi6n del concurso.
Los actos y contratos que surjan de la celebraci6n del concordato o
de su ampliaci6n, estar .n exentos de impuestos, registro de incripci6n
especial y de cualquier indole, inclusivo los tributos fiscales, municipales o
especiales, referentes a transferencia de dominio y gravimenes de bienes
muebles e inmuebles. La condonaci6n de capital, intereses o su rebaja por
parte del acreedor de la compafifa concursada no requierirh de autorizaci6n
previa de la Direcci6n General de Rentas, consecuentemente, para efectos
del Impuesto a la Renta se aceptari como ingreso los intereses realmente
percibidos y como deducci6n especial del monto de la condonaci6n del
capital.

CREDITOS DEL INSTITUTO ECUATORIANO DE SEGURIDAD SOCIAL

El IESS como sujeto activo de las obligaciones por aportes
patronale, individuales, fondos de reserva, descuentos, etc., podri
conceder facilidades de pago de acuerdo con sus normas y regulaciones
internas, sin embargo por Resoluci6n del Consejo Superior del IESS,
podri ampliarse el plazo y modificar las condiciones de pago establecidas,
restringiendo garantis y cuotas iniciales.
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EFECTOS DE LA ADMISION DEL CONCURSO

1. Suspensi6n de procesos patrimoniales. 2. Prohibici6n de
iniciar nuevos procesos patrimoniales. 3. Suspensi6n de prescripci6n y
caducidad. 4. Todos los actos juridicos que se hubieran celebrado dentro
de los ciento ochenta dias anteriores a la fecha de presentaci6n de la
solicitud del concurso son inoponibles frente a los acreedores. 5. La
solicitud de concurso o su tramitaci6n no seri causal para dar por
terminado los contratos previamente adjudicados y vigentes.

AMPLIACION, MODIFICACION 0 INTERPRETACION DEL
CONCORDATO

En cualquier 6poca y a solicitud conjunta del deudor y de los
acreedores que hayan intervenido en el trdmite concursal, o de sus
cesionarios que representen no menos del 50% del valor de los cr6ditos no
cancelados pero admitidos en el concurso podr.n solicitar al
Superintendente, se convoque a una reuni6n con el fin de que se adopten
las deciones necesarias para interpretar, ampliar o modificar el concordato
o facilitar su cumplimiento.

TERMINACION DEL CONCORDATO

El concordato termina por cumplimiento o no del mismo. Si fuera
cumplido el concordato el deudor comunicari al Superintendente de
Compafffas para que proceda mediante Resoluci6n a declarar lo cumplido,
la misma que se marginari en el Registro Mercantil y se publicard
mediante aviso en unos de los peri6dicos de mayor circulaci6n del
domicilio principal de la compaffia deudora o concursada; o si el
concordato no es cumplido por la compafiia deudora, el Superintendente de
oficio o a petici6n de cualquier acreedor declarard terminado y notificard la
resoluci6n al representante legal de la compafiia y se publicari en uno de
los peri6dicos de mayor circulaci6n del domicilio principal de la compafiia
deudora o concursada.
En el caso de que uno o mis de los acreedores no cumplieran el
concordato, el cudl tiene cardcter de titulo ejecutivo, la compaffia deudora
podrd demandarles por esa via el cumplimiento con indemnizaci6n de
dafios y perjuicios o si fuere una instituci6n bancaria o financiera la
Corporaci6n Financiera Nacional a pedido de la Superintendencia de
Compafifas podrd dar por vencido el plazo de financiamiento concedido a
dicho banco o instituci6n fmanciera y en lo posterior tener la posibilidad de
descontar o redescontar obligaciones de compafifas que se acojan al
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concordato, para lo cual la Junta Monetaria determinarh las condiciones a
que se sometan dichos crdditos.

LAW OF ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION
AMENDMENT TO THE CIVIL CODE
(R.O. No. 145, September 4, 1997)
The Law of Arbitration and Mediation was issued on August 29,
1997, superceding the Commercial Arbitration Law issued under Supreme
Decree No. 735 on October 23, 1963 and published in Official Register
No. 90 on October 28, 1963.
The aforementioned legal body defines an Arbitration Agreement
as a written agreement whereby the parties agree to submit all disputes or
certain disputes to arbitration that arise or may arise from those pertaining
to a determined legal contractual or non-contractual relationship.
Mediation is a dispute-resolving procedure whereby the parties are
helped by a neutral third party called a mediator in seeking a voluntary
agreement regarding a matter which may be subject to an agreement of an
extra-judicial and final nature ending the conflict.
Arbitration is an alternative dispute-resolving mechanism whereby
the parties, through mutual agreement, may submit existing or future
disputes subject to settlement to be solved by Arbitration Boards, whether
through managed arbitration or independent arbitration formed for
reviewing said disputes. Arbitration is managed when it operates under
this Law and the norms and procedures issued by the Arbitration Center.
It is independent when it is executed subject to the parties' agreement per
the terms hereunder.

FAIR OR LEGAL ARBITRATION
The parties must indicate if the mediators shall make their
decisions based on fairness or the law. If there is no agreement, then the
decision will be based on fairness: mediators shall act according to their
loyal knowledge and understanding, and following the principles of
constructive criticism. In this case, the mediators acting do not necessarily
have to be attorneys, but their decision shall be issued based on the law.
The mediators must be attorneys and adhere to the law, universal legal
principles, jurisprudence and doctrine.
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ELIGIBILITY FOR THE ARBITRATION SYSTEM

Private individuals or corporations eligible for settlements after
meeting the requirements established hereunder shall be eligible for the
aforesaid arbitration system.

PUBLIC SECTOR

In order for entities from the public sector to submit to arbitration
they shall comply with the requirements established hereunder plus certain
additional requirements, such as: establish an arbitration agreement prior
to the occurrence of disputes, which must have the effects of a contract,
establish the manner mediators are chosen, waive ordinary jurisdiction,
and be signed by the individual authorized to execute contracts on the
Institution's behalf. If an arbitration agreement is executed when a dispute
has arisen, the Attorney General of the State shall be consulted and his/her
ruling shall be mandatory.

PREVENTIVE MEASURES

According to the norms of the Civil Procedures Code or those they
see fit on a case-by-case basis, mediators may issue preventive measures.
Also, mediators may require a bond from the individual requesting that
preventive measures -be taken to cover the cost of such measure and
compensation for damages for the opposing party if the charges are
declared groundless in their decision. Furthermore, the opposing party
affected by the preventive measures can request suspension thereto by
rendering a sufficient bond to the Board.

ARBITRATION PROCEDURE

A claim is filed with the Arbitration Board selected containing the
requirements established hereunder, in Article 72 of the Civil Procedures
Code and other pertinent laws. Also, the arbitration agreement and
pertinent proofs shall be included, and an evidentiary term must be
requested in support of the charges in the claim. If the claim is complete,
then it will be processed per the provisions hereunder.
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OTHER FORMS OF SUBMISSION TO ARBITRATION

This is for cases when the agreement is included in an exchange of
letters or other means of written correspondence that are documentary
proof of the parties' wish to submit to arbitration.

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

Notwithstanding international treaties, arbitration may be on an
international basis: a) when the arbitration agreement is executed, the
parties reside in different states; b) in the event of a substantial breach of
the obligations or the site where the object of the litigation is more closely
related is located outside the state where at least one of the parties resides;
and, c) when the object of the litigation pertains to an international
business operation. International arbitration is regulated by treaties,
conventions, protocols and other acts of international law executed and
ratified by Ecuador.

SUPPLEMENTARY NORMS

The norms of the Civil Code, the Civil Procedures Code, the
Commercial Code, and other similar laws shall be applied as a supplement
provided they cover arbitration rights.

AMENDMENT TO THE CIVIL CODE

This Law of Arbitration and Mediation expressly derogates the
following phrase in Article 1505 of the Civil Code, "Thus, the promise to
submit in Ecuador to a jurisdiction that is not recognized under Ecuadorian
law is null because its purpose is flawed," as well as the interpretation
made under Supreme Decree No. 797-B published in Official Register No.
193 on October 15, 1976. Because this procedure has been derogated, the
parties are enable to submit to jurisdiction whether or not it is recognized
under Ecuadorian law.
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DEROGATIONS
Furthermore, the aforementioned law derogates Section XXX of
Title II, Book II of the Civil Procedures Code pertaining to arbitration
claims; Section XV of Title I of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch
pertaining to mediators and Article 21 of the Organic Law for Public
Ministries on waives and settlement.

LEY DE ARBITRAJE Y MEDIACION
REFORMA AL CODIGO CIVIL
(R.O. No. 145, de 4 de septiembre de 1997)
El 29 de agosto de 1997 fue promulgada la Ley de Arbitraje y
Mediaci6n, la misma que derog6 la Ley de Arbitraje Comercial dictada
mediante Decreto Supremo No. 735, de 23 de octubre de 1963, publicado
en el Registro Oficial No. 90 de 28 de octubre de 1963.
El referido cuerpo legal define al Convenio Arbitral como el
acuerdo escrito en virtud del cual las partes deciden someter a arbitraje
todas las controversias o ciertas controversias que hayan surgido o que
puedan surgir entre ellas respecto de una determinada relaci6n juridica
contractual o no contractual.
Mediacion, es el procedimiento de soluci6n de conflictos por el
cual las partes asistidas por un tercero neutral llamado mediador, procuran
un acuerdo voluntario, que verse sobre materia transigible, de caricter
extra-judicial y definitivo que ponga fin al conflicto.
Arbitraje, es un mecanismo alternativo para la soluci6n de
conflictos al cual partes pueden someter de mutuo acuerdo, las
controversias suceptibles de transacci6n, existentes o futuras para que sean
resueltas por los Tribunales de Arbitraje, ya sea por la via de arbitraje
administrado o por irbitros independientes que se designaren para conocer
dichas controversias. El arbitraje es administrado cuando se desarrolla con
sujeci6n a la presente Ley y a las normas y procedimientos expedidos por
un Centro de Arbitraje; y, es independiente cuando se realiza conforme a
lo que partes pacten con arreglo a esta Ley.

ARBITRAJE DE EQUIDAD 0 DE DERECHO
Las partes indicaran si los drbitros deben decidir en equidad o en
derecho, a falta de convenio, el fallo serd en equidad; los drbitros actuardn
conforme a su leal saber y entender y atendiendo a los principios de la sana
critica. En este caso los irbitros, que actuaran no tienen que ser
necesariamente abogados mas si el laudo debe expedirse fundado en
derecho, los drbitros deberin ser abogados y atenerse a la ley, a los
principios universales del derecho, a la jurisprudencia y a la doctrina.
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CAPACIDAD PARA ACUDIR AL SISTEMA ARBITRAL

Podrin someterse a dicho sistema arbitral, las personas naturales o
juridicas que tengan capacidad para transigir previo el cumplimiento de los
requisitos establecidos en la Ley.

SECTOR PUBLICO

Para someterse a arbitraje las diferentes entidades del sector
pfiblico deberin cumplir con, los requisitos que establece esta Ley ms
ciertos requisitos adicionales, tales como: pactar un convenio arbitral con
anterioridad al surgimiento de la controversia, el mismo que deberi ser de
caricter contractual, establecer la forma de selecci6n de los irbitros,
renunciar a la jurisdicci6n ordinaria y ser firmado por la persona
autorizada para contratar a nombre de la Instituci6n. Para el caso de que
se quisiera firmar el convenio arbitral una vez surgida la controversia
deberd consultarse al Procurador General del Estado, cuyo dictamen serd
de obligatorio cumplimiento.

MEDIDAS CAUTELARES

Los drbitros pueden dictar medidas cautelares, de acuerdo con las
normas del C6digo de Procedimiento Civil a las que se consideren
necesarias para cada caso; adicionalmente, los drbitros pueden exigir una
garantia a quien solicite la prdctica de esta medida cautelar con el prop6sito
de cubrir el pago del costo de tal medida y la indemnizaci6n por dafios y
perjuicios a la parte contraria; si la pretensi6n fuera declarada infundada en
el laudo. Por otro lado, la parte contra quien se dicte la medida cautelar
podrd pedir la suspensi6n de 6sta, rindiendo cauci6n suficiente ante el
Tribunal.

PROCEDIMIENTO ARBITRAL

Se inicia con la demanda que se presentard ante el Tribunal
Arbitral escogido, y contendrd los requisitos establecidos en esta Ley, el
Articulo 72 del C6digo de Procedimiento Civil y mds leyes pertinentes; de
igual manera se acompafiara el convenio arbitral, las pruebas que fueren
del caso y se solicitarA la prdctica de las diligencias probatorias que
justifiquen lo aducido en la demanda; si la demanda estd completa se
procederd conforme lo establecido en la Ley.
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OTRA FORMA DE SOMETERSE AL ARBITRAJE

Es cuando el acuerdo figure en un intercambio de cartas o
cualquier otro medio de comunicaci6n escrito que deje constancia
documental de la voluntad de las partes de someterse al arbitraje.

ARBITRAJE INTERNACIONAL

Sin perjuicio de los tratados internacionales el arbitraje podr, ser
internacional cuando: a) las partes al momento de la celebraci6n del
convenio arbitral, tengan sus domicilios en estados diferentes; b) cuando el
lugar de incumplimiento de una parte sustancial de las obligaciones o el
lugar en el cual el objeto del litigio tenga una relaci6n mds estrecha, est6
situado fuera del estado en que, por lo menos una de las partes tiene su
domicilio; y, c) Cuando el objeto del litigio se refiere a una operaci6n de
comercio internacional. El arbitraje internacional estard regulado por los
tratados, convenciones, protocolos y demis actos de derecho internacional
suscritos y ratificados por el Ecuador.

NORMAS SUPLETORIAS

Se aplicarin supletoriamente las normas del C6digo Civil, C6digo
de Procedimiento Civil, C6digo de Comercio y otras leyes conexas,
siempre que se trate de arbitraje en derecho.

REFORMA AL CODIGO CIVIL

Esta Ley de Arbitraje y Mediaci6n deroga en forma expresa la
frase del Articulo 1505 del C6digo Civil: "Asi, la promesa de someterse
en el Ecuador a una jurisdicci6n no reconocida por las leyes ecuatorianas,
es nula por vicio del objeto," asi como su interpretaci6n realizada mediante
Decreto Supremo No. 797-B, publicado en el Registro Oficial No. 193 de
15 de octubre de 1976. Con esta derogatoria, se habilita a las partes a
someterse a una jurisdicci6n reconocida o no por las leyes ecuatorianas.
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DEROGATORIAS
Ademis, la mencionada ley deroga la Secci6n XXX del Tftulo II,
Libro II del C6digo de Procedimiento Civil sobre el juicio de arbitraje; la
Secci6n XV del Titulo I de la Ley Orgdnica de la Funci6n Judicial de los
drbitros y el Articulo 21 de la Ley Org6.nica del Ministerio Ptiblico sobre el
desestimiento y transacci6n.
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ETHIOPIA
Judiciary
The Ethiopian judicial system consists of two principal branches; the
Federal Supreme Court has final jurisdiction over federal cases, and the
state supreme courts have final jurisdiction over state concerns. State
supreme courts may also serve as federal first-instance courts. Federal
judges are nominated by the prime minister and appointed after approval
by the Council of Peoples' Representative.
Magistratura
El sistema judicial de etiopia consiste en dos ramas principales; la Corte
Suprema Federal tiene jurisdicci6n final sobre los casos federales, y las
cortes supremas estatales tienen jurisdicci6n final sobre preocupaciones
del estado. Las cortes supremas tambi6n pueden servir como cortes
federales de primer-caso. Los jueces federales son nombrados por el
primer ministro y se fijan despu6s de la aprobaci6n por el Representante
del Concilio del Pueblo.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The conventional wisdom of those conversant with the law of
personal liability of owners of a business is that sole proprietors and
general partners always have unlimited liability for the debts of a business
which they own. On the other hand, shareholders in companies enjoy
limited liability for those debts. However, a close reading of the Ethiopian

*
Assistant Professor and Fulbright Lecturer (1997-98), Faculty of Law, Addis Ababa
University, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. I was a practicing lawyer in New York and Honolulu for
almost thirty years before beginning to teach in Ethiopia in 1995.
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Commercial Code of 1960' shows that some sole proprietors and some
general partners may enjoy limited liability for the debts of their
businesses. Similarly, shareholders in private limited companies2 may lose
their limited liability in unexpected ways and shareholders in share
companies, 3 when acting as directors, may also lose their limited liability.
Before pursuing these conclusions, some background information about
Ethiopia is useful.
A. Location of Previous Governments
Ethiopia is located in the Horn of Africa, the eastern-most part of
Africa. Its neighbors are Kenya to the south, Sudan to the west, Eritrea (a
former province of Ethiopia, independent de facto since 1991 and de jure
since 1993) to the north and east, and Djibouti and Somalia to the east.
Ethiopia is the only country in Africa, other than Liberia, which retained
its independence during the colonial period. In fact, it expanded its
traditional borders, conquering many tribes east, south and west of the
territory of Abyssinia. Italy attacked Ethiopia in 1936, drove Emperor
Haile Selassie I into exile and occupied the country until expelled by the
British in 1941. Haile Selassie returned in 1941 and retained power until a
coup in 1974 forced him to abdicate. From 1974 to 1991 a communist
military dictatorship called the Derg ruled the country.
B. Present Government
A party of former communists controls the present government of
Ethiopia. It acquired power in 1991 when it won a long civil war against
the Derg. After a period of transitional government, a new Constitution
was written in 1994, and elections were held in the spring of 1995,
-although the main opposition parties boycotted them.
The new
Constitution came into effect and the government assumed its new offices
in August 1995.4 To its credit, the present government has said many
things about creating a democratic society and a free market economy. It
has carried into practice fewer policies and practices than are necessary for

1.
NEGARIT GAZETA, COMMERCIAL CODE OF THE EMPIRE OF ETHIOPIA (Proclamation
No. 166 of 1960).
Gazette Extraordinary, 19th year.
In Ethiopian legal terminology
proclamation simply means act or statute. The Negarit Gazeta was the official government
gazette for publishing laws, regulations and official notices, all of which have no authority until
published. It was published from 1941 until August 1995, when the Federal Negarit Gazeta
superseded it.
2. A private limited company is somewhat comparable to an American close corporation.
3. A share company is comparable to an American corporation.

4.

ETH. CONST. 1st Year, No. 1, (1995).

Porter

1998]

1085

a democratic society and a free market economy to come into being. The
ideology of the government, which requires the government to own all of
the land' and public utilities, and limits investment in many activities to
Ethiopian nationals or residents, 6 constitutes a major impediment to the
creation of economic conditions which would lift Ethiopia out of its
poverty. While the federal government talks about a transition from a
communist command economy to a market economy, it has not yet made
the transition. The economy is not a market economy, let alone a free
market economy. There are very few signs that the government is willing
to relinquish the control, which it must do if it is to permit business
persons and others to create a free market economy.
C. Constitution
The 1994 Constitution establishes a federal system composed of a
-national government and nine states.' The Constitution reserves to the
federal government all matters dealing with the Commercial Code.' The
capital is Addis Ababa and its administration is responsible to the federal
government. 9 The dividing line between federal and state authority is not
clearly set forth in the 1994 Constitution, just as it is not clear in the
American federal system. One area in which this causes difficulties for all
businesses is access to land. While all land is owned by the "State and
Peoples in Ethiopia,"' ° leases are granted by the states. There is ample
evidence that the states and the city of Addis Ababa are using their
ownership of the land to harass business persons and farmers, often
evicting them without a pretense of following the law or the land lease
contracts."
D. Codes
Ethiopia adopted a Civil Code and a Commercial Code in 1960.12
Both were written by French professors and incorporated many civil law

5.

Id. art. 40.3.

6.
7.

Investment Proclamation, 25 FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, arts. 5-7, 181-184 (1996).
ETH. CONST. art. 47.1.

8.

Id. art. 55.4.

9. Id. art. 49.3.
10. Id. art. 40.3.
11. B. Yosef Government Measures Against Businessmen Called Illegal, ADDIS TRIBUNE
(Addis Ababa), June 6, 1997, at 1; Backward to De-kulakization or Forward to Farmers
Prosperity?THE MONITOR (Addis Ababa), Apr. 10, 1997, at 3.
12. GAZETA, supra note 1, Proclamation 165/2.
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concepts which were modem at the time.' 3 While the Civil Code expressly

repealed all written or customary rules in force concerning matters
provided for in the Code, 4 it specifically retained some indigenous
customary institutions." No indigenous institutions were specifically
6
retained in the Commercial Code.
The Civil Code and the Commercial Code did not penetrate deeply
into Ethiopian society during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie 1.17 While
neither code was repealed or amended by the Derg, a law nationalizing
almost all property in Ethiopia'8 rendered inoperative the business

organization provisions of the Commercial Code.
II. BUSINESSES, TRADES AND TRADERS
The Ethiopian Commercial Code makes a distinction between
economic activities which are designated as commercial, trade or business
(all of which mean the same thing) and those which are not. Article 124

defines a business as an incorporeal movable organized for the purpose of
carrying out any of the activities specified in Article 5. Article 5 is
composed of 21 clauses, each of which lists one or more activities which
are deemed to be trades, that is, activities carried on professionally and for
gain by traders.' 9 Article 5 by its terms excludes from the definition of
13. Jean Escarra, Expose des Motifs: General Part (Comm. C. Doc. No. 2)(April 13,
1954), in BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS OF THE ETHIOPIAN COMMERCIAL CODE OF 1960 30, Doc.

No. 7 (Peter Winship ed. & trans., 1974) [hereinafter Winship]; Jean Escarra, Expose des
Motifs: Commercial Register (Comm. C. Doc .No. 6B) (May 31, 1954), at 46, Document No.
16.
14. GAZETA, supra note 1, art. 3347.
15. See, e.g., id. arts. 722-33, 241-60.
16. While no institutions of customary law in Ethiopia were retained in the Commercial
Code, nonetheless customary institutions, such as the customary partnerships of traders in Addis
Ababa, have survived in practice. Paul McCarthy, "DeFacto" and Customary Partnershipsin
EthiopianLaw, 5 J. ETH. L. 105 (1968).
17. John Henry Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and
the Common Law, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 357 (1981), in JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET. AL., THE
CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA AND EAST ASIA 22 (1994).
18. Government Ownership and Control of the Means of Production Proclamation
No.26/1975, NEGARIT GAZETA, 34th Year, No. 22, (Mar. 11, 1975).
19. GAZETA, supra note 1, art. 5. Persons to be regardedas traders, states:
Persons who professionally and for gain carry on any of the following activities
shall be deemed to be traders:
(1) Purchase of movables or immovables with a view to re-selling them either as they
are or after alteration or adaptation;
(2) Purchase of movables with a view to letting them for hire;
(3) Warehousing activities as defined in art. 2806 of the Civil Code;
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traders persons who may engage in those activities as hobbies. Thus, a
photographer, regardless of his or her talent and skill, will not be a trader
if he or she does not take photographs for economic gain. Similarly, a
publisher which does not expect to make a profit, such as the press of a
school or university, will not be a trader because the activity is not carried
on for gain, but for some other purpose, such as the dissemination of
knowledge.
(4) Exploitation of mines, including prospecting for and working of mineral oils;
(5) Exploitation of quarries not by handicraftsmen;
(6) Exploitation of salt pans;
(7) Conversion and adaptation of chattels, such as foodstuffs, raw materials or semifinished products not by handicraftsmen;
(8) Building, repairing, maintaining, cleaning, painting or dyeing movables not by
handicraftsmen;
(9) Embanking, leveling, trenching or draining carried out for a third party not by
handicraftsmen;
(10) Carriage of goods not by handicraftsmen;
(11) Printing and engraving and works connected with photography or cinematography
not by handicraftsmen;
(12) Capturing, distributing and supplying water;
(13) Producing, distributing and supplying electricity, gas, compressed air including
heating and cooling;
(14) Operating places of entertainment or radio or television stations;
(15) Operating hotels, restaurants, bars, cafes, inns, hairdressing establishments not
operated by handicraftsmen and public baths;
(16) Publishing in whatever form, and in particular by means of printing, engraving,
photography or recording;
(17) Operating news and information services;
(18) Operating travel and publicity agencies;
(19) Operating business as an agent, broker, stock broker or commercial agent;
(20) Operating a banking and money changing business;
(21) Operating an insurance business.
Article 5 is limited by articles 6, 7, 8 and 9, which exempt agricultural and forestry
activities and the activities of fishermen and define the status of handicraftsmen.
The
"enumeration [in art. 5) should be limitative." Alfred Jauffret, GeneralReport: Book , (March
1, 1958) (Excerpt), 50, Doc. No. 18 in Winship, supra, note 13. Therefore, any activity which
is not listed in article 5 is not a trade, its practitioners are not traders and it does not constitute a
business under art. 124 of the Commercial Code. Handicraftsmen are defined in art. 9(2)-(3) as:
(2) Handicraftsmen are persons who carry on an independent activity, who live
mainly on their own manual work, who may carry on their activity with the assistance
of members of their family and of not more than three employees or apprentices and
who buy such material only as is necessary for carrying out their activities, without
setting up stocks.
(3) Handicraftsmen may use mechanical power.
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The traditional professions of medicine, law, architecture and
education are not listed in Article 5. Neither are the newer professions of
accounting,
consulting,
engineering,
design, fashion,
computer
programming, providing business services such as fax and e-mail,
secretarial and office management services, etc. Persons who conduct
these activities professionally and for gain are not deemed to be traders
because their activities are not listed in Article 5. Similarly, certain
persons who are handicraftsmen are also not traders even if they engage in
activities which are trades. Therefore, the economic activities of some
professionals and handicraftsmen are not treated as businesses by the
Commercial Code. They escape from the registration and record keeping
2
requirements imposed by the Code. '
The discussion below with respect to sole proprietorships is
restricted to those owned by certain persons. It concerns only persons who
are engaged in a business, that is, one of the activities described in Article
5, and who are married. Sole proprietors of activities which are not listed
in Article 5, and who, therefore, do not carry on a trade, or who are not
married, may not avail themselves of the protection from unlimited liability
afforded by the Commercial Code.
III.

LIMITED LIABILITY OF MARRIED SOLE PROPRIETORS WHO ARE
TRADERS
An economic activity carried on for profit which is owned by one
person is a sole proprietorship.22 If there are two or more owners of an
economic activity (whether it is a trade or not), the owners must form one
of the business organizations described in Articles 210 through 560 of the
Commercial Code?2
Articles 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 2P' of the
GAZETA, supra note 1, art. 9(2), (3).
20. Id. arts. 86-123.
21. Id. arts. 63-85.
22. If a married person carries on the business or trade, it may be common property under
article 653(1) of the Civil Code. In this case, two persons, the spouses, in fact own it. But it is
nonetheless treated by the Commercial Code as if the trader solely owned it. Id. art. 105,
dealing with registration of a trader, requires a trader to state if a marriage settlement has been
entered into, but does not require the name or any information about the spouse of the trader. It
should be noted that identical legal terminology in the English language can mean different things
in different legal systems. The property called common property in the Ethiopian Civil Code is
called community property in those American states which recognize that type of marital property
regime. In Ethiopia, property solely owned by one of the spouses is called personalproperty. In
American community property states, property solely owned by one of the spouses is called
separateproperty. The term personalproperty is the term applied in all American states except
Louisiana to the property which the civil codes of Ethiopia and Louisiana call movableproperty.
23. The commercial code states, in part:
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Commercial Code relate to the sole proprietorship of a trader who is
married. A married trader may attain a measure of limited liability with

remarkable ease. Article 16 states that a married person may carry on a
trade as though he or she were unmarried, unless the spouse objects under
Article 645 of the Civil Code. The objecting spouse may enter the
objection in the commercial register pursuant to Article 17(2) of the

Commercial Code. Article 645 permits an objection to any occupation "in
the interest of the household." That phrase is not defined and its content is

"(1) There are six forms of business organizations under this Code:
(a) ordinary partnership;
(b) joint venture;
(c) general partnership;
(d) limited partnership;
(e) share company;
(f)
private limited company."
GAZETA, supra note 1, art. 212.

24. Art. 16. - Married persons may carry on trade.
Any married person may carry on a trade as though he were unmarried unless his
spouse objects thereto as provided in art. 654 of the Civil Code.
Art. 17. - Notification of objection.
(1) As between spouses an objection under Art. 16 may be notified to the trading
spouse in any manner.
(2) An objection under Art. 16 shall not affect third parties, in accordance with Art.
121 of this Code, unless notice of such objection has been entered in the commercial
register.
Art. 18. - Setting aside of objection.
(1) Where the trading spouse is of the opinion that the objection is not justified,
having regard to the interest of the family, he may apply to the family arbitrators to set
aside the objection.
(2) Where the arbitrators set the objection aside, a notice to this effect shall be entered
in the commercial register.
Art. 19. - Debts contracted by the trading spouse.
Debts contracted by the trading spouse shall be deemed to be debts of the marriage
within the meaning of Art. 659 of the Civil Code and may be recovered on the
personal estate of each spouse and on common property.
Art. 20. - Effect of objection.
Where an objection under Art. 16 has been entered in the commercial register, debts
contracted by the trading spouse may be recovered on his personal estate only.
Art. 21. - Cooperation of spouses.
Where spouses together carry on a trade, they shall both be deemed to be traders,
unless it is shown that one of them is the employee of the other.
GAZETA, supra note 1, arts. 16-21.
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2
left to the determination of the family arbitrators who decide the matter. 1
But neither Article 16, any other article of the Commercial Code, nor any
article of the Civil Code imposes any constraints upon the spouse who

persists in the trade despite the objection of the other spouse.26 The only
consequences of the objection are the administrative requirement of Article

17 that the objection be entered in the commercial register and the benefit
bestowed by Article 20. Article 20 of the Commercial Code provides that

when the objection has been entered in the commercial register, the debts
contracted by the trader may be recovered only from the trader's separate

property. Obviously, an objection does not prohibit a trader from
continuing the trade, or there would be no purpose served by the limitation
imposed by Article 20.17 The only commercial result of Article 20 is that
the trader may have more difficulty getting credit than is normally the case
because the trader's common property is not available to pay the debts of
the business.

Thus, liability limited to personal property may be obtained for a
business simply upon the filing of an objection pursuant to Article 17(2) of

the Commercial Code.

No other action is required.

Neither the Civil

Code, nor the Commercial Code, prescribes any consequences to the trader

who continues to engage in the trade after the objection of his or her
spouse has been entered in the commercial register. Therefore, the risks
associated with continuing the trade after an objection has been entered in
the register are nonexistent. The benefit is large. It is a form of limited
liability. The common property of the couple and the personal property of

25. Family arbitrators are elders or others who act pursuant to Civil Code article 722-733.
Each spouse appoints two arbitrators and these four typically appoint a fifth person as chairman.
The purpose of the family arbitrators is to decide matters such as: whether certain property is
personal property instead of common property; whether an objection of one spouse to the
carrying on of a business by the other is valid; divorce; division of common property after a
divorce; etc. Family arbitrators are not officers of the court nor appointed by the court, but their
decisions are final unless appealed to the court because of corruption of the arbitrators, fraud in
regard to third persons, or the illegal or manifestly unreasonable character of the decision.
26. As originally drafted, if the trader continued the trade over the objection of the spouse,
that continuation was a ground for divorce. Alfred Jauffret, GeneralReport: Book I (March 1,
1958)(Excerpt), 51, 177 n.8, Doe. No. 18 in Winship, supra note 13 [hereinafter Jauffret].
27. The limitation of a creditor's right to recover a trader's debt to the personal property
of the trader is a significant limitation because income from personal property is common
property, so even the income from the trade is exempt from seizure by a creditor. See text
following supra note 30.
28. Credit is not easy to obtain in Ethiopia at the present time because no one owns any
land which may be mortgaged under art. 3041 through 3130 of the Civil Code to secure a debt.
Nor is it common to pledge securities under art. 950 through 958 of the Commercial Code
because there are very few share companies available in which to invest.
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the non-trading spouse are protected from the claims of creditors of the
trading spouse's business.
Article 18 of the Commercial Code permits the trader to appeal the
objection to the family arbitrators, who may sustain or set aside the
objection. Nothing is changed from the situation created by the objection
if the family arbitrators sustain the objection. However, liability limited to
the personal property of the trader would be lost if the family arbitrators
set aside the objection. That would not appear to be "in the best interest of
the family," the standard set forth in Article 18 to govern the decision of
the family arbitrators. If the trading spouse called upon the family
arbitrators, therefore, it would only be to confirm the objection and thus,
give the objection greater status by their independent decision.
The background materials of the Commercial Code contain no
reference to this ability of a married trader to protect the common property
of the family from liability for the debts of the business.2 9
The effect of the limitation by Article 20 of the Commercial Code
of debt recovery solely from the personal estate ° of the trader depends,
therefore, upon the property regime established by the Civil Code for
married persons. What is a married person's personal estate?
Articles 647 through 661 of the Civil Code govern the property
regime of a married couple. Article 653(1) establishes the presumption
that all property is common property unless one of the spouses establishes
his or her sole ownership. Article 652(1) deals specifically with the
salaries and income of the spouses. It establishes the rule that all salaries
and income are common property. All of the income from the business of
a trader is, therefore, common property. It is not his or her personal
property. This is so even if the property employed in the business is
separate property. (Of course, the property employed in the business may
itself be common property if it does not fall within one of the kinds of
property which is personal property.) Article 647 provides that personal
property is property owned at the time of the marriage or acquired after the
marriage by succession or donation. Article 648 provides that property
acquired by onerous title (for value) during a marriage in exchange for
personal property or with personal money shall be personal property only
if so declared by the family arbitrators. Therefore, a business or a trade
will be common property unless the trader owned the business before the
marriage, was given the business during the marriage, or bought it with
29. See Jauffret, supra note 26.
30. The commercial code of article 20 uses the words personal estate. Article 647 and
following use the words personal property. Nothing in either code suggests that the terms have
different meanings.
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personal property or money and obtained the required declaration from the
family arbitrators. With respect to a married person's debts, Article 659
states that the debts of a spouse may be recovered from the personal
property of the spouse and from the common property of the couple.
Note, however, that Article 19 of the Commercial Code also makes the
personal property of the non-trading spouse, as well as the couple's
common property and the trader's personal property, liable for the debts of
a trader.
In the interest of protecting the family, every spouse who is
married to a trader should object and enter the objection in the commercial
register pursuant to Article 17(2) of the Commercial Code. Article 20 of
the Commercial Code makes entry of the objection the sole requirement
for protecting the common property of the couple from the debts of the
business by limiting recovery to the trader's personal estate. If asked
pursuant to Article 18, the family arbitrators should, for the reasons
discussed above, sustain the objection as a matter of course. This will not
deter the trader from continuing his or her trade, as the objection (and the
arbitrator's decision, if any, to sustain it) will be pursuant to a well
thought-out plan to protect the common property of the trader and his or
her spouse and the personal property of the spouse. It is only by following
this procedure that a married trader who is a sole proprietor creates a
form of limited liability from the debts of the business. As a result of this
procedure, the common property of the trader and his or her spouse and
the personal property of the spouse are protected from the liabilities of the
business. The rules established by Article 659(1) of the Civil Code, which
makes the common property of a couple liable for the debts of each
spouse, and by Article 19 of the Commercial Code, which makes the
common property of the couple and the personal property of each liable for
the debts of the trading spouse, are overcome by the procedure set forth in
the Commercial Code with respect to the debts of the business of a trader
whose spouse has objected to the trade and entered the objection in the
commercial register (and whose objection was sustained by the family
arbitrators as in the best interest of the family).
A. Limited Liability of General Partners
At least two, and probably three, persons drafted book II of the
Commercial Code, governing business organizations.'
The provisions
relating to ordinary partnerships were originally in the Civil Code. They
were transferred to the Commercial Code without careful thought about

31.

Winship, supra note 13, at v.
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how they would affect the other provisions of the Commercial Code
governing partnerships. Some general rules governing partnerships appear
to have been omitted from the draft, which was enacted despite the
omission." A result is that there'are unfortunate gaps in the Commercial
Code, and, as we shall see, several inconsistent provisions.
Article 215(2) is in the title of the Commercial Code (Title I of
Book II) which sets forth general provisions which theoretically relate to
all business organizations.3 3 Article 215(2) provides that any provision
relieving one or more partners of his or her share in the losses of the
partnership shall be of no effect. This general provision is contradicted in
every title dealing with a specific kind of partnership. Title II, governing
ordinary partnerships,3' Title III, governing joint ventures 35 Title IV,
governing general partnerships, 6 and Title V, governing limited
partnerships,3'7 all contain rules permitting a partnership to create exceptions
to Article 215(2). The usual rule of statutory interpretation is that the
specific provision overrules the general provision. 38 Therefore, the rule set
forth in Article 215(2) does not necessarily affect any of the partnerships
recognized by the Commercial Code. The specific provisions governing
each form of partnership authorize exceptions to the rule.
No exemption from unlimited liability for a general partner is
automatically provided by the Commercial Code, except for non-managing
partners of a joint venture, who according to Article 276(2), have limited
liability unless it is taken from them by the partnership agreement. In
other partnerships, the Commercial Code only permits the partnership
agreement to provide the exemption. Thus, except for joint ventures, for a
general partner to enjoy a form of limited liability, there must be a
provision to that effect in the partnership agreement.

32. Id.
33. The commercial code of article 215(2) by its terms applies only to partnerships.
Article 210(1), however, states that a business organization is any association arising out of a
partnership agreement. Article 215 would, therefore, apply to any business organization as a
result of art. 210(1). The Commercial Code sometimes uses the words partner and partnership
in the technical sense of business organizations governed by art. 227-303 and sometimes uses
them in a general sense applicable even to shareholders and a company.
34. GAZETA, supra note 1, arts. 227-70.
35. Id. arts. 271 - 79.
36.

d. arts. 280 - 95.

.37. Id. arts. 296 - 03.

38. Generalia specialibus non derogant, General words do not derogate from special
words. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 684 (6th ed. 1990).
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B. Ordinary Partnerships
An ordinary partnership may not engage in any of the activities
listed in Article 5.11 Therefore, it is not commercial and may not engage in
a business as defined in Article 124. If it engages in these activities, it will
be deemed to be a general partnership.40 Because an ordinary partnership
may not engage in a trade, none of its partners would be engaged in a
trade. Therefore, the partners of an ordinary partnership, not being
traders, cannot use the procedure described above for traders in a sole
proprietorship to obtain limited liability. However, other avenues to forms
of limited liability are open to them.
The most obvious exception in an ordinary partnership to the
general partner's theoretically unlimited liability described in Article
215(2) is provided by Article 254. It states that a general partner who
contributes only skill to the partnership may share in the profits but not in
the losses of the partnership, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 215.
Therefore, a general partner who contributes only skill may, if the
partnership agreement so provides, incur no monetary losses, regardless of
the extent of the losses falling upon another partner. This complete
freedom from any liability is unique in economic activities in Ethiopia.
Even shareholders in a share company may lose their investment in their
shares. They have limited liability, not no liability. A partner in an
ordinary partnership who contributes only skill may have no liability.
Article 254 permits creative planning for a partnership to ensure
that no individual incurs personal liability. An ordinary partnership may
be formed with a private limited company or a share company as a general
partner. The company contributes all of the necessary cash to the ordinary
partnership. That cash will be all of the monetary capital of the
partnership. The individual partners contribute only their skill to the
partnership. The partnership agreement is drafted to give the individual
partners the right afforded by Article 254 to be free from any liability for
the losses of the partnership. The losses will fall only upon the general
partner. It is a private limited company or share company, of which by
definition the capital is limited.41 Thus, the only partner in the ordinary
partnership which has unlimited liability under the partnership law
provides limited liability to its shareholders under company law. So, if the
general partners, who contribute only their skill to the ordinary

39. GAZETA, supra note 1, art. 213(1).
40. Id. art. 213(2).
41. Id. art. 304(1) for share companies and commercial code article 510(1) for private
limited companies.
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partnership, contribute their money or property in kind to the company
(thus owning the company) which in turn contributes all the necessary
money or property in kind to the partnership, they have managed to limit
their exposure to the amount of their contribution to the company. The
company serves as a general partner and is the only general partner to
make a contribution to the ordinary partnership in money or kind.
In addition, Article 255 provides another potential form of
protection from unlimited liability to some of the general partners of an
ordinary partnership. Article 255(2) states that creditors may "claim
against the personal property of the partners Who (sic) shall, unless
otherwise agreed, be jointly and severally liable to them for the obligations
of the partnership. "42 The phrase unless otherwise agreed is somewhat
ambiguous. Agreed between or among whom? If the agreement is
between the creditors and the individual members of the partnership, it is
outside of partnership law. It would simply be an agreement in which
creditors, confident of the ability of the partnership to pay its debts, would
agree not to look to the personal assets of the partners for payment in the
event that the partnership did not pay its debts. Such an agreement would
be unusual; general partners would probably not seek it if they, too, were
confident of the ability of the partnership to pay its debts. Merely asking
for the agreement would excite the suspicions of creditors that the partners
had knowledge of unfavorable developments that the creditors did not
have.
Is it possible that the agreement referred to in Article 255(2) is the
partnership agreement itself? Yes. This conclusion is supported by Article
255(3), which states:
Any provision relieving the partners or some of them of
joint and several liability may not be set up against third
parties unless it is shown that such parties were aware of
such provision. Notwithstanding any provision to the
contrary, the partners who acted in the name of the
43
partnership shall always be jointly and severally liable.
"Any provision" appears to refer to the agreement mentioned in the
preceding sub-article, which would therefore be the partnership agreement.
In any event, sub-article (3) itself clearly permits the partnership agreement
of an ordinary partnership to provide protection from joint and several
liability to some of the partners. The only requirement is that the creditors
be aware of the protection. Any contract entered into by the partnership
42. Id. art. 255(2).

43. Id. art. 255(3).
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could simply state that fact, thus making the other party to the contract
aware of it. The provision of the second sentence of the sub-article does
not make it clear whether a partner who acted for the partnership in any
transaction is liable in all transactions or merely the ones in which he or
she acted. But it does make clear that a general partner, who is passive
and performs no activities (who is merely an investor in the ordinary
partnership) or who performs only internal functions (such as being the
accountant or office manager for the partnership), could be freed from
joint and several liability for the debts of the partnership by a clause in the
partnership agreement to that effect if creditors are made aware of the
clause. Any person drafting the partnership agreement of an ordinary
partnership should certainly try to achieve the broadest possible
interpretation of Article 255(3) and provide that no partner who has not
acted in the name of the partnership in a particular transaction shall be
jointly and severally liable for that transaction, regardless of the extent of
that partner's actions in other transactions.
C. Joint Ventures
Joint ventures are unique among partnerships because they do not
register in the commercial register.u Thus, the public is not put on notice
as to their existence and has no knowledge of the identities of the partners,
other than the managing partner. The manager is known and conducts the
activities of the joint venture in the manager's name.45 Article 276(2)
provides that partners who are not managers are liable only to the extent
set forth in the partnership agreement of the joint venture. Thus, such an
agreement may limit the liability of a non-managing joint venture partner
to the amount of his or her contribution. The agreement may even provide
that the manager undertakes to return all or part of the contribution. Thus,
the theory behind Article 215(2) plays no role in a joint venture. Unlike
the situation with respect to ordinary partnerships, it is not necessary that
the creditor be aware of the limitation of liability. This follows from the
fact that the creditor does not know of the existence of the joint venture or
of the non-managing partners. However, even if the creditor becomes
aware of the existence of the joint venture, Article 272(4) provides that the
joint venture will be treated as an actual partnership. As this paper shows,
general partners of actual partnerships may enjoy forms of limited liability
in certain circumstances.
Nothing would necessarily change when a
creditor became aware of the existence of the joint venture.

44. Id. art. 272(2).
45.

GAZETA, supra note 1, art. 276(1).
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Even the manager of a joint venture may achieve some limitation
of liability if the joint venture is engaged in a commercial activity and the
manager is married. If the joint venture is engaged in an activity listed in
Article 5, the managing partner conducting that activity is required to
register as a trader. If the manager is married, the procedure discussed
above in Limited Liability of Married Sole Proprietors Who Are Traders
with respect to traders who own sole proprietorships could be used by the
manager to protect common property by limiting liability to the manager's
personal property.
D. General Partnerships
A general partnership is very similar to an ordinary partnership. A
general partnership may engage in commercial or non-commercial
activities, or both." If it engages in commercial activities, Article 280(2)
requires each general partner to register as a trader. If the partner is
married, he may avail himself or herself of the protection afforded by
Article 20 so long as his or her spouse objects to the trade and enters the
objection in the commercial register. The general partner, registered as a
trader, would follow the same procedure described above in Limited
Liability of Married Sole Proprietors Who Are Traders for a sole
proprietor engaged in a trade.
In addition to the protection from unlimited liability which may be
available to a married general partner who is a trader, the law of general
partnerships also provides a small amount of protection. Article 280(1)
states, "A general partnership consists of partners who are
personally, jointly, severally and fully liable as between themselves

and to the partnership for the partnership firm's undertakings. Any
provision to the contrary in the partnership agreement shall be of no
effect with regard to third parties.",'
While the first sentence of Article 290(1) is completely
unequivocal, the second sentence serves no purpose except to modify the
first. The phrase in the second sentence, "with regard to third parties"
only serves to emphasize that the provision may have effect among the
partners. This article obviously provides much less protection to general
partners of a general partnership then Articles 254 and 255 do to general
partners of ordinary partnerships. However, to the extent that one or more
partners is willing and able to protect fellow partners, a partnership
agreement may provide limited liability to one or more partners. The
46. Id. art. 213.
47. GAZETA, supra note 1, art. 280(1).
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limitation is not binding upon third parties, but it does permit a partner to
proceed against another partner to recover any amounts he or she was
required to pay to a third person.
Therefore, it is in general partnerships that the theory of unlimited
liability embodied in Article 215(2) finds its greatest expression.
However, even here, there may be exceptions set forth in the partnership
agreement or available to married traders under Article 20 of the
Commercial Code.
E. Limited Partnerships
Article 296 states unambiguously that limited partners in a limited
partnership are liable only to the extent of their contributions. In this
regard, a limited partner is like a shareholder in a company. Thus, Article
215(2) has no effect upon limited partners, who, by their very definition,
have limited liability.
However, the limited partner may lose that limited liability. Article
301(3) provides that a limited partner who acts as a manager of the limited
partnership acquires full, joint and several liability for any liabilities
arising out of his activities as a manager. Sub-articles 4, 5 and 6 contain a
list of things which a limited partner may do without being deemed to act
as a manager. The permitted activities are primarily internal activities,
such as consulting other partners, giving advice or checking the books of
the partnership. Nonetheless, a limited partner may be an employee (but
not a manager) of the partnership.
The liability of a general partner in a limited partnership is the
same as that of a general partner in a general partnership. Nonetheless, it
is easy to structure a limited partnership so that no individual has unlimited
liability for the debts of the partnership. The general partner can be a
share company or a private limited company; the individual partners
should all be limited partners. Under partnership law, the company which
is the general partner will have unlimited liability for the debts of the
limited partnership. However, because it is a company, its shareholders,
who may be the limited partners, will have limited liability for the debts of
the company (with the exceptions described in the next section of this
paper). This is the same situation described in more detail above, under
Ordinary Partnerships. Thus, if the owners of a business desire to have a
partnership, the limited partnership offers the greatest protection against
unlimited liability.
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POTENTIAL UNLIMITED LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDERS

A. Share Companies
Ethiopian share companies afford their shareholders protection
from unlimited liability for the debts of the company. Limited liability
does not, however, mean no liability." A shareholder may always lose the
amount he or she has invested in the share company. The loss may occur
when the company is dissolved if the assets of the company are insufficient
to pay its debts and return the shareholder's invested capital. The loss may
also occur before the dissolution of the company if the shareholder sells his

or her shares for less than their purchase price.
Article 347 of the Commercial Code states that directors of a share
company must be members, or shareholders, of the company. Several
articles of the Code impose liability upon directors to the company, its
shareholders and third persons.49 The liability is for the acts or negligence
of the directors. Thus, at least some of the shareholders of a share
company must expose themselves to unlimited liability for their actions as
directors.
In addition to liability for their actions as directors, because of the
standard of conduct established by the Commercial Code and the burden of
proving conformity with the Code's requirements, directors may be
personally liable for the debts of the share company itself. Article 366(1)
states, "Directors shall be liable to the company's creditors where they fail
to preserve intact the company's assets."5 Article 366 establishes no
standard by which to judge the actions or failures of the directors. Article
364, which governs the liability of directors to the share company itself,
establishes a standard. The directors are responsible for showing that they
exercised due care and diligence. This appears to be a high standard of
conduct, as it should be. Must the same high standard be applied to the
failure of the directors to maintain the company's assets intact?

What

defenses are available to the shareholder-directors if any part of the assets
of the company is lost? Any losses of a company will, if great enough or
for a prolonged period, imperil the assets. Are directors expected to
recommend to the shareholders that the company be dissolved at the first
hint that losses will cause the assets to be inadequate to pay creditors? The
imposition of personal liability under Article 366 (1) may have that effect.
48. Only a general partner in an ordinary partnership who contributed only skill may have
no liability under Ethiopian law. See supra beginning at note 39.
49.

GAZETA, supra note 1, arts. 364 - 67.

50. Id. art. 366(1).
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In other articles of the Code, the frame of reference is the capital of the
company. Articles 487 through 490 deal with a reduction of capital as a
result of losses. The capital of a company will usually be less than the
assets of the company. So failure to keep intact the assets of a company
may occur well before the losses are sufficient to require a reduction of
capital. Article 366(1) could be interpreted to create liability for directors
even if the losses do not impair the capital of the company.
On the other hand, failure to preserve implies the ability to
determine the outcome of actions which caused the loss. Directors would
not be liable if the assets were not preserved because of something over
which they had no control. Thus, if a government confiscated the assets
and did not pay for them, or the assets where destroyed in an uninsurable
accident, such as an earthquake, for which insurance is generally
unobtainable in areas where earthquakes are common, there is no failure
on the part of the directors. In addition, many other losses in the ordinary
course of business may be beyond the control of directors and not a result
of their failure.
Unlimited liability for directors because of a company's loss of its
assets will probably not affect all shareholders of a share company,
especially if it has a large number of shareholders. But it may affect those
shareholders who are also directors, simply because directors must be
shareholders.
B. PrivateLimited Companies
Shareholders of a share company confront unlimited liability only in their
role as directors. Shareholders of a private limited may have unlimited
liability in their capacity as shareholders.
Article 519 deals with the consequences of a contribution in kind to
a private limited company.'
Unlike the elaborate procedures set forth in
Article 315 for determining the value of a contribution in kind to a share
company, Article 519 requires the members of a private limited company
to determine the method of valuation and the value of the contribution.2
Article 519(3) imposes joint and several liability to third persons for the
valuation fixed in accordance with the method determined by the
shareholders.' Article 519(4) imposes joint and several liability upon all
members for any overvaluation of the contribution, even if they were

51.

Id. art. 519.

52. Id.
53. Id. art. 519(3).
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unaware of the overvaluation.1 The liability of Article 519(4) seems to be
strict liability. The article states no defenses to a claim, such as the
reasonableness of the method of valuation or possible fraud by the person
making the contribution. The good faith of the innocent member cannot be
a defense." Article 519 is a serious impediment to the contribution of
property to a private limited company. The members who do not make a
contribution in kind would want to have an agreement with each person
who makes a contribution in kind to reimburse those members against any
losses incurred as a result of an overvaluation of the property.
In addition to Article 519, the law governing private limited
companies creates unlimited liability in another situation." Unlike a share
company, a private limited company does not have a board of directors or
managers chosen by the board. A private limited company is managed by
its shareholders or some of them, like a partnership. Article 531 deals
with the liability of these shareholder-managers when the private limited
company is in bankruptcy proceedings and the assets are insufficient to pay
the creditors. 5 Article 531(1) states that the bankruptcy court may order
the managers or the shareholders or some of them to pay all or part of the
debts of the private limited company. 8 The article is not a model of
clarity. Sub-article (1) permits a bankruptcy court to order members, as
well as managers, to pay the company's debts. Sub-article (2) says that
such an order may not be entered against members who have not acted as
managers, nor where the managers and members"9 show that they have
acted with due care and diligence. What is clear is that the burden of
proving due care and diligence is upon those manager-shareholders who
wish to escape from unlimited liability for the debts of the bankrupt
company. What is not clear is the extent to which a shareholder who is not
a manager may escape from unlimited liability merely because he or she
was a member who was not also a manager. The first clause of Article
531(2) says that an order to pay the company's debts will not be made in
respect of members who did not act as managers. The second clause says
54. Id. art. 519(4).
55. The drafter of article 519(4) said, "[tihe rules governing contributions in kind are
unusually severe ....
In this form of company, all the members should be sufficiently interested
in the running of the company's business not to be able to hide behind ignorance, which would
be a culpable form of negligence." (Emphasis in the original.) Jean Escarra, Expose des Motifs:
Book II (Comm. C.Doc. No.9B) (9 October/November 1954), 57, 69, Doc. No. 20 in Winship,
supra note 13.
56.

GAZETA, supra note 1, art. 519.

57. Id. art. 531.
58. Id. art. 531(1).
59.

GAZETA, supra note 1, art. 531.
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that such an order will not be made against members who show that they
acted with due care and diligence. Why are members mentioned at all in
either sub-article of Article 531 if only managers may be required to pay?
Article 531 is a muddle.
Article 531 speaks of liabilities in a bankruptcy situation. One
cannot, however, dismiss that as a reference merely to the worst-case
situation. Unlimited liability for the debts of any business arises only in
the worst situation. If the business of a sole proprietor or business
organization can its pay debts in the ordinary course as they become due,
the owner of the business will never be asked to pay them from her or his
personal assets. It is only when the business is in trouble that creditors
look to the owners. So it is only in the extreme situation that the issue of
unlimited liability ever arises.
V.

A PROPOSAL FOR LIMITED LIABILITY FOR ALL SOLE
PROPRIETORS
The search for unlimited liability in the Commercial Code of
Ethiopia shows that unlimited liability may be found is some
circumstances. If two or more persons wish to form a private limited
company, they may achieve a high, but not the highest, measure of limited
liability. The highest measure of limited liability is reserved for five
persons, who form a share company. These two forms of company also
have different minimum capital requirements - Birr 15,000 for a private
limited company," and Birr 50,000 for a share company.6
The option of forming a company that exists for two or five
persons does not exist for one person. A sole proprietor, especially one
who is not married or who engages in an economic activity which is not a
trade, has no protection from unlimited liability. It does not matter how
much money he is willing to invest in a company - he must nonetheless
find one or four additional shareholders. These additional shareholders
may be dummies who have absolutely no interest in the company, but
Ethiopian law requires that they be shown as shareholders.6
If no
60. Id. art. 306(l). In June 1997, there were Birr 6.7 to the United States dollar.
61. Id. art. 512(1).
62. Take Birr 50,000, the minimum capital for a share company, and divide it by Birr 10,
the minimum par value per share, and the result is 5,000 shares. Give one share each to four
people and take the other 4,996 shares for yourself. Or, take Birr 15,000, the minimum capital
for a private limited company, and divide it by Birr 10 par value, the minimum value per share,
and the result is 1,500 shares. Give one share to one person and keep 1,499 shares for yourself.
In each case, you have created a legitimate company in which only one person has any practical
interest. This is perfectly legal and fully satisfies the requirements of the Commercial Code.
These examples also go to show how absurd the requirement for a minimum number of
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shareholder in a share company is personally liable for the debts of the
company, why does it matter whether the share company has a million
shareholders, five shareholders or one shareholder? In no event will the
shareholders or shareholder be required to contribute an additional cent to
the company.
No additional protection for creditors is gained by
establishing a minimum number of shareholders. Protection for creditors
is based primarily upon the capital of the company and whether it is
operated profitably. Both of those criteria are unrelated to the number of
shareholders.
The requirement for a minimum number of shareholders is simply
history. 3 The first statutes permitting the formation of companies required
a minimum number of incorporators or founders and a minimum number
of shareholders. No reasonable justification exists for either requirement
today. These formal requirements are so easily complied with when the
reality of the company is different that the requirements merely encourage
disrespect for the law. If a person may so easily evade this requirement,
why not evade other requirements which are inconvenient?
If the
minimum shareholder requirements served any purpose, such as making
more capital available or making more people liable for the debts of the
company, they could be justified. But they do not serve either those
purposes or any other.
How should Ethiopia amend its Commercial Code to permit a
company to be owned by one person? The worst way would be to create a
shareholders actually is. It is the capital of a company which is contributed, not the number of
contributors, which creates a company.
63. The weight of tradition bears very heavily on legal institutions. Tradition places
special obstacles in the way of acceptance of new concepts, even though, when considered
without prejudice, they appear to be obvious and valuable means of achieving useful ends. The
view that only concepts that have been bequeathed to us by past generations are authoritative and
inviolate leads us to operate with old institutions, even when their structure and objects must be
distorted, rather than consider impartially the adoption of new formulae.
An outstanding example of this phenomenon seems to occur in the use of the principle
of limited liability to facilitate the participation of individuals in commercial enterprises. All the
traditional forms of company enable the participants' own assets to be free of claims for the debts
of the company beyond the amount the participants initially paid, subscribed, and committed
themselves to pay. Yet, this benefit of limited liability, which seems so natural even when one is
thinking of a company that may have as few as two members, is today apparently quite
unthinkable if the company has only a single member.
If, in a perfectly ordinary joint-stock company having perhaps the paltry minimum
capital required by Italian law of one million lire, A and B limit their liability to one-half eachor A to 999,990 lire and B to 100 lire - all is in order; but it is otherwise if a multimillionaire
wishes to limit his involvement in the fortunes of a business he wishes to start to some 100
million lire.
Mario Rotondi, Limited Liability of the Individual Trader: One-Man Company or
Commercial Foundation?,48 TUL. L. REv. 989 (1974).
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new kind of entity, thereby increasing the complexity of the Commercial
Code and creating a need for conversion of the one-person company into
another kind of company if more investors bought shares. 64 A better
solution would be to repeal those sections of the share company law and
the private limited company law which impose minimum shareholder
requirements. This would permit a sole shareholder to choose whichever
kind of company he or she wished to form. It would not be necessary to
change the minimum capital requirements, the management structures or
any other provisions governing companies. It would only be necessary to
amend the articles which contain references to a minimum number of
shareholders.
The best solution to creating one-shareholder companies would be
to amend the Commercial Code to permit truly one-person companies. All
articles dealing with shareholders, directors and managers could be revised
to provide that in the case of a company with one shareholder, there need
be no shareholders meeting, only signed resolutions; only one director, and
no meetings, only signed resolutions; etc. This would entail a great deal of
work. If that amount of work were to be done, all of Book II should be
revised to make it more modern and less complex, not just those articles
which would permit a one-person company.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Commercial Code of Ethiopia deals with the issue of unlimited
or limited liability of investors in businesses in a variety of ways. Sole
proprietors and general partners of partnerships usually have unlimited,
joint and several liability for the debts of the partnership. But exceptions
exist to this unlimited liability. These exceptions exist in surprising places,
including traders who are married and some general partners of
partnerships. Shareholders of companies usually have limited liability for
the debts of the company. But exceptions exist to this limited liability; the
most serious exceptions are in the law of private limited companies.
Because of the potential unlimited liability of managers in a private limited
company and the unclear status of other shareholders in those companies,
the share company provides the best protection to investors against
unlimited liability. Perhaps the only disadvantage of a share company is
the requirement that it have at least five shareholders and a minimum
64. That is the French solution. In 1985, the French created a new entity, the entreprise
unipersonnelle a responsabiliteliraitee,
to permit a form of limited company to be organized and
owned by one person.
(2d ed. 1992).

JEAN-PIERRE LE GALL & PAUL MOREL, FRENCH COMPANY LAW 61
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shareholders' capitalization of Birr 50,000.61 Any person who wants to
start a firm or to invest in one and who is concerned about personal
liability will form or invest in a share company. It offers the best
protection against unlimited liability of any arrangement created by the
Commercial Code. That protection should be extended to one owner of a
company instead of limiting it to a company with five owners.

65. See supra for examples of how easy compliance with the requirement for the number
of shareholders is overcome. With respect to capital, art. 312(1)(b) permits a shareholder to pay
only one-quarter of the price of the shares and art. 338(2) permits the remaining three-quarters of
the price to be paid over five years. Therefore, a share company may be formed with only Birr
12,500 (one-quarter of the minimum of Birr 50,000) in cash. By contrast, the shareholders of a
private limited company must pay the entire minimum contribution of Birr 15,000 before the
company is registered. Thus it takes less cash to form a share company than it does to form a
private limited company.
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I.

INTRODUCCI6N

El punto de vista convencional de aquellos que conocen las leyes
sobre la responsabilidad personal de los propietarios de un negocio es que
*
Profesor Asistente y Catedrdtico Fullbright (1997-1998), Facultad de Derecho,
Universidad de Addis Abeba, en Addis Abeba, Etiopia. Fui abogado en Nueva York y Honolulu
durante casi treinta afios antes de empezar a ensefiar en Etiopfa en 1995.
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propietarios finicos y socios generales (sociedades personalistas) siempre
tienen responsabilidad ilimitada por las deudas de su negocio. Por otro lado,
los accionistas de las sociedades de capital disfrutan de responsabilidad
limitada por esas deudas. Sin embargo, un anilisis detallado del C6digo de
Comercio etiope de 1960 demuestra que algunos propietarios (Inicos y
algunos socios generales pueden disfrutar de responsabilidad limitada por
las deudas de sus negocios. De igual manera, los accionistas de sociedades
de capital (an6nimas o de responsabilidad limitadas) pueden perder su
responsabilidad limitada de manera inesperada y cuando los accionistas en
sociedades participes3 sirven como administradores, tambi~n pueden perder
su responsabilidad limitada. Antes de considerar estas conclusiones, es (itil
proveer alguna informaci6n sobre Etiopia.

A.

Ubicaci6n; GobiernosAnteriores
Etiopia esti ubicada en el Cuerno de Africa, el extremo oriental de
Africa. Sus vecinos son Kenya en el sur, Sudin en el occidente, Eritrea
(una antigua provincia de Etiopia, independiente leyes desde 1991 y de
derecho desde 1993) en el norte y oriente, y Djibouti y Somalia en el
oriente. Etiopia es el finico pais de Africa, fuera de Liberia, que mantuvo
su independencia durante la colonizaci6n.
De hecho, extendi6 sus
fronteras tradicionales conquistando a muchas tribus al Oriente, sur, y
occidente del territorio de Abisinia. Italia atac6 a Etiopia en 1936, condujo
al Emperador Haile Selassie I al exilio y ocup6 al pais hasta que los
Britinicos la expulsaron en 1941. Haile Selassie regres6 en 1941 y retuvo
el poder hasta que un golpe en 1974 le oblig6 a abdicar. Una dictadura
militar comunista Ilamada el Derg gobem6 al pais de 1974 a 1991.
B. Gobierno Actual
Un partido de antiguos comunistas controla el gobierno actual de
Etiopfa. Adquiri6 el poder en 1991 cuando triunf6 tras una prolongada
guerra civil contra el Derg. Despu6s de un gobierno de transici6n, se
decret6 una nueva Constituci6n en 1994 y se convocaron elecciones en la
primavera de 1995 aunque los principales partidos de oposici6n las
1.
NEGARIT GAZETA, COMMERCIAL CODE OF THE EMPIRE OF ETHIOPIA (Proclamation
No. 166 of 1960). En terminologfa legal etfope proclamaci6n simplemente significa una ley o
estatuto. La Negarit Gazeta era la gaceta oficial del gobierno para publicar leyes, reglamentos y
avisos oficiales, los cuales no entran en vigor hasta que se publican. Se public6 de 1941 hasta
agosto de 1995 cuando fue reemplazado por la Federal Negarit Gazeta.
2. Una sociedad limitada privada es algo comparable a una sociedad americana cuyos
dirigentes son los propietarios de todas las acciones.
3. Una sociedad participe es comparable a una sociedad americana de capital.
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boicotearon. La nueva Constituci6n entr6 en vigor y el gobierno ocup6 su
nueva posici6n en agosto de 1995.4 A su favor, el gobierno actual ha
asegurado muchas cosas sobre la creaci6n de una sociedad democritica y
una economia de libre comercio. En la prdctica, ha llevado a cabo menos
politicas y pricticas que las necesarias para que una sociedad democritica
y una economfa de libre comercio sea una realidad. La ideologia del
gobierno que exige que 6ste sea el duefio de toda la tierral y los servicios
pfiblicos, y que s6lo admite la inversi6n de etiopes o residentes6 en muchas
Areas, es un grave impedimento a la creaci6n de condiciones econ6micas
que sacarian a Etiopia de la pobreza. Mientras el gobierno federal habla
acerca de la transici6n de una economfa comunista a una econornia de
mercado, atin no se ha producido tal transici6n. La economia no es de
mercado, mucho menos una economia de libre comercio. Existen pocos
indicios de que el gobierno este dispuesto a ceder el control que tiene para
permitir a empresarios y a otros la creaci6n de una economia de libre
comercio.
C. Constituci6n
La Constituci6n de 1994 establece un sistema federal compuesto de
un gobierno nacional y nueve estados., La Constituci6n le concede al
gobierno federal todos los asuntos que son relacionados con el C6digo de
Comercio.' La capital es Addis Abeba; su administraci6n rinde cuentas al
gobiemo federal. 9 La lIfnea divisoria entre la autoridad federal y estatal no
esti claramente def'mida en la Constituci6n de 1994 como tambien no lo
estA en el sistema federal americano. Un Area en la cual esto causa
dificultades a todos los negocios es en el acceso a tierra. Aunque el
"Estado y el Publico de Etiopfa" son los duefios de toda la tierra,'0 son los
estados los que conceden los contratos de arrendamiento. Existe extensa
evidencia de que los estados y la ciudad de Addis Abeba estdn utilizando el
hecho de que son duefios de la tierra para acosar a los empresarios y los

4.

ETH. CONST. 1st Year, No. 1, (1995).

5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. art. 40.3.
Investment Proclamation,25 FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, arts. 5-7, 181-184 (1996).
ETH. CONST. art. 47.1.
Id. art. 55.4.

9. Id. art. 49.3.
10. Id. art. 40.3 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).
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granjeros, de tal manera que frecuentemente los desalojan sin basarse en la
ley o en los contratos de arrendamiento."
D. C6digos
Etiopia adopt6 un C6digo Civil y un C6digo de Comercio en
1960.12 Profesores franceses redactaron ambos c6digos e incorporaron
muchos conceptos de la ley civil que eran modernos en aquel entonces."
Aunque el C6digo Civil expresamente derog6 todas las reglas escritas o
4
tradicionales en vigor con respecto a asuntos tratados en el C6digo,1
especificamente mantuvo algunas instituciones indigenas tradicionales."
No se conservaron instituci6nes indigenas especificamente en el C6digo de
6
Comercio.
El C6digo Civil y el C6digo de Comercio no penetraron
profundamente en la sociedad etiope durante el reinado del Emperador
Haile Selassie 1.17 Aunque el Derg no derog6 ni enmend6 ninguno de los
c6digos, una ley que nacionaliz6 casi toda la propiedad en Etiopia'8 hizo
que las disposiciones del C6digo de Comercio con respecto a
organizaciones de negocio resultasen ineficaces.

II.

NEGOCIOS, TRAFICO MERCANTIL Y COMERCIANTES
El C6digo de Comercio Etiope diferencia entre aquellas actividades
econ6micas designadas como comerciales, de trdfico mercantil o de
negocio (todas las cuales significan lo mismo) y aquellas que no lo son. El
Articulo 124 def'me un negocio como un activo inmaterial organizado a fln
11. B. Yosef, Government Measures Against Businessmen Called Illegal, ADDIS TRIBUNE
(Addis Ababa), June 6, 1997, a 1; Backward to De-kulakization or Forward to Farmers
Prosperity?THE MONITOR (Addis Ababa), Apr. 10, 1997, a 3.
12. GAZETA, supra nota 1; Proclamation 165/2.
13. Jean Escarra, Expose des Motifs: General Part (Comm. C. Doc. No. 2) (April 13,
1954) en BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS OF THE ETHIOPIAN COMMERCIAL CODE OF 1960 30, Doc.
No. 7 (Peter Winship ed. & trans., 1974) [m:s adelante Winship]; Jean Escarra, Expose des
Motifs: Commercial Register (Comm. C. Doc. No. 6B) (May 31, 1954), a 46, Doc. No. 16.
14. GAzETA, supra nota 1, art. 3347.
15. See, e.g., id. arts. 722-33, 241-60.
16. Aunque no se retuvieron instituciones de leyes tradicionales en el C6digo de Comercio
de Etiopia, en la pr~ctica, instituciones tradicionales como las sociedades tradicionales de
comerciantes en Addis Abeba han perdurado. Paul McCarthy, "De Facto" and Customary
Partnershipsin EthiopianLaw, 5 J. ETH. L. 05 (1968).
17. John Henry Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and
the Common Law, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 357 (1981), en JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET. AL., THE
CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA AND EAST ASIA a 22 (1994).
18. Government Ownership and Control of the Means of Production Proclamation
No.26/1975, NEGARrr GAZETA, 34th Year, No. 22, Mar. 11, 1975.
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de lievar a cabo cualquiera de las actividades que se especifican en el
Articulo 5. El Articulo 5 estd compuesto de 21 clusulas, cada una de las
cuales nombra una o mis actividades consideradas como trdfico mercantil;
es decir, actividades que comerciantes lievan a cabo profesionalmente y
por dnimo de lucro.' 9 El Artfculo 5, de acuerdo a sus tfrminos, excluye la
19. GAZETA, supra nota 1, a art. 5. Persons to be regarded as traders, declara:
Se considerarin comerciantes las personas que Ileven a cabo profesionalmente y por
nimo de lucro cualquiera de las siguientes actividades:
(1) Compra de muebles y inmuebles con la idea de revenderlos en la condici6n que
est~n o despu~s de su alteraci6n o adaptaci6n;
(2) Compra de muebles con la idea de arrendarlos;
(3) Actividades de almacenaje como se defmen en el art. 2806 del C6digo Civil;
(4) Explotaci6n de minas, incluyendo la prospecci6n y el refinamiento de aceites
minerales;
(5) Explotaci6n de canteras por aquellos que no son artesanos;
(6) Explotaci6n de salinas;
(7) Transformaci6n y adaptaci6n de bienes muebles como comestibles, materia prima
o productos parcialmente terminados por aquellos que no son artesanos;
(8) Construcci6n, reparaci6n, mantenimiento, limpieza, pintura y tintura de muebles
por aquellos que no son artesanos;
(9) Limitaci6n con terraplenes, nivelaci6n, construcci6n de trincheras o drenaje
Ilevado a cabo para terceros por aquellos que no son artesanos;
(10) Transporte de bienes por aquellos que no son artesanos;
(11) Impresi6n y grabado y trabajos relacionados con ia fotografla o la cinematografia
por aquellos que no son artesanos;
(12) Captaci6n, distribuci6n y provisi6n de agua;
(13) Producci6n, distribuci6n y provisi6n de electricidad, gas o aire comprimido
incluyendo calefacci6n y aire acondicionado;

(14) Explotaci6n de lugares de diversi6n o estaciones de radio o televisi6n;
(15) Explotaci6n de hoteles, restaurantes, bares, cafes, posadas o peluquerias por
aquellos que no son artesanos y baftos piiblicos;
(16) Cualquier clase de edici6n particularmente imprimida, grabada, en fotos o
grabada en disco;
(17) Explotaci6n de noticias y servicios de informaci6n;
(18) Explotaci6n de agencias de viaje y publicidad;
(19) Operaci6n de un negocio como un agente, corredor, corredor de bolsa o agente
comercial;
(20) Operaci6n de un negocio de la banca y cambio de moneda;
(21) Operaci6n de un negocio de seguros;
El artfculo 5 estA limitado por los artfculos 6,-7, 8 y 9 que exencionan actividades agricolas
y de silvicultura y las actividades de pescadores y definen la condici6n de artesanos. La
enumeraci6n [en el art. 5] deberA ser limitativa. [Alfred Jauffret, General Report: Book 1, (1
March 1958) 50, Doc. No. 18 en Winship, supra, nota 13]. Por consiguiente, cualquier
actividad que no est6 relacionada en el artfculo 5 no es un oficio, los que la ejercen no son
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definici6n de comerciante aquellas personas que lleven a cabo esta
actividad como un pasatiempo. Por consiguiente, un fot6grafo, a pesar de
su talento o habilidad, no es un comerciante si no hace fotografias por
dnimno de lucro. De igual manera, un editor que no espera realizar
ganancia, como por ejemplo, la prensa de un colegio o universidad, no se
considerari una entidad comercial porque la actividad no se lleva a cabo
con inimo de lucro sino por otro fin como por ejemplo, la divulgaci6n de
conociniento.
Las profesiones tradicionales de medicina, derecho, arquitectura y
educaci6n no se mencionan en el Artfculo 5 ni las profesiones mis
modernas de contabilidad, asesoria, ingenieria, disefio, moda,
programaci6n de computadores, prestaci6n de servicios para negocios,
como por ejemplo, facsimile y correo electr6nico, servicios de manejo de
oficina y de secretaria, etc. Las personas que Ilevan a cabo estas
actividades a nivel profesional y por inino de lucro, no se consideran
comerciantes porque sus actividades no figuran en el Articulo 5. De igual
manera, ciertas personas que son artesanos tampoco se consideran
comerciantes aunque Ileven a cabo actividades consideradas oficios. Por
consigpiente, el C6digo de Comercio no considera las actividades
econ6micas de algunos profesionales y artesanos negocios. Evitan los
requisitos de registro2O y mantenimiento de archivos impuestos por el

C6digo .21
Lo espuesto con respecto a propiedades unipersonales estA
restringido a aquellos cuyos propietarios son ciertas personas.
S61o
concierne a personas que ileven a cabo un negocio; es decir, una de las
actividades descritas en el Articulo 5 y que sean casados. Los titulares
tinicos de actividades que no se nombran en el Articulo 5 y que, por
consiguiente, no llevan a cabo un oficio o que no estAn casados, no pueden
valerse de la protecci6n de responsabilidad limitada proporcionada por el
C6digo de Comercio.

comerciantes y no se considera un negocio bajo el art. 124 del C6digo de Comercio. Los
artesanos se definen en el art. 9 (2)-(3) como:
(2) Artesanos son personas que Ilevan a cabo una actividad independiente
principalmente gardndose la vida de su propia mano de obra, que pueden Ilevar a cabo
su actividad con ia ayuda de miembros de su familia, que no tienen mAs de tres
empleados o aprendices y que compran material s61o en la medida necesaria para
Ilevar a cabo sus actividades sin crear acciones.
(3) Artesanos pueden usar fuerza mecdnica.
20. Id. arts. 86-123.
21. Id. arts. 63-85.
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III. RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA DE EMPRESARIOS INDIVIDUALES
CASADOS QUE SON COMERCIANTES

Una actividad econ6mica que se lleve a cabo con inimo de lucro y
que sea propiedad de una persona es una propiedad unipersonal.2 Si hay
dos o mis duefios de una actividad econ6mica (ya sea un oficio o no), los
duefios deben crear una de las organizaciones de negocio descritas en los
Articulos 210 a 560 del C6digo de Comercio.Y Los Articulos 16, 17, 18,

19, 20 y 21' del C6digo de Comercio se refieren a la propiedad de una
22. Si el negocio u oficio se lieva a cabo por una persona casada, puede considerarse
propiedad conuin bajo el articulo 653(1) del C6digo Civil. En este caso, es de hecho la
propiedad de dos personas, los c6nyuges. Sin embargo, el C6digo de Comercio la trata como si
s6lo fuera propiedad del comerciante. El articulo 105 que habla sobre la inscripci6n del
comerciante, exige que un comerciante declare si se ha celebrado un contrato matrimonial, pero
no exige el nombre ni ninguna informaci6n acerca del c6nyuge del comerciante. Se debe tomar
en cuenta que la terminologfa legal id6ntica en ingles puede significar diferentes cosas en
diferentes sistemas legales. La propiedad que se llama propiedad cormdn en el C6digo Civil
etiope se llama propiedad en comunidad en aquellos estados americanos que reconocen esa clase
de r6gimen economico matrimonial. En Etiopfa, la propiedad de un solo c6nyuge se llama
propiedad personal. En los estados americanos donde existe el concepto de propiedad en
comunidad, lapropiedad de un solo c6nyuge se llama propiedadseparada. El t6rmino propiedad
personal es elt6rmino utilizado en todos los estados americanos menos Louisiana a ia propiedad
que los c6digos civiles de Etiopfa y Louisiana laman propiedadmovible.
23. El c6digo Commercial declara, en parte:
"(1) Existen seis clases de organizaciones de negocio bajo este C6digo:
(a) sociedad civil;
(b) empresa conjunta (joint venture);
(c) sociedad regular colectiva;
(d) sociedad limitada;
(e) sociedad an6nime;
(f)sociedad limitada privada."
24. Art. 16. - Las personas casadas pueden ejercer un oficio.
Cualquier persona casada puede ejercer un oficio como si no estuviera casado a menos
que su c6nyuge se oponga a ello como se dispone en el art. 654 del C6digo Civil.
Art. 17. - Notificaci6n de laobjeci6n.
(1) Entre c6nyuges, la objeci6n del art. 16 se puede notificar al c6nyuge comerciante

de cualquier forma.
(2) La objeci6n del art. 16 no afectari a terceros de acuerdo con el art. 121 de este
C6digo, a menos que se haya hecho una anotaci6n de esta objeci6n en el registro
comercial.

Art. 18. - Desestimaci6n de laobjeci6n
(1) Cuando el c6nyuge comerciante considera que laobjeci6n no estA justificada,
teniendo en cuenta los intereses de lafamilia, puede solicitar a los frbitros de familia

desestimaci6n de laobjeci6n.
(2) Cuando los drbitros desestiman laobjeci6n, se har- una anotaci6n de esto en el

registro comercial.
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sola persona que sea comerciante y que est6 casado. Un comerciante
casado puede obtener cierta responsabilidad limitada con una facilidad
extraordinaria. El Articulo 16 enuncia que una persona casada puede

ejercer un oficio como si no estuviera casada a menos que el c6nyuge se
oponga bajo el Articulo 645 del C6digo Civil. El c6nyuge que se opone
puede registrar la objeci6n en el registro comercial de acuerdo con el
Artfculo 17(2) del C6digo de Comercio. El Articulo 645 permite una
objeci6n a cualquier ocupaci6n "en beneficio del hogar." Esa frase no se
define y su contenido se deja a la discreci6n de los drbitros de familia que
deciden el fallo." Sin embargo, ni el Articulo 16, ni ningdin otro articulo
del C6digo de Comercio, ni ningtin articulo del C6digo Civil impone
restricciones al c6nyuge que insiste en continuar en el oficio a pesar de la
oposici6n de su c6nyuge.26 La dinica consecuencia de la objeci6n es el
requerimiento administrativo del Articulo 17 que se anote la objeci6n en el
registro comercial y se conceda el beneficio concedido por el Articulo 20.
El Articulo 20 del C6digo de Comercio estipula que cuando se haya
anotado la objeci6n en el registro comercial, las deudas contraidas por el
comerciante se pueden hacer efectivas solamente de la propiedad separada
del comerciante. Obviamente, la objeci6n no prohibe a un comerciante
Art. 19. - Deudas contraidas por el c6nyuge comerciante.
Las deudas contraidas por el c6nyuge comerciante se considerardn las deudas del
matrimonio dentro del significado del art. 659 del C6digo Civil y se podrdn hacer
efectivas sobre los bienes personales de cada c6nyuge y de la propiedad comfin.
Art. 20. - Efecto de la objeci6n.
Cuando se haya anotado una objeci6n bajo el art. 16 en el registro comercial, las
deudas contraidas por el c6nyuge comerciante s6lo responderdn de ellas sus bienes
personales.
Art. 21 - Cooperaci6n entre c6nyuges.
Cuando ambos c6nyuges ejerzan un oficio, ambos se considerardn comerciantes a
menos que se demuestre que uno es el empleado del otro.
GAZETA, supra nota 1, arts. 16-21.
25. Los Arbitros de familia son personas de edad u otros que obran de acuerdo con el art.
722-733 del C6digo Civil. Cada c6nyuge nombra dos Arbitros y estos cuatro irbitros usualmente
nombran una quinta persona como presidente. La meta de los rbitros de familia es decidir
asuntos tales como: si cierta propiedad es propiedad personal y no propiedad comtin; si la
objeci6n de un c6nyuge contra que el otro c6nyuge Ileve a cabo un negocio es valida; el divorcio;
la divisi6n de la propiedad comdin despu~s de una divorcio; etc. Los drbitros de familia no son
oficiales de la corte ni son nombrados por los tribunales pero sus decisiones son finales a menos
que se apele a los tribunales por la corrupci6n de los firbitros, fraude con respecto a terceros o lo
ilegal o manifiestamente irrazonable de la decisi6n.
26. Como se redact6 originalmente, si el comerciante continuara el oficio despu6s de la
objeci6n de su c6nyuge, seria motivo para divorcio. Alfred Jauffret, General Report: Book 1, (1
March 1958)(Excerpt) 51, 177 n.8, Doc. No. 18 en Winship, supra, nota 13 [mis adelante
Jauffret].
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continuar en el comercio o no habria raz6n para la limitaci6n impuesta por
el Articulo 20.27 El tinico resultado comercial del Articulo 20 es que el
comerciante puede pasar por mayor dificultad para obtener cr6dito que lo
que acostumbra porque la propiedad comdin del comerciante no estard
disponible para pagar las deudas del negocio.
Por consiguiente, se puede limitar la responsabilidad a la propiedad
personal para un negocio sencillamente con la presentaci6n de una objeci6n
de acuerdo con el Articulo 17(2) del C6digo de Comercio. No se necesita
hacer otras actuaciones. Ni el C6digo Civil ni el C6digo de Comercio
prescribe consecuencia alguna para el comerciante que persiste en ilevar a
cabo el oficio despu6s de que la objeci6n de su c6nyuge se haya registrado
en el registro comercial. Por consiguiente, no existen riesgos asociados
con la continuaci6n del oficio despues de que una objeci6n se haya
registrado en el registro. Es un gran beneficio. Es una forma de
responsabilidad limitada. La propiedad comfin de la pareja y la propiedad
personal del c6nyuge que no es comerciante estAn protegidas de las
demandas de acreedores del negocio del c6nyuge comerciante.
El Articulo 18 del C6digo de Comercio permite al comerciante
apelar la objeci6n a drbitros de familia que pueden confirmar o desestimar
la objeci6n. Si los Arbitros de familia confirman la objeci6n, no se altera
la situaci6n creada por 6sta. Sin embargo, la responsabilidad limitada a la
propiedad personal del comerciante se perderia si los irbitros. de familia
desestimaran la objeci6n. Eso no pareceria ser "en el mejor interns de la
familia," la norma establecida en el Articulo 18 para regir la decisi6n de
los drbitros de familia. Si el c6nyuge comerciante convocara a los ,rbitros
de familia, solamente seria para confirmar la objeci6n y, por consiguiente,
concederle a 6sta mayor importancia dada a independencia de su decisi6n.
Los antecedentes materiales del C6digo de Comercio no hacen
referencia a esta habilidad que tiene un comerciante casado de proteger la
propiedad comfin de la familia de responsabilidad por las deudas del
29
negocio.

27. La restricci6n que tiene un acreedor de s6lo recuperar la deuda de un comerciante de
la propiedad personal del comerciante es una restricci6n significativa porque los frutos que
resulten de la propiedad personal es propiedad comtin (C6d. C. 652(1)). Por consiguiente, ain
los frutos que se devengan del comercio estun exentos de embargo por el acreedor. Vea el texto
que le sigue infra nota 30.
28. No es ffcil obtener cr&lito en Etiopia en actualidad porque nadie es propietario de
tierra que se pueda hipotecar bajo los art. 3041 a 3130 del C6digo Civil para garantizar una
deuda. Ni es comtin dar valores en fianza bajo los art. 950 a 958 del C6digo de Comercio
porque hay muy pocas sociedades an6nime donde invertir.
29. See Jauffret, supra nota 26.
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El efecto de la limitaci6n por el Articulo 20 del C6digo de
Comercio de la responsabilidad por deudas solamente sobre los bienes
personales" del comerciante, por consiguiente, depende del r6gimen de
propiedad establecido por el C6digo Civil para individuos casados.
,Cuales son los bienes personales de una persona casada?
El r6gimen de propiedad de una pareja casada esti regido por los
Articulos 647 a 661 del C6digo Civil. El Articulo 653(1) establece la
presunci6n de que toda la propiedad es propiedad comfin a menos que uno
de los c6nyuges declare que algo es de su propiedad solamente. El
Articulo 652(1) trata especificamente sobre los salarios e ingresos de los
c6nyuges. Establece la regla de que todos los salarios e ingresos son de
propiedad comfin. Por consiguiente, todos los ingresos del negocio de un
comerciante son de propiedad comtdn. No son propiedad personal de 61 ni
de ella. Esto incluso si la propiedad que se usa en el negocio es propiedad
personal. (La propiedad que se usa en un negocio, por supuesto, puede ser
de propiedad en comnn si no clasifica en una de las categorias de
propiedad que sea propiedad personal.) El Articulo 647 estipula que la
propiedad personal es propiedad que se tiene al momento del matrimonio o
se obtuvo despu6s del matrimonio por una sucesi6n o donaci6n. El
Articulo 648 estipula que la propiedad obtenida a titulo oneroso (por un
precio) durante el matrimonio a cambio de propiedad personal o con dinero
personal serd propiedad personal solamente si asi lo declaran los irbitros
de familia. Por consiguiente, un negocio u oficio seri de propiedad comfin
a menos que el comerciante fuese propietario del negocio antes del
matrimonio, se le regal6 el negocio durante el matrimonio o lo compr6 con
propiedad o dinero personal y obtuvo la declaraci6n requerida de los
drbitros de familia. Con respecto a las deudas de una persona casada, el
Articulo 659 enuncia que las deudas de un c6nyuge se pueden hacer
efectivos sobre la propiedad personal del c6nyuge y de la propiedad comtin
de la pareja. Sin embargo, notese que el Articulo 19 del C6digo de
Comercio tambidn hace a la propiedad personal del c6nyuge que no es
comerciante y a la propiedad comdin de la pareja, asi como la propiedad
personal del comerciante, responsable por las deudas del comerciante.
En inter6s de proteger a la familia, todos los c6nyuges que est6n
casados con comerciantes deberidn oponerse y registrar la objeci6n en el
registro comercial de acuerdo con el Articulo 17(2) del C6digo de
Comercio. El Articulo 20 del C6digo de Comercio hace de la presentaci6n
de la objeci6n el finico requisito para proteger la propiedad comtin de la
30. El artfculo 20 del c6digo commercial utiliza las palabras bienes personales. Artfculo
647 y lo que le sigue utiliza las palabras propiedadpersonal. No existe nada en ninguno de los
c6digos que sugiera que los trminos tienen significados diferentes.
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pareja de las deudas del negocio limitando la responsabilidad a los bienes
personales del comerciante. Si se les pide, de acuerdo con el Articulo 18,
los drbitros de familia deberidn, por las razones enunciadas anteriormente,
confirmar la objeci6n como cosa natural.
Esto no le inpediri al
comerciante continuar con su oficio ya que la objeci6n (y la decisi6n del
drbitro, si la hay, para confirmar) serd de acuerdo con un plan bien
planeado para proteger la propiedad comin del comerciante y su c6nyuge y
la propiedad personal del c6nyuge.
Solamente a trav6s de este
procedimiento un comerciante casado que sea propietario tinico crea una
clase de responsabilidad limitada de las deudas del negocio. Como
resultado de este procedimiento, la propiedad comfin del comerciante y su
c6nyuge y la propiedad personal del c6nyuge estin protegidas de la
responsabilidad del negocio. La reglas establecidas por el Articulo 659(1)
del C6digo Civil que hace de la propiedad comtin de la pareja responsable
por las deudas de cada c6nyuge y por el Articulo 19 del C6digo de
Comercio que hace de la propiedad comfin de la pareja y la propiedad
personal de cada uno responsable por las deudas del c6nyuge comerciante
se anulan por el procedimiento establecido en el C6digo de Comercio con
respecto a las deudas del negocio de un comerciante cuyo c6nyuge se ha
opuesto y registrado una objeci6n en el registro comercial (y cuya objeci6n
fue confirmada por los drbitros de familia para servir los mejores intereses
de la familia).
A. ResponsabilidadLimitada de Socios Colectivos
Por lo menos dos aunque probablemente tres personas
contribuyeron con la redacci6n del Libro II del C6digo de Comercio
regulando organizaciones de negocio." Originalmente, las disposiciones
sobre sociedades civiles estaban en el C6digo Civil. Se transfirieron al
C6digo de Comercio sin mucha reflexi6n sobre como afectarian las otras
disposiciones del C6digo de Comercio que rigen las sociedades. Parece que
en su redacci6n, se omitieron algunas reglas generales que rigen
sociedades y se aprob6 a pesar de las omisiones.12 El resultado es que
existen lagunas desafortunadas en el C6digo de Comercio y como veremos,
varias disposiciones inconsistentes.
El Articulo 215(2) estd en el titulo del C6digo de Comercio (Titulo
I del Libro II) que establece disposiciones generales que te6ricamente se
refieren a todas las organizaciones de negocio."
El Articulo 215(2)
31.

Winship, supra nota 13, a v.
32. Id.
33. El articulo 215(2) del c6digo commercial de acuerdo a sus trminos, s6lo se refiere a
sociedades. Artfculo 210(1), sin embargo, estipula que una organizaci6n de negocio es una

1118

ILSA Journalof Int l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 4:1107

estipula que cualquier disposici6n que releve a uno o mis de los socios de
su participaci6n en las p6rdidas de la sociedad no tendrl efecto. Esta
disposici6n general se contradice en todos los titulos que tienen que ver
con una clase especifica de sociedad. El Tftulo II que rige sociedades
civiles,' el Titulo III que rige las empresas conjuntas (joint ventures)," el
Titulo IV que rige sociedades regulares colectivas,3'6 y el Titulo V que rige
sociedades limitadas," todas contienen reglas que permiten que una
sociedad crea excepciones al Articulo 215(2).
La regla usual de
interpretaci6n de una ley es que la disposici6n especifica prevalezca sobre
la disposici6n general.38 Por consiguiente, la regla establecida en el
Articulo 215(2) no necesariamente afecta las sociedades reconocidas por el
C6digo de Comercio. Las disposiciones especificas que rigen cada clase
de sociedad autorizan excepciones a la regla.
El C6digo de Comercio no estipula automticamente una exenci6n
de responsabilidad ilimitada para un socio colectivo, con la excepci6n de
socios de una empresa conjunta que no sean gerentes que, de acuerdo con
el Articulo 276(2), tienen responsabilidad limitada a menos que por el
acuerdo de la sociedad se establezca lo contrario. En otras sociedades, el
C6digo de Comercio s6lo le permite al acuerdo de la sociedad proveer la
exenci6n. Por consiguiente, con la excepci6n de empresa conjunta, para
que un socio colectivo disfrute de responsabilidad limitada, debe existir
una disposici6n con respecto a esto en el acuerdo de la sociedad.
B. Sociedades Civiles
Una sociedad civil no podri ilevar a cabo las actividades
mencionadas en el Articulo 5.19 Por consiguiente, no es comercial y no
podri llevar a cabo un negocio como se define en el Articulo 124. Si Ileva
a cabo estas actividades, se considerard una sociedad regular colectiva.4
Ya que una sociedad corriente no podrd llevar a cabo un oficio, ninguno de
asociaci6n que surge del acuerdo de la sociedad. Articulo 215, por consiguiente, se referiria a
cualquier organizaci6n de negocio como resultado del articulo 210(1). El C6digo de Comercio a
veces usa las palabras socio y sociedad en el sentido t6cnico de las organizaciones de negocio
regidas por los articulos 227-03 y a veces las usa en un sentido general afin aplicable a
accionistas y a una empresa.
34. GAZETA, supra nota 1, arts. 227-70.
35. Id. arts. 271 -79.
36.

Id. arts. 280 - 95.

37.

Id. arts. 296 - 03.

38. Generaliaspecialibus non derogant, T6rminos generales no perjudican a los tdrminos
especiales. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 684 (6a ed. 1990).
39. GAZETA, supra nota 1, art. 213(1).
40. Id. art. 213(2).
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sus socios llevarin a cabo un oficio. Por consiguiente, los socios de una
sociedad corriente, al no ser comerciantes, no podrin usar el
procedimiento descrito arriba para comerciantes duefios de una propiedad
de una sola persona para obtener responsabilidad limitada. Sin embargo,
existen otras avenidas para crear responsabilidad limitada.
El Articulo 254 estipula la exenci6n mis obvia en una sociedad
civil a la responsabilidad te6ricamente ilimitada del socio colectivo descrita
en el Artfculo 215(2). Enuncia que el socio colectivo que s6lo realiza
aportacion de servicios a la sociedad podri participar en las ganancias pero
no en las p6rdidas de la sociedad, a pesar de las disposiciones del Articulo
215. Por consiguiente, un socio colectivo que s6lo aporta servicios podrd,
si el acuerdo de la sociedad lo provee, no incurrir en p6rdida monetaria a
pesar de la magnitud de las p6rdidas que corresponde al otro socio. Esta
total exoneraci6n de cualquier responsabilidad es singular en las
actividades econ6micas de Etiopia. Afin los accionistas de una sociedad
an6nime podr~in perder su inversi6n en acciones. Tienen responsabilidad
limitada, no ninguna responsabilidad. Un socio en una sociedad
personalista (civil) que s6lo aporta sus servicios no tendri responsabilidad.
El Articulo 254 permite la constituci6n de una sociedad con el fin
de garantizar que ningfin individuo tenga responsabilidad personal. Se
puede crear una sociedad colectiva (personalista) con una sociedad limitada
privada o con una sociedad an6nima como socio colectivo. La empresa
contribuye con todo el dinero necesario a la sociedad colectiva. Ese dinero
constara el capital de la sociedad. Los socios individuales s6lo contribuyen
con sus servicios a la sociedad. El acuerdo de la sociedad se redacta para
darle a los socios individuales el derecho estipulado por el Artfculo 254 de
ser libre de cualquier responsabilidad por las p6rdidas de la sociedad. Las
pdrdidas s6lo recaerin en el socio colectivo. Es una sociedad limitada
privada o una sociedad an6nime que por definici6n tiene un capital
limitado.41 Por consiguiente, el inico socio en una sociedad colectiva que
tiene responsabilidad ilimitada bajo la ley de sociedades provee de
responsabilidad limitada a sus accionistas bajo legislacion empresarial.
Asi, si los socios colectivos que s6lo contribuyen con su trabajo a la
sociedad colectiva, contribuyen con dinero o propiedades en especies a la
empresa (asi siendo propietarios de la empresa) que a su vez aporta todo el
dinero o propiedad en especie que sea necesario a la sociedad, han logrado
limitar su responsabilidad a la cantidad de su contribuci6n a la empresa.
La sociedad sirve como socio colectiva y es el tinico socio colectivo que
hace una contribuci6n a la sociedad colectivo en dinero o especie.
41. Id. art. 304(1) para sociedads participes y el articulo 510(1) para sociedads limitadas
privadas.
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Ademis, el Articulo 255 establece otra forma potencial de
protecci6n contra la responsabilidad ilimitada para algunos de los socios
colectivo de una sociedad colectiva. El Articulo 255(2) enuncia que los
acreedores podrin "tener derecho a la propiedad personal de los socios que
(sic) serdn, a menos que se acuerde lo contrario, todos y cada uno de ellos
responsables por las obligaciones de la sociedad."42 La frase a menos que
se acuerde lo contrario es algo ambigua. iSe acuerde entre quienes? Si el
acuerdo es entre los acreedores y los socios individuales de la sociedad,
quedan fuera de la ley de sociedades. Sencillamente seria un acuerdo
donde los acreedores, confiados de la capacidad de la sociedad de pagar
sus deudas, acordarian no ejecutar en los activos personales de los socios
para la cancelaci6n de obligaciones el caso que la sociedad no pagara sus
deudas.
Tal acuerdo seria excepcional; los socios colectivos
probablemente tampoco lo harian si ellos tambi6n tuvieran confianza en la
capacidad de la sociedad de pagar sus deudas. S61o solicitar esto haria
surgir sospechas de los acreedores que los socios conocian sucesos
desfavorables que no conocian los acreedores.
ZEs posible que el acuerdo que hace referencia al Articulo 255(2)
fuera el acuerdo de la sociedad en si? Si. El Articulo 255(3) respalda esta
conclusi6n al anunciar:
Cualquier disposici6n que exonere a los socios o a algunos
de ellos de responsabilidad conjunta y solidarias no podri
oponerse contra terceros a menos que se demuestre que
estos terceros conocian esta disposici6n. A pesar de que
haya una disposici6n que lo contradigo, los socios que
representaron a la sociedad siempre seran responsables
3
conjunta y solidariamente.
"Cualquier disposici6n" parece referirse al acuerdo mencionado en el
subarticulo anterior que, por consiguiente, seria el acuerdo de la sociedad.
En todo caso, el subarticulo (3) en si claramente permite al acuerdo de la
sociedad de una sociedad colectiva proveer protecci6n a algunos de los
socios contra la responsabilidad conjunta y solidaria. El dinico requisito es
que los acreedores conozcan la protecci6n. Cualquier contrato celebrado
por la sociedad sencillamente podria anunciar ese hecho y asi darlo a
conocer a la otra parte del contrato. La disposici6n de la segunda frase del
subarticulo no aclara si el socio que represent6 a la sociedad en alguna
transacci6n es responsable por todas las transacciones o si sencillamente en
las que la represent6. Sin embargo, aclara que un socio colectivo que es
42. Id. art. 255(2) (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
43. Id. art. 255(3) (nota editoria: traducido del Ingl6s).
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pasivo y no desempefia actividades (que sencillamente es un inversionista
en la sociedad colectiva) o que s6lo desempefia funciones internas (como
por ejemplo, la de contador o administrador de la oficina para la sociedad),
podria liberarse de responsabilidad conjunta y solidaria de las deudas de la
sociedad por medio de una c1usula en el acuerdo de la sociedad que
informe de esto si se informa a los acreedores sobre esta c1usula.
Cualquier persona que redacte el acuerdo de la sociedad de una sociedad
colectiva ciertamente debe intentar lograr la interpretaci6n mds amplia
posible del Articulo 255(3) y estipular que ningdin socio que no haya
representado a la sociedad en una transacci6n particular sea responsable
conjunta y solidariamente de esa transacci6n, haciendo caso omiso de la
magnitud de representaci6n de ese socio en otras transacciones.
C. Empresa Conjunta (Joint Ventures)
Las empresas conjunta son singulares en el concepto de sociedades
porque no se registran en el registro comercial." Por consiguiente, no se
notifica al pfiblico sobre su existencia y no se conoce la identidad de los
socios, con la excepci6n del socio directivo. Se conoce al gerente y las
actividades de la empresa conjunta se Ilevan a cabo a nombre del gerente.4 5
El Articulo 276(2) establece que los socios que no son gerentes son
responsables s6lo en la medida en que lo estipule el acuerdo de la empresa
conjunta. Por consiguiente, este acuerdo puede limitar la responsabilidad
de un socio de la empresa conjunta que no sea gerente a la cantidad de su
contribuci6n. El acuerdo inclusive podrd estipular que el gerente se
encargard de restituir toda o parte de la aportaci6n. Por consiguiente, la
teoria detrds del Articulo 215(2) no juega ningfin papel en una empresa
conjunta. A diferencia de la situaci6n con respecto a las sociedades
colectivas, no es necesario que el acreedor conozca la limitaci6n de la
responsabilidad. Esto resulta del hecho de que el acreedor no conoce la
existencia de la empresa conjunta o de los socios que no son gerentes. Sin
embargo, ain cuando el acreedor conozca la existencia de la empresa
conjunta, el Articulo 272(4) estipula que la empresa conjunta se
considerari como una sociedad real. Como demuestra este documento, los
socios colectivos de sociedades reales pueden disfrutar de formas de
responsabilidad limitada en ciertas circunstancias. No necesariamente
cambiaria nada si un acreedor se diera cuenta de la existencia de una
empresa conjunta.

44. Id. art. 272(2).
45. GAZETA, supra nota 1, art. 276(1).
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Afin el gerente de una empresa conjunta puede lograr alguna
limitaci6n de responsabilidad si la empresa conjunta lleva a cabo una
actividad comercial y el gerente estA casado. Si la empresa conjunta lleva
a cabo una actividad mencionada en el Articulo 5, el socio gerente que estA
llevando a cabo esa actividad tiene que registrarse como comerciante. Si el
gerente estA casado, el procedimiento mencionado arriba en
Responsabilidad Limitada de Propietarios Unicos Casados Que Son
Comerciantes con respecto a comerciantes que son propietarios (nicos se
podrfa usar por el gerente para proteger la propiedad comtin limitando la
responsabilidad a la propiedad personal del gerente.

D. Sociedades Regulares Colectivas
Una sociedad regular colectiva es muy parecida a una sociedad
civil. Una sociedad regular colectiva puede lievar a cabo actividades
comerciales o no comerciales o de ambas clases."
Si lleva a cabo
actividades comerciales, el Articulo 280(2) exige que cada socio colectivo
se registre como comerciante. Si el socio es casado, puede valerse de la
protecci6n concedida por el Articulo 20 con tal de que su c6nyuge se
oponga a la actividad y presente la objeci6n en el registro comercial. El
socio regular colectivo, registrado como comerciante, seguiria el mismo
procedimiento descrito arriba en Responsabilidad Limitada de Propietarios
Unicos Casados Que Son Comerciantes para un propietario 6nico que ileve
a cabo un oficio.
Ademds de la protecci6n contra la responsabilidad ilimitada que
puede estar disponible a un socio regular colectivo casado que sea un
comerciante, la ley de sociedades regulares colectivas tambi6n provee una
cierta de protecci6n. El Articulo 280(1) anuncia "Una sociedad regular
colectiva consiste en socios que son personal, conjunto, solidarios y
totalmente responsables entre ellos y la sociedad de la actividad social.
Cualquier disposici6n en contrario en el acuerdo de la sociedad no surtiri
efecto con respecto a terceros.''
Mientras que la primera frase del Articulo 290(1) es totalmente
inequivoca, la segunda frase no sirve ningfin prop6sito salvo que modifica
la primera. El t6rmino en la segunda frase, "con respecto a terceros" s6lo
sirve para enfatizar que la disposici6n puede surtir efecto entre los socios.
Este articulo obviamente concede mucho menos protecci6n a socios
colectivo de una sociedad regular colectiva que los Articulos 254 y 255 a
socios colectivos de sociedades colectivas. Sin embargo, en la medida en
que uno o mis socios estfin dispuestos y son capaces de proteger a sus
46. Id. art. 213.
47. GAZETA, supra nota 1, art. 280(l)(nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
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socios, un acuerdo de una sociedad puede proveer responsabilidad limitada
a uno o mis de los socios. La limitaci6n no obliga a terceros pero si
permite que un socio siga un proceso contra otro socio para recuperar
cualquier cantidad haya pagado a terceros.
Por consiguiente, es en las sociedades regulares colectivas donde la
teoria de responsabilidad ilimitada representada en el Articulo 215(2)
encuentra su mayor expresi6n. Sin embargo, ain aquf, pueden existir
excepciones establecidas en el acuerdo de la sociedad o disponible a
comerciantes casados bajo el Articulo 20 del C6digo de Comercio.
E. Sociedad Limitada
El Articulo 296 anuncia sin ambigiiedad que los socios limitados
en una sociedad limitada s6lo son responsables en la medida de sus
aportaci6nes. En este respecto, un socio limitado es como un accionista en
una compafia. Por consiguiente, el Articulo 215(2) no surte efecto en
socios limitados que por definici6n, tienen responsabilidad limitada.
Sin embargo, el socio limitado puede perder esa responsabilidad
limitada. El Articulo 301(3) estipula que un socio limitado que sea gerente
de una sociedad limitada adquiere responsabilidad total, conjunta y
solidaria por cualquier responsabilidad que surge de sus actividades como
gerente. Los subarticulos (4), (5) y (6) contienen relaciones de actuaciones
que un socio limitado puede hacer sin asi considerarse gerente. Las
actividades permitidas son principalmente actividades internas como por
ejemplo, asesoria a otros socios, consejo o revisi6n de libros de la
sociedad. Sin embargo, un socio limitado puede ser un empleado (pero no
un gerente) de la sociedad.
La responsabilidad de un socio colectivo en una sociedad limitada
es la misma que un socio colectivo en una sociedad regular colectiva. Sin
embargo, es ficil estructurar una sociedad limitada de tal manera que
ningfin individuo tenga responsabilidad ilimitada por las deudas de la
sociedad. El socio colectivo puede ser una empresa an6nime o una
sociedad limitada privada; todos los socios individuales deberin ser socios
limitados. Bajo la ley de sociedades, la empresa que sea el socio colectivo
tendri responsabilidad ilimitada por las deudas de la sociedad limitada.
Sin embargo, debido a que es una empresa, sus accionistas (que pueden ser
los socios limitados) tendrin responsabilidad limitada por las deudas de la
sociedad. (Con las excepciones descritas en la pr6xima secci6n de este
documento.) Esta es la misma situaci6n descrita en mis detalle arriba,
bajo Sociedades Colectivas. Por consiguiente, si los duefios de un negocio
desean formar una sociedad, la sociedad limitada ofrece la mayor
protecci6n contra responsabilidad ilimitada.
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IV. RESPONSABILIDAD ILIMITADA POTENCIAL DE ACCIONISTAS
A. Sociedades An6nimas
Las sociedades an6nimas con acciones les conceden a sus
accionistas protecci6n contra responsabilidad ilimitada por las deudas de la
compafiia. Sin embargo, responsabilidad limitada no significa ninguna
responsabilidad." Un accionista siempre puede perder la suma que ha
invertido en la sociedad an6nima. La p~rdida puede ocurrir cuando la
compafifa se disuelve porque los activos de la compafiia son insuficientes
para pagar las deudas y devolverle al accionista el capital invertido. Una
p6rdida tambi6n puede ocurrir antes de la disoluci6n de una compafiia si
los accionistas venden sus acciones por menor valor que el precio de
compra.
El Articulo 347 del C6digo de Comercio establece que los
administradores de una sociedad an6nima deben ser socios o accionistas de
la empresa. Varios articulos del C6digo imponen la responsabilidad de los
administradores

a

la empresa,

sus accionistas

y terceros.4 9

La

responsabilidad es por los actos o negligencia de los administradores. Por
consiguiente, por lo menos algunos de los accionistas de una sociedad
participe deben exponerse a responsabilidad ilimitada por sus actos como
directores.
Ademis de la responsabilidad de sus actos como administradores,
estos pueden ser personalmente responsables de las deudas de la sociedad
an6nima misma debido a la norma de conducta establecida por el C6digo
de Comercio y la carga de probar el cumplimiento con los requerimientos
del C6digo.
El Articulo 366(1) anuncia, "Los administradores
responderan frente a los acreedores de la empresa cuando no mantengan
los activos de la empresa intactos."10 El Artfculo 366 no establece una
norma para evaluar los actos o faltas de los administradores. El Articulo
364 que rige la responsabilidad de administradores a la sociedad an6nima,
establece una norma. Los administradores son responsables de probar que
ejercieron el debido cuidado y diligencia. Esto parece ser un alto criterio
de conducta, como debe ser. LDebe usarse el mismo criterio de conducta
al fracaso de los directores de mantener los activos de la compafiia
intactos? LQu6 defensas tienen los accionistas-directores si se pierde alguna
porci6n de los activos de la empresa? LCualquier p6rdida de la compafifa,
48. S61o un socio colectivo en una sociedad corriente que s61o contribuy6 su habilidad
podrA no tener responsabilidad bajo la ley etfope. Vea supra empesando con nota 39.
49.

GAZETA, supra nota 1, arts. 364 - 67.
50. Id. art. 366(1) (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).

1998]

Porter

1125

si es lo suficientemente grande o prolongada, pondrd los activos en
peligro? iSe espera que los administradores recomienden a los accionistas
disolver la compaflia a la primera insinuaci6n de que las p6rdidas hardn
que los activos sean insuficientes para pagar los acreedores?
La
imposici6n de responsabilidad personal bajo el Articulo 366(1) puede tener
ese efecto. En otros articulos del C6digo, el marco de referencia es el
capital social. Los Articulos 487 a 490 se refieren a la reducci6n de
capital como resultado de prdidas. El capital de una sociedad usualmente
serd menor que los activos de la empresa. Entonces el no mantener los
activos de una empresa intactos puede ocurrir mucho antes de que las
p6rdidas sean suficientes para requerir una reducci6n de capital. El
Articulo 366(1) podria interpretarse como una creaci6n de responsabilidad
para administradores ain si las pdrdidas no afectan el capital de la
compalifa.
Por otro lado, dejar de conservar implica la habilidad de
determinar el resultado de acciones que causaron la p6rdida.
Los
administradores no serian responsables si los activos no se conservaron por
algo sobre lo cual no tenian control. Por consiguiente, si un gobierno
confisca los activos y no paga por ellos, o los activos se destrozan en un
accidente que no se puede asegurar (como por ejemplo un terremoto,
contra el cual generalmente no se puede asegurar en regiones donde
terremotos son comunes), no existe una falta por parte de los
administradores. Ademis, muchas otras pdrdidas en el trifico mercantil
ordinario pueden estar fuera del control de los administradores y no ser el
resultado de sus faltas.
La responsabilidad ilimitada de los administradores por la p6rdida
de los activos de una compafifa probablemente no afectard todos los
accionistas de una sociedad an6nina, especialmente si tiene un gran
nfimero de accionistas. Pero puede que afecte aquellos accionistas que
tambi6n son administradores, sencillamente porque los administradores
tienen que ser accionistas.
B. Sociedades Limitadas Privadas
Los accionistas de la sociedad s6lo son ilimitadamente responsables
en su calidad de administradores. Los accionistas de una sociedad limitada
privada pueden tener responsabilidad ilimitada como accionistas.
El Articulo 519 se refiere a las consecuencias de las aportaciones
en especie a una sociedad limitada privada.1' A diferencia de los detallados
procedimientos establecidos en el Articulo 315 para determinar el valor de

51.

Id. art519.
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una aportaci6n en especie a una sociedad an6nime, el Articulo 519 requiere
que los socios de una sociedad limitada privada determinen el m6todo de
valoraci6n y el valor de la aportaci6n.12 El Articulo 519(3) impone
responsabilidad conjunta y solidaria a favor de terceros por la valoraci6n
establecida de acuerdo con el m~todo determinado por los accionistas. 3 El
Articulo 519(4) impone responsabilidad conjunta y solidaria a todos los
socios por cualquier sobrevaloraci6n de la aportaci6n, ain cuando no
supieran de la sobrevaloraci6nM La responsabilidad a la qual se refiere el
Artfculo 519(4) parece ser responsabilidad estricta.
El articulo no
menciona como defensa a una demanda como la l6gica del m6todo de
valoraci6n o el posible fraude de la persona que hace la aportaci6n. La
buena fe de un miembro inocente no puede ser una defensa.11 El Articulo
519 es un serio impedimento de una aportaci6n de propiedad a una
sociedad limitada privada. Los socios que no hacen una aportaci6n en
especie querrian tener un acuerdo con cada persona que hace una
aportaci6n en especie para reembolsarle a aquellos socios cualquier p6rdida
que surja a causa de una sobrevaloraci6n de la propiedad.
Adems del Articulo 519, la ley que gobierna a las sociedads
limitadas privadas crea una responsabilidad ilimitada en otra situaci6n.5 6 A
diferencia de una sociedad an6nime, una sociedad limitada privada no tiene
un consejo de administradores o junta directiva o gerentes nombrados por
una junta. Todo los accionistas o algunos de ellos, administran una
sociedad limitada privada como una sociedad. El Artfculo 531 se refiere a
la responsabilidad de estos accionistas-gerentes cuando una sociedad
limitada privada se declare en quiebra y los activos sean insuficientes para
pagar a los acreedores .5 El Articulo 531(1) anuncia que el tribunal que
declara la quiebra puede ordenar que los gerentes o accionistas o algunos
de ellos paguen todas o una parte de las deudas de la sociedad limitada
privada. ' El articulo no es un modelo de claridad. El subarticulo (1) le
52. Id.
53. Id. art. 519(3).
54. Id. art. 519(4).
55. El redactor del articulo 519(4) dijo, "[L]as reglas que rigen las aportaci6nes en especie
son excepcionalmente severas. . . . En esta clase de sociedad, todos los socios deberin tener
inter6s suficiente en el funcionamiento del negocio de la sociedad como para no poder esconderse
bajo el pretexto de ignorancia lo cual seria una forma culpable de negligencia." (El 6nfasis viene
del original.) (Nota editorial: traducido del Inglds). Jean Escarra, Expose des Motifs: Book II
(Comm. C. Doc. No. 9B) (9 October/November 1954), 57, 69 Doc. No. 20 en Winship, supra
nota 13.
56. GAZETA, supra nota 1, art. 519.
57. Id. art. 531.
58. Id. art. 531(1).
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permite al tribunal que declare la quiebra y ordene a los socios y
administradores a pagar las deudas de la sociedad. El subarticulo (2) dice
que no se puede dictar esta orden a socios que no hayan sido
administradores ni cuando los administradores y socios-9 demuestren que
han ejercido el debido cuidado y diligencia. Lo que es claro es que la
carga de probar el debido cuidado y diligencia recae en aquellos
accionistas- administradores que desean aludir la responsabilidad ilimitada
por las deudas de una sociedad en quiebra. Lo que no estA claro es la
medida en que un accionista que no sea administrador puede aludir la
responsabilidad ilimitada sencillamente porque fue un socio que no era
administrador. La primera cldusula del Articulo 531(2) dice que los socios
que no fueron administradores no podridn ser obligados a pagar las deudas
La segunda clusula declara que los socios que
de la compaiiia.
demuestren que ejercieron el debido cuidado y diligencia no seran
obligados. ,Porqu6 se mencionan socios en los subarticulos del Artfculo
531 si solamente se les puede exigir pagar a los administradores? El
Articulo 531 es una confusi6n.
El Articulo 531 habla sobre las responsabilidades en cuanto
quiebra. Sin embargo, no se puede descartar eso sencillamente como un
ejemplo de una situaci6n en el peor de los casos. La responsabilidad
ilimitada por las deudas de cualquier negocio s6lo surge en el peor de los
casos. Si el negocio de un propietario tinico u organizaci6n de negocio
puede pagar sus deudas en el trayecto ordinario cuando se vencen, nunca
se le pedird al duefio pagar por ellas de sus activos personales. Es s6lo
cuando el negocio estA en dificultades cuando los acreedores apuntan a los
duefios. Entonces, es solamente cuando surge una situaci6n extrema que
se toca el tema de responsabilidad ilimitada.
UNA PROPUESTA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA PARA TODOS
LOS PROPIETARIOS UNICOS
La investigaci6n de la responsabilidad ilimitada en el C6digo de
Comercio de Etiopia demuestra que existe responsabilidad ilimitada en
algunos casos. Si dos o mis personas desean crear una sociedad limitada
privada, pueden lograr un grado alto, no el mds alto, grado de
responsabilidad limitada. El grado mds alto de responsabilidad limitada se
reserva a cinco personas que crean una sociedad an6nime. Estas dos clases
de empresas tambi6n tienen diferentes requisitos minimos de capital-Birr
V.

59.

GAZETA, supra nota 1, art. 531.
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y Birr 50.000 para una

La opci6n de crear una empresa que existe para dos o cinco
personas no existe para una persona. Un propietario inico, especialmente
uno que no est6 casado o que tenga una actividad econ6mica que no sea un
oficio, no esti protegido contra la responsabilidad ilimitada. No importa
cuanto dinero estA dispuesto a invertir en la empresa--tiene que conseguirse
uno o cuatro accionistas adicionales. Estos accionistas adicionales pueden
ser testaferros que no tienen absolutamente ningin interns en la empresa

pero las leyes etiopes requieren que figuren como accionistas.62 jSi ningin
accionista en una sociedad an6nime es personalmente responsable por las

deudas de una empresa, porqud interesa si la sociedad participe tiene un
mill6n de accionistas, cinco accionistas o un accionista? En todo caso, los
accionistas o accionista no tendrdn que aportar un centavo adicional a la
empresa. No se obtiene una protecci6n adicional para los acreedores si se
establece una cantidad minima de accionistas.
La protecci6n para
acreedores estA basada principalmente en el capital de la sociedad y si se
opera lucrativamente. Estos dos criterios no estAn relacionados con la
cantidad de accionistas.
El requisito de una cantidad minima de accionistas es sencillamente
historia.63 Los primeros estatutos que permitieron la creaci6n de empresas
d. art. 306(1). Enjunio de 1997, un d6lar de los Estados Unidos equivalfa Birr 6.7.
61. Id. art. 512(1).
62. Si se toma Birr 50.000, elcapital mfnimo para una sociedad an6nime y se divide por
Birr 10, elvalor a lapar mfnimo por acci6n, el resultado es 5.000 acciones. Ceda una acci6n a
cada uno de cuatro personas y qu&lese con las otras 4.996 acciones. Si se toma Birr 15.000, el
capital mfnimo para una sociedad limitada privada y se divide por Birr 10 valor a la par, el valor
mfnimo por acci6n, el resultado es 1.500 acciones. Ceda una acci6n a una persona y qu~dese con
1.499 acciones. En ambos casos, usted ha constituido una sociedad legftima en la cual s6lo una
persona tiene inter(s. Esto es perfectamente legal y cumple totalmente con los requerimientos del
C6digo de Comercio. Estos ejemplos tambi6n demuestran la absurdo del requisito por un nimero
mfnimo de accionistas. Es elcapital social, no el ntimero de socios, lo que crea una empresa.
63. El peso de latradici6n es una gran carga sobre las instituciones legales. La tradici6n
crea unos obstAculos particulares en laforma en que se aceptan nuevos conceptos aunque, cuando
se consideran objetivamente, parecen ser obvios y formas valiosas para lograr fines (itiles. El
punto de vista de que s6lo conceptos que las generaciones anteriores nos han legado tener
autoridad y ser inquebrantables, nos lleva a operar con instituciones anticuadas atin cuando sus
estructuras e intenciones est~n distorsionadas en lugar de considerar imparcialmente la adopci6n
de nuevas f6rmulas.
Un ejemplo destacado de este fen6meno parece ocurrir cuando se usa elprincipio de
responsabilidad limitada para facilitar la participaci6n de individuos en sociedades mercantiles.
Todas las formas tradicionales sociales permiten que los activos de los socios sean libres de
demandas por las deudas de la sociedad mayor que lacantidad que los socios inicialmente
pagaron, subscribieron y se comprometieron a pagar. Sin embargo, este beneficio de
responsabilidad limitada que parece tan natural ain cuando se estd pensando de una sociedad que
60.
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exigian un nfimero minimo de socios contribujente o fundadores y un
nfunero minimo de accionistas. Hoy en dia, no existe ninguna justificaci6n
Estos requisitos formales se cumplen tan
para estos requerimientos.
ficilmente, es verdad que la empresa es diferente y dichos requisitos
sencillamente promueven la falta de respeto a la ley. iSi una persona
puede evadir este requisito tan ficilmente, porqu6 no evadir otros que sean
inconvenientes? Si el requisito de un ntimero minimo de accionistas
sirviera un prop6sito, como por ejemplo, elevar el capital disponible o el
nfimero de personas responsables por las deudas de la empresa, podrian
justificarse. Pero ni sirven estos prop6sitos ni a ningfin otro.
,C6mo debe enmendar Etiopia su C6digo de Comercio para
permitir que una sola persona sea duefia de una sociedad? La peor manera
seria crear una nueva clase de entidad y asi hacer el C6digo de Comercio
mis complejo y crear la necesidad de convertir la sociedad unipersonal en
otra clase de empresa si mis inversionistas compraran acciones." Una
mejor soluci6n seria revocar esas secciones de la ley de la sociedad
an6nime y la ley de la sociedad limitada privada que imponen requisitos de
un nfinero mininmo de accionistas. Eso permitiria que un s6lo accionista
escogiera la clase de empresa que deseara crear. No se necesitaria camnbiar
los -requisitos de un ninero minino de capital, las estructuras de
administraci6n o cualquier otra disposici6n que rige las sociedades.
Solamente se necesitaria enmendar los articulos que hacen referencia a un
nfimero minimo de accionistas.
La mejor soluci6n para crear una sociedad con un s6lo socio seria
enmendar el C6digo de Comercio para permitir sociedades que realmente
sean de una persona. Se podria revisar todos los articulos que tienen que
ver con accionistas, administradores y gerentes para estipular que si una
empresa tiene un accionista, no se necesita juntas de accionistas, sino
solamente resoluciones firmadas; s6lo un administrador y ninguna reunion,
solamente resoluciones firmadas, etc. Esto implicaria una gran cantidad de
puede tener hasta s6lo dos socios, hoy en dfa es aparentemente inconcebible si tiene un s61o
miembro.
Si, en una sociedad completamente an6nima corriente que quizA tenga el insignificante
capital minimo de un mill6n de liras que requiere la ley italiana, A y B limitan su responsabilidad
a ia mitad cada uno- o A a 999.990 liras y B a 100 liras- todo estA correcto; pero es diferente si
un multimillonario desea limitar su compromiso en las fortunas de un negocio que desea iniciar a
unos 100 millones de liras.
Mario Rotondi, Limited Liability of the Individual Trader: One-Man Company or
Commercial Foundation?,48 TUL. L. REV. 989 (1974).
64. Esa es la soluci6n francesa. En 1985, los franceses crearon una nueva entidad, la
enterprise unipersonelle a responsabilite limitee, para permitir una forma de sociedad limitada
que una sola persona organiza y de la cual es propietaria. JEAN-PIERRE LE GALL & PAUL
MOREL, FRENCH COMPANY LAW 61 (2a ed. 1992).
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trabajo. Si 6sto se realiza, todo el Libro II tendria que ser revisado para
actualizarlo y hacerlo menos complejo, no solamente los articulos que
permitirian una sociedad unipersonal.
VI.

CONCLUSION

El C6digo de Comercio de Etiopfa se refiere al tema de
responsabilidad limitada o ilimitada de inversores en negocios en una
variedad de maneras. Propietarios 6inicos y socios colectivos de sociedades
usualmente tienen responsabilidad ilimitada conjunta y solidaria por las
deudas de la sociedad. Pero existen excepciones a esta responsabilidad
ilimitada. Estas excepciones existen en lugares sorprendentes, incluyendo
comerciantes que est~n casados y algunos socios colectivos de sociedades.
Los accionistas usualmente tienen responsabilidad limitada por las deudas
de la sociedad. Pero existen excepciones a esta responsabilidad limitada;
las excepciones mis serias se encuentran en la ley de sociedades limitadas
privadas.
Debido a la responsabilidad ilimitada, potencial de los
administradores en una sociedad linitada privada y el estado ambiguo de
otros accionistas en esas sociedades, la sociedad an6nine provee la mejor
protecci6n para inversores contra la responsabilidad ilimitada. QuizA la
tinica desventaja de una sociedad an6nime es el requerimiento de que tenga
por lo menos cinco accionistas y un capital minimo de los accionistas de
Birr 50.O00.61 Cualquier persona que desee iniciar una empresa o invertir
en una y que est6 preocupado sobre la responsabilidad personal creard o
invertird en una sociedad an6nima. Ofrece la mejor protecci6n contra la
responsabilidad ilimitada de cualquier arreglo creado por el C6digo de
Comercio. Esa protecci6n se debe extender a un socio unipersonal en
lugar
de
limitarla
a
una
sociedad
con
cinco
duefios.

65. Vea supra para ejemplos de lo ficil que es cumplir con el requisito del nimero de
accionistas. Con respecto a capital, el art. 312(I)(b) le permite a un accionista desembolsar s61o
una cuarta parte del valor de las acciones y el art. 338(2) permite que la restante tercera parte del
valor se pague a Io largo de cinco afios. Por consiguiente, se puede constituir una sociedad
an6nime con s6lo Birr 12.500 (una cuarta parte de la cantidad minima de Birr 50.000) en
efectivo. En contraste, los accionistas de una sociedad limitada privada deben pagar toda la
aportaci6n minima de Birr 15.000 antes de registrar la sociedad. Por consiguiente, se necesita
menos dinero para crear una sociedad participe que para crear una sociedad limitada privada.

Microsoft Illustration

1132

ILSA Journal of Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 4:1131

WORLD COURT
International Court of Justice, principal judicial organ of the United
Nations. It was created in 1945 under the UN Charter as the successor to
the Permanent Court of International Justice under the League of
Nations. The court functions in accordance with its own statute, which
forms an integral part of the UN Charter. The main task of the court is
to decide legal cases between nations; private persons may not bring
cases before the court. All members of the UN are parties to the statute
of the World Court, as are three nonmember states, Switzerland,
Liechtenstein, and San Marino. A nation that is not a party to the statute
may use the court if it accepts, either in general or in a given case, the
obligations of a member of the UN. Headquarters is at The Hague, the
Netherlands.

CORTE MUNDIAL
La Corte Internacional de Justicia, 6rgano judicial principal de las
Naciones Unidas. Se cre6 en el 1945 bajo la Carta Constitucional de la
ONU como el sucesor a la Corte Permanente de Justicia Internacional
bajo la Liga de Naciones. La corte a funcion de acuerdo con su propio
estatuto que forma una parte integra de la Carta Constitucional de ONU.
La tarea principal de la corte es decidir casos legales entre naciones; las
personas privadas no pueden presentar casos ante la corte. Todos los
miembros de la ONU son partes del estatuto de la Corte Mundial, asi
como tres estados no miembros, Suiza, Liechtenstein, y San Marino.
Una naci6n que no es parte del estatuto puede usar la corte si acepta, en
general o en un caso dado, las obligaciones de un miembro de la ONU.
La oficina principal estA en La Haya, los Paises Bajos.
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The conclusion I came to during my time in the Foreign
Office was that the old international order was neither a
natural phenomenon to which humanity had simply
adjusted its behaviour nor a fortuitous aggregation of
countless past events of human interaction. The old
international order determines the possibilities perceived
by, and hence available to, politicians and governments
and, so far as they play any part in the system, members of
the general public. But the international system itself is
*
LL.M. (emphasis in International Law) University of Cambridge in 1996.
Universidad de Costa Rica in 1994. LL.B. Universidad de Costa Rica in 1993.
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nothing other than a structure of ideas; and it has been

made nowhere else than in the human mind.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In her seminal article, Burley2 challenged international lawyers to
explore the implications of recent political science theory upon
international law theory. This essay is an attempt to take up that
challenge. I shall use the bureaucratic politics model of the state3 and of
the organizational decision making process,' and the concepts of
international regimes,, transgovernmental networks 6 and epistemic

communities7 to propose an explanation about how and why international
law is created, applied and maintained.

1. PHILIP ALLOTr, EUNOMIA, NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD xv-xvi (1990).
2. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory:
A DualAgenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 239 (1993).
Overall, international lawyers can ill afford to ignore the growing wealth of political
science data on the world they seek to regulate. The measurements may be imprecise,
the theories crude, but the whole offers at least the hope of a positive science of world
affairs. As an adolescent discipline, international political science long rejected the
insights of international law. As it grows, it rediscovers what international lawyers
never forgot, but with added insights of its own. In the end, law informed by politics is
the best guarantee of politics informed by law.
See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and International
Economic Law, 10 AM.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 717, 717-731 (1995) (summarizing the main
schools of thought in International Relations Theory).
3.
See generally GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN
MISSILE CRISIS (1971) for a complete, and now classical, exposition of the model of bureaucratic
politics decision making; but see Edward Rhodes, Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter? Some
Disconfirming Findings from the Case of the US Navy, 47 WORLD POL. 1 (1994); Stephen D.
Krasner, Are BureaucraciesImportant?(orAllison Wonderland), 7 FOREIGN POL'Y 159 (1972).
4. See generally PAUL R. KLEINDORFER ET AL., DECISION SCIENCES, AN INTEGRATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 295-303 (1993).
5. See generally INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); REGIME
THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Volker Rittberger ed., 1993) [hereinafter REGIME
THEORY].
6. See generally ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND
INTERDEPENDENCE (2nd ed. 1989); THOMAS RISSE-KAPPEN, BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL
RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS 3 (Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., 1995) [hereinafter TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS].

7. See generally Peter M. Haas, Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of
International Environmental Co-Operation, in REGIME THEORY, supra note 5, at 168
[hereinafter Haas, Epistemic Communities]; Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic
Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1-35 (1992) [hereinafter
Haas, Introduction].
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I shall question the state as a unitary actor paradigm, dominant in
international law theory, and argue that it is possible to explain
international law while conceptualizing the state as bureaucratic entity. I
shall suggest that, if states are thus to conceptualize, it is possible to
explain international law not as a creation of states but of individuals; that
international law is an international regime created and maintained by the
epistemic community of international law practitioners. In simpler words,
that international law is a set "of implicit or explicit principles, norms,
rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations
converge in a given area of international relations"' created and applied by
a community of international lawyers and practitioners through their
participation in their state's or organization's bureaucratic processes of
foreign policy making, and that, in consequence, it reflects the share
conceptions of those individuals. 9

II.

THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF THE STATE

A. State as a Unitary The Actor Model
Public international law appears to be a state centered system. It
assumes states are its main subjects and creators. Only states can be
members of the United Nations'0 and only states can be parties in cases
before the International Court of Justice." States conclude treaties 2 and
their general practice constitutes customary international law. 3 Even the
principles of international law are postulated in terms of states' rights and
obligations:

8. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 5, at 1, reprinted in ROBERT J.
BECK ET AL., INTERNATIONAL RULES 167 (1996).
9. A preliminary exposition of some these theses was attempted in Carlos Fernando DiazPaniagua, InternationalLaw and the Decision Making Process: Some Observations on Tacsan's
Alternative Approach, 11(1) INT'L LEGAL THEORY 17 (1996) (Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law Interest
Group on the Theory of Int'l Law, Washington, D.C.).
10. U.N. CHARTER art. 4, para 1 ("Membership in the United Nations is open to all other
peace-loving States which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the
judgement of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.").
11. I.C.J. STAT. art. 34, para. 1 ("Only States may be parties in cases before the
Court.").
12. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 6, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
8 I.L.M. 679 ("Every State possesses capacity to conclude treaties.").
13. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (4th ed.

1990).
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[e]very State has the duty to refrain in its international
relations from the threat or use of force . . .Every State
shall settle its international disputes with other States by
peaceful means . . .No State or group of States has the
right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other
State.1
This state-centered conception of international law corresponds to
the traditional theories of international relations that purport to explain
international relations, including international law, as the result of state
action. These theories assume that states are unitary rational actors, i.e.,
unitary decision making entities, with only one set of goals, perceived
options and estimated consequences of those options; that choose among
their options that whose expected consequences they rank highest in terms
of their goals."
This approach is illustrated by the neo-realist theory of K. Waltz
which contends that:
[s]tates are the units whose interactions form the structure
of international political systems. . . . To say that a state
is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will cope
with its internal and external problems, including whether
or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to
limit its freedom by making commitments to them. States
develop their own strategies, chart their own course, make
their own decisions about how to meet whatever needs
their experience and whatever desires they develop.16
B. Limitations and Alternatives to the 'State as a Unitary Actor'
Model
The realities of international relations, that constitute the object of
both international law and international relations theory, are more complex
than their representation by the state as a rationaland unitary actor model.
States are neither unitary nor rational entities but fictious persons.
Individuals interacting constitute states' substance. As Judge Cassese
14. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625,
U.N. GAOR, 25th sess., U.N. Doc A1RES/2625 (1970).

15. See generally ALLISON, supra note 3, at 10-38 (providing a general exposition of the
State as a rational actor model).
16. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 95-96 (1979).
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wrote: "States have no soul, no capacity to form and express an
autonomous will; they are 'abstract' structures acting through individuals.
Human beings alone can give flesh and blood to State activity." "7
This condition in the nature of states necessarily affects the
operation international law. Treaties are, in fact, negotiated, signed,
ratified and deposited by individuals acting on behalf of their states. State
practice, that generates customary law, is really the sum of acts performed
individual human beings. Particular norms of international law are, in the
same way, complied with or violated, not by metaphysical entities, but by
individuals.'" These phenomena are unavoidable and, in consequence,
several substantive norms of international law respond to them. For
example, both the rules regarding representation and full powers for the
negotiation of treaties 9 and the norms sanctioning genocide2s acknowledge,
17. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 14 (1986).
18. See id. at 9-10.
Although the protagonists of international life are corporate structures, of course they
cannot but operate through individuals, who do not act on their own account but as
State officials, or rather as the tools of the structures to which they belong. Thus, for
instance, if a treaty of extradition is concluded by the UK with the USSR, this deal
should not blind us to what actually happens, namely that the international instrument
is concretely brought into being by individuals and is subsequently implemented by
individuals. Diplomats belonging to the two states negotiate the agreement; the
instrument of ratification is formally approved and signed by the Heads of State, if
necessary after authorization by parliamentary assemblies. Once a treaty has entered
into force, it is implemented by the courts of each country and, if required, also by
officials of the respective Ministries of Justice and, indeed, it is generally for the
courts to grant or refuse in each particular case.
19. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 7, 47, 50, 51, 1155
U.N.T.S 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
(Art. 7.1. A person is considered as representing a state for the purpose of adopting or
authenticating the text of a treaty or for the purpose of expressing the consent of the state to be
bound by a treaty if:
he produces appropriate full powers; or
it appears from the practice of the state concerned or from other circumstances that their
intention was to consider that person as representing the state for such purposes and to dispense
with full powers.
2. In virtue of their functions and without having to produce full powers, the following are
considered as representing their state:
a) heads of state, heads of government and ministers for foreign affairs, for the purpose
of performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty;
b) heads of diplomatic missions, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty between
the accrediting state and the state to which they are accredited;
Representatives accredited by states to an international conference or to an international
organization or one of its organs, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty in that
conference, organization or organ.
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and purport to regulate, the role of individuals acting on behalf of their
states.
Similarly, international relations theory and political science have
acknowledged the limitations of the state as a rational actor model for
describing the complex realities of international politics and have proposed
several alternative conceptions of the state .21 One of these is the statist
conception of the state, according to which states are "central decisionmaking organizations and personnel"2 interacting both with domestic and
transnational actors and with other states.
This kind of conception of the state has been called subsystemic,
second image2 and a two level approach because it uses the states' internal
organization and politics for explaining their foreign policy and, more
broadly, the whole international society. Even if in international relations

theory and political science there still are considerable discrepancies about
which elements should be emphasized and about the basic terminology,n

there is a growing consensus that:
Art. 47. If the authority of a representative to express the consent of a state to be bound by
a particular treaty has been made subject to a specific restriction, his omission to observe that
restriction may not be invoked as invalidating the consent expressed by him unless the restriction
was notified to the other negotiating states prior to his expressing such consent.
Art. 50. If the expression of a state's consent to be bound by a treaty has been procured
through the corruption of its representative directly or indirectly by another negotiating state, the
state may invoke such corruption as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty
Art. 51. The expression of a state's consent to be bound by a treaty has been procured by
the coercion of its representative through acts or threats directed against him shall be without any
legal effect.
20. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res.
260, art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/260a (1948). 1021 U.N.T.S. 277 ("Art. 4. Persons committing
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.").
21.

See generally MARTIN HOLLIS & STEVE SMITH, EXPLAINING AND UNDERSTANDING

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 32-36 (1990) (summarizing the recent theoretical developments in
political science regarding the State).
22. Stephen D. Krasner, Power Politics, Institutions, and Transnational Telations, in
TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 6, at 259.
23. Michael Zurn, Bringing the Second Image (Back) In: About Domestic Sources of
Regime and the Course of Debt Crisis of the 1980s, in REGIME THEORY, supra note 5, at 28292.
24. HOLLIS, supra note 21, at 7-9; Andrew Kydd & Duncan Snidal, Progress in GameTheoretical Analysis of InternationalRegimes and Non-State Actors, in REGIME THEORY, supra
note 5, at 127-34.
25. See generally HOLLIS, supra note 21, at 38-41; Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing
TransnationalRelations Back in: Introduction, in TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 6, at
17-28 (discussing the current debates about the role of the state and of its domestic structures in
international politics).
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the way in which states bargain and co-operate cannot be
understood except with reference to the changing nature of
the state and the domestic political system. States interests
are not fixed but vary accordingly to the institutional
context, to the degree of organization of the contending
political forces within the state and wider political system,
and to the leadership capacities of the major actors?'

Il.

THE BUREAUCRATIC MODEL OF THE STATE AND THE DECISION
MAKING PROCESS
A classic form of the statist alternative to the state as a rational
actor model is the governmental or bureaucratic politics model.27 This
model purports to explain the conduct and policy, of states, but also of any
other bureaucratic entity; either a corporation, an international
organization, a non-governmental organization, or an interest group, as the
outcome of interaction between human beings. 2

A. Bureaucrats,interests and influence
The key assumption of the bureaucraticpolitics model is that states
and organizations are not unitary decision making actors but sets of
bureaucrats bargaining between themselves. 2 ' States do not have a unitary
set of goals, options and estimated consequences of those options, but
rather each individual actor in the internal decision-making process has its
own goals, conceptions and interests that he tries to promote, with the
power at his disposal, within and through the organization."° Therefore, its
main contention is that the actions attributed to the state are not rationally
chosen solutions to particular problems but rather the result from
"compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and
unequal influence."

26. Andrew Hurrell, International Society and the Study of Regimes, a Reflective
Approach, in REGIME THEORY, supra note 5, at 69, reprinted in BECK, supra note 8, at 206.
27.

ALLISON, supra note 3, at 144-244; see also HOLLIS, supra note 21, at 146-54;

KLEINDORFER, supra note 4, at 288-303.
28. See KLEINDORFER, supra note 4, at 288-303.
29. See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 164 ("The governmental actor is neither a unitary agent
nor a conglomerate of organizations, but rather is a number of individual players. Groups of
these players constitute the agent for particular governmental decisions and actions. Players are
men in jobs."). Id.; HOLLIS, supra note 21, at 146-47; KLEINDORFER, supra note 4, at 296.
30. See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 166-67; KLEINDORFER, supra note 4, at 296.
31. ALLISON, supra note 3, at 162.
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This model assumes that each individual actor in the internal

decision making process has and promotes his own goals, conceptions and
interests. 32 These private goals and interests flow, in part, from the
position of each actor in the bureaucratic organization but also from his
personal values, interests and conception of his role." Even more, these

actors can sponsor certain outcomes due to misrepresentation of the
situation or the options, 3' lack or inaccurate communication with other
actors, reticence to take certain risks, self-imposed constraints" and even
3

erroneous expectations . 6

In addition, the bureaucratic politics model assumes that the

individual actors in the decision making process have diverse power. Each
actor's capacity to influence the final governmental action, his power,
depends on his possession of bargaining advantages, on his skill and will to
use his advantages, and on the other actor's perception of his possession
and willingness to use those advantages. Bargaining advantages are those
elements, including 'formal authority, position, responsibilities, expertise,
control of information and resources, charisma, and personal relations with
other actors which also have bargaining advantages, that enable each actor
37
to influence the final outcome.
Furthermore, this model does not distinguish, in principle, between
policy or strategic decision making and regular conduct or routine
32. See id. at 166-67; KLEINDORFER , supra note 4, at 296.
33. See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 166-7.

A Secretary of State's resolution . . . depends not only upon the position, but also
upon the player who occupies it. For players are also people; men's metabolisms
differ. The hard core of bureaucratic politics mix is personality. How each man
manages to stand the heat in his kitchen, each player's basic operating style, and the
complementarity or contradiction among personalities and styles in the inner circles are
irreductible pieces of the policy blend. Then, too, each person comes to his position
with baggage in tow. His bags include sensitivities to certain issues, commitments to
various projects, and personal standing with and debts to groups in the society.
See generally KLEINDORFER, supra note 4, at 35-42; YAACOV Y. I. VERZTBERGER, THE
WORLD IN THEIR MINDS: INFORMATION PROCESSING, COGNITION AND PERCEPTION IN

FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONMAKING 113 (1990) (providing a detailed discussion of the role of
personal beliefs in the decision making process: "[t]he most elementary cognitive tools with
which the decisionmaker approaches, and attempts to clarify and impose meaning, on complex
and uncertain environments are beliefs, values and stereotypes. They serve as guides to
information processing and become a baseline for interpretations, expectation and predictions of
others' behavior."). But see HOLLIS, supra note 21, at 151 n.10 (arguing that the actors'
preferences are determined only by their positions Within the bureaucratic structure).
34. See KLEINDORFER, supra note 4, at 52-56.

35. See id. at 56-58.
36.

See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 178-79.

37. See id. at 168-69.
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decisions. 3 Any conduct requires to be performed, the decision of an
individual to execute it. Nonetheless, this model acknowledges that most
decisions are interrelated. First, because, as far as general policy decisions
usually require long series of subordinate decisions for their
implementation, there are a series of concatenated decisions. Second,
previous decisions may determine the issues and options being considered
and the power, interests and commitments of the actors. It further
recognizes that the actors that make those subordinate decisions also try to
promote their own goals, and that, in consequence, they try to modify,
ignore or construe the previous decisions, with the power at their disposal,
in order to favor their desired outcomes.3 9 In this sense, an actor entrusted
with the implementation of a policy decision can be more influential upon
the final outcome than the actor who took it.40
The consequence of these assumptions is that any state's or
bureaucratic entity's action is an agglutination of several relatively
independent judgments.41 The final outcome of the decision making
process is the result of the bargaining among several actors each of which
"pulls and hauls with the power at his discretion for the outcomes that will
advance his conception of national, organizational, group, and personal
interests. "42 Thus, the final action cannot be the result of a rational
selection between several options considering their estimated consequences
against the entities' goals, nor of a simple choice by a unitary group, nor
even the result of a coordinated policy or a common intention
independently pursued. On the contrary, it is rather the sum of the inputs
of several actors that were able either to act independently or to prevail i
the decision making process at its different levels.
Additionally, this model recognizes that individuals outside of the
formal structure of the bureaucratic entity also take part in the decision
38. See id. at 169-70 (discussing the channels of action). But see KLEINDORFER, supra
note 4, at 298-99 (distinguishing between strategic, tactical and routine decisions).
39.

See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 173.

Most decisions leave considerable leeway in implementation. Players who supported
the decision will maneuver to see it implemented and may go beyond the spirit if not
the letter of the decision. Those who opposed the decision, or opposed the action, will
maneuver to delay implementation, to limit implementation to the letter but not to the
spirit, and even to have the decision disobeyed.
40. See id. at 175 ("The mix of players and each player's advantages shift not only
between action-channels but also along action-channels. Chiefs dominate the major formal
decisions on important foreign policy issues, but indians, especially those in the organization
charged with carrying out the decision, may play a major role thereafter."); KLEINDORFER,
supra note 4, at 301.
41.

See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 171-73.

42.

Id. at 171.
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making process. In the case of states, while this model acknowledges the
central role of governmental officials in their government's decision
making process, it recognizes that members of the parliament, press,
interest groups and the public can and do take part in it, affecting thus the
final outcome. Therefore, it suggests that there are concentric circles of
3
influence and power in which state's actions crystallize.'
B. Coalitions,Networks and Communities
The bureaucratic politics model also contends that individual
actors tend to form coalitions with other actors in order to increase their
capadity to influence the final outcome of the decision making process
through the coordinated use of their bargaining advantages.
These
coalitions are formed either with actors that share similar values or goals
before the bargaining on the specific issue starts or with actors that are
persuaded, during the bargaining process, to sponsor their proposals."
Within governments, the formation of coalitions is not limited to
each state's internal political system. When actions in one state result in
advantages or disadvantages for actors in other state's internal political
processes, or when the proposed action requires a certain degree of
international negotiation, as most acts relevant to international law do,
coalitions are formed transnationally. Furthermore, in those cases, the
actors in one state, in order to increase their own influence in the final
outcome, try to empower their allies in other states by creating bargaining
advantages for them.'4

43. See id. at 164-65. C. W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of
InternationalLaw, in 86 A.S.I.L. PROC. 118-125 (1992). Taking a similar approach:
[tihe participants in any decision process include those formally endowed with decision
competence, for example judge, and all those other actors who, though not endowed
with formal competence, may nonetheless play important roles in influencing
decisions. In international decision, the observer must examine, in addition to formal
international organizations, state officials, non-governmental organizations, pressure
groups, interest groups, gangs, and individuals who act on behalf of all other
participants and on their own.
44. See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 169 (referring to "personal persuasiveness with other
players (drawn from personal relations, charisma); and access and persuasiveness who have
bargaining advantages drawn from above (based on interpersonal relations, etc.)" as sources of
power.); KLEINDORFER, supra note 4, at 301. ("The political model especially highlights that in
addition to their formal positions people are part of informal networks and coalitions, and that
organizational rationality may not always prevail because of hidden agendas. This realization is
especially crucial in understanding decision making in government or other large
bureaucracies.").
45.

See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 178.
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Several political scientists and international relations theorists have
devoted themselves to the study of this kind of transnational alliance." For
instance, Keohane and Nye have referred to transgovernmental coalitions
and transgovernmental policy networks as the coalitions formed by
"governmental bureaucracies charged with similar tasks . . . on particular
policy questions," 7 seeking to improve their chances of success by
bringing "actors from other governments into their own decision-making
processes as allies." 48 They have also acknowledged the relevance of
coalitions whose members do not belong to the formal governmental
structure.4 9 Thus, they use the broader concept of 'transnational relations'
to refer to all "contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries
that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of
governments"" while they restrict the use of the term transnational
interactions only to describe those transnational relations in which "at least
one actor is not an agent of a government or an intergovernmental
organization. ""1
Some of these transnational coalitions are ad hoc alliances created
specifically to promote particular policies, while others are permanent
coalitions formed because its members share common values, interests and
knowledge.: Among the latter, the coalitions based on certain knowledge
have deserved a closer examination because their characteristic bargaining
advantage, their share knowledge, increases its potential influence in the
final outcome as the issues object of the decision making process grow in
complexity."
In situations of high technical intricacy or uncertainty, most of the
regular participants in the decision making process lack the necessary
knowledge to determine the key issues and, in consequence, depend on
scientific or technical expertise. In such conditions, the task of making the
46. See generally Risse-Kappen, supra note 6, at 3-13 (summarizing the recent theoretical
developments regarding transnational alliances); Haas, Introduction, supra note 7, at 16-25
(analyzing the differences between the several theoretical constructions regarding transnational
alliances).
47. KEOHANE, supra note 6, at 34.
48. Id.

49. See id. at 24-25, 33-34; Joseph S. Nye & Robert 0. Keohane, TransnationalRelations
and World Politics: An Introduction, in TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS ix

(Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye eds., 1981).
50. Nye, supra note 49, at xi. See also Risse-Kappen, supra note 6, at 3.
51. Nye, supra note 49, at xii.
52. See Haas, Introduction, supra note 7, at 16-20 (discussing the various kinds of
transnational alliances).
53. See id. at 4-16; Haas, Epistemic Communities, supra note 7, at 179-80.
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Hence, the experts

become participants in the bureaucratic bargaining. Even more, if those
experts have political objectives, they can consolidate their influence upon
the final outcome through the acquisition of bureaucratic positions from
which they can dominate the decision making process. They can also
extend their influence through the creation of coalitions, which enable them

both to influence other actors and to avoid disagreements that might create
lack of confidence in their expertise."'
Several empirical studies have found transnational coalitions acting

in this way. In the area of international economic relations, for instance,
they have been found participating in the development of the European
Economic and Monetary Union 5 and in the trade relations between the
United States and Japan.5' They have also been found acting in the areas of
arms control,5' 7 environmental protection, from that of the African
elephantsm to that of the Mediterranean,' 9 and in Law of the Sea
negotiations,60 as described by Keohane:
[a]s transnational economic activity increased, so did
transnational political activity and contacts. . .
Oil
companies worked through their lawyers' membership in
the International Law Association, which influenced the
54. See Diana Crane, Transnational Networks in Basic Sciences, in TRANSNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS, supra note 49, at 242-251; Haas, Epistemic Communities,
supra note 7, at 179.
Under conditions of complex interdependence and generalized uncertainty specialists
play a significant role in attenuating such uncertainty for decision-makers.... Under
such circumstances perceptions may be false, leaders lack adequate information for
informed choice, and traditional search procedures are impossible, information is at a
premium, and leaders look for those able to provide authoritative advice and/or
delegate responsibility to them .... Such experts' influence is subject to their ability
to avoid widespread internal disagreement, and their influence persists through their
ability to consolidate political power through capturing important bureaucratic
positions in national administrations, from which they may persuade other decisionmakers or usurp control over decision-making.
55. See David R. Cameron, Transnational Relations and the Development of European
Economic and Monetary Union, in TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS supra note 6, at 37.
56. See Peter J. Katzenstein & Yutaka Tsujinaka, "Bullying, "Buying," and "Binding":
US-Japanese TransnationalRelations and Domestic Structures, in TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS
supra note 6, at 79.
57. See Matthew Evangelista, TransnationalRelations, Domestic Structures, and Security
Policy in the USSR and Russia, in TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS supra note 6, at 146.
58. See Thomas Princen, Ivory, Conservation, and Environmental Transnational
Coalitions, in TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS supra note 6, at 227.
59. See Haas, Epistemic Communities, supra note 7, at 191-201.
60. See KEOHANE, supra note 6, at 86-162.
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International Law Commission's work on draft conventions
for
the
1958
conference.
Scientists organized
transnationally in the Scientific Committee on Oceans
Research (SCOR) and successfully pressed their
governments to create the International Oceanographic
Commission (IOC) to coordinate large-scale oceanographic
research. World order groups worked transnationally to
promote a stronger international regime.'

It seems that these coalitions of experts are an outgrowth of
scientific communities. Progress of science requires the exchange of
information about new discoveries, techniques and theories between the
leading scientists. Their continued interaction forms a network of informal
links: acquaintances, friendships, partnerships and confidence, among
them, their collaborators and students, which favors the scientific research.
Furthermore, as both the scientific community itself and the complexity
and cost of the data collection increase, such community has to coordinate
its activities and concentrate its resources both through international non
governmental and intergovernmental organizations.62 Thus, if the members
of the scientific community develop policy objectives, or if their
knowledge is relevant to the political decision making process, the
scientific community's network of communication and convergence of
ideas facilitates the creation of transnational coalitions able to influence the
decision making process.
These coalitions based on scientific or technical knowledge whose
members promote coordinately a determined policy goal based arguably,
on their particular knowledge, have been denominated Epistemic
Communities.!, They have been defined as: "A group of individuals
(whose membership usually transcends national boundaries and includes
both scientists or experts and policy-makers) who share a common view
regarding causal mechanisms and appropriate responses and who have a
common set of values [that] emerges in conjunction with the issue in
question." 64

61. Id. at 110.
62. See Crane, supra note 54, at 237-38, 250.
63. See Haas, Epistemic Communities, supra note 7, at 179; Haas, Introduction, supra
note 7, passim.
64. Oran R. Young & Gail Osherenko, Testing Theories of Regime Formation: Findings
from a Large Collaborative Research Project, in REGIME THEORY, supra note 5, at 250. Cf.
Haas, Epistemic Communities, supra note 7, at 179-80. Giving a more detailed and restrictive
definition;
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IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW ACCORDING THE 'BUREAUCRATIC
POLITICS' MODEL

A. The Decision Making Process
The bureaucratic politics model of the state and the decision
making process seems adequate to explain the operation of international
law. Consider the simplest act relevant to international law, a unilateral
declaration. According to the 'bureaucratic politics' model, these kind of
acts should be either the result of the more or less detailed bargaining
process inside the governmental structure of only one state, or the sum of
relatively independent decisions and actions attributable to only one state.6
P. Kamath's account of the decision making process of India's unilateral
recognition of China's sovereignty over Tibet provides a suitable example:
[a]ccording to the former Principal Private Secretary of
Nehru, M.O. Mathai, it was Ambassador K.M. Panikkar
who by a change of crucial word in the cable changed
India's policy on Tibet. Nehru's telegram to Panikkar in
Peking authorized him to communicate India's recognition
of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, which Ambassador is
alleg[ing] to have changed to sovereignty. If this is true,
then Nehru did not make India's policy towards Tibet in
1950 but Ambassador Panikkar in fact made it. It is also
said that Nehru was persuaded by Pannikar not to insist on
a simultaneous Chinese recognition of McMahon line when
India recognized Chinese claim over Tibet."

They are a group of professionals, often from a number of different disciplines, who
share the following set of characteristics:
1. Shared consumatory values or principled beliefs. Such beliefs provide a value-based
rationale for social action of the members of the community.
2. Shared causal beliefs or professional judgments. Such beliefs provide analytic
reasons and explanations of behavior, offering causal explanations for the multiple
linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes.
3. Common notions of validity: intersubjective, internally defined criteria for
validating knowledge.
4. A common policy enterprise: a set of practices associated with a central set of
problems which have to be tackled, presumably out of a conviction that human welfare
will be enhanced as a consequence. Id.
65. See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 162-64.
66. P. M. KAMATH, FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING AND INTERNATIONAL POLmCS 90 (1990).
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India's decision to recognize China's suzerainty over Tibet without
insisting on a reciprocal recognition, seems, in Kamath's account, the
result of interaction of the central actors in India's foreign policy making:
the Prime Minister and his ambassador to Peking. India's recognition of
China's sovereignty over Tibet, seems to have been a decision of the
ambassador alone, who used his position, a bargaining advantage, to
change the key wording, thus overruling the Prime Minister's objections.
Hence, India's action, and its foreign policy and legal stand on this issue,
can accurately be described as a the sum of the inputs of several actors that
were able to act, interact, and prevail in the decision making process at its
different levels.
Usually, the decision making process of actions relevant to
international law is more complex than in Kamath's example. First, the
decision making process can be less centralized or the governmental
structure more complex. Second, nature of outcome being decided might
be, in itself, more complex than a unilateral declaration. It might involve
lengthy processes of negotiation with other states and the balancing of
contending interests in the municipal arena. In the case of multilateral
negotiations, these features of the bureaucratic decision making process
become acute, as illustrated by the United States' position during the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea:
[a]t the Caracas law of the sea meetings, the United States
delegation numbered 110 (of which only 20 were from the
State Department) - a virtual conference within a
conference. The efforts of the secretary of state to cut the
size of the delegation still left a delegation over eighty at
Geneva in 1975 . .
Some U.S. delegates have
misrepresented views of foreign governments within the
delegation, others have taken position with foreign
delegates contrary to official policy. Unauthorized leaks of
U.S. fallback positions have not been uncommon.
Somewhat more subtlety, the various "clubs" of delegates
with similar functional interests in fishing, navies, oil,
mining, and so forth that were established as part of the
informal conference diplomacy set up regular channels of
communication that cut across and created tension within
61
the already fragmented national positions ....
A particularly important instance was the lobbying by the United
States Interior Department and oil company officials with less developed
67. KEOHANE, supra note 6, at 116.
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countries in favor of broad coastal state jurisdiction over the continental
shelf (contrary to then official United States policy) at the Geneva sessions
8
of the Seabed Committee.6
These examples illustrate how the 'bureaucratic politics' model
serves to describe the decision making process of actions relevant to
international law. However, this description of the decision making
process of actions relevant to international law does not explain why
international law is complied in international relations.

B. The Effectiveness of InternationalLaw
I contend that the effectiveness of international law depends on
whether it affects the states' decision making processes in such a way that
the final outcomes comply or are in accordance with its substantive
provisions or not. Only if the outcomes of those processes comply with
international law, will it be effective.
Only if those outcomes are
construed to create or modify international law, will it be created or
modified. Therefore, it is necessary to consider how international law
affects the decision-maker's judgments in such a way that they will
produce outcomes in accordance with it.
International law can affect the judgments of the actors in the
decision making process in four different ways. First, it might be an
element in the formation of the individual actor's goals and interests.
Second, it might be part of the subject matter being decided. Third, it
might be a bargaining advantage in the hands of some of the actors; and,
fourth, it can be part of the constraints that might exist upon the bargaining
process.
First, international law might be an element in the formation of the
actors' goals. These goals are determined by the actors' positions in the
governmental structure, their personal values, interests, expectations and
conception of their role. Thus, it is possible that some actors may have
certain personal preference, inclination or commitment to international
law." If it is so, they may prefer and promote policies and conduct that
comply, or are in accordance, with it. President Wilson, who promoted

68. Id. at 149.
69. See ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE
ENVIRONMENT INA STATELESS SOCIETY 192 (1994) ("Subjects may feel an obligation to comply
with the prescriptions embedded in a regime because they see it as the proper thing to do on
moral or ethical grounds (that is, for moral reason)... ").
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mechanisms based on international law for the maintenance of international
peace, 0 exemplifies this attitude.
This kind of commitment to international law might flow from the
education, previous experiences or ethics of the actors. However, it can
also flow from the pure calculation of the advantages of that policy,7'1 either
because it reduces future conflicts or because it creates norms of conduct
that will, in subsequent interactions, be favorable to their interests or
increase their bargaining advantages.
Thus, for instance, Foreign
Ministries' legal advisors will tend to advance policies in accordance to
international law both as a result of their commitment, due to their
education and position, to law, and as a form to increase their own
influence and promote their parochial interests in their governments'
overall bargaining process.
Second, international law can be the subject matter of the decision
making process. Frequently, due to previous decisions and commitments,
state's and international organization's bureaucrats have to develop policies
or conduct towards international law or have to frame their decisions in
terms of international law. The extended negotiations and contradictions
within various governments to determine their positions during the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea exemplify this situation.
The actors, while elaborating their state's positions towards the
Conference, had to advocate their preferred policies or conduct on the
substantive issues in normative terms, because only in such terms could
they have been embodied in the expected outcome of the Conference; a
treaty.
Third, knowledge of international law can be a bargaining
advantage in the decision making process. When international law is the
subject matter or a relevant element in the decision making process, due to
the technicality or intricacy of the issues, the task of making the decision is
shared with or transferred to experts in international law. Hence, as
predicted by the model, the experts become influential in the bureaucratic
bargaining because of their knowledge.
Furthermore, even when international law is less central to the
issues at stake, the knowledge of international law allows the actors that
possess it bring, in favor of their positions, the authority of previous
conmmitments, nr or superior values, such as the respect for law. Thus, as
70. See KALEVI J. HOLSTI, PEACE AND WAR: ARMED CONFLICTS AND INTERNATIONAL
ORDER 1648-1989, 181-89 (1991).

71. See YOUNG, supra note 69, at 193.
72. Cf. VERZTBERGER, supra note 33, at 306 (referring to the use of historical arguments
in the foreign policy decision making process: "[wihen information about the environment is
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far as the use of such arguments allows them to influence the final outcome
of the decision making process in line to their policy goals, their
knowledge of international law becomes a base for their power. The use
of international human rights law as an argument during the decision

making process seems a suitable example.
Fourth, international law can be a constraint upon the decision
making process. 7 Structural elements of international law are seldom
reconsidered. They are, in fact, the result of previous decisions, which
have settled the particular issues. Hence, all or most actors in the
subsequent decision making processes assume them. For instance, when
the policy toward a particular treaty negotiation is considered, the principle
of the sovereign equality of states, finally agreed during the 1645-1648
negotiation of the peace of Westphalia,"4 is usually assumed and, therefore,
the decisions are made taking it into consideration.
Similarly, international law can establish patterns of bargaining and
influence the relative power of the actors." In these cases, international
law determines the rules of the game of the decision making process. For
complex and poses a high level of uncertainty and where power is shared, argumentation by
reference to history is a vital component of policy formulation and serves as a means of
persuading both the self and others.").
73. See generally id. at 41-44 (discussing the psychological constraints that limit the
behavior of the foreign policy decision-makers).
The perception of constraints affects choice. In choosing among options, decisionmakers may systematically analyze the content of the issues at hand and the constraints
imposed by the environment on choice, the implementation of the chosen alternative,
and the possible consequences of any relevant option . . . tacit and explicit selfimposed commitments to other political entities and their determination of actors'
behavior towards their patterns. Thus, a partnership in an alliance imposes certain
types of behavior toward other partners and a different sort toward those outside the
alliance. Membership in an organization such as the United Nations demands, at least
nominally, the adoption of specific standards of behavior, and any deviation from them
is supposed to require explanation or self-justification. Id.
74. See HOLSTI, supra note 70, at 33-39.
75. Cf. Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: Customary International
Law from an InterdisciplinaryPerspective, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 109, 122-124 (1995) (arguing a
similar point using the state as a unitary actor model).
A legal system such as the international legal system does more than simply create
expectations and promote stability. It also fulfills an essential social function by
transforming applications of raw power into legitimate power, thereby creating rights
to apply power within certain structures using certain means. For instance, in the
absence of an overarching, law-making sovereign, the international legal system
demands reciprocity: recognition on the part of those applying power of the rights of
others to apply power within those same structures and using those same means. This
recognition in turn imposes a significant constraints on states as they engage in
behavior that contributes to the maintenance, development or change of rules of
customary international law. Id.
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example, the United Nations Charter and the rules of procedure of the
Council inform the bargaining process, which creates resolutions of the
Security Council of the United Nations. Thus, as far as the adoption of the
resolutions requires certain majority and the norms favor decisions by
consensus, the delegates that take part in the negotiations try actively to
obtain the acquiescence of even the smallest powers. In the same way, the
influence of the delegates of the permanent members is increased by the
shadow of their veto power, also granted by previous decision regarding
international law.
I submit that international law can affect, in any of the above
mentioned ways, the judgment of some actors in the decision making
process. If it does, such actors will be committed, constrained,
empowered or expert in international law. Hence, if any of those actors
prevails or influences the bargaining process, international law will
probably inform the final outcome, i.e., it will be effective. Conversely, if
those actors are excluded from the decision making process, or if they
exercise a minor influence, the final outcome will tend to be in less
conformity with international law. The degree of influence of those actors
upon the final outcome depends, as mentioned before, on their possession
of bargaining advantages, their skill and will to use those advantages, and
the other actor's perception of their possession and willingness to use those
advantages, over the several stages of the decision making process. In
consequence, the effectiveness of international law resides in the success of
those actors committed, constrained, empowered or expert in it, in
promoting policies or conducts in accordance with it, within the decision
making processes of their organizations.
Consider, for instance, the effectiveness of the Laws of War.
According to the previous argument, these norms would be effective only
if they affect the judgments of some decision makers in the chain of
command in such way that the final actions are in accordance with them.
Conversely, these norms would be ineffective if they are put aside during
the relevant decision making processes. General Powell's comment on the
1991 Gulf War decision making process seems to confirm these
propositions: "Decisions were impacted by legal considerations at every
level. Lawyers proved invaluable in the decision-making process." 76
C. The creation of InternationalLaw
The bureaucraticpolitics model also seems able to explain how
and why international law is created. It argues the actors in the decision
76. Christopher Greenwood, Command and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 4 STRATEGIC
AND COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER 1 (1993).
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making process try to promote their goals not only within their particular
organizations, but also through them. Governmental bureaucrats do not
limit their interests, goals and expectations to the municipal arena, but they
also have interests and goals in other states and expectations regarding the
whole international society. Hence, these actors pursue, within their
governments, outcomes regarding other states, i.e., foreign policy.
Furthermore, if these actors are, in some way, committed, constrained,
empowered or expert in international law, those outcomes will tend to be
expressed in terms of international law. Thus, I submit, international law
is created for promoting, in the international arena, the interests, goals and
values of those individuals committed, constrained or empowered by
international law or expert in it.
Once these individuals are successful in committing their
governments to diplomatic negotiations or in creating intergovernmental
organizations, the bureaucratic decision making process is extended to the
international arena. It seems that, in principle, international law affects the
judgments of the individual actors in the intergovernmental decision
making process in the same way that it does to those actors within the
internal decision making process. Therefore, international law can also be
an element in the formation of the individual actor's goals and interests, a
part of the subject matter being decided, a bargaining advantage in the
hands of some of the actors, or constitute constraints upon the bargaining
process. In consequence, it seems that international law results from the
"compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and
unequal influence," " all of which try to promote their parochial interests,
values and goals in the international arena.
The history of negotiation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
provides some support to these theses. As Best remarks, the influence and
positions of some states seem to have been based on the influence and
interests of their delegates:
Britain's social strategist Alexander was not being entirely
satirical in his reference to 'the Great Powers (including
Monaco.)' Monaco's chief delegate was the vigorous and
influential French law professor from Aix-en-Provance,
Paul de Geouffre de La Pradelle. Monaco mattered partly
because he mattered. He was one of the most thoughtful
contributors to the debates (two years later published a
uniquely valuable book about the 1949 conference) and he
was a weighty spokesman for the most persistent of
77.

ALLISON, supra note 3, at 162.
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pressure-groups, the International Committee of Military
Medicine and Pharmacy, from which, based in Monaco
before the war, had flowed a stream of humanitarian
proposals."7

In some instances, even the specific drafting of the provisions can
be related to the parochial and immediate interests of the actors. The
inconsistency embodied in article 130 of the III Geneva Convention, which
refers to great suffering or serious injury to body or health committed
againstpersons or property, 79 resulted, according to the British Foreign
Office, - to the fact that Mr. Vaillancourt, the head of the Canadian
delegation, wanting his lunch, did not allow the drafting committee to look
at it properly.80
Furthermore, as far as the actions within one government or
organization, or their outcomes, can affect the distribution of power or the
goals of actors in other governments, those actors with common goals or
values will tend to create transnational coalitions in order to increase their
overall influence.!' If the member of these coalitions are successful in
influencing their respective government's policy or conduct decision
making process, the outcomes, i.e., the actions attributed to those states,
will tend to converge.8 2 These facts explain both the successful conclusion
of treaties and the homogeneity of the state practice on which customary
international law is based.
Regarding the role of transnational coalitions in the successful
conclusion of treaties, a suitable example, which deserves to be quoted in
full, is provided by the description of the negotiating process of the
Atlantic Treaty given by Theodore Achiles, a member of the United States
delegation:
At first there were the British, French, Belgians, Dutch,
Luxembourgers, Canadians, and ourselves.
The
negotiations were normally conducted by the Secretary of
State and the various ambassadors in Washington. They
met only infrequently.
The actual negotiations were
78.

GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 (1994).

79. III Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,
1949, art. 130, 75 U.N.T.S., 39 U.K.T.S. Cmnd. 550, 47 A.S.I.L. Supl. 119-177 (1953).
80. BEST, supra note 78, at 165.
81.

ALLISON, supra note 3, at 178.

82. Cf. Haas, Epistemic Communities, supra note 7, at 188-89 ("[a]s epistemic
communities obtain and consolidate influence in different governments, national preferences and
policies will come to reflect the epistemic beliefs."); I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN & MAUREEN R.
BERMAN, THE PRACTICAL NEGOTIATOR 37-38 (1982).
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conducted by a working group of which Jack Hickerson
was the senior member, Bill Galloway the junior officer,
and [which included] myself and two other members of the
U.S. team. The other members were ministers or political
counselors of the various embassies here.
That was before the days of air conditioning, and we met
all summer in our shirtsleeves around a table in one of the
offices of the State Department. By the time the summer
was over we had a treaty in pretty good shape, and all
knew each other intimately, trusted each other, and we
were all used to working together. Derick Hoyer-Miller,
who was the British minister and the senior member of the
British representatives in the working group, stated
something which we later called the NATO spirit. One
day in a working group he made a proposal. No one
remembers what it was, but nobody liked the proposal and
we all said so rather bluntly. And Derick said, all right,
those are my instructions from London. I'll tell them that I
made my pitch and that it was shot down, and that this is
what everybody else thinks that the answer should be.
So we worked out collectively what we thought the best
arrangement was. Derick referred it back to London and
got approval on it, and we all referred it to our various
governments and got approval.
That developed into a quite a negotiation technique. No
matter what any of us had by the way of instruction, we
would try to find what we thought was the right answer,
and then tried to get our respective governments to agree
to it. That worked out very well indeed. 83
Regarding customary international law, I contend its coherence is
due to the fact that individuals belonging to the same epistemic community
create it. As far as those individuals sharing knowledge about international
law are committed, in different degrees, to promote outcomes in its terms
and are successful in doing so both within the bureaucratic decision making
process of their states or organizations and while acting in the international
arena on their behalf, the actions regarding international law attributed to

83.

ZARTMAN, supra note 82, at 37-38.
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their states or organizations do converge.8 The sum of these converging
actions constitutes general practice.
It seems that international lawyers and diplomats form the
epistemic community which creates international law. They share, on
broad terms, certain number of professional beliefs: a similar conception of
international law, its principles, sources and procedures. 8 The existence of
these shared beliefs is evidenced by the fact that most introductory manuals
to international law argue the same points, with the same examples, and,
usually, even following the same structure. Similar syllabi and teaching
methodologies in international law lectures around the world reinforce the
homogeneity of the shared knowledge," while the leading scholars
systematize it and help to propagate it. Thus, if these beliefs are generally
effective in international relations, is because those professionals are able
to advance them through their state's or organization's policy-making
processes.
These individuals also form a transnational network of
professionals, as it is proved by the extended membership of professional
organizations such as the American Society of International Law'7 and the
existence of activities such as the annual meeting of Foreign Ministries'

84. Cf. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 210-11
(1994) (arguing the investment protection law has been created by a 'club of jurists': "[olverseas
tribunals are inclined to apply norms developed by jurists from capital-exporting states which are
favorable to investment protection... Statements that arbitrators belong to a club that reinforces
attitudes of its members are beginning to appear.").
85. See Jutta Brunn& & Stephen 1. Toope, Environmental Security and Freshwater
Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 26, 34 (1997) ("It might even be
argued that international lawyers themselves form something akin to an epistemic community,
because they promote values through specific principles, such as the ecosystem principles posited
in this paper, which can guide the evolution of regimes and ultimately gain normative
significance."); see also Byers, supra note 75, at 130 ("As a social institution the process of
customary law is above all a set of shared beliefs, expectations or understandings held by the
individual human beings who govern and represent states. Like all institutions, and the
international system itself, it is a set of ideas.").

86. See generally JOHN

KING GAMBLE, TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 1990S

(1992).
87. Charlotte Ku, Message from the Executive Director, ASIL NEWSLETrER (The Am.
Soc'y of Int'l Law, Washington, D.C.), Mar.-May 1996, at 4.

Through membership in the American Society of International Law, individuals gain
access to a specialized and well-recognized network - both of other ASIL members and
of members of organizations comparable to the society ....
It is the formation and
maintenance of this network which are a principal task of the leadership and staff of
the organization. The network further identifies opportunities to motivate and to
mobilize members to take leadership roles in their communities and professional life to
foster the use and study of international law.
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legal advisors during the General Assembly of the United Nations." Their
regular contact both through intergovernmental meetings and private
associations provides them with an opportunity to form acquaintances,
share information and create common values, all of which facilitate the
formation of coalitions for the promotion of specific policy objectives.
It seems also that they share, on very broad basis, the same values
and policy objectives. Most international lawyers and diplomats seem to
be committed to promoting the rule of law in international relations:
"world order through law. "1 Nevertheless, some empirical research seems
necessary to assess the extent of this commitment and whether it is
transformed into specific policy recommendations.
On the other hand, subgroups of this network clearly have shared
values and policy objectives. For instance, a coalition including legal
experts of the International Red Cross; Professor H. Lauterpacht, from
Cambridge; Professor Graven, from Geneva University; Max Huber,
former judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice; Captain
Mouton, a member of The Netherlands's Supreme Court; and Coronel
Phillimore, a legal advisor to the British Government and a member of the
prosecution in Nuremberg, developed and successfully promoted the
concept of grave breaches during the 1949 Geneva Conference.90 Another
example is provided by the coalition of Foreign Ministries' legal advisors,
legal counselors in several permanent missions to the United Nations and
the World Health Organizations, and private international lawyers
belonging to several NGOs, that was able to advance two requests for
advisory opinions on the use of nuclear weapons to the International Court
of Justice. 9 Finally, M. Sonarajah contends that a similar coalition is
acting in the area of protection of foreign investment.n
88. Miguel Angel Gonzllez Felix, Fifth Legal Advisers' Meeting at UN Headquaters in
New York, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 644, 644-49 (1995).
89. Cf. Reisman, supra note 43, at 123 (arguing that:
Jurists are distinctive among them [scholars] in that they alone undertake, explicitly, to
intervene in the social process that has been examined in order to secure changes in the
pattern of authoritative decision so that it will henceforth discriminate in favor of a
particular party or, one hopes, in favor of the common interest).
90. BEST, supra note 78, at 160-65.
91. Manfred Mohr, Advisory Opinion of the InternationalCourt of Justice on the Legality
of the use of Nuclear Weapons Under InternationalLaw, a Few Thoughts on its Strengths and
Weaknesses, 316 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 92, 92-93 (1997).
In May 1992 an international campaign was launched in Geneva by non/governmental
organizations (NGOs) under the title World Court Project. The original promoters of
the campaign were the long-standing International Peace Bureau (IPB) in Geneva, the
well-known International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and the
International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, formed at the end of the
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V.

CONCLUSION: THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

If the previous argument, that international law is a set of norms

created by the members of an epistemic community, for promoting their
parochial interests, goals and values in the international arena, were to be
accepted; it would be necessary to reconsider the nature of international
law. Conceiving it just as a system of law based on the will and practices
of the states would appear unsatisfactory.
Therefore, I suggest that
international law should be conceived as an international regime created by

an epistemic community.
The concept of international regimes, as used by political scientists
and international relations scholars, refers to "sets of implicit or explicit
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which
actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations." 91
This concept, in principle, does not coincide with that of international
law." It does not require the norms to be legally binding or have a legal
1980s. Some 10 more (international) NGOs, including Greenpeace International, later
joined in. What at the outset looked like rather unpromising initiative by a few
determined "peace activists" soon developed into a worldwide movement made up of
numerous non-governmental and governmental players.
See also Legality of the Threat or use of nuclear weapon Advisory Opinion, Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Oda, I.C.J. § 8 (1996), UN Doc. A/51/218 pp. 94-95 (1996), 35 I.L.M. 809 & 1343
(1996) (explaining the previous involvement of the NGO's).
.92. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 84, at 354-55.
There are no objective criteria by which the principles of this so-called legal system
[lex mercatoria]canbe identified and no bench-mark by which it could be tested except
its acceptance by a select group of European arbitrators and scholars who promote it
through their incestuous writings. Systematic damage is done by efforts to create
investment protection through the formulation of spurious doctrines by scholars totally
committed to the protection of the multinational corporations and hostile to the
interests of the developing countries. It is unlikely that these efforts will cease.
93. Krasner, supra note 8, at 2; see MARK W. ZACHER & BRENT A. SuTrON,
GOVERNING GLOBAL NETWORKS:

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES FOR TRANSPORTATION

AND

COMMUNICATIONS 14-15 (1996); cf. Volker Rittberger, Research on International Regimes in
Germany: The Adaptative Internalization of an American Social Science Concept, in REGIME
THEORY, supra note 5, at 10 - 11.
94. Cf. Brunn6e, supra note 85, at 31 (using a more restrictive definition of regimes than
the one used in this paper: "Regimes as understood in international relations theory, because of
their grounding in state practice, provide building blocks for the construction of more specific
(and binding) legal regimes. We call these relatively informal and nonbinding regimes contextual
regimes for they provide a setting in which binding normativity can emerge."); but see Byers,
supra note 75, at 128-36 ("To an international lawyer this phenomenon [regimes] sounds like
international law by another name, Indeed, it is international law, with the important twist that
the regime theorists, unlike international lawyers, are directly concerned about the relationship
between power and sets of rules or procedures."); YOUNG, supra note 69, at 184-211; Kenneth
W. Abbott, Elements of a Joint Discipline, 86 A.S.I.L. PROC. 167-72 (1992); Burley, supra note
2, at 220; Oran R. Young, Remarks, 86 A.S.I.L PROC. 172-75 (1992).

1158

ILSA Journalof Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 4:1133

character. 5 On the contrary, it purports to include norms, rules, principles
and decision making procedure that do not necessarily belong to
international law, such as non binding guidelines, secret or illegal
agreements and even implicit agreements for the division of areas of
influence." Furthermore, regimes theory considers separate sections of
international law, or sets of norms, as separate international regimes.
Thus, for example, the internationalshipping regime, formed by over fifty
international instruments regulating damage and compensation," and the
Jan Mayen-Iceland Marine Resources regime," based on a treaty between
Iceland and Norway," are considered totally independent regimes.
Nevertheless, this kind of approach is familiar to international law
scholarship. It is usual to describe areas of the law as separate unties: Law
of the Sea, Laws of War, International Human Rights Law, the Hague
System for the Settlement of Disputes, the Regime of the High Seas,
Diplomatic Protection.'" ° In addition, as far as general international law
constitutes an indispensable framework for each particular international
regime 01 and provides some of their defining characteristics,- it constitutes
95. Robert 0. Keohane, The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a EuropeanAmerican Research Programme, in REGIME THEORY, supra note 5, at 27-28 (arguing that a
defining characteristic of regimes is their effectiveness).
Mhe most fundamental issue is whether regimes are to be identified on the basis of
explicit rules and procedures, or on the basis of observed behavior, from which rules,
norms, principles, and procedures can be inferred. Defining regimes simply in terms
of explicit rules and procedures risks slipping into the formalism characteristic of some
traditions of international law: that is, purely nominal agreements could be considered
to be regimes, even though they had no behavioral implications. The futile and empty
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1927, to outlaw war, could on a formalistic definition be
considered an international regime.
Rittberger, supra note 93, at 11.
96. See YOUNG, supra note 69, at 200-02; Friedrich Kratochiwil, Contract and Regimes:
Do Issue Specificity and Variations of Formality Matter?, in REGIME THEORY, supra note 5, at
73, 85-91.
97. See ZACHER, supra note 93, at 52-54.
98. See YOUNG, supra note 69, at 61-63.
99. Agreement on the Continental Shelf between Iceland and Jan Mayen, Oct. 22, 1981,
Iceland-Norway, 21 I.L.M. 1222 (1982).
100. Cf. BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 528 (arguing that:
International Law is not a system replete with certain nominated torts or delicts, but
[that] the rules are specialized in certain respects. Thus reference may be made to the
source of harm, such as unauthorized acts of officials, insurrections, and so on, or to
the object and form of harm, as, for example, territorial sovereignty, diplomats and
other official agents, or injury to nationals).
101. See ZACHER, supra note 93, at 2.
Without states' acceptance of each other's sovereign authority with defined territorial
domains, their network of diplomatic conventions for communication and international
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an integral element of each of them. Hence, as far as general international
law is a set of norms shared among several independent regimes, it can be
described as a meta regime.0 3
Thus, I submit, particular sets of international law norms constitute
several specific international regimes, characterized by the actor's
perception that their norms are legally binding (opinio juris), while the
core of general international law; including, possibly, its general
principles, definitions about its subjects and sources, and basic principles
on law of treaties and settlement of international disputes; constitutes a
meta regime.
Once international law is conceptualized as an international regime
created by an epistemic community, it is possible to apply to it, in order to
understand its development, the theoretical elaboration of regimes theory.
This theory contends that, when the distribution of power in the
international society favors a state or group of states, norms are created by
the action of actors and epistemic communities through the machinery of
that hegemonic power, and that those norms will persists as long as that
state maintains its dominant position.'- When the power is distributed
homogeneously or in several centers, the norms, according to this theory,
are created by the action of the members of epistemic communities in the
different governments, and they persists as far as those actors retain their

law-making, and their obligations to comply with international agreements and to
assure compliance by their citizens, it would be impossible to generate the kinds of
specific regimes that are increasingly prevalent and important in many spheres of
international relations.
102. Cf. Kratochiwil, supra note 96, at 80-1.
Although many regimes are likely to contain rules and norms that serve this function
[increasing transparency and lowering transaction costs], it is difficult to call such
provisions by themselves a regime, unless we refer directly to contracting itself as a
regime. At a minimum, a regime requires a relationship that emerges from a long-term
interactive contracting. This seems to be required for two reasons. First, the parties to
an incomplete contract must agree not only on rules regulating specific actions, but
also on much more general principles which impose upon them duties to settle future
disputes. Consequently, it is quite understandable that these principles have been held
to supply the 'basic defining characteristics of a regime', or even its 'nature'. Id.
103. See generally ZACHER, supra note 93, at 14 ("Norms are also often shared among
specific regimes, and when the norms are the same or very similar among a number of regimes,
it is possible to say that a meta regime exists.").
104. See Haas, Epistemic Communities, supra note 7, at 187 ("Under conditions of
uncertainty, when the international power is concentrated in one state, and when epistemic
communities have successfully consolidated influence in the dominant state . . . [tihe regime
would still be created through the intercession of the hegemon, but its substance would reflect
epistemic consensus.").
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When there is a change in the distribution of power, the

norms may persist if some members of the epistemic community that
created them are able to acquire bureaucratic positions in the new dominant
powers. Nevertheless, if the knowledge of such community looses its
validity, the regime will decay. This theory further argues that both the
variations in the national policies and the different degrees of compliance
with the norms are due to the different degrees of penetration and influence

of the members of the epistemic community in the decision making
processes of each state. '06
This approach can provide some insights on the development of
international law. First, it can explain its main trends. Thus, for example,
the acceptance of international law by Third World Countries and NonWestern States '°1 can be explained as the result of the penetration of
members of the epistemic community of international law practitioners into
the growing bureaucracies of those states.' 08 Second, it can explain
particular incidents in the development of the law. For instance, it would
attribute the negotiations on the Law of the Sea since 1967, including the
entrance into force of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, and the negotiation of two implementation agreements, I0° to the
105. See id. at 188-89.
106. See id. at 189.
National positions would vary according to the extent of penetration by epistemic
communities, or the sensitivity of policies in that country to policies in a country
already influenced by the epistemic community. . . . Policies and linkages may be
quite sophisticated, reflecting the quality of its beliefs. The extent to which such
lessons are accepted and converted into new policies in different countries, as well as
regime compliance, are subject to the ability of members of the epistemic community
to occupy key bureaucratic slots and to persuade others of their preferred policies.
107. See generally CASSESE, supra note 17, at 69-70.
108, Cf. ZARTMAN, supra note 82, at 226.
By now the world has established an international diplomatic culture that soon
socializes its members into a similar behavior. Even the Chinese have learned to play
the U.N. game by its rules, newly independent countries such as the African nations
attach themselves to their former colonial delegations for general advice until they
have learned the ropes, and groups of delegates teach the newer members about
diplomatic ways originally developed for a European state system. It is difficult to
maintain, as Nicolson and Morgenthau did, that the Western system of diplomacy and
negotiation worked out over the centuries is in danger of imminent destruction at the
hands of people who cannot comprehend our ways; to the contrary, the new nations
have learned the Western ways well and are using them to their own purposes.
109. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, OFFICIAL TEXT OF
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA WITH ANNEXES AND INDEX, UN
Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983), 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982); Agreement Relating to the Implementation
of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted July 28, 1994,
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activities of a epistemic community of international lawyers and
practitioners,10 formed around Ambassador Pardo,"' and which grew
during the following negotiations.
On the other hand, while this approach can provide a deeper
understanding of the nature of international law and its role in international
relations, it does not challenge the normal practice of international law. Its
conclusions are limited to the theory of international law, not to the normal
science12 of international law. International law's methods do not lose
their validity because they are the methods reserved for a community that
uses them to promote the values and goals of its members. On the
contrary, they are valid precisely because the members of such a
community accept them, and the conclusions reached using them, as valid.
Hence, international lawyers would have to continue arguing international
law, using legal terms and legal methods, in order for their conclusions to
be accepted as relevant statements of the law by other members of their
community and, as a consequence, to be influential in promoting their own
goals and values.
Finally, this conception of international law does have an ethical
consequence. It highlights the role that international lawyers, including
diplomats, legal advisors and academicians, play in international relations.
It reveals that these individuals have certain values and goals regarding
how international relations should be, and that they work to assure that
those values are embodied in the actual practice attributed to their states or
international organizations. Thus, it would require these professionals to
acknowledge their role and relevance and to be aware of the direction that
they are imprinting upon the international society. This new awareness
calls for higher level of responsibility on their part.
Politicians and diplomats were privileged inhabitants of a
world of unreality, an unreality which was life-threatening
on a grand scale, a world which nevertheless seemed to its
G.A. Res. 48/263 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1309 (1994); Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks, adopted Dec. 5, 1995, G.A. Res. 50/24 (1995), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/37; U.N.
Doc. A/50/550, annex I.

110. Cf. KEOHANE, supra note 6, at 114-16, 125, 148 - 50.
111. Cf. CASSESE, supra note 17, at 379-84.
112. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2nd ed. 1970)

(defining a normal science as the scientific endeavor which uses a paradigm, i.e., (at vii) the
'universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and
solutions to a community of practitioners," as its criteria for determining the validity any further
research.).
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inhabitants, in characteristic paranoid fashion, to be
perfectly real and natural and inevitably and right. It
followed that specialists in the study of so-called
international relations were studying a form of pathological
behavior.
And it followed also that the role of
international lawyers had been to seek to rationalize and
3
regularize pathological behavior."

113. ALLOTr, supra note 1, at xii.
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La conclusi6n a la cual llegu6 durante mi tiempo en la Oficina
Extranjera era que el orden internacional viejo no era un fen6meno natural
al que la humanidad habia ajustado su conducta ni una agregaci6n fortuita
de eventos pasados innumerables de interacci6n humana. El orden
internacional viejo determina las posibilidades percibidas, y tambi6n
disponible a politicos y gobiernos cuando ellos tocan cualquier parte en el
sistema y tambidn los miembros del pfiblico general. Pero el propio
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sistema internacional es solamente una estructura de ideas creadas en la
mente humana, y nada mis.i

I.

INTRODUCCI6N

En su artfculo seminarial, Burley2 desafi6 a los abogados
intemacionales para explorar las implicaciones de la reciente Teorfa de la
Ciencia Polftica en la Teorfa de la Ley Internacional. Este documento es
un esfuerzo para aplicarse a ese desaffo. En 61, yo usar6 el Modelo de la
Polftica Burocrdtica del Estado 3 y el proceso organizacional para tomar
decisiones, 4 y los conceptos de R~gimenes Intemacionales, 5 las redes
Transgubernamentales, 6 y las Comunidades Epist~micas 7 para proponer
1.

PHILIP ALLOTT, EUNOMIA, NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD, xv-xvi (1990).

2.
Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and International Relations Theory:
A DualAgenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L. L. 205, 239 (1993).
Sobretodo, los abogados internacionales no pueden ignorar las riquezas crecientes de

datas cientificas politica en elmundo que ellos buscan a regular. Las medidas pueden
ser imprecisas, las teorfas cruda, pero las ofertas enteras por lo menos dan la
esperanza de laciencia positiva de asuntos mundiales. Como es una disciplina
juvenil, la ciencia polftica internacional hace mucho rechaz6 las visiones de ley
internacional. Como crece, redescubre lo qu6 a los abogados internacionales nunca
se leolvid6, pero con visiones agregadas de su propio conocimiento. En elextremo, la
ley informada por polftica es la mejor garantfa de polftica informada por la ley. Id.
(nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).
Vea tambiin Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and International
Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 717, a las 717-731 (1995) (resumiendo las
escuelas principales de pensamiento en Teorfa de las Relaciones Internacional).
3. Vea generalmente GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1971) para una completa, y ahora clfsica, exposici6n del modelo de
decisi6n de la politica burocritica; pero vea Edward Rhodes, Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter?
Some Disconfirming Findingsfrom the Case of the US Navy, 47 WORLD POL. 1 (1994); Stephen
D. Krasner, Are Bureaucracies Important?(or Allison Wonderland), 7 FOREIGN POL'Y 159
(1972).
4. Vea generalmente PAUL R. KLEINDORFER ET AL., DECISION SCIENCES, AN
INTEGRATIVE PERSPECTIVE 295-303 (1993).

5. Vea generalmente INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); REGIME
THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Volker Rittberger ed., 1993) [en adelante REGIME
THEORY].
6. Vea generalmente ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND
INTERDEPENDENCE (2nd ed. 1989); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations
Back in: Introduction, in BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE
ACTORS, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 3 (Thomas Risse-Kappen
ed., 1995) [en adelante TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS].
7. Vea generalmente Peter M. Haas, Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of
InternationalEnvironmental Co-Operation, in REGIME THEORY, supra nota 5, a 168 [en adelante

Haas, Epistemic Communities]; Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and
InternationalPolicy Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1-35 (1992) [en adelante Haas, Introduction].
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una explicaci6n sobre c6mo y por qu6 la ley internacional se crea, se
aplica, y se mantiene.
Yo cuestionar6 el paradigma de el estado como un actor unitario,
dominante en teoria de la ley internacional, y argumentar6 que es posible
explicar la ley internacional mientras conceptuando el estado como entidad
burocritica. Yo sugerir6 que, si los estados son conceptualmente vistos
asi, serd posible explicar la ley internacional no como una creaci6n de
estados, sino de individuos; que la ley internacional es un Regimen
Internacional creado y mantenido por la Comunidad Epist~mica de
Practicantes de las Leyes Internacionales. En palabras mis simples, la ley
internacional es un grupo "de principios implicitos o explicitos, normas,
reglas y procedimientos para tomar decisiones alrededor de que las
expectativas de los actores que convergen en un irea de relaciones
internacionales" 8 creado y aplicado por una comunidad de Abogados
Internacionales y Practicantes a trav~s de su participaci6n en las
organizaciones de sus estados, los procesos burocrdticos de politica
extranjera, y que, en consecuencia, refleja los conceptos de esos
9
individuos.
II.

EL CONCEPTO TRADICIONAL DEL ESTADO

A. El Modelo del Estado Como un Actor Unitario
La ley internacional pfiblica parece ser un sistema de estado
centralizado la cual asume que estados son sus asuntos principales y
creadores. S61o los estados pueden ser miembros de las Naciones Unidas l°
y s6lo los estados pueden ser vistos en casos ante la Corte Internacional de
Justicia.1
Los estados concluyen tratados1 2 y su prictica general

8. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra nota 5, a 1, reimprimido en ROBERT
J. BECK ET AL., INTERNATIONAL RULES 167 (1996). (Nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).

9. Una exposici6n preliminaria de algunos de estas tesis se intentaron en Carlos Fernando
Diaz-Paniagua, International Law and the Decision Making Process: Some Observations on
Tacsan's Alternative Approach, II(1) INT'L LEGAL THEORY 17 (1996) (Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law

Interest Group on the Theory of Int'l Law, Washington, D.C.).
10. U.N. CHARTER art. 4, para. 1 ("El ntimero de miembros en las Naciones Unidas estA
abierta a todos los otros Estados que tienen en cuenta la paz y que aceptan las obligaciones
escritas en la Carta constitucional presente y, en el juicio de la Organizaci6n, son capazes y
llevarnm a cabo estas obligaciones."). (Nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
11. I.C.J. STATUTE art. 34, para. 1 ("S61o Estados pueden tomar parte en casos antes de
la corte."). (Nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).
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constituye ley intemacional de costumbre. 13 Incluso se postulan los
Principios de Ley Intemacional en t6rninos de los derechos y obligaciones
de los estados:
Cada Estado tiene el deber de dejar sus relaciones
internacionales de la amenaza o uso de fuerza. . . . Cada
Estado estableceri sus disputas internacionales con otros
Estados por medios pacificos.... Ningtin Estado o grupo
de Estados tienen el derecho para intervenir, directamente
o indirectamente, por cualquier raz6n, en4 los asuntos
1
internos o externos de cualquier otro Estado.
Este concepto de estado centralizado de la ley internacional
corresponde a las teorias tradicionales de relaciones intemacionales que
pretenden explicar relaciones internacionales,
incluyendo la ley
internacional, como el resultado de acci6n estatal. Estas teorias asumen
que los estados son actores racionales unitarios, es decir, decisi6n unitaria
que hace entidades, con s6lo unas metas, las opciones percibidas y las
consecuencias estimadas de esas opciones. Eso le permite escoger entre
sus opciones las consecuencias que los estados alinien mds alto en el
15
t6rmino de sus metas.
Este aproche es ilustrado por la teoria del neo-realista K. Waltz
quien contiende que:
Los Estados son las unidades cuyas interacciones forman la
estructura de sistemas politicos intemacionales ....
Decir
que un estado es soberano, el estado tiene que decidir por
si mismo c6mo cubrird sus problemas intemos y externos,
incluyendo decidir buscar ayuda o no de otros y entonces
estos compromisos limitan su libertad.
Los Estados
desarrollan sus propias estrategias, trazan su propio curso,
toman sus propias decisiones sobre c6mo encontrar

12. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 6, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
8 I.L.M. 679 ("Cada Estado posee capacidad de concluir tratados."). (Nota editorial: traducido
del Inglds).
13. Vea, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (4th ed.
1990).
14. Declaration on.Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625,
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc A/RES/2625 (1970) (nota editorial: traducido del Inglds).
15. Vea generalmente a ALLISON, supra nota 3, a 10-38 (proporcionando una exposici6n
general del modelo el estado como un actor racional).
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cualquier cosa que necesitan su experiencia y cualquier
cosa que deseen ellos desarrollar. 16
B. Las Limitaciones y Alternativas al Modelo del Estado Como un
Actor Unitario
Las realidades de relaciones internacionales que constituyen el
objeto de la ley internacional y la Teoria de las Relaciones Internacionales,
es mIs compleja que su representaci6n en el modelo del estado como un
Actor Racional y Unitario. Los estados no son entidades unitarias ni
racionales sino personas ficticias. La substancia del estado est, constituida
por individuos actuando reciprocamente. Como el Juez Cassese escribi6:
"Los Estados no tienen ninguna alma, ninguna capacidad de formar y
expresar un testamento aut6nomo; ellos son estructuras abstractas actuando
a trav6s de los individuos. Los seres humanos s6lo pueden dar came y
17
sangre para una actividad del Estado."
Esta condici6n en la naturaleza de estados necesariamente afecta el
funcionamiento de la ley internacional. Tratados, de hecho, se negocian,
son firmados, ratificados, y depositados por individuos que acttan en
nombre de sus estados. La Practica de Estados que genera la ley de
costumbre, realmente es la suma de actos realizados por individuos que son
seres humanos. Las normas particulares de la ley internacional son, de la
misma manera, cumplidas o violadas, no por entidades metafisicas, sino
por individuos. 18 Estos fen6menos son inevitables y, en consecuencia,
varias normas substantivas de ley internacional responden a ellos. Por
ejemplo, ambas reglas con respecto a la representaci6n y los poderes llenos
16. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 95-96 (1979) (nota
editorial: traducido del Inglds).
17. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 14 (1986) (nota
editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
18. Vea id. a las 9-10.
Aunque los protagonistas de vida internacional son estructuras corporativas, por
supuesto ellos no pueden operar a travs de individuos que no actfian en su propia
cuenta sino como oficiales Estatales, o mds bien como las herramientas de las
estructuras a las que ellos pertenecen. Asi, por ejemplo, si un tratado de extradici6n es
concluido por el REINO UNIDO con la URSS, este trato no debe cegarnos a lo que
realmente pasa, principalmente que el instrumento internacional se trae concretamente
por individuos y es Ilevado a cabo como consecuencia por individuos. El acuerdo es
negociado por diplomrticos que pertenecen a los dos estados; el instrumento de
ratificaci6n es formalmente aceptado y firmado por los jefes de Estado, si es necesario
despu~s de Ia autorizaci6n por asambleas parlamentarias. A la vez que un tratado ha
entrado en fuerza, se Ileva a cabo por las cortes de cada pals y, si se requiere, tambi~n
por oficiales de los ministerios respectivos de Justicia y, de hecho, generalmente las
cortes conceden o se niegan en cada caso particular. Id.
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para la negociaci6n de tratados' 9 y las normas que sancionan genocidio 2
reconocen, y pretenden regular, el papel de individuos que actcian en
nombre de sus estados.
Semejantemente, la Teorfa de las Relaciones Internacionales y la
Ciencia Poliftica han reconocido que las limitaciones del modelo del Estado
como un Actor Racional por describir las realidades complejas de politica
internacional y han propuesto varias concepciones alternativas del estado. 2'
Uno de dstos es la concepcion del estado como un estato, segin cual los
19. Convenio de Viena en la Ley de Tratados, mayo 23, 1969, arts. 7, 47, 50, 51, 1155
U.N.T.S 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
Art. 7.1. Una persona es considerada representante del estado con el prop6sito de adoptar o
autenticar el texto de un tratado o con el prop6sito de expresar el consentimiento del estado o por
ser ligado por un tratado si:
a) 61 produce poderes Ilenos apropiados; o
b) aparece de la prictica del estado involucrada o de otras circunstancias que su intenci6n es
considerar a esa persona como representante del estado para cosas asi propone y para distribuir
poderes totales.
2. En virtud de sus funciones y sin tener que producir poderes totales, lo siguiente es
considerado como representar su estado:
a) Los jefes de estado, los jefes de Gobierno y Ministros para los Asuntos Extranjeros, con
el prop6sito de realizar todos los actos que relacionan a la conclusi6n de un tratado;
b) Los jefes de misiones diplomticas, con el prop6sito de adoptar el texto de un tratado
entre el estado acreditando y el estado a lo que ellos son acreditados;
Representantes acreditados por estados a una conferencia internacional o a una organizaci6n
internacional o uno de sus 6rganos, con el prop6sito de adoptar el texto de un tratado en esa
conferencia, organizaci6n u 6rgano (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
Art. 47. Si se ha hecho la autoridad de un representante para expresar el consentimiento de
un Estado ser ligado por un tratado particular sujeto a una restricci6n especffica, su omisi6n para
observar esa restricci6n no puede invocarse como invalidar el consentimiento expresado por 61 a
menos que la restricci6n se notific6 al otro estado antes de negociar y ese expreso su
consentimiento (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
Art. 50. Si la expresi6n del consentimiento de un estado es ligado por un tratado que se ha
procurado directamente o indirectanente a trav6s de la corrupci6n de su representante por otro
estado que negocia, el estado puede invocar tal corrupci6n como invalidar su consentimiento por
el tratado (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
Art. 51. La expresi6n del consentimiento de un estado es ligado por un tratado que ha sido
procurado por la coerci6n de su representante a trav6s de actos o amenazas dirigidas contra 61,
estar- sin cualquier efecto legal (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
20. Convenci6n en la Prevenci6n y Castigo del Crimen de Genocidio, G.A. Res. 260, art.
4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/260 A (1948). 1021 U.N.T.S. 277 ("Articulo 4. Personas que
comprometen genocidio o cualquiera de los otros actos enumerados en artfculo se castigardn, si
ellos son constitucionalmente gobernantes responsables, oficiales ptiblicos o individuos
privados.").
21. Vea generalnente MARTIN HOLLIS & STEVE SMITH, EXPLAINING AND
UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 32-36 (1990) (resumiendo los recientes
desarrollos te6ricos de la Ciencia Polftica con respecto al estado).
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estados son "la organizaci6n central y el personal que toman decisiones " 22
actuando reciprocamente los dos con actores dom6sticos y transnacionales
y con otros estados.
Este tipo de concepci6n del estado se ha llanado subsist~mico,
imagen segunda,23 y un acercamiento de dos nivelei 4 porque usa la
organizaci6n interior y politica del estado para explicar su politica
extranjera y, mis ampliamente, la sociedad internacional entera. Aun
cuando en Teoria de las Relaciones Internacionales y la Ciencia Polftica
hay todavia diferencias considerables sobre las que deben darse dnfasis a
elementos y sobre la terminologfa bisica,25 hay un acuerdo general
creciente que
la manera en que los estados cooperan, y hacen negocios
no puede entenderse excepto con referencia a la naturaleza
cambiante del estado y el sistema politico dom6stico. Los
intereses de estados no son fijos sino varfan de acuerdo al
contexto institucional, al grado de organizaci6n de las
fuerzas politicas dentro del estado y el sistema politico mis
ancho, y a las capacidades de direcci6n de los actores
mayores.26

III. EL MODELO BUROCRATICO DEL ESTADO Y EL PROCESO DE
TOMAR DECISIONES
Una forma clsica de la alternativa Estato al modelo del Estado
como un Actor Racional es el modelo Gubernamental o el modelo de la

22. Stephen D. Krasner, Power Politics, Institutions, and Transnational Relations, in
TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra nota 6, a las 257 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).

23. Michael Zrn, Bringing the Second Image (Back) In: About Domestic Sources of
Regime and the Course of Debt Crisis of the 1980s, en REGIME THEORY, supra nota 5, a las 282292.
24. HOLLIS, supra nota 21, a las 7-9; ANDREW KYDD & DUNCAN SNIDAL, Progress in
Game-TheoreticalAnalysis of InternationalRegimes and Non-State Actors, en REGIME THEORY,
supra nota 5, a las 127-34.
25.

Vea generalmente HOLLIS,

supra nota 21, a las 38-41; Thomas Risse-Kappen,

Bringing TransnationalRelations Back in, Introduction, in TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra
nota 6, a las 17-28 (discutiendo los debates actuales sobre el papel del estado y de sus estructuras
domesticas en lapolitica internacional).
26. Andrew Hurrell, International Society and the Study of Regimes, a Reflective
Approach, in REGIME THEORY, supra nota 5 a 69, reimprimido en BECK, supra nota 8, a 206
(nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
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Este modelo pretende explicar la conducta y

politica, no s6lo de estados, sino tambidn de cualquier otra entidad

burocrdtica; o una corporaci6n, una organizaci6n internacional, una
organizaci6n no-gubernamental, o un grupo de inter6s; como el resultado
de interacci6n entre los seres humanos.2 s

A. Bur6cratas, intereses e influencia
La premisa importante del modelo de la politica Burocrdtica es
que los estados y las organizaciones no son actores de decisiones unitaria
sino grupos de bur6cratas que negocian entre ellos. 29 Los estados no
tienen un grupo unitario de metas, opciones, ni estiman las consecuencias
de esas opciones, sino cada actor individual en el proceso interior de tomar

decisiones tiene sus propias metas, conceptos, e intereses que 61 intenta
promover, con el poder a su disposici6n, dentro de y a trav6s de la
organizaci6n. 30 Por consiguiente, su disputa principal es que las acciones
que se le atribuyeron al estado no son soluciones que se escogen
racionalnente a los problemas particulares sino son el resultado de "el
compromiso, conflicto, y confusi6n de oficiales con intereses diversos y la
influencia desigual. "31
Este modelo asume que cada actor individual, en el proceso
interior de tomar decisiones, tiene y promueve sus propias metas,
conceptos e intereses.32 Estas metas privadas e intereses pasan, en parte,

de la posici6n de cada actor en la organizaci6n burocritica teniendo en
cuenta sus valores personales, intereses, y concepto de su papel. 33 Mis
27. ALLISON, supra nota 3, a las 144-244; yea tambien HOLLIS, supra nota 21, a las 14654; KLEINDORFER, supra nota 4, a las 288-303.
28. Vea KLEINDORFER, supra nota 4, a las 288-303.
29. Vea ALLISON, supra nota 3, a las 164 ("El actor gubernamental ni es un agente
unitario ni una conglomeraci6n de organizaciones, sino es varios jugadores individuales. Los
grupos de estos jugadores constituyen al agente para las decisiones gubernamentales particulares
y acciones. Los Jugadores son hombres que trabajan.") Id. (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s);
HOLLIS, supra nota 21, a las 146-47; KLEINDORFER, supra nota 4, a 296.
30. Vea ALLISON, supra nota 3, a las 166-67; KLEINDORFER, supra nota 4, a 296.
31. ALLISON, supra nota 3, a 162 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
32. Vea id. a las 166-67; KLEINDORFER , supra nota 4, a 296.
33. Vea ALLISON, supra nota 3, a las 166-67.
La resoluci6n de la Secretaria de el Estado . . .no s6lo depende de laposici6n, sino
tambidn en el jugador que lo ocupa. De jugadores las personas estAn a favor tambi6n;
los metabolismos de hombres difieren. El centro duro de mezcla de la polftica
burocrdtica es la personalidad. C6mo cada hombre aguanta resistir el calor en su
cocina, el estilo operando b~sico de cada jugador, y la complementariedad o
contradicci6n entre las personalidades y estilos en los circulos internos son las piezas
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aun, estos actores pueden patrocinar ciertos resultados debido a la falsedad
de la situaci6n o las opciones,34 falta de comunicaci6n, o una comunicaci6n
inexacta con otros actores, reticencia para tomar ciertos riesgos, la
36
obligaci6n impuesta por

Si

mismo, 35 e incluso las expectativas err6neas.

Ademds, el modelo de la politica burocrdtica asume que los
actores individuales en el proceso de tomar decisiones tienen poder
diverso. La capacidad de cada actor de influir en la acci6n gubernarnental
final, o sea, su poder depende de su posesi6n de ventajas del trato, de su
habilidad y necesidad para usar sus ventajas, y de la percepci6n de los
otros actores de su posesi6n e intenci6n para usar esas ventajas. Las
ventajas de negociar son esos elementos, incluyendo autoridad formal,
posici6n, responsabilidades, especializaci6n, el mando de informaci6n y
recursos, el carisma, y las relaciones personales con otros actores que
tambi6n tienen ventajas que le permiten a cada actor influir en el resultado
37
final.

Adems, este modelo no distingue, en principio, entre politica o
estrategia de tomar decisiones de conducta regular o decisiones
rutinarias.38 Cualquier conducta requiere, para ser realizada, la decisi6n
de un individuo para ejecutarlo. No obstante, este modelo reconoce que la
mayoria de las decisiones son interrelacionadas. Primero, porque, las
decisiones de la polftica general normalmente requieren una larga serie de
decisiones subordinadas para su aplicaci6n, o sea, son decisiones
encadenadas.
Segundo, porque las decisiones anteriores pueden
irreducibles de la mezcla politica, entonces, tambi6n, cada persona viene a su posici6n
con su propio equipaje. Sus bolsas incluyen sensibilidades a ciertos problemas,
compromisos a los varios proyectos, y su valor personal y lo que debe a los grupos en
la sociedad. Id. (nota editorial: traducido del Ingls).
Vea generalmente KLEINDORFER, supra nota 4, a las 35-42; YAACOV Y. I. VERZTBERGER,
THE WORLD IN THEIR MINDS: INFORMATION PROCESSING, COGNITION AND PERCEPTION IN
FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONMAKING 113-33, a 113 (1990) (proporcionando una discusi6n
detallada del papel de creencias personales en tomar decisiones: "Las herramientas cognocitivas
mds elementales con las que la persona que toma las decisiones se acerca, e intenta clarificar y
importer significando, en el complejo y los ambientes inciertos las creencias, valores y
estereotipos, Ellos sirven de guias a informaci6n que procesa y se vuelven un bosico para las
interpretaciones, expectativa y predicciones de la conducta de otros.") (Nota editorial: traducido
del Ingl6s). Sino yea HOLLIS, supra nota 21, a 151 n. 10 (defendiendo que las preferencias de los
actores estAn determinadas por sus posiciones dentro de la estructura burocritica).
34. Vea KLEINDORFER, supra nota 4, a las 52-56.
35. Vea id. a las 56-58.
36. Vea ALLISON, supra nota 3, a las 178-79.
37. Vea id. a las 168-69.
38. Vea id. a las 169-70 (discutiendo las causas de acci6n). Pero yea KLEINDORFER,
supra nota 4, a las 298-99 (distinguiendo entre las decisiones estrat6gicas, tActicas, y rutinarias).
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determinar tanto los problemas y opciones que son considerados, como el
poder, intereses y compromisos de los actores. Reconoce que los actores
que tambidn toman esa decisi6n subordinada intentan promover sus propias
metas, y que, como consecuencia, ellos intentan modificar, ignorar o
traducir las decisiones anteriores, con el poder a su disposici6n, para
favorecer sus resultados deseados. 39 En este sentido, el actor confiado con
la aplicaci6n de una decisi6n politica puede ser mhIs influyente en cuanto al
resultado final que el actor que lo tom6. 4°
La consecuencia de estas asunciones es que la acci6n de cualquier
estado o entidad burocrdtica es una aglutinaci6n de varios juicios
relativamente independientes. 4 1 El resultado final de la decisi6n que hace
proceso es el resultado del trato entre varios actores cada uno que "tira y
dd tirones con el poder a su discreci6n para adelantar los resultados de su
concepci6n de intereses nacionales, organizacionales, de grupos, y los
intereses personales." 42 Asi, la acci6n final no puede ser el resultado de
una selecci6n racional entre varias opciones que consideran sus
consecuencias estimadas contra las metas de las entidades, ni de una opci6n
simple por un grupo unitario, ni incluso el resultado de una polftica
coordinada ni una intenci6n comfin, sino independiente. Al contrario, es
mejor la suma de las entradas de varios actores que puedan actuar
independientemente o prevalecer en la decisi6n que hace proceso a sus
niveles diferentes.
Ademis, este modelo reconoce que los individuos fuera de la
estructura formal de la entidad burocrhtica tambi6n toman parte en el
proceso de tomar decisiones. En el caso de los estados, mientras este
modelo reconoce el papel central de oficiales gubernamentales en sus

39.

Vea ALLISON, supra nota 3, a 173.

La Mayoria de las decisiones dejan considerable espacio para su aplicaci6n. Jugadores
que apoyaron la decisi6n maniobraran para verlo Ilevada a cabo y pueden ir m9 alld
del espfritu si no al pie de la letra en cuanto a la decisi6n. Aqullos que oponen la
decisi6n, o oponen la acci6n, maniobraran para tardar implementarla o para limitar
implementarla al pie de la letra pero no al espiritu, y tambi6n desobedecer la decisi6n.
Id. (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
40. Vea id. a 175.
La mezcla de jugadores y las ventajas de cada jugador no s61o cambia entre los canales
de acciones sino tambi~n a lo largo de los canales de acciones. Jefes dominan las
decisiones formales mayores en poliftica extranjera importante, pero los indios, sobre
todo aqu61los en la organizaci6n encargados con Ilevar a cabo la decisi6n, pueden
jugar un papel mayor despu6s de esto. (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
KLEINDORFER, supra nota 4, a 301.
41.

Vea ALLISON, supra nota 3, a las 171-73.

42. Id. a 171 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
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procesos de decisiones de gobiernos, reconoce que los miembros del
parlanento, la prensa, grupos de inter6s y el pfiblico pueden y toman parte
en 61, afectando asi el resultado final. Por consiguiente, sugiere que haya
circulos concdntricos de influencia e impulsa en que las acciones del estado
se cristalicen.43
B. Coalici6n, Redes, y Comunidades
El modelo de politica burocrdtica tambi6n contiende que actores
tienden a formar coaliciones con otros actores para aumentar su capacidad
de influir en el resultado final del proceso de decisi6n a trav6s del uso
coordinado de sus ventajas del trato. Se forman estas coaliciones con
actores que comparten valores similares o metas antes que empiecen los
tratos de los problemas especificos o con actores que se persuaden, durante
el proceso del trato, de patrocinar sus propuestas. 44
Dentro de los gobiernos, la formnaci6n de coaliciones no es limitada
al sistema politico interior de cada estado. Cuando las acciones en un
estado resultan en ventajas o desventajas para actores en los procesos
politicos interiores de otro estado, o cuando la acci6n propuesta requiere
cierto grado de negociaci6n internacional, como son la mayoria de los
actos pertinentes a la ley internacional, se forman coaliciones
transnacionales. Aderiis, en esos casos, los actores en un estado para
aumentar su propia influencia en el resultado final, intentan autorizar a sus
aliados en otros estados creando ventajas para ellos. 45

43.

Vea id. alas 164-65; cfW. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of

InternationalLaw, in 86 A.S.I.L. Proc. 118-125 (1992) (tomando un acercamiento similar:
Los participantes en cualquier proceso de decisi6n incluyen aqu~llos dotados de
competencia de decisi6n formalmente, por ejemplo un juez, y todos esos otros actores
que, aunque no tienen de competencia formal, pueden jugar papeles importantes no
obstante influyendo en decisiones. En decisiones internacionales el observador debe
examinar ademds de las organizaciones internacionales formales, oficiales estatales,
organizaciones no-gubernamentales, grupos de presi6n, grupos de inter6s, bandas, y
individuos que actdian en nombre de todos los otros participantes y en su propio.).
(Nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).

44. Vea ALLISON, supra nota 3, a 169 (refiri~ndose a "la persuasiva personal con otros
jugadores (deducido de las relaciones personales, carisma); y el acceso y la persuasiva que tienen
negociando ventajas dibujados de anterior (bas6 en relaciones interpersonales, etc.)" como
fuentes de poder.) (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s); KLEINDORFER, supra nota 4, a 301 ("El
modelo politico especifica que ademis de sus posiciones formales las personas son parte de redes
informales y uniones, y esa racionalidad orgdnica no siempre puede prevalecer debido a las
agendas ocultas. Esta realizaci6n es especialmente crucial para comprender el proceso de tomar
decisiones en gobiernos o otras burocracias grandes."). (Nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
45.

Vea ALLISON, supra nota 3, a 178.
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Varios cientificos politicos y los te6ricos de relaciones
internacionales se han consagrado al estudio de este tipo de alianzas
Por ejemplo, Keohane y Nye han referido a las
transnacional. 46
redes politicas
las
y
a
transgubernamentales
coaliciones
transgubernamentalescomo las coaliciones formadas por "las burocracias
gubernamentales encargadas con tareas similares . . . en preguntas de la
politica particulares," 47 buscando mejorar sus oportunidades de 6xito
trayendo "actores de otros gobiernos a sus propios procesos de tomar
decisiones como aliados." 48 Ellos tambi~n reconocen la relevancia de
coaliciones cuyos miembros no pertenecen a la estructura gubernamental
formal. 49 Asi, ellos usan el concepto mis ancho de las relaciones
transnacionales a referirse a todos "los contactos, coaliciones, e
interacciones entre diferente estados que no son controlados por los
6rganos centrales de la politica extranjera de gobiernos" 50 mientras ellos
s6lo restringen el uso del t~rmino las interacciones transnacionales s6lo
para describir esas relaciones transnacionales en que "por lo menos un
de un gobiemo o una organizaci6n
actor no es agente
5
intergubernamental. " 1
Algunas de estas coaliciones transnacionales son alianzas ad hoc
creadas especificamente para promover politicas particulares, mientras
otros son coaliciones permanentes formadas porque sus miembros
comparten valores comunes, intereses, y conocimiento.5 2 Entre el tiltimo,
las coaliciones basadas en cierto conocimiento han merecido un examen
Sus
mis intimo a causa de su caracteristica ventaja en tratos.
conocimientos aumentan su influencia potencial en el resultado final como
los problemas del proceso de tomar decisiones crece en complejidad 3

46. Vea generalmente Risse-Kappen, supra nota 6 a las 3-13 (un resumen de teoria
reciente de aliansas transnacionales); Haas, Introduction, supra nota 7, a las 16-25 (analisando
las diferencias entre varias teorias construidas de aliansas transnacionales).
47. KEOHANE, supra nota 6, a 34 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
48. Id (nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).
49. See id. a las 24-25, 33-34; Joseph S. Nye & Robert 0. Keohane, Transnational
Relations and World Politics: An Introduction, in TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD
POLITICS ix (Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye eds., 1981).
50. Nye, supra nota 49, a xi. (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s). See also RisseKappen, supra nota 6, a 3.
51. Nye, supra nota 49, a xii (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
52. Vea Haas, Introducci6n, supra nota 7, a las 16-20 (discutiendo los varios tipos de
alianzas transnacionales).
53. Vea id. a las 4-16; Haas, Epistemic Communities, supra nota 7, a las 179-80.
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En situaciones de complejidad t~cnica alta o incertidumbre, la
mayoria de los participantes regulares en el proceso de tomar decisiones no
tienen el conocimiento necesario para determinar los problemas
importantes y, como consecuencia, dependen de especializaci6n cientifica o
t~cnica. En esta condici6n, la tarea de tomar las decisiones es compartida
o transferida a los expertos.
Entonces, los expertos se vuelven
participantes en el trato burocritico. Mds aun, si esos expertos tienen
objetivos politicos, ellos pueden consolidar su influencia en el resultado
final a trav~s de la adquisici6n de posiciones burocriticas de las que ellos
pueden dominar el proceso de tomar decisiones. Ellos tambi~n pueden
extender su influencia a trav~s de coaliciones creadas que les permiten
influir a otros actores y evitar discordancias que podrian crear falta de
confianza en su especializaci6n 4
Varios estudios empiricos han encontrado
coaliciones
transnacionales que actdian de esta manera. En el Area de relaciones
econ6micas internacionales, por ejemplo, ellos se han encontrado
participando en el desarrollo de la Uni6n Econ6mica y Monetaria Europea6
(UE)"5 y en las relaciones de comercio entre los Estados Unidos y Jap6n.5

Ellos tambi~n se han encontrado actuando en las dreas de control de
armas, 7 protecci6n del ambiente, de los elefantes africanos,58 el mar
54.

Vea Diana Crane, Transnational Networks in Basic Sciences, in TRANSNATIONAL

RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS, supra nota 49, a las 242-251; Haas, Epistemic Communities,
supra nota 7, a 179.
Bajo las condiciones de interdependencia compleja y de incertidumbre generalizados

los especialistas juegan un papel significante atenuindo tal incertidumbre para los
fabricantes de deciones. . . Bajo tales percepciones las circunstancias pueden ser
falsa, los lideres les faltan la informaci6n adecuada para hacer una opci6n informada,
y los procedimientos de la bfisqueda tradicionales son imposibles, la Informaci6n estA

en un premio, y los lideres buscan esos capaz de

proporcionar autoritariamente

consejo y/o delegar responsabilidad a ellos. . .. [Que la influencia de tales expertos
estA sujeto a su habilidad de evitar discordancia interior extendida, y su influencia
persiste a trav6s de su habilidad de consolidar poder politico a trav6s de capturar
posiciones buroctiticas importantes en administraciones nacionales de las que ellos

pueden persuadir a otros fabricantes de decisiones o pueden usurpar mando encima de
tomar decisiones. (Nora editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
55. Vea David R. Cameron, Transnational Relations and the Development of European
Economic andMonetary Union, en TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra nota 6, a 37.
56. Vea Peter J. Katzenstein & Yutaka Tsujinaka, "Bullying, - 'buying, " and "binding":
US-Japanese TransnationalRelations and Domestic Structures, en TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS,
supra nota 6, a 79.

57.

Vea Matthew Evangelista, Transnational relations, domestic structures, and security

policy in the USSR and Russia, en TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra nota 6, 146.
58.

Vea Thomas Princen, Ivory, conservation, and environmental transnationalcoalitions,

en TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra nota 6, a 227.

1176

ILSA Journal of Int'l & ComparativeLaw

mediterrineo,
Keohane:

9

[Vol. 4:1163

y en las negociaciones de la Ley del Mar,60 descrito por

Como la actividad econ6mica transnacional se aumenta, asi
aument6 la actividad politica transnacional y contactos...
Las compaftias de petroleo trabajaron a travs de sus
abogados que eran miembros de la Asociaci6n de la Ley
Internacional que influy6 en el trabajo de la Comisi6n de la
Ley Internacional en convenciones del proyecto para la
conferencia de 1958.
Cientificos se organizaron
transnacionalmente
en
el Comit6 Cientifico
de
Investigaciones de Oc~anos (CCIO) y con 6xito hicieron
que sus gobiernos crearan la Comisi6n Oceaonogrgfica
Intemacional (COI) para coordinar investigaciones
oceaonogrifica de gran escala. Los grupos del orden
mundial trabajaron transnacionalmente para promover un
r6gimen internacional mds fuerte. 6
Parece que estas coaliciones de expertos nacen de comunidades
cientificas. El progreso de ciencia requiere el intercambio de informaci6n
sobre los nuevos descubrimientos, t6cnicas, y teorias entre los principales
cientificos.
Su interacci6n continuada forma una red de eslabones
informales: los conocimientos, amistades, sociedades, y confianza, entre
ellos, sus colaboradores y estudiantes que favorecen la investigaci6n
cientifica. Ademis, tanto la comunidad cientifica con el aumento de la
complejidad y costo de colecci6n de datos, como la comunidad en si,
tienen que coordinar sus actividades y concentrar sus ambos recursos a
trav6s de las organizaciones internacionales no gubemamentales e
intergubernamentales.6 2 Asf, si los miembros de la comunidad cientifica
desarrollan objetivos politicos, o si su conocimiento es pertinente en el
proceso politico de tomar decisiones, la red de la comunidad cientifica de
comunicaci6n y convergencia de ideas facilita la creaci6n de coaliciones
transnacionales capaces de influir en el proceso de tomar decisiones.
Estas coaliciones estdn basadas en conocimientos cientificos o
t6cnicos cuyos miembros promueven coordinadamente una meta de la
politica determinada basada, discutiblemente, en su conocimiento

59.

Vea Haas, Epistemic Communities, supra nota 7, a las 191-201.

60.

Vea KEOHANE, supra nota 6, a las 86-162.

61.

Id. a 110 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).

62.

Vea Crane, supra nota 54, a las 237-38, 250.
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particular, que se ha denominado Comunidades Epistimicas.63 Ellos lo
han definido como:
Un grupo de individuos (de quien el nfimero de miembros
normalmente transciende muchas nacionalidades e incluye
a ambos cientificos o expertos y politicos) qui~nes
comparten una vista comdin con respecto a los mecanismos
causales y las contestaciones apropiadas y un grupo de
valores comfines que surgen junto con el problema en
cuesti6n.64
IV. LA LEY INTERNACIONAL SEGON EL MODELO DE LA POLTICA
BUROCRXTICA
A. El Proceso de Tomar Decisiones
El modelo de la Politica Burocrdtica del estado y el proceso de
tomar decisiones parecen adecuados para explicar el funcionamiento de la
ley internacional. Considere el acto mis simple pertinente a la ley
internacional: una declaraci6n unilateral. Segiin el modelo de la Politica
Burocrdtica, estos tipos de actos deben ser por lo menos. el resultado del
proceso de negociar dentro de la estructura gubernamental de s6lo un
estado, o la suma de decisiones relativamente independientes y acciones
atribuibles a s6lo un estado.6 El cuento de P. Kamath del proceso de
63. Vea Haas, Epistemic Communities, supra nota 7, a 179; Haas, Introduction, supra nota
7, passim.
64. Oran R. Young & Gail Osherenko, Testing Theories of Regime Formation:Findings
from a Large Collaborative Research Project, in REGIME THEORY, supra nota 5, a 250 (nota
editorial: traducido del Ingl6s); cf. Haas, Epistemic Communities, supra nota 7, a las 179-80
dando una definici6n mns detallada y restrictiva:
Ellos son un grupo de profesionales, a menudo de varios disciplinas diferentes que
comparten el siguiente grupo de caracteristicas:
1. El tnrmino compartido, valores o creencias del principio. Tales creencias proveen una
raz6n basada en valor para la acci6n social de los miembros de la comunidad.
2. Creencias causales compartidas o juicios profesionales. Tales creencias proporcionan
las razones analiticas y explicaciones de conducta, ofreciendo explicaciones causales para las
uniones mfiltiples entre las posibles acciones de la polftica y los resultados deseados.
3. Nociones comdnes de validez: intrasubjectivo, criterio internamente definido para validar
conocimiento.
4. Una empresa de la politica comdn: un grupo de pricticas asociadas con un grupo central
de problemas que tienen que ser atacados, probablemente fuera de una convicci6n que reforzari
el bienestar humano como una consecuencia. Id. (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
65.

Vea ALLISON, supra nota 3, a las 162-64.
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tomar decisi6nes del reconocimiento unilateral de India de la soberania de
China sobre Tibet proporciona un ejemplo propicio:
Segfin la Secretaria Privada Principal anterior de Nehru,
M.O. Mathai, fue el Embajador K.M. Panikkar que por un
cambio de palabra crucial en el cable cambi6 la politica de
India hacia Tibet. El telegrama de Nehru a Panikkar en
Peking autoriz6 que 6l comunicara el reconocimiento de
India de soberania China sobre Tibet, que el Embajador se
le alega haber cambiado la soberania. Si esto es verdad,
entonces Nehru no hizo la politica de la India deveras en
cuanto a Tibet en 1950 sino el Embajador Panikkar lo
hizo. Tambi6n se dice que Nehru fue persuadido por
Panikkar de no insistir en un reconocimiento Chino
simultAneo de linea de McMahon cuando India reconoci6
la demanda China sobre Tibet."
La decisi6n de India para reconocer la soberania de China sobre
Tibet sin insistir en un reconocimiento reciproco, parece ser, en el cuento
de Kamath, el resultado de interacci6n de los actores centrales en la
politica extranjera de India: el primer ministro y su embajador a Peking.
El reconocimiento de India de la soberania de China sobre Tibet, parece
haber sido una decisi6n del embajador solo, quidn us6 su posici6n, una
ventaja de trato, para cambiar la redacci6n importante, asi dominando las
objeciones del primer ministro. De la acci6n de India y de su politica
extranjera y su posici6n legal en este problema, puede describirse con
precisi6n como la suma de las entradas de varios actores que pudieron
actuar reciprocamente y prevalecer en el proceso de tomar decisi6nes en
sus niveles diferentes.
Normalmente, el proceso de tomar decisi6nes de acciones
pertinentes a la ley internacional es mis complejo que en el ejemplo de
Kamath. Primero, el proceso de tomar decisi6nes puede ser menos
centralizado o la estructura gubernamental puede ser mds compleja.
Segundo, la naturaleza del resultado que se decide podria ser, en si mismo,
mds compleja que una declaraci6n unilateral. Podria involucrar procesos
largos de negociaci6n con otros estados y el equilibro de contender
intereses en la arena municipal.
En el caso de negociaciones
multilaterales, estos rasgos del proceso de tomar decisi6nes burocrdticas
son puestos agudos, bien ilustrados por la posici6n de los Estados Unidos
durante la Tercera Conferencia de los Naciones Unidas en la Ley del Mar:
66.

P. M. KAMATH, FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 90 (1990)

(nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
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En las reuniones en Caracas de la Ley del Mar, la
comisi6n de Estados Unidos numer6 110 (de que s6lo 20
eran del departamento Estatal) una conferencia virtual
dentro de una conferencia. Los esfuerzos del secretario
del estado por cortar el tamafio de la comisi6n todavia
dejaba mds de ochenta en la comisi6n en Ginebra en 1975.
. . . Algunos delegados de los Estados Unidos han
falseado vistas de gobiernos extranjeros dentro de la
comisi6n mientras,
otros han tornado
posici6n
contrariamente con delegados extranjeros a la politica
oficial de su pais. Tambi6n, no es nada raro que delegados
hayan hablado de la estrategia de los Estados Unidos.
Algo mis sutil, los varios conjuntos de delegados con
intereses funcionales similares en pesca, armadas navales,
petroleo, minas, y otros que se establecieron como la parte
de la diplomacia de la conferencia informal prepararon
canales regulares de comunicaci6n que cort6 y cre6 tensi6n
dentro de las posiciones nacionales ya fragmentadas .... 67
Un caso particularmente importante fue cabildeando del
departamento del Interior de los Estados Unidos y los oficiales de la
compafifa de petroleo con paises menos desarrollados a favor de la
jurisdicci6n del estado costero ancha encima del estante continental
(contrariamente a la politica de los Estados Unidos oficial) a las sesiones
de Ginebra del Comit6 del lecho marino."
Estos ejemplos ilustran c6mo el modelo de la Polftica Burocrdtica
sirve para describir el proceso de tomar decisi6nes de acciones pertinentes
a la ley internacional. Sin embargo, esta descripci6n del proceso de tomar
decisi6nes de acciones pertenecientes a la ley internacional no explica por
qu6 la ley internacional se cumple en Relaciones Internacionales.
B. La Efectividad de la Ley Internacional
La efectividad de la ley internacional depende por adelantado si
afecta el proceso de tomar decisi6nes de los estados de semejante manera
que los resultados finales cumplan o est6n de acuerdo con sus provisiones
substantivas o no. S61o si los resultados de esos procesos obedecen la ley
internacional, serin eficaz. S61o si esos resultados se entienden como para
crear o modificar la ley internacional, se creari o se modificari. Por
consiguiente, es necesario considerar c6mo la ley internacional afecta a los
KEOHANE, supra nota 6, a 116 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
68. Id. a 149 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).

67.
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juicios de fabricantes de decisiones de semejante manera que ellos
producir~in resultados de acuerdo con 61.
La ley internacional puede afectar las decisi6nes de los actores en
el proceso de tomar decisi6nes de cuatro maneras diferentes. Podria ser
primero un elemento en la formaci6n de metas e intereses de los actores
individuales; segundo, parte de la materia que se va a decidir; tercero, una
ventaja del trato en las manos de algunos de los actores; y, cuarto, parte
del constreffimiento que podria existir en el proceso del trato.
Primero, la ley internacional podria ser un elemento en la
formaci6n de las metas de los actores. Estas metas son determinadas por
la posici6n de los actores en la estructura gubernamental, sus valores
personales, intereses, expectativas y concepto de su papel. Asi, es posible
que algunos actores puedan tener cierta preferencia personal, inclinaci6n o
compromiso a la ley internacional. 69 Si es asi, ellos pueden preferir y
pueden promover las politicas y conductas que cumplen, o est~n de
acuerdo con 61. El Presidente Wilson que promovi6 mecanismos basados
en la ley internacional para el mantenimiento de paz internacional, 70
ejemplifica esta actitud.
Este tipo de compromiso a la ley internacional podria brotar de la
educaci6n, experiencias anteriores o 6tica de los actores. Sin embargo,
tambi6n puede fluir del puro cdlculo de las ventajas de esa polftica, 71 o
porque reduce conflictos futuros o crea las normas de conducta que puede,
y en interacciones subsecuentes, puede ser favorable a sus intereses o
puede aumentar sus ventajas del trato. Asi, por ejemplo, los consejeros
legales de ministerios extranjeros tienden a adelantar politicas de acuerdo
con la ley internacional. Ambos son como resultado de su compromiso,
debido a su educaci6n y posicion, a la ley, y como una forma para
aumentar su propia influencia y promover sus intereses parroquiales en el
proceso de negociar de sus gobiernos.
Segundo, la ley internacional puede ser la materia del proceso de
tomar decisiones. Frecuentemente, debido a las decisiones anteriores y
compromisos, los bur6cratas de estados y las organizaciones
internacionales tienen que desarrollar polfticas o conductas hacia la ley

69.

Vea

ORAN

R.

YOUNG,

INTERNATIONAL

GOVERNANCE:

PROTECTING

THE

ENVIRONMENT INA STATELESS SOCIETY 192 (1994) ("los sujetos pueden sentir una obligaci6n
de obedecer las reglas dentro de un r6gimen porque ellos lo yen como lo apropiado de hacer en
rakces morales o 6ticas (es decir, por raz6n moral) ...
") (Nota editorial: traducido del
Ingl6s).
70. Vea KALEVI J. HOLSTI, PEACE AND WAR: ARMED CONFLICTS AND INTERNATIONAL
ORDER, 1648-1989, a las 181-89 (1991).
71.

Vea YOUNG, supra nota 69, a 193.
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internacional o tienen que idear sus decisi6nes en t6rminos de ley
intemacional. Las negociaciones extendidas y contradicciones dentro de
los varios gobiemos para determinar sus posiciones durante la Tercera
Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas en la Ley del Mar ejemplifican esta
situaci6n. Los actores, mientras elaboraban las posiciones de sus estados
hacia la Conferencia, tuvieron que defender sus politicas preferidas o
conductas en los problemas substantivos en t6rminos normativos, porque
s6lo en tales tdrminos ellos pudieran ser incluidos en el resultado esperado
de la Conferencia: un tratado.
Tercero, el conocimiento de la ley internacional puede ser una
ventaja en el proceso de tomar decisi6nes. Cuando la ley internacional es
la materia o un elemento pertinente en el proceso de tomar decisi6nes,
debido al tecnicismo o complejidad de los problemas, la tarea de
fabricaci6n de decisi6nes es compartida con o transferida a los expertos en
ley internacional. Entonces, por medio del modelo, los expertos son
influyentes en el trato burocrdtico debido a su conocimiento.
Ademds, incluso cuando la ley internacional estA menos central a
los problemas presentados, el conocimiento de la ley internacional permite
que los actores tengan este conocimiento, a favor de sus posiciones, la
autoridadde compromisos anteriores, n o valor superior, o sea, el respeto
por la ley. Asi, hasta donde el uso de tales argumentos les permite influir
en el resultado final del proceso de tomar decisi6nes la decisi6n es
apropiada con sus metas de la polftica, y su conociiniento de la ley
internacional se vuelve en base para su poder. El uso de la Ley de los
Derechos Humanos Internacionales como un argumento durante el proceso
de tomar decisi6nes es un ejemplo conveniente.
Cuarto, la ley internacional puede ser un constreiimiento en el
proceso de tomar decisi6nes. 3
Raramente se revisan elementos
72. Cf. VERZTBERGER, supra nota 33, a 306 (refiridndose al uso de argumentos hist6ricos
en proceso de tomar decisiones de la politica extranjera: "Cuando la informaci6n sobre el
ambiente es compleja y propone un nivel alto de incertidumbre y donde el poder es compartido,
el discutir por referencia a la historia es un componente vital de formulaci6n de la politica y sirve
como un medio de persuadir el mismo y otros."). (Nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).
73. Vea generalmente id., a las 41-44 (discutiendo los constreffimientos psicol6gicos que
limitan la conducta de tomar decisiones de la polftica extranjera).
La percepci6n de constrefhimiento afecta la opci6n. Escogiendo entre las opciones, las
personas que toman decisiones pueden analizar sistemdticamente a mano el volumen de
los problemas y los constreffimiento impuestos por el ambiente en la opci6n, la
aplicaci6n de la altemativa escogida, y las posibles consecuencias de cualquier opci6n
pertinente. y, a las 41, "los compromisos por si mismo impuestos tdcitos y explicitos a
otras entidades politicas y su determinaci6n de la conducta de los actores hacia sus

modelos. Asi, una sociedad en una alianza impone ciertos tipos de conducta hacia otros
compafieros y una clase diferente hacia esos fuera de la alianza. El mimero de
miembros en una organizaci6n como las Naciones Unidas exige, por lo menos
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estructurales de la ley internacional. Ellos son, de hecho, el resultado de
decisi6nes anteriores que han establecido los problemas particulares.
Entonces, se asumen estos problemas por todos o la mayoria de los actores
en el subsecuente proceso de tomar decisi6nes. Por ejemplo, cuando la
politica hacia una negociaci6n del tratado particular es considerada, el
principio de la igualdad soberana de estados, f'malmente establecida
durante la negociaci6n de la paz de Westphalia en 1645-1648, 74 es
normalmente supuesta y, por consiguiente, las decisi6nes que se toman lo
tienen en cuenta.
Semejantemente, la ley internacional puede establecer modelos de
trato y puede influir en el poder relativo de los actores.75 En estos casos,
la ley internacional determina las normas del juego del proceso de tomar
decisi6nes. Por ejemplo, el proceso del trato que crea resoluciones del
Concilio de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas estA informado por la carta
constitucional de las Naciones Unidas y las reglas de procedimiento del
Concilio. Asi, hasta donde la adopci6n de las resoluciones requiere que
cierta mayoria y las normas favorecen decisi6nes por acuerdo general, los
delegados que toman parte activamente en la prueba de las negociaciones
tratan de obtener la aprobaci6n de los poderes mis pequefios. De la
misma manera, la influencia de los delegados de los miembros
permanentes se aumenta por la sombra de su poder del veto, tambi6n
concedida por decisi6n anterior con respecto a la ley internacional.
Esa ley internacional pueda afectar, en cualquiera de las maneras
anteriores, la decisi6n de algunos actores en el proceso de tomar
decisi6nes. Si asi es, tales actores serin comprometidos, encogidos,
autorizados, o nombrados expertos en la ley internacional. Entonces, si
nominalmente, la adopci6n de normas especificas de conducta, y se supone cualquier
desviaci6n de ellos debe requerir explicaci6n o justificaci6n misma. Id. (nota editorial:
traducido del Inglds).

74. Vea HoLSTi, supra nota 70, a las 33-39.
75. Cf. Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: Customary International
Law from an Interdisciplinary Perspective, 17 MICH. J.

INT'L L. 109,

122-124 (1995)

(sosteniendo un punto similar que usa el estado como un actor unitario modelo).
Un sistema legal como el sistema legal internacional simplemente hace mAs que crear
expectativas y promueve estabilidad. Tambi~n cumple una funci6n social esencial
transformando aplicaciones de poder crudo en poder legitimo, asi creando derechos
para aplicar poder dentro de ciertas estructuras que usan ciertos medios. Por ejemplo,
en la ausencia de un overarching, ley-haciendo soberano, el sistema legal intemacional
exige reciprocidad: el reconocimiento por parte de aqudllos aplicando poder de los
derechos de otros para aplicar poder dentro de esas mismas estructuras y usando esos
mismos medios. Este reconocimiento impone un constreffimiento significantes a su vez
en estados cuando ellos comprometen en conducta que contribuye al mantenimiento,
desarrollo o cambio de reglas de ley internacional de costumbre. Id. (nota editorial:
traducido del Ingles).
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cualquiera de esos actores prevalece o influye en el proceso del trato, la
ley internacional informard el resultado final el cual probablemente seri
eficaz. Reciprocamente, si esos actores se excluyen del proceso de tomar
decisi6nes, o si ellos ejercen una influencia menor, el resultado final tendri
que estar en menos conformidad con ley internacional. El grado de
influencia de esos actores en el resultado final depende, como mencion6
antes, de su posesi6n de ventajas del trato, su habilidad, la necesidad para
usar esas ventajas, y la percepci6n de los otros actores de su posesi6n y
necesidad para usar esas ventajas, ademis de las varias fases del proceso
de tomar decisiones. Como resultado, la efectividad de la ley internacional
reside en el 6xito de esos actores comprometidos, encogidos, autorizados,
o expertos en 61, promoviendo politicas o conductas de acuerdo con 61,
dentro del proceso de tomar decisiones de sus organizaciones.
Considere, por ejemplo, la efectividad de las Leyes de Guerra.
Segfin el argumento anterior, estas normas serian s6lo eficaces si ellos
afectan las decisi6nes de algunos fabricantes en la cadena del orden de tal
manera que las acciones finales estin de acuerdo con eilos.
Reciprocamente, estas normas serian ineficaces si ellos se apartan durante
el proceso pertinente de tomar decisiones. El comentario del General
Powell en el proceso de tomar decisi6nes en la guerra del Golfo en 1991
parece confirmar estas proposiciones: "Las decisi6nes fueron impactadas a
trav6s de consideraciones legales a cada nivel. Los abogados demostraron
ayuda inestimable en el proceso de tomar decisiones."76
C. La Creaci6nde la Ley Internacional
El modelo de la politica burocrdtica tambi6n parece capaz de
,explicar c6mo y por qud la ley internacional se crea. Este modelo defiende
a los actores en el proceso de tomar decisi6nes que intentan no s6lo de
promover sus metas dentro de sus organizaciones particulares, sino
tambi6n a trav6s de ellos. Los bur6cratas gubernamentales no limitan sus
intereses, metas y expectativas a la arena municipal, sino ellos tambidn
tienen intereses y metas en otros estados y expectativas con respecto a la
sociedad internacional entera. Entonces, estos actores siguen, dentro de
sus gobiernos, los resultados con respecto a otros estados, o sea, politica
extranjera.
Ademds, si estos actores son, de alguna manera,
comprometidos, constreffidos, autorizados, o expertos en la ley
internacional, esos resultados serian expresados en t6rminos de la ley
internacional. Asi, la ley internacional se crea para promover, en la arena
76. Christopher Greenwood, Command and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 4 STRATEGIC
AND COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER 1 (1993) (nota editorial:

Ingles).

traducido del
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internacional, los intereses, las metas, y los valores de esos individuos
comprometidos, constrefiidos, o autorizados por la ley internacional o
expertos en la materia.
A la vez estos individuos tienen 6xito comprometiendo a sus
gobiernos a las negociaciones diplomiticas o creando organizaciones
intergubernamentales, el proceso burocrdtico de tomar decisi6nes se
extiende a la esfera internacional.
Parece que, en principio, la ley
internacional afecta las decisi6nes de los actores individuales en proceso
intergubernamental de tomar decisi6nes de la misma manera que hacen
Por
esos actores dentro del proceso interior de tomar decisi6nes.
consiguiente, la ley internacional tambi6n puede ser un elemento en la
formaci6n de las metas e intereses de los actores individuales, una ventaja
del trato en las manos de algunos de los actores, o constituye
constrefiimiento en el proceso del trato. Como consecuencia, parece que la
ley internacional resulta de "el compromiso, conflicto, y confusi6n de
oficiales con intereses diversos e influencia desigual." 7 7 Todos estos
elementos intentan promover sus intereses parroquiales, valores, y metas
en la esfera internacional.
La historia de negociaci6n de las Convenciones de Ginebra en
1949 proporciona un poco de apoyo a esta tesis. Como comenta Best, la
influencia y posiciones de algunos estados han sido basados en la influencia
e intereses de sus delegados:
El estrategista social de Bretafia, Alejandro, no estaba
siendo completamente satirico en su referencia a los
Grandes Poderes (incluso Monaco). El delegado primero
de Monaco era el vigoroso e influyente profesor de leyes
francesas de Aix-en-Provence, Paul de Geouffre de La
Pradelle.
Monaco importaba en parte porque
l
importaba.
1l era uno de los contribuyentes mls
pensativos a los debates (dos afios despu6s public6 el
valioso libro sobre la conferencia de 1949) y 61 era uno de
los portavoces para los mis persistentes grupos de presi6n,
el Comit6 Internacional de Medicina Militar y Farmacia,
de que, basado en Monaco antes de la guerra, habfa fluido
un arroyo de propuestas humanitarias.78
Incluso en algunos casos, se pueden relacionar las especificas
provisiones a los intereses parroquiales e inmediatos de los actores. La
77. ALLISON, supra nota 3, a 162 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
78.
Ingles).

GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 (1994) (nota editorial:

traducido del
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inconsistencia incluida en el articulo 130 de la Tercera Convenci6n de
Ginebra que se refiere al gran dolor o seria lesi6n a cuerpo o salud
7 9 y result6, segtin la Oficina
cometido contra personas o propiedad,
Extranjera britdnica, porque el Sr. Vaillancourt, el que encabezaba la
comisi6n canadiense, queriendo su almuerzo, no permiti6 que el comit6
arreglara el escrito.8°
Ademds, hasta donde las acciones dentro de un gobierno o una
organizaci6n, o sus resultados, puede afectar la distribuci6n de poder o las
metas de actores en otros gobiernos, esos actores con metas comfines o
valores tendrd.n que crear coaliciones transnacionales para aumentar su
influencia global. 8 ' Si los miembros de estas coaliciones tienen 6xito
influydndoles las politicas de su propio gobierno, o del proceso de tomar
decisi6nes, los resultados, o sea, las acciones que atribuyen a esos estados,
tienden a converger. 2 Estos hechos explican tanto la conclusi6n exitosa de
tratados como la homogeneidad de la prdctica estatal en la que la ley
internacional de costumbre esti basada.
Con respecto al papel de coaliciones transnacionales en la
conclusi6n exitosa de tratados, un ejemplo conveniente que merece ser
citado por completo, es proporcionado por la descripci6n del proceso
negociante del Tratado Atlintico dada por Theodore Achiles, miembro de
la comisi6n de los Estados Unidos:
Estaban al principio los britinicos, franceses,
b6lgicos, holandeses, luxemburgueses, canadienses, y
nosotros. Las negociaciones normalmente fueron dirigidas
por el Secretario de Estado de los Estados Unidos y los
varios embajadores en Washington, D.C. Ellos s6lo se
encontraban infrecuentemente. Las negociaciones reales
fueron dirigidas por un grupo del cual Jack Hickerson era
el miembro mayor, Bill Galloway el funcionario menor,
dos otros miembros del equipo de los Estados Unidos y yo.
Los otros miembros eran ministros o los consejeros
politicos de las varias embajadas aqui.

79. III Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,
1949, art. 130, 75 U.N.T.S., 39 U.K.T.S. Cmnd. 550, 47 A.S.I.L. Supl. 119-177 (1953).
80. BEST, supra nota 78, a 165.
81. ALLISON, supra nota 3, a 178.
82. Cf. Haas, Epistemic Communities, supra nota 7, a las 188-89 ("Como comunidades
epistdmicas obtienen y consolidan influencia en gobiernos diferentes, las preferencias nacionales
y polfticas vendrn a reflejar las creencias epist~micas.") (nota editorial: traducido del Ingles); I.
WILLIAM ZARTMAN AND MAUREEN R. BERMAN, THE PRACTICAL NEGOTIATOR 37-38 (1982).
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Eso pas6 antes de los dias de aire acondicionado, y
nosotros nos encontramos todo el verano en nuestras
camisas de mangas cortas alrededor de una mesa en una de
las oficinas del departamento estatal. Cuando el verano se
estaba acabando nosotros teniamos un tratado en forma
bastante buena, y todos nos conociamos intimamente, nos
confiibamos, y nosotros estfbamos todos acostumbrados a
trabajar juntos. Derick Hoyer-Miller que era el ministro
britAnico y el mayor miembro de los representantes
britAnicos en el grupo, declar6 algo que nosotros liamamos
el espfritu de la OTAN despu6s. Un dia en una reuni6n 61
hizo una propuesta. Nadie recuerda lo que era, pero a
nadie le gust6 la propuesta y todos nosotros dijimos que no
bruscamente. Y Derick dijo, 'Bien, 6sas fueron mis
instrucciones de Londres. Yo les dir6 que yo hice mi
propuesta y ustedes dijeron que no, y que esto es lo que
todos los demis piensan que la respuesta debe ser.'
Entonces nosotros hicimos colectivamente lo que
nosotros pensamos que era el mejor arreglo. Derick se lo
refiri6 a Londres y consigui6 aprobaci6n en 61, y todos
nosotros nos lo referimos a nuestros gobiernos y la
conseguimos tambi6n.
Eso se desarroll6 en una t~cnica de la negociaci6n.
No importa lo que cualquiera de nosotros tenia a prop6sito
de instrucciones, intentariamos encontrar lo que pensamos
era la respuesta correcta, y entonces intentar conseguir que
nuestros gobiernos respectivos lo aceptaran. Eso funcion6
muy bien de hecho. 83
Con respecto a la ley internacional de costumbre, su coherencia es
debido al hecho de que es creado por individuos que pertenecen a la misma
comunidad epistdmica.
Hasta donde esos individuos comparten
conocimiento sobre la ley internacional, se comprometen en grados
diferentes para promover resultados en sus tdrminos y tienen 6xito
haciendo ambos asi dentro del proceso burocrdtico de tomar decisiones de
sus estados u organizaciones y mientras actdan en la esfera internacional en
su nombre, las acciones con respecto a ley internacional atribuida a sus

83.

ZARTMAN, supra nota 82, a las 37-38 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
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estados u organizaciones convergen.
La suma de estas acciones
convergiendo constituye la prctica general.
Parece que Abogados Internacionales y Diplomdticos forman la
comunidad epist~mica que crea la ley internacional. Ellos comparten, en
trminos anchos, cierto ntimero de creencias profesionales: un concepto
similar de la ley internacional, sus principios, fuentes, y procedimientos s5
La existencia de estas creencias es evidente por el hecho que la mayorfa de
los manuales introductorios a la ley internacional sostienen los mismos
puntos, con los mismos ejemplos, y, normalmente, incluso siguiendo la
misma estructura. Los contenidos de cursos y las metodologias de
instrucci6n similares en conferencias de la ley internacional alrededor del
mundo refuerza la homogeneidad del conocimiento compartido,86 mientras
los profesores principales lo sistematizan y ayudan propagarlo. Asi, si
estas creencias son generalmente eficaces en relaciones internacionales, es
porque esos profesionales pueden adelantarlos a trav6s de los procesos de
tomar decisi6nes en sus estados u organizaciones.
Estos individuos tambi6n forman una red transnacional de
profesionales, como es demostrado por el nfirnero de miembros extendido
de organizaciones profesionales como la Sociedad Americana de la Ley
Intemacional8 y la existencia de actividades como la reuni6n anual de los
84.

Cf. M. SORNARAJAH, LA LEY INTERNACIONAL DE INVERSI6N EXTRANJERA 210-11

(1994) (sosteniendo que la ley de la protecci6n de la inversi6n ha sido creada por un club de
juristas: "tribunales extranjeros estan inclinados a aplicar normas desarrolladas por juristas de
estados exportadores de capitales a los que son favorables a la protecci6n de la inversi6n ....
Declaraciones que Arbitros pertenecen a un club que refuerza actitudes de sus miembros estd
empezando a aparecer."). (Nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).
85. Vea Jutta Brunn6e & Stephen J. Toope, Environmental Security and Freshwater
Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 26, 34 (1997) ("incluso podria
defenderse que los abogados internacionales forman algo semejante como una comunidad
epist~mica, porque ellos promueven valores a travs de los principios especificos, como el
posited de principios de ecosistema en este papel que puede guiar ]a evoluci6n de r6gimenes y
finalmente gana una normativa significante.") (nota editorial: traducido del Ingles); yea tambi4n
Byers, supra nota 75, a 130 ("Como una instituci6n social el proceso de ley de costumbre es
anteriormente de todo un grupo de creencias compartido, expectativas o comprensiones
sostenidas por los seres humanos individuales que gobieman y representan a estados. Como
todas las instituciones, y el propio sistema internacional, es un grupo de ideas.") (nota editorial:
traducido del Ingles).
86.

Vea generalmente JOHN KING GAMBLE, TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE

1990S (1992).

87. Charlotte Ku, Message from the Executive Director, ASIL NEWSLETTER (The Am.
Soc'y of Int'l Law, Washington, D.C.), Mar.-May 1996, a 4.
A travs del ndimero de miembros en la Sociedad Americana de Ley Internacional, los
individuos ganan acceso a una red especializada y muy reconocida de otros miembros
de ASIL y de miembros de organizaciones comparable a la sociedad. . . . Es la
formaci6n y mantenimiento de esta red que es una tarea principal de la direcci6n y
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Consejeros Legales de Ministerios Extranjeros durante la Asamblea
General de las Naciones Unidas.88 Su contacto regular a trav6s de las
reuniones intergubernamentales y las asociaciones privadas les
proporcionan una oportunidad de formar conocimientos, prestar
informaci6n, y crear valores comunes todos los cuales facilitan la
formaci6n de coaliciones para la promoci6n de objetivos especificos
politicos.
Tambi6n parece que ellos comparten, en una base muy ancha, los
mismos valores y objetivos de la politica. La mayoria de los Abogados
Internacionales y Diplomdticos parecen ser comprometidos a promover la
regla de ley en relaciones internacionales: "el orden mundial a trav6s de la
ley." 89 No obstante, algunas investigaciones empiricas parecen ser
necesarias para evaluar la magnitud de este compromiso y si se transforma
en las recomendaciones especificas politicas.
Por otro lado, claramente, los sub-grupos de esta red han
compartido valores y objetivos de la politica. Por ejemplo, una coalici6n
que incluye a los expertos legales de la Cruz Roja Internacional; Profesor
H. Lauterpacht, de Cambridge; Profesor Graven, de la Universidad de
Ginebra; Max Huber, juez anterior de la Corte Permanente de Justicia
Internacional; Capitlin Mouton, un miembro de la Corte Suprema de
Netherlands; y el Coronel Phillimore, consejero legal al Gobierno britdnico
y un miembro de la prosecuci6n en Nuremberg, desarrollaron y con 6xito
promovieron el concepto de grandes aperturas durante la Conferencia de
Ginebra en 1949.90 Otro ejemplo es proporcionado por la uni6n de los
consejeros legales de ministerios extranjeros, consejeros legales en varias
misiones permanentes a las Naciones Unidas, las Organizaciones de Salud
Mundial, y abogados internacionales privados que pertenecen a varios
NGOs que pudieron adelantar dos demandas para las opiniones asesoreras
personal de la organizaci6n. La red identifica oportunidades mds alii para motivar y
movilizar a los miembros para tomar papeles de direcci6n en sus comunidades y vida
profesional crecer el uso y estudio de ley internacional. (Nota editorial: traducido del
Ingl6s).
88. Miguel Angel Gonzdlez Felix, Fifth Legal Advisers' Meeting at UN Headquaters in
New York, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 644, 644-49 (1995).
89. Cf. Reisman, supra nota 43, a 123 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s) (defendiendo
que:
Los Juristas son distintivos entre ellos [los estudiosos] en que ellos solo emprenden,
explicitamente, para intervenir en el proceso social que se ha examinado para afianzar
cambios en el modelo de decisi6n autoritaria para que diferenciara de aqui en adelante
a favor de un partido particular o, uno espera, a favor del interns comin). (Nota
editorial: traducido del Ingls).
90. BEST, supra nota 78, a las 160-65.
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en el uso de armas nucleares a la Corte Internacional de Justicia. 91

Finalmente, M. Sonarajah considera que una coalici6n
similar estA
92
actuando en el irea de protecci6n de inversi6n extranjera.
V.

CONCLUSION: LA NATURALEZA DE LA LEY INTERNACIONAL

Si el argumento anterior podrfa ser aceptado, que la ley
internacional es un grupo de normas creadas por los miembros de una

comunidad epistdmica para promover sus intereses parroquiales, metas y
valores en la arena internacional, entonces seria necesario revisar la
naturaleza de la ley internacional. Pues, concebi~ndolo asi como un
sistema de ley basado en el testamento y prictica de los estados, parecerfa
poco satisfactorio. Por consiguiente, la ley internacional debe concebirse

como un Regimen Internacional creado por una Comunidad Epist~mica.
El concepto de R~gimenes Internacionales, como usado por
Cientfficos Politicos y los estudiosos de las Relaciones Internacionales, se
refiere a "grupos de principios implicitos o explfcitos, normas, reglas y
procedimientos de tomar decisiones alrededor de que las expectativas de

91. Manfred Mohr, Advisory Opinion of the InternationalCourt of Justice on the Legality
of the use of Nuclear Weapons Under InternationalLaw, a Few Thoughts on its Strengths and
Weaknesses, 316 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 92, 92-93 (1997).
En mayo de 1992, una campafia internacional se lanz6 en Ginebra por organizaciones
no gubernamentales (NGOs) bajo el titulo El Proyecto Judicial Mundial. Los
promotores originales de ]a campafia eran el duradero Escritorio de Ia Paz
Internacional duradera (IPB) en Ginebra, los M&licos Internacionales muy conocidos
para la Prevenci6n de Guerra Nuclear y la Asociaci6n Internacional de Abogados
Contra las Armas Nucleates, formado al final de los afios ochenta. Unos 10 mds
NGOs (intemacionales), incluso Greenpeace International, despuds se unieron. Lo que
a la salida parecia m.s bien una iniciativa sin promesas por unos determinados
activistasde paces rapidamente se desarroll6 en un movimiento mundial compuesto de
numerosos jugadores no-gubernamentales y gubernamentales.
(Nota editorial:
traducido del Ingl6s).
Vea tambien Legality of the Threat or use of nuclear weapon Advisory Opinion, Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Oda, ICJ § 8 (1996), UN Doc. A/51/218 p. 94-95 (1996), 35 ILM 809 & 1343
(1996) (explicando como se envolvieron los NGOs antes).
92.

Vea SORNARAJAH, supra nota 84, a las 354-55.

No hay ningfin criterio objetivo por la cual los principios de este sistema legal llamado
[lex mercatoria] sea identificado y ningfina marca por el que podrfa probarse excepto
su aceptaci6n por un grupo selecto de gdrbitros europeos y estudiosos que lo promueven
a trav~s de sus escrituras incestuosas . . . el daflo sistemdtico es hecho por esfuerzos
para crear protecci6n de la inversi6n a travs de la formulaci6n de doctrinas espurias
por estudiosos totalmente comprometidos a la protecci6n de las corporaciones
multinacionales y hostil a los intereses de los paises en vfas de desarrollo. Es
improbable que estos esfuerzos cesarin. (Nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).
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los actores convergen en una Area dada de relaciones internacionales." 93
Este concepto, en principio, no coincide con la ley internacional. 94 No
requiere que las normas sean legalmente obligatorias o tengan un caricter

legal. 95 Al contrario, pretende incluir las normas, reglas, principios y el
proceso de tomar decisi6nes que no pertenece necesariamente a la ley
internacional, como gufas que no son obligatorias, secretos, o acuerdos
ilegales e incluso los acuerdos implicitos para la divisi6n de Areas de
influencia. 96 Ademis, la Teoria de los Rgimenes considera secciones
separadas de la ley internacional, o los grupos de normas, como
Rgimenes Internacionales separados. Asi, por ejemplo, el r~gimen de
envio internacional, formado por mis de cincuenta instrumentos

93. Krasner, supra nota 8, a 2 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingles); vea MARK W.
ZACHER WITH BRENT A. SUTTON, GOVERNING GLOBAL NETWORKS: INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
FOR TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 14-15 (1996); cf. Volker Rittberger, Research on
InternationalRegimes in Germany: The Adaptative Internalizationof an American Social Science
Concept, in REGIME THEORY, supra nota 5, at 10-11.
94. C. Brunn6e, supra nota 85, a 31 (usando una definici6n m s restrictiva de r~gimenes
que se us6 en este escrito: "Los Rgimenes como se entiende en teorfa de las relaciones
internacional, debido a su raices en pr~ctica del estado, mantenga ladrillos la construcci6n de mds
especffico (y ligaduras) los rfgimenes legales.
Nosotros Ilamamos dstos los r~gimenes
relativamente informales y no valedero los rigimenes contextuales porque ellos proporcionan una
escena en la que ligaduras normativas pueden surgir.") (nota editorial: traducido del Inglds);
pero yea Byers, supra nota 75, a las 128-36 ("A un abogado internacional este fen6meno [los
r~gimenes] parece ley internacional por otro nombre, de hecho, es ley internacional, con la
torcedura importante que los te6rico del r6gimen, abogados internacionales diferentes, estdn
directanente interesados sobre la relaci6n entre el poder y grupos de reglas o procedimientos.")
(nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s); YOUNG, supra nota 69, a las 184 - 211; Kenneth W.
Abbott, Elements of a Joint Discipline, 86 A.S.I.L. Proc. 167-172 (1992); Burley, supra nota 2,
a 220; Oran R. Young, Remarks, 86 A.S.I.L Proc. 172-175 (1992).
95. Robert 0. Keohane, The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a EuropeanAmerican Research Programme, in REGIME THEORY, supra nota 5, a las 27-28 (defendiendo que
una caracteristica que define los r6gimenes es su efectividad).
El problema mAs fundamental es si los r~gimenes serdn identificados en base de las
reglas explfcitas y procedimientos, o en base de conducta observada de la que pueden
inferirse reglas, normas, principios, y procedimientos. Definiendo r~gimenes
simplemente en trminos de reglas explfcitas y riesgos de los procedimientos que se
resbalan en la caracteristica de formalismo de algunas tradiciones de ley internacional:
es decir, podria considerarse que los acuerdos completamente nominales son
r6gimenes, aunque ellos no tenian ninguna implicaci6n al comportamiento. El Pacto
de Kellogg-Briand fiitil y vacio de 1927, a prohibir guerras, pudo en una definici6n
formalistica a ser considerada un r6gimen internacional (nota editorial: traducido del
Ingl6s).
Rittberger, supra nota 93, a 11.
96. Vea YOUNG, supra nota 69, a las 200-02; Friedrich Kratochiwil, Contract and
Regimes: Do Issue Specificity and Variations of Formality Matter?, en REGIME THEORY, supra
nota 5, a las 73, 85-91.
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internacionales que regulan dafios y compensaci6n, 97 y el Rggimen de los
Recursos Marino Jan Mayen-Iceland,98 basados en un tratado entre Islandia
y Noruega, 9 son considerados r~gimenes totalmente independientes.
No obstante, este tipo de acercamiento est, familiarizado a los
estudios de la ley internacional. Es usual que se describa fireas de la ley
por separado como: la Ley del Mar, las Leyes de Guerra, la Ley de los
Derechos Humanos Internacionales, el Sistema de Hague para el Pago de
1
Disputas, el Rgimen de los Mares Altos, y la Protecci6n Diplomitica. 00
Ademis, hasta donde la ley internacional General constituye un armaz6n
indispensable para cada Rgimen Internacional 0°' y proporciona algunas de
sus caracteristicas que la definan,' °2 constituye un elemento integro de cada
uno de ellos. Entonces, hasta donde la ley internacional general es un

97.
98.
99.
Ice.-Nor.,

Vea ZACHER, supra nota 93, a las 52-54.
Vea YOUNG, supra nota 69, a las 61-63.
Agreement on the Continental Shelf between Iceland and Jan Mayen, Oct. 22, 1981,
21 I.L.M. 1222 (1982).

100. Cf. BROWNLIE, supra nota 13, a 528 (defendiendo que:

La ley internacional no es un sistema repleto con ciertos torts nombrados o delicts,
pero [que] las reglas se especializan en ciertos respetos. Asi la referencia puede
hacerse a la fuente de dafio, como actos desautorizado de oficiales, las insurrecciones,
y asi sucesivamente, o al objeto y forma de dafio, como, por ejemplo, soberania
territorial, diplomdticos y otros agentes oficiales, o lesi6n al nacional.).
(Nota
editorial: traducido del Ingl~s).
101. Vea ZACHER, supra nota 93, a 2.
Sin la declara aceptaci6n de los estados de la autoridad soberana de cada uno con
dominios territoriales definidos, su red de convenciones diplomticas para la
comunicaci6n y la fabricaci6n de ley internacional, y sus obligaciones para obedecer
acuerdos internacionales y asegurar complacencia por sus ciudadanos, seria imposible
de generar los tipos de r~gimenes especificos que son en aumento prevaleciente y
importante en muchas esferas de relaciones internacionales. (Nota editorial: traducido
del Ingls).
102. Cf. Kratochiwil, supra nota 96, a las 80-81.
Aunque es probable que muchos r~gimenes contengan las reglas y normas que sirven
esta funci6n [agrandando la transparencia y disminullendo los costos transaccionales],
es dificil llamar cosas asi aprovisiona por ellos un regimen, a menos que nosotros nos
referimos directamente a contratarse a si mismo como un regimen. A un minimo un
regimen requiere una relaci6n que surge de contmtar interactivamente a largo plazo.
Esto parece ser requerido por dos razones. Primero, los grupos de un contrato
incompleto no s6lo deben estar de acuerdo en reglas que regulan acciones especificas,
pero tambi~n en principios mucho mds generales que imponen en ellos los deberes para
establecer disputas futuras.
Por consiguiente, es bastante entendible que estos
principios se ban sostenido para proporcionar Las caracteristicasbdsicas para definir
un r~gimen, o incluso su naturaleza. Id. (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl~s).
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grupo de normas compartido entre varios r6gimenes independientes, puede
ser descrita como un regimen de meta.10 3
Asi, los grupos particulares de normas de la ley internacional
constituyen varios Rdgimenes Internacionales especificos, caracterizado
por la percepci6n de los actores que sus normas son obligatorias
legalmente (opinio juris), mientras que el centro de la ley internacional
general; incluyendo, posiblemente, sus principios generales, definiciones
sobre sus asuntos y fuentes, y principios bdsicos en la ley de tratados y
pago de disputas internacionales constituye un regimen de meta.
Una vez que la ley internacional es conceptualmente definida como
un Rgimen Internacional creado por una Comunidad Epistemica, es
posible aplicar la ley para entender su desarrollo: la elaboraci6n te6rica de
Teoria de los Rdgimenes. Esta teoria contiende que cuando la distribuci6n
de poder en la sociedad internacional favorece a un estado o grupo de
estados, las normas son creadas por la acci6n de actores y comunidades
epist6micas a travds de la maquinaria de ese poder homog6neo, y que esos
testamentos de las normas persisten con tal de que ese estado mantenga su
posici6n dominante.'°4 Cuando el poder es homog6neamente distribuido o
en varios centros, las normas, segoin esta teoria, son creadas por la acci6n
de los miembros de comunidades epistemicas en los gobiernos diferentes, y
ellos persisten mientras esos actores mantienen su influencia.' 0 5 Cuando
hay un cambio en la distribuci6n de poder, las normas pueden persistir si
algunos miembros de la comunidad epist6mica que las cre6 pueden adquirir
posiciones burocrdticas en los nuevos poderes dominantes. No obstante, si
el conocimiento de tal comunidad pierde su validez, el r6gimen se
deteriorard. Esta teorfa defiende rns all que ambas, las variaciones en
las polfticas nacionales y los grados diferentes de complacencia con las
normas, son debidas a los grados diferentes de penetraci6n e influencia de
los miembros de la comunidad epist6mica en el proceso de tomar
decisiones de cada estado.'0o

103. Vea generalmente ZACHER, supra nota 93, a 14 ("tambi6n se comparten a menudo

normas entre los r~gimenes especfficos, y cuando las normas son las mismas o muy similares
entre varios regimenes, es posible decir que a un el rogimen de la meta existe."). (Nota
editorial: traducido del Ingles).

104. Vea Haas, Epistemic Comnmuities, supra nota 7, a 187 ("Bajo las condiciones de
incertidumbre, cuando el poder internacional se concentra en un estado, y cuando las
comunidades epistdmicas han consolidado influencia con 6xito en el estado dorninante . . . [el
r6gimen todavia se crearfa a trav6s de la intercesi6n del hegemon, pero su substancia reflejarfa
acuerdo general epist~mico."). (Nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
105. Vea id. a las 188-89.
106. Vea id. a 189.
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Este aproche puede proporcionar algunas visiones en el desarrollo
de ley internacional. Primero, puede explicar sus tendencias principales.
Asi, por ejemplo, la aceptaci6n de ley internacional por Terceros Paises
Mundiales y Estados No-occidentales"o puede explicarse como el resultado
de la penetraci6n de miembros de la comunidad epistdmica de practicantes
de la ley internacional en las burocracias crecientes de esos estados.108
Segundo, puede explicar casualidades particulares en el desarrollo de la
ley. Por ejemplo, atribuiria las negociaciones en la Ley del Mar desde
1967, incluso la entrada en fuerza de la Convenci6n de las Naciones
Unidas en la Ley del Mar en 1982, y la negociaci6n de dos acuerdos de
aplicaci6n,' °9 a las actividades de una comunidad epist6mica de Abogados

Las posiciones nacionales variarian segtin la magnitud de penetraci6n por comunidades
epist6micas, o la sensibilidad de polifticas en ese pafs a las polifticas en un pais ya

influido por la comunidad epist~mica. . . . Pueden sofisticarse polifticas y uniones
realmente, reflejando la calidad de sus creencias. Hasta que punto se aceptan tales
lecciones y se convierten en las nuevas politicas en paises diferentes, asf como la
complacencia del r6gimen, estA sujeto a la habilidad de miembros de la comunidad
epist~mica ocupar puestos importantes burocrdticos y persuadir otros de sus polfticas
preferidas. (Nota editorial: traducido del Inglds).
107. Vea generalnente CASSESE, supra nota 17, a las 69-70.
108. Cf. ZARTMAN, supra nota 82, a 226.
Ahora el mundo ha establecido una cultura diplomltica internacional que pronto
estatifica a sus miembros en una conducta similar. Incluso los chinos han aprendido a
jugar con la O.N.U. con sus reglas, los paises recientemente independientes como las
naciones africanas se atan a sus comisiones coloniales anteriores para consejo general
hasta que ellos hayan aprendido las diplomacia, y los grupos de delegados ensefian a
los mlis nuevos miembros originalmente sobre maneras diplomiticas desarrolladas para
un sistema estatal europeo. Es diffcil mantener, como Nicolson y Morgenthau dijeron,
que el sistema Occidental de diplomacia y negociaci6n funcion6 durante los siglos estA
en peligro de destrucci6n inminente a las manos de las personas que no pueden
comprender nuestras maneras; al contrario, las nuevas naciones han aprendido bien las
maneras Occidentales y han estado acostumbrdndolos a sus propios prop6sitos. (Nota
editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
109. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, abierto para firma Dec. 10, 1982,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reimprimido en UNITED NATIONS, OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA WITH ANNEXES AND INDEX, UN Sales

No. E.83.V.5 (1983), 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982); Acuerdo que Relaciona a la Aplicaci6n de Parte
XI de la Convenci6n de los Naciones Unidas en la Ley del Mar de 10 diciembre, 1982, adoptado
el 28 de julio de 1994, UNGA Res. 48/263 (28 de julio de 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1309 (1994); el
Acuerdo para la aplicaci6n de las Provisiones de la Convenci6n de los Naciones Unidas en la Ley
de 10 de marzo de 1982 de diciembre que relaciona a la Conservaci6n y Direcci6n de
Abastecimiento de Pez incluyendo Peces de Migratorias, adoptado el 5 de diciembre de 1995,
UNGA Res. 50/24 (Diciembre 5, 1995), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/37; U.N. Doc. A/50/550,
annex I.
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Internacionales y Practicantes,"10 formada alrededor del Embajador
Pardo,"' y qu6 creci6 durante las siguientes negociaciones.
Por el otro lado, mientras este acercamiento puede proporcionar un
entendimiento mds profundo de la naturaleza de la ley internacional y su
papel en relaciones internacionales, no desafia la prdctica normal de la ley
internacional. Sus conclusiones son limitadas a la Teoria de la Ley
Internacional, no la ciencia normal"12 de la ley internacional. Los mdtodos
de la ley internacional no pierden su validez porque esos son los reservados
para una comunidad que los usa para promover los valores y las metas de
sus miembros. Al contrario, esos m6todos precisamente son vilidos
porque los miembros de semejante comunidad los aceptan, y las
conclusiones que se alcanzan son vlidas.
Entonces, los abogados
internacionales tendrian que continuar apoyando la ley internacional,
usando t6rminos y m~todos legales, para que sus conclusiones sean
aceptadas como declaraciones pertinentes a la ley por otros miembros de su
comunidad y, como una consecuencia, para ser influyente promoviendo sus
propias metas y valores.
Finalmente, esta concepci6n de la ley internacional tiene una
consecuencia 6tica. Resalta el papel que los abogados internacionales,
incluso diplomdticos, consejeros legales, y acad6micos, juegan en
relaciones internacionales. Revela que estos individuos tienen ciertos
valores y metas con respecto a c6mo las relaciones internacionales deben
ser, y que ellos trabajan para asegurar que esos valores sean incluidos en la
prictica real atribuida a sus estados o las organizaciones internacionales.
Asi, les exigiria a estos profesionales reconocer su papel y relevancia y
estar consciente de la direcci6n en que ellos estin imprimiendo en la
sociedad internacional. Este nuevo conocimiento requiere un nivel mds
alto de responsabilidad de su parte.
Politicos y diplom~iticos eran los habitantes de privilegio de
palabras de irrealidad, esta irrealidad amenazaba la vida
en una gran escala, un mundo que no obstante parecia a
sus habitantes, en moda paranoica caracteristica, ser
absolutamente real y natural e inevitablemente y derecho.
Sigui6 que especialistas en el estudio de relaciones
110. Cf. KEOHANE, supra nota 6, a las 114-16, 125, 148-50.
111. Cf. CASSESE, supra nota 17, a las 379-84.
112. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2nd ed. 1970)

(definiendo una ciencia normal como el esfuerzo cientffico que usa un paradigma, i.e., (al vii) el
"universalmente reconoci6 logros cientificos que durante un tiempo los problemas ejemplares y
soluciones proporcionan a una comunidad de practicantes," como su criterio por determinar la
validez cualquier otra investigaci6n extensa.). (Nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).
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internacionales estaban estudiando una forma de conducta
patol6gica. Y tambi6n sigui6 que el papel de abogados
el racionalizar y el
internacionales habia sido el buscar,
13
regularizar conducta patol6gica.1

113. ALLOTr, supra nota 1, a xii (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
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EUROPEAN UNION (EU)
Prior to November 1993, the European Union was called the European
Community. The EC was composed of three originally separate
organizations: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), created
in 1951; the European Economic Community (EEC, often referred to as
the Common Market), and the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom), both set up in 1957. The three institutions merged in 1967,
creating the EC and establishing headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.
Court of Justice
The final arbiter in all matters of EU law is the Court of Justice. The
court deals with disputes between member governments and EU
institutions and among EU institutions, and with appeals against EC rulings
or decisions. Courts within the member states often refer cases involving
an unclear point of EU law to the Court of Justice. The court makes
binding rulings on EU law to help guide the rulings of national courts. The
rulings of the Court of Justice set legal precedents and become part of the
legal framework of each member state.
Uni6n europea (UE)
Antes de noviembre del 1993, la Uni6n europea se llam6 la Comunidad
europea. La CE estaba compuesta por tres organizaciones originalmente
separadas: la Comunidad europea de Carb6n y Acero (CECA), creada
en el 1951; la Comunidad Econ6mica europea (CEE, a menudo llamada
el Mercado Comfin), y la Comunidad de Energia At6mica europea
(Euratom), las dos establecidas en el 1957. Las tres instituciones se
unieron en el 1967, creando la CE y estableciendo sus oficinas
principales en Bruselas, B6lgica.
Corte de Justicia
El ,rbitro final en todas las materias de ley de la UE es la Corte de
Justicia. La corte trata con disputas entre los gobiernos del miembro y
instituciones de UE y entre las instituciones de UE, y con apelaciones
contra decisiones o ordenes de la CE. Las cortes de los estados de los
miembros a menudo refieren casos que involucran un punto incierto de
ley de la UE a la Corte de Justicia. La corte hace ordenes obligatorias
que se aplican a la UE para ayudar a guiar las decisiones de las cortes
nacionales. Las decisiones de la Corte de Justicia fija los precedentes
legales y forman parte del armaz6n legal de cada estado miembro.

THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION AND ITS
IMPACT ON MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM TRADE
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INTRODUCTION
I.
When business parties enter into binding agreements, it is in their
interest not merely to consider the immediate dynamics of the exchange,
but to anticipate the ways in which a changing world might affect their
obligations. Individual circumstances are only a baseline in contract
negotiations. In order to achieve maximum security for the parties, the
agreement must be attuned to political and economic realities.
In the area of export trade finance, one of the most significant
external influences which parties need to take into account today is the
impending European Monetary Union (EMU). The EMU, scheduled to be
launched in 1999, is the dramatic culmination of sustained efforts to unify
economic and monetary policies in Europe. It signals the death of various
national currencies, which are to be succeeded by a single monetary unit.
At this time, only a minority of EU member states perform well enough
economically to qualify for the EMU.1 Nevertheless, the EMU is expected
to proceed according to schedule, inducting the qualified countries
immediately, followed by the other countries as they become eligible.'
The obsolescence of national currencies poses some technical
difficulties, because many contracts stipulate a specific currency in which
payment is to be made. Part I of this paper explores the currency
problems that could arise as a consequence of the single currency, focusing
in particular on countertrade and forfaiting transactions. Part II of the
paper discusses the identifying features of forfait financing. Part III
addresses counterpurchase agreements and bilateral clearing agreements.
Part IV then examines the history and technical aspects of the EMU. Part
V anticipates currency disputes related to forfaiting transactions and
countertrade. Finally, Part VI concludes that business parties should pay
close attention to the external influence of the EMU when they coordinate
their mutual obligations.

1. These include France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
See infra note 160.
2. See infra notes 153 and 154.
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FORFAITING AS A METHOD OF EXPORT FINANCE

A. Identifying Features
As with other forms of export finance, forfaiting is a mechanism
designed to secure credit for buyers with the least possible risk to sellers. 3
Exporters find forfaiting appealing because cash is received shortly after
shipment.' Buyers find it helpful because it enables them to purchase
goods without having to tender immediate payment.- Estimates indicate
that approximately two percent of all international trade involves
forfaiting .6 This method of finance is now gaining acceptance in the
United States, where many European forfait houses have established
representative offices.'

In a forfaiting transaction, the exporter sells export receivables at a
discount to a forfaiter in return for cash.' Trade instruments used for this
purpose include promissory notes, guaranteed bills of exchange (i.e., "per
aval"), and letters of credit.9 The debt is ordinarily paid in semi-annual
installments, each of which is evidenced either by a negotiable instrument,
or by a letter of credit.' 0 When the exporter sells the negotiable

3.
See CHARLES J. GMUR ET AL., TRADE FINANCING 117 (1981) [hereinafter Gmur];
Elnora Uzzelle, ForfaitingShould Not Be Overlooked As An Innovative Means of Export Finance,
BUS. AM., Feb. 1995, at 20 [hereinafter Uzzelle].
4.

See Uzzelle, supra note 3, at 20.
5.
See A. I. Trade Finance, Inc. v. Centro Internationale Handelsbank AG, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15100, 1992 WL 296419 at 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
6.

See Uzzelle, supra note 3, at 22.
7.
See Id. at 20. Forfaiting was developed in the wake of World War II by Swiss
financiers in order to facilitate the sale of West German capital assets to Eastern Europe. Id.
Today, the center of the forfaiting market is London. Id.; Edmond Tavernier, Legal Aspects of
Forfaiting, 11 INT'L Bus. LAW 25 (Oct. 1983) (describing the role of forfaiting in U.S. grain
exports) [hereinafter Tavernier].
8.

See A. I. Trade Finance, Inc. v. Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1993).
9.
See Tavernier, supra note 7, at 27-28. A per aval guarantee by a bank is "an
unconditional irrevocable and freely assignable obligation of the bank, not only as guarantor, but
as co-obligor as well." Uzzelle, supra note 3, at 20. Thus, the bank as guarantor is required to
make payment without respect to any nonperformance issues that might afflict the underlying
transaction. See Handelsbank AG, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15100, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,

1992). A letter of credit is "an undertaking issued by a bank for the account of the buyer (the
Applicant) or for its own account, to pay the [seller] the value of the Draft and/or documents

provided that the terms and conditions of the [letter of credit] are complied with." CHARLES DEL
BUSTO, ICC GUIDE TO DOCUMENTARY CREDIT OPERATIONS 22 (1994).
10.

See Uzzelle, supra note 3, at 20.
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instruments, the forfaiter may hold them until they mature, or resell them
in a secondary market."
Since the forfaiter buys the instruments from the exporter on a
non-recourse basis, all of the risks related to foreign debt are shifted from
the exporter to the forfaiter.' 2 Recourse against the exporter is only
The first is where the
available in three extraordinary situations."
instruments are in some way defective.1 Recourse may also be had if the
guarantee by the bank was not valid when it was made.' 5 Finally, the
forfaiter has recourse if the transaction was "not as represented.",'

B. ForExample
Suppose Spacely Sprockets, a United States exporter, enters into a17
sales agreement with Compratore di Milano, an Italian buyer.
Compratore agrees to purchase 10,000 sprockets in return for a six-year
credit on the sale. As part of the arrangement, Compratore secures a
guarantee of payment from its local bank. Next, Spacely ships the

11. See Petra Bank, 989 F.2d at 78. The secondary markets are quite active and involve
A
heavy trading of notes. See HOWARD PALMER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE FINANCE:
PRACTMONER'S GUIDE 50 (1995).

[The products and the objectives of this market are very different from those of the
original forfaiters. The participants in this secondary market view any item generated
in the primary cycle (as a means to finance the export) merely as a risk asset to be
endorsed and traded as a marketable security. Bankers participating simply buy risk,
invariably on a non-recourse basis, and judge that risk by its country of origin, the
credit status of the guaranteeing or avalizing party and their portfolio management
objectives. Popular risk, such as good quality Chinese paper, could change hands as
many as 10 times in the secondary market. Id. at 51.
12. See Gmur, supra note 3, at 117.
13. See A.I. Finance, Inc. v. Centro Internationale Hjandelsbank, AG, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15100, at 68 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1992).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. See also Eugene A. Ludwig & Michael J. Coursey, The Export Trade Note: A
New Instrument for International Trade, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 381 (1986) [hereinafter
Ludwig & Coursey]:
[IIt is unclear under European civil law whether the exporter, despite its endorsement
of the note without recourse, implicitly covenants to the note-purchaser that the note it
isselling is a valid note, validly executed by the importer and validly [guaranteed] by
the importer's bank. Thus, the exporter in a forfait transaction may ultimately be
liable to the note-purchaser if the note proves to be invalid in form or substance.
Id. at 387 (citing Tavernier, Legal Aspects of Forfaiting, 11 INT'L Bus. LAW 25, 28-29 (Oct.
1983)).
17. This example is based on an illustration which appeared in Elnora Uzzelle's article.
See Uzzelle, supra note 3, at 21.
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sprockets to Italy and endorses the guaranteed negotiable instruments on a
non-recourse basis in .favor of Fred's Forfaiting. Fred then pays to
Spacely the discounted proceeds in cash. Spacely is now out of the
picture, although it is still responsible for the quality of the goods."
Meanwhile, Fred has absorbed all of the risks attending the transaction:
the credit risk of Compratore's bank; the risk of exchange rate
fluctuations; and the political risks of doing business with an Italian firm.' 9
Fred now has the option of transferring those risks by selling the notes to
another bank or to a private investor.m0
Under a forfaiting agreement, credit terms can range from two
months to ten years. 2' However, the normal range is between 180 days and
about six years." In general, the amount of time granted for repayment
corresponds to the risks involved.3 Thus, high risk transactions entail
short repayment terms and high discount rates, while transactions of low
risk imply the reverse.u4
III.

COUNTERTRADE

Countertrade is a term used generically to describe a variety of
international trade agreements.Y The most common forms of countertrade
are counterpurchase agreements, buy-back agreements and barter.26 While
barter and buy-back agreements typically do not require cash payment, 2
other countertrade techniques often do?
In light of the rapidly
approaching changes in Europe's currency system, this section outlines two
18. Id.
19. See Uzzelle, supra note 3, at 21.
20. See supra note 11.
21. See Uzzelle, supra note 3, at 21.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. "For sales to Japan, Canada, and France, terms may reach five years and the
discount to yield hovers around 6.75%. However, sales to Pakistan may yield a one year term
limit with a discount rate of 7.5%, reflecting the perceived risk." Id.
25. See generally Cedric Guyot, Countertrade Contracts in International Business, 20
INT'L LAW 921, 922-24 (1986) [hereinafter Guyot].
26. See Steven Rinaldi, Can United States Anti-Dumping Law Be Effectively Applied to
CountertradeTransactions?, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 441, 442 (1987).
27. Id. In a barter transaction, the parties exchange goods of equal value. Id. In a buyback transaction, one trading partner exports technology and equipment in order to construct a
plant in another country, and in return receives a predetermined supply of the plant's ultimate
output. Id. at 444.
28. See S. Douglas Nugent, U.S. Countertrade Policy: Is It Economically Sound?, 19
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 829, 830-34 (1985) [hereinafter Nugent].
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counterpurchase agreements and bilateral clearing

A. Counterpurchase
In a counterpurchase agreement, the parties enter into multiple
contracts, and the value of the reciprocal deliveries need not be
equivalent." The first contract is simply a cash-for-goods transaction.30
The second contract prescribes the conditions of the counterpurchase, i.e.,
it covers the original exporter's obligation to purchase goods from the
original buyer.' The final contract, known as a protocol, links the first
two agreements. 2 This protocol is frequently incorporated into the
counterpurchase contract."
The two essential purchase agreements are discrete transactions
and involve separate payments of currency.Y
The performance of
deliveries and payments is ordinarily spread out over a period of one to
five years.31 To illustrate, a German telecommunications company might
sell hardware to a buyer in the Republic of Malawi for cash. This initial
purchase would then be linked to a reciprocal purchase agreement. The
German company would thereby assume an obligation for the subsequent
purchase of some commodity, such as limestone or uranium.
B. BilateralClearingAgreements
Under a bilateral clearing agreement, two countries agree to extend
mutual lines of credit and trade certain quantities of each other's goods
during a specified period of time.36 In other words, one country purchases
goods from the other and the price of the goods are debited from its line of
37
credit.
When the clearing period expires, there is often an imbalance
between the amounts of credit used by each country." In such a case, the

29. See William D. Zeller, Countertrade, the GAT,
11 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 247, 251 (1988).

30.
3i.
32.
33.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Guyot, supra note 25, at 930.

34. Id.
35. Id.

36. See Nugent, supra note 28, at 833.
37. Id.
38. Id.

and the Theory of the Second Best,
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greater-consuming country is obligated to pay any residual difference to
the lesser-consuming country. 9 For example, if Austria shares a clearing
agreement with Romania, and if at the end of the clearing period Austria
has imported more goods from Romania than Romania has imported from
Austria, then Austria will be responsible for its outstanding residual debt.40
Whether the transaction in question involves a clearing agreement,
a counterpurchase, or a forfait financing, parties to agreements with
medium and long-term credit terms are advised to consider their possible
exposure to risks related to the steady advance of a unified system of
currency in Europe. The following section describes the forces propelling
the new regime, the concomitant technical details and the arguments for
and against its consummation.
IV. THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION
In 1957, the concept of a unified economic and monetary structure
in Europe was formally posited in Article 3(g) of the Treaty of Rome.4 '
From 1957 until 1972, the Bretton-Woods Agreement represented the
principal attempt to stabilize European currencies relative to one another.41
Under this regime, the fluctuations in exchange rates on foreign markets
were subject to tight controls in the participating countries. 3 However,
recessionary pressures in the late 1960's and early 1970's forced the
39. Id.
40. Id. Romania would also have the option of selling its credit to a third party at a
discount. Id. at 833-34.
41. The Treaty of Rome was signed by France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux
countries, and was ratified by each of those states as of 1958. See AURTHUR I. BLOOMFIELD ET
AL., EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION AND ITS MEANING FOR THE UNITED STATES 1
(Lawrence B. Krause & Walter S. Salant eds., 1973) [hereinafter Bloomfield]. This treaty
provided for the dissolution of restrictions on the free movement of capital among the
participating countries, and for the erection of a single customs union. Id. Article 2 of the
Treaty proclaimed that a common market was to be achieved, and that the economic policies of
the signatories were to be harmonized. See John P. Flaherty & Maureen E. Lally-Green, The
European Union: Where is it Now?, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 923, 937 (Summer 1996) [hereinafter
Flaherty & Lally-Green]. Article 3 provided the instrumental details, including: (1) the
coordination of a single external commercial and tariff policy; (2) the elimination of barriers to
the free movement of labor, capital, goods, and services; (3) the development of common policy
in certain areas of the economy such as agriculture and transportation; (4) the unification of
economic and monetary policy; (5) the harmonization of the various laws of the signatories in
order to nurture the common market; (6) the establishment of a European Social Fund and a
European Investment Bank to promote employment and commercial expansion; and (7) the
increase of trade with other countries and territories. Id.
42. The participating countries included France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux
countries. See Bloomfield, supra note 41, at 22-23.
43. Id.
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original participants to withdraw from the agreement in order to
rehabilitate their individual economies." The abandonment of BrettonWoods resulted in pronounced instability in exchange rates in Europe on
the markets for goods and capital suffered accordingly.41
A. The European Monetary System
Partly inspired by the lessons learned from Bretton-Woods, the
current effort to maintain stable markets and exchange rates is known as
the European Monetary System (EMS)." The EMS is far more ambitious
than Bretton-Woods, and contemplates the coordination of fiscal and
monetary policy as well as the stabilization of currency.47 Beyond these
objectives, the EMS was also conceived as a vehicle for the establishment
of a single currency that might eventually become suitable for international
trade .4
The push for a single currency can be traced to the Werner Plan of
1970, which set forth in detail the implications of a European Monetary
Union.4 9 This plan sought to eliminate restrictions on the movement of
capital, and to advance the goal of policy coordination.- In 1979, this
philosophy found expression as the European Economic Community
adopted the EMS.-'
Technically, the EMS is "an agreement among central banks to
manage intra-community exchange rates and to finance exchange market
interventions. " 2 This system includes three operative components. 3 First,
member states are required to limit fluctuations in exchange rates through
44.

See Susan B. Shulman, A Rapid or Evolutionary Approach: The EEC's Adoption of

the ECU as a Common Currency, 12 J. INT'L L. BUS. 392, 407 (1991) [hereinafter Shulman].
45.

See Bloomfield, supra note 41, at 23.
46. See LAWRENCE B. KRAUSE ET AL., EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION AND ITS
MEANING FOR THE UNITED STATES, supra note 41, at 114-15 [hereinafter Krause].
47.

Id. at 115.

48. Id.; HORST UNGERER ET AL., THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM: DEVELOPMENTS
AND PERSPECTIVES 2-3 (1990) [hereinafter Ungerer].
49. The Werner Report documented the need for the total convertibility of currency, as
well as the elimination of fluctuations in exchange rates, and the establishment of parity ratios.
See Krause, supra note 46, at 114-15.
50.

Id. at 115-16.

51. See MICHELE FRATIANNI & JURGEN VON HAGEN, THE EUROPEAN MONETARY
SYSTEM AND EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION 1 (1992) [hereinafter Fratianni & von Hagen].
52. JOHN B. GOODMAN, MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY: THE POLITICS OF CENTRAL
BANKING IN WESTERN EUROPE 192 (1992) [hereinafter Goodman].
53. See STEPHEN ZAMORA ET AL., BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW 471 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds., 1990) [hereinafter Zamora].
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an Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). 1 Second, member states may
obtain short-term credit in order to intervene in cases of serious
fluctuation." Finally, the EMS embraces the European Currency Unit
(ECU) as the official reserve asset, and as the official accounting unit for
the EEC.56
Currency stability under the EMS is maintained by a parity grid
and a divergence indicator.,, The parity grid measures the performance of
one country's currency versus that of another." Desired bilateral rates are
set by agreement and function as reference points for parameters beyond
which currencies are not allowed to fluctuate. 9 If a currency strays outside
of the pre-set bands, the central bank of that country is required to
6
intervene.60 Thus, the EMS works as a pegged exchange arrangement. '
While the parity grid measures bilateral variations, the divergence
indicator measures the performance of individual currencies against the
weighted average of all the other currencies.62 If a member state's
currency diverges too far from the ECU, that state is required to adjust by
selling or buying its own currency, as the case may be.63

However,

participation among states in both the parity grid and the divergence
indicator is voluntary."
In the absence of excessive market pressures, the parity grid and
the divergence indicator have helped to stabilize exchange rates.65
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The ECU is a unit of account that represents a weighted average of the individual
currencies of the member states. See John H. Works Jr., The European Currency Unit: The
Increasing Significance of the European Monetary System's Currency Cocktail 41 BUS. LAW.
483, 494 (1986) [hereinafter Works].
57. See Brian K. Kurzmann, Challenges to Monetary Unification in the European Union:
Sovereignty Reigning Supreme?, 23 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 135, 143 (Fall 1994)
[hereinafter Kurzmann].
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. If the currency of a central bank approaches the high end of its range versus another
currency, the bank must sell its overvalued currency and buy the undervalued currency.
Conversely, a central bank whose currency approaches the low end of the band must buy its own
currency and sell the other. See Works, supra note 56, at 493-94.
61. See Kurzmann, supra note 57, at 144.
62. Id.
63. See Works, supra note 56, at 495.
64. See Schluter v. Hauptzollamt Lorrach, [1973] E.C.R. 1135, 1161 (holding that
member states are not ultimately required to submit to the terms of the Exchange Rate
Mechanism).
65. See Kurzmann, supra note 57, at 144.

1208

ILSA Journal of Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 4:1199

Nevertheless, these devices have failed when intense market forces have
jeopardized individual currencies." For example, Italy and the United
Kingdom withdrew their currencies from the EMS in 1992 because of
drastic economic conditions.67
When the EMS was implemented in 1979, critics argued the wide
disparities between the economies of the member states would preclude a
workable system.61 These critics pointed to three possibilities as a result of
the economic divergences."9 First, they argued the system would rapidly
fail because it was not flexible enough to accommodate such disparate
economies.70 Second, the critics warned that the system would have a
deflationary impact, either by forcing countries with high inflation to
tighten their policies or by making it necessary to suppress the
competitiveness of all member states in order to sustain the weaker
countries.,, The third possibility was severe inflation might ensue because
countries with low inflation would have to import inflation from other
member states in the form of price supports and increases in their
monetary bases.71 Despite these risks, however, the EMS has survived and
currently serves as the functional precursor to the single currency.Y
B. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992
In December of 1991, an intergovernmental conference on the
EMU made its report to the Maastricht European Council.1' Input from the
conference was then formally incorporated as part of the Treaty on the

66. Id.
67. See Emma Tucker, Obligations of European ERM Members, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 26,
1992, at 5. Italy rejoined the ERM in November of 1996. See Angelo Tarallo, On the Road to
the Euro, THE BOTrOM LINE, Spring 1997, at 4 [hereinafter Tarallo].
68. For example, in 1979 the inflation rate in Germany was 2.7%, compared to 12.2% in
Italy. The dramatic disparities in inflation rates among EEC member states were partly
compounded by the OPEC crisis of the 1970's. See JACQUES VAN YPERSELE & JEAN-CLAUDE
KOEUNE, THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM:

ORIGINS, OPERATIONS AND OUTLOOK 66

(1984) [hereinafter Van Ypersele & Koeune].
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Goodman, supra note 52, at 182-83.
74. See Roger J. Goebel, The European Union Grows: The Constitutional Impact of the
Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1092, 1109 (1995)
[hereinafter Goebel].
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European Union ["TEU"] on February 7, 1992." Under the terms of the
TEU, the European Monetary Union is cast with other significant EU
institutions 6 as one of three pillars, which together uphold the European
Union."
The Treaty specifies three incremental stages for the eventual
changeover to a single currency.71 The first stage (now complete) involved
the enhanced coordination of economic policies among the member states
within the extant institutional framework.79 On January 1, 1994, the
second stage beganY0 This transitional stage brought a prohibition on all
barriers to the free movement of capital, not only among member states but
also with respect to third-party states. 8' In addition, restrictions were
drawn on government deficits; the European Monetary Institute was
formed and the eventual independence of each state's central bank was
prescribed.Y Stage Three is scheduled to commence no later than January
1, 1999, at which time participating countries will adopt a single monetary
policy and a single policy on exchange rates.1
Under stage two the key institutional change was the establishment
of the European Monetary Institute (EMI)." The EMI monitors the
European Monetary System; promotes the use of the ECU in private
transactions; and supervises the development of the ECU clearing system."
The EMI will also be consulted by the authorities of the member states on
monetary policy and will be authorized to issue pertinent

75. The TEU became effective on January 1, 1993. Id. (citing 24 BULL. EC 12-1991, at

7-8).
76. These include the European Union itself, as well as two other treaty-based institutions
known as Euratom (which coordinates nuclear energy policy) and the European Coal and Steel
Community (which coordinates matters relating to coal and steel-scheduled incidentally, to be
subsumed by the European Union in 2002). Id. at 1110.
77. See TEU art. G. The second pillar is the Common Foreign and Security Policy. See'
TEU art. J. Under this article, the European Council is to establish and administer non-binding
rules on foreign and security policy. Id. The third pillar is known as Cooperation in Justice and
Home Affairs. See TEU art. K. Article K concerns the coordination of affairs of justice. Id.
78. Goodman, supra note 52, at 202-08.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See The MaastrichtAgreement on Economic and Monetary Union, 32 BANK OF ENG.
Q. BULL. 64, 67 (1992) [hereinafter BEQB].
85. Id.
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recommendations.'
If a member state wishes to hold foreign exchange
reserves with the EMI, the Institute is competent to manage the reserves as
the state's agent." However, the EMI cannot intervene in foreign markets
on its own initiative. 8
The EMI consists of the central bank governors from all the
member states, as well as a full-time President.8' The governors are fully
independent, but independence is not required for the central banks
themselves during Stage Two.8 ' The central banks are responsible for the
EMI's administrative costs. 91
Two significant events will usher in the third stage.
First,
exchange rates between participating currencies will be permanently
fixed.92 Second, the European Central Bank (ECB), with the cooperation
of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), will assume managerial
control over the new currency. 93 The ECB will determine monetary policy
for the entire EU, and will be "empowered to enforce binding rules on
national budgets. "14
The chief objective for both the ECB and the ESCB will be to
ensure price stability. 5 The ESCB will also be charged with a host of
collateral duties. First, it will develop and administer a single monetary
policy. 9 Second, it will hold and manage the foreign exchange reserves of
participating member states.97 As a third matter, the ESCB is required to
facilitate the operation of payments systems." Finally, it must assist
competent authorities in the prudential supervision of credit institutions and
the maintenance of a stable financial system." Central bank governors
from the various states will serve as members of the Governing Council of

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
The Maastricht Agreements on Economic and Monetary Union, supra note 84, at 67.
91. Id.
92. Because exchange rates will be locked, the ECU will no longer represent a weighted
average of the individual currencies. Md.at 64-65.
93. Id.at 65.
94. Goodman, supra note 52, at 203.
95. See BEQB, supra note 84, at 65.
96. d.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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the ECB.' °° They will be joined on the Council by a full-time executive
board appointed by the member states. 01
The ECB and the ESCB are to be free from all external
influence.' °0 This policy of independence was designed to avoid the
administrative complications that would arise if the ECB were to be
accountable on an individual basis to fifteen national governments and
parliaments. 13 Instead, accountability is to be maintained through the
Although the
European Council of Finance Ministers (ECOFIN).' °0
ECOFIN President may not vote in the ECB's Governing Council
meetings, the President may participate and submit motions for
consideration. 0 - The ECOFIN Council may also discuss ECB objectives
with the ECB President, and may amend the ESCB statute to a limited
extent. '
Additional accountability measures include a requirement that the
ECB deliver an annual report on monetary policy to the ECOFIN Council,
the European Parliament, the Commission, and the European Council.I'"
Furthermore, members of the ECB executive board, including the
President, can be requested to appear at the hearings of certain committees
of the European Parliament.?0 Finally, central bank governors may freely
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
See BEQB, supra note 84, at 65.
Id.
Id.
Id.

105. Id.

106. The ECOFIN Council may not amend provisions which govern the ESCB's principal
tasks and objectives, nor may it alter the ESCB's ultimate independence. Id.
107. See BEQB, supra note 84, at 65. The European Parliament serves as a forum for
debating issues of concern to the peoples of the EU member states. See BERMANN ET AL.,
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 66 (1993). The Parliament is considered the most democratic arm
of the EU, because its members are directly elected by the people. Id. at 68. However,
"although its role in the legislative and budgetary processes has grown, Parliament still lacks the
power it ordinarily would enjoy in a modern democracy." Id. For example, legislation is
proposed not by Parliament, but by the Commission. Id. at 66.
The Commission performs tasks commonly associated with an executive organ:
oversight and enforcement of policy. Id. at 57. The Commission's duty is to promote the
interests of the EU, rather than those of the member states. Id. at 58. Its areas of responsibility
include the administration of EU finances, external relations and trade, and legal actions against
member states for violations of EU law. See BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
59, 66 (1993). The European Council coordinates the foreign policy of member states. Id. at
56. It is composed of the heads of state and the President of the Commission. Id. The
European Council submits progress reports each year to the Parliament, and sets guidelines on
the economic policies of both the member states and the EU as a whole. Id.
108. See BEQB, supra note 84, at 65.
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attend national parliamentary committees, either as representatives of the
Governing Council or in their national capacities. °0
During Stage Three, the ECOFIN Council will retain responsibility
for the choice of exchange rate system of the new currency relative to nonEU currencies, and for the central rate within the system."0 However, in
order to ensure policies consistent with the goal of price stability, the
ECOFIN Council must consult with the ECB before making such
decisions."' Exchange rate operations from day to day are left to the ECB,
which will initially control up to ECU 50 billion 12 for the purpose of
exchange-market intervention."'
In terms of macroeconomic policy, Stage Three embraces three
baseline principles: no excessive deficits; no monetary financing; and no
bailouts."' The ECB and the national central banks are prohibited from
offering credit facilities to Community institutions or to member states.",
They are further prohibited from directly purchasing debt instruments from

these institutions. 116
1. Convergence Criteria
In order to join the EMU, member states must conform with four
threshold criteria measuring economic performance."' First, the member
state must demonstrate significant price stability.", In particular, the rate
of inflation must be comparable to the three member states with the
greatest price stability. "9 Second, the financial position of the applying
state must be sustainable. '2
Governments with excessive deficits,
2
therefore, will not be eligible.' ' Third, the state must have adhered to the
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.
This figure equates to approximately 65 billion United States dollars. Id.

113. Id. at 67.
114. See BEQB, supra note 84, at 65.

115. Id.
116. Id.

117. See TEU art. 1090).
118. Id.
119. The average rate of inflation of the applying state, as observed over a period of one
year, must not exceed those of the three best performing states by more than one and one-half
percentage points. Inflation is to be measured by the Consumer Price Index. Id. As of early
1997, the maximum allowable annual inflation was about 3%. See Tarallo, supra note 67, at 3.
120. See TEU art. 1090).
121. Id. The standards for budgetary performance are found in Article 104(c)(2) of the
TEU: first, the ratio of the actual or planned government deficit to GDP must not exceed 3%,
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fluctuation margins of the ERM for at least two years, without devaluing
against any other member state's currency." The last criterion requires
the applying state to maintain interest rates that are comparable to the three
member states with the greatest price stability for at least one year."2
2. The Changeover
The introduction of the new currency will proceed according to
four chronological checkpoints.1' 4 The first significant step is scheduled to
take place approximately one year before Stage Three begins. At that
time, the European Council will decide which countries qualify for the
EMU based on the convergence criteria.'12 Second, as Stage Three begins,
the exchange rates between member states will be replaced by permanently
fixed conversion rates.'2 Functionally, the new currency (to be known as
the "Euro") and the several national currencies will be interchangeable.' 2
Only national banknotes will carry legal tender status until the European
banknotes are introduced.'12 The ESCB will then incorporate the Euro as
the central unit of its single monetary policy.129 Although the financial
markets are expected promptly to switch to the Euro, most private
businesses and individuals are likely to continue using the national
currencies for a longer period of time.'30
The third checkpoint is scheduled no later than three years after
Stage Three begins. The ESCB will at that point start to issue the Euro
and exchange it against the national banknotes and coins.'3' Finally, six
months after the Euro is introduced, the changeover will be complete for
unless either the ratio has substantially declined or the excess is only temporary; and second, the
ratio of government debt to GDP must not exceed 60%, unless the ratio is diminishing at a
satisfactory rate. See the TEU Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure.
122. See TEU art. 1090).
123. The average nominal long-term interest rate of the applying state, as observed over a
period of one year, must not exceed those of the three best performing states by more than two
percentage points. Interest rates are to be measured in reference to long-term government bonds
or similar securities. Id.
124. See The European Monetary Institute, THE CHANGEOVER TO THE SINGLE CURRENCY
12, 13 (1995) [hereinafter THE CHANGEOVER].
125. This decision is expected to be made in early 1998. Id.
126. Stage Three is scheduled to commence no later than January 1, 1999. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See THE CHANGEOVER, supra note 124.
131. d. The introduction of the Euro is expected to occur no later than January 1, 2002.

1214

ILSA Journalof Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 4:1199

all agents and operations.' 2 National currencies will lose their status of
legal tender and gradually disappear.,33
3. Developments Over the Past 18 Months
In December of 1995, then-British Prime Minister John Major
expressed serious doubts about the EMU, suggesting that the 1999 launch
date was arbitrary and unrelated to economic realities.1M4 He was especially
concerned about the relationship between the first wave countries and the
remaining states that will not make the initial cut.'35 "There is a risk that
this could tear Europe apart and destroy the single market ... resulting in
a situation where countries inside the EMU form a protectionist bloc
against [EU member states that fail to qualify for the EMU]. "136 Major's
remarks reflect the United Kingdom's reticence regarding the EMU, as
well as a pessimism that resounds throughout Europe. For example, a
1996 poll conducted by the Harris Polling Institute indicated that seventyeight percent of the British opposed the EMU, while seventy percent of
Germans, fifty-five percent of the French, and fifty percent of Belgians
were likewise opposed.'1 7 This opposition is not surprising, because
member states have implemented some significant spending cuts in an
attempt to close in on the convergence criteria.' 38 These cuts have had a
predictably harsh impact on jobs and welfare benefits. 3 9
Ironically, officials have noted that the EMU would help stimulate
the investment and growth necessary to reduce Europe's chronic
unemployment.' ° Former United States Ambassador to the EU, Stuart
Eizenstadt, explained the comprehensive effort that is necessary to mitigate
the shocks of transition: "Non-wage labor costs must be reduced, heavy
payroll taxes must be slashed, labor markets must become more flexible,
investments in job training, lifetime learning, and vocation education must

132. The latest date to phase out the national currencies is July 1, 2002. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Joe Kirwin, EU Leaders Summit Reaches Accord on Key Monetary and Trade
Issues, 12 INT'L TRADE REP., Dec. 20, 1995, at 2097.

135. Id.
136. Id.

137. See EU to Seek to Conclude Disagreement With Britain, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY,
June 21, 1996, at 16 [hereinafter EU].
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Outgoing U.S. Ambassador Says Monetary Union Plans Moving Ahead, BNA
INT'L TRADE DAILY, Feb. 9, 1996, at 20.
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be made.""' Furthermore, it has been pointed out that serious budgetcutting measures by member states with large deficits were inevitable,
2
without respect to the convergence criteria of the EMU."
In order to boost morale in Europe, European Commission
43
President Jacques Santer proposed what he calls a "confidence pact.'
The central feature of the pact is the Trans-European Network, which is an
elaborate
infrastructure
of
transportation,
energy,
and
telecommunications.'" Santer and other officials are convinced this plan
5
must be carried out in order to compete effectively in the global market."
However, the cost of the plan, over a billion United States dollars, would
put a strain on surplus EU funds, which member states need to help pay
for deficit reductions.'"
In September of 1996, EU finance ministers met in Dublin and
agreed on two important EMU details.1"7 The first point of general
agreement concerned the formation of a stability pact for the purpose of
enforcing budgetary discipline among EMU participants.'
The pact will
establish an administrative council in order to impose economic sanctions
against EMU states that develop excessive deficits."4 9 Second, the ministers
agreed to create a new model of the Exchange Rate Mechanism that will
regulate currencies between EMU member states and non-EMU member
states.10 The new mechanism, known as "ERM2," will enforce a
fluctuation band of plus or minus fifteen percent versus the Euro.'5 ' If a
participating currency were to deviate from the maximum range, the
European Central Bank would intervene in order to maintain price
stability.52 Immediately after the Dublin meeting, Santer announced that

141. Id.
142. See Slow Growth Troubling, But Some Members Should Be Ready For EMU,
Commission Says, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Mar. 7, 1996, at 18.
143. See EU, supra note 137, at 17.
144. Id.
145. Id.

146. Id.
147. See EMU Framework Pact Reached, Euro Said On Track For '99 Launch, 13 INT'L
TRADE REP., Sept. 25, 1996, at 1500 [hereinafter EMU].
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1501.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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"[t]he EMU is irreversible and on track," in accordance with the timetable
contemplated by the Maastricht Treaty.'
Santer's optimism was supported by the recent publication of new
budgets by several EMU candidates: France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
Belgium, and the Netherlands.'" All of the budgets were designed to bring
budget deficits down to the required three percent of GDP." However,
despite the impressive budgets, not all of these countries are in good
economic health.' Belgium, for instance, has traditionally had a very high
public debt-to-GDP ratio--more than double the required sixty percent in
1995.,-" Elsewhere, Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini suggested in
October of 1996 that the EMU launch date should be postponed until his
In the meantime, Italy has
country's fiscal situation stabilizes.' 8
implemented serious austerity measures to get its deficit under control, and
as a result bond yields for the lira compared to the Deutsche mark have
dropped significantly.", However, the drastic cuts and the tax hike in the
new Italian budget are likely to inhibit economic growth.160
There also appears to have been some creative accounting
employed in the new budgets.' 6' For example, France borrowed money
from the pension funds of France Telecom to pay for its budget, while
Belgium sold off gold.1"6 Economist Richard Reid cautioned that "[t]his
could very easily come back to haunt these countries after EMU starts
because then deficits could skyrocket again without making the really
painful cuts needed."'"6 Partly based on the newly proposed budgets, other
economists have projected that the first wave of the EMU will consist of
Germany, France, Austria, and the Benelux countries.'

153. See EMU, supra note 147. For details relating to the EMU timetable, see supra notes
124-33, and appurtenant text.
154. See Joe Kirwin, With EMU Expected to Happen, Attention Turns to Who Will Make the
Cut, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Oct. 8, 1996, at 10.
155. Id.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160

Id.
Id.at 11.
Id.
Id.
See Joe Kirwin, With EMU Expected to Happen, Attention Turns to Who Will Make

the Cut, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Oct. 8, 1996, at 10.
161. Id. at 10.

162. Id.at 12.
163. Id.
164. Id.at 11.
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On March 17, 1997, the EU finance ministers formally examined
and approved the German and French budgets.16 , Until recently, there had
been great speculation about the 1999 launch date because of Germany's
twelve percent rate of unemployment.'" After 500,000 German jobs were
lost in January, many economists doubted that the country could attain its
projected 2.9% deficit-to-GDP ratio.'67 By April, unemployment had
reached its highest mark since Hitler rose to power.'" Many experts are
convinced that, because it is the engine of the EU economy, if Germany
fails to meet the convergence criteria, the EMU will not be sustainable.1'"
Further uncertainty mounted in May of 1997 when a dispute arose
between the German government and its central bank.17°
The
"Bundesbank" objected to German Finance Minister Theo Waigel's plan to
place a higher value on gold and currency reserves as a means of
enhancing receipts to the national treasury.'7 The Bundesbank stressed that
this dubious accounting technique would damage the credibility of the Euro
and open the door for weaker economic powers such as Italy to enter into
the first wave of EMU. '7 2 As a result of this criticism, Waigel stipulated
that the revaluation would not occur until 1998.'17
In France, recent parliamentary elections forced Conservative
President Jacques Chirac to share control of the government with the new
Socialist Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin.174 This led to new speculation,
because Jospin punctuated his election campaign with criticism against
fiscal austerity, and suggested that the stability pact would not have any
authority to impose sanctions on member states. 171

165. See EU Finance Ministers Approve France, Germany For EMU Membership, BNA
INT'L TRADE DAILY, Mar. 18, 1997, at 3 [hereinafter Finance Ministers].
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Ian Geoghegan, EU Ministers to Meet on EMU, Cheered by Kohl, THE REUTER
EUR. COMMUNITY REP., Apr. 4, 1997, at 1.

169. See Finance Ministers, supra note 165, at 3.
170. See Jeremy Gaunt, German Gold Row Prompts EMU Jitters, THE REUTER EUR.
COMMUNITY REP., May 29, 1997, at 1.
171. Id.

172. Id.
173. See Jeremy Gaunt, EU Finance Ministers to Meet on EMU on Sunday, THE REUTER
EUR. COMMUNITY REP., June 4, 1997, at 1.

174. This so-called system of cohabitation requires cooperation between the ideologically
opposed leaders. See Paul Taylor, New French Government Takes Its Time on EMU, THE
REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., June 6, 1997, at 2.

175. Id. For an explanation of the stability pact, see supra notes 147-49.
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Furthermore, the Socialist party demanded a significant shift in
EMU philosophy. 76 The party platform called for several conditions
precedent to EMU cooperation, including early membership for Spain and
Italy; flexible interpretation of the Maastricht agreement; a Euro that is not
overvalued; and a new European economic government.'" Speaking on
behalf of the new French Prime Minister, former Commission President
Jacques Delors announced on June 9, 1997 that France would seek a
protocol to the stability pact which will clarify how member states will
new currency is introduced-coordinate their economic policies after the
78
particularly with respect to unemployment.
French concerns were answered in part by the European Council's
adoption of a "Resolution on Growth and Employment," which is to
supplement the stability pact.' 79 The new resolution stresses sound
economic and budget policies, as well as sustainable growth and
employment.1'8 It is expected that the resolution will appease France's
insistence on job creation in Europe, where an estimated 18 million people
are out of work. 8 ' A report on the implementation Of the Resolution will
be submitted to the .European Council in Luxembourg in December of
1997. 92 In addition to the Resolution, the principal measures of the
stability pact include regulations which establish compulsory standards of
fiscal discipline for first-wave countries, and eligibility criteria for the
1 83
other non-EMU member states.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Myra MacDonald, France Seeks Protocol to EMU Budget Pact, THE REUTER
EUR. COMMUNITY REP., June 9, 1997, at 1. By June of 1997, unemployment in France had
reached a record 12.8%. See Commissioner De Silguy Opposes French EMU Delay, THE
REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., June 10, 1997, at 1.

179. The details were finalized by the EU Finance Ministers in Amsterdam on June 16,
1997, as part of an intergovernmental conference. See Peter O'Donnell et al., European
Council, June 16/17, 1997: Summit Sees EU Stumble Onwards in Amsterdam, EUR. REP., June
18, 1997, at 5.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 7.
183. Id. at 7-9.

Beginning June 1st, the Finance Council will evaluate countries to

determine whether a country's deficit exceeds the maximum limit, and will make
recommendations to any offending country. The country then has four months to act. If the
country fails to act, one further warning will issue. Id. After an additional two months, the
Council may impose sanctions under Article 1049(c) of the Treaty. The sanction will vary

between 0.2% of GDP and 0.5% of GDP for the first year of infraction. Id. For the second
year, the minimum will not apply, but the sanction will still be limited to the 0.5% maximum.

However, for the first two years, any money that the country must pay will merely represent a
security deposit, to be relinquished upon compliance.

If the country continues to violate the
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4. Costs and Benefits
The single currency is expected to bring a wide range of benefits to
particular classes of individuals. First, investors would be assured that the
competitiveness and marketability of exports would be immune from
Second, businesses would be able to quote
exchange-rate fluctuations.'
the risk of prejudicing their own profits.115
without
currency
one
in
prices
Third, consumers would have a superior basis on which to compare the
prices of goods from two or more countries.9'6 Fourth, tourists would be
able to travel throughout the EEC without having to exchange currencies.'
And fifth, bankers would be able to borrow and lend throughout the region
without any exchange-rate risks.Iu
Furthermore, the changeover is expected to produce a number of
systemic advantages. For example, the savings in currency conversion
costs are estimated to be more than ECU 15 billion' 9 each year, which
represents about 0.4 % of the EU's annual GDP.'11 The stimulation of trade
among EU member states is also likely, because exchange-rate risk
contributes significantly to the high cost of international goods
transactions. 9' Additionally, since uncertainty among investors is likely to
diminish, firms might not have to pay as much in risk premiums in order
to invest and raise capital.1n Reduced uncertainty could also lead to
sustained increases in income and decreases in the jobless rate.'9

standards in the third year, the deposit will convert into a permanent fine. Another deposit will
then be mandatory. Finally, where a country is beset by a severe recession, the Council is
authorized to make its decisions on a case-by-case basis, and to take into account "exceptional
and temporary circumstances." Id. at 9.
184. See MICHAEL EMERSON & CHRISTOPHER HUNE, Foreword to THE ECU REP. 11
(1991).

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. This figure is the approximate equivalent of 19.5 billion U.S. dollars. Id.
190. See HUNE, supra note 184, at 32. There is some debate about whether the
disappearance of currency conversion costs would mean true savings, as opposed to a mere
redistribution of wealth. Most of the savings are expected to accrue from the elimination of bank
commissions. Other savings would result as corporations eliminate their treasury departments.
However, this in turn would imply an increase in unemployment. Thus, the notion of "savings"
can be a matter of perspective. Id.
191. Id.at 33.
192. For example, if risk premiums drop by 0.5% points, this reduction might eventually
raise income by as much as 5 to 10%. Id.
193. Id.
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On the other hand, critics have pointed out that the progress
toward the single currency severely hampers the ability of member states
to respond to economic shocks in their countries.'19 Member states will
also lose a great deal of their ability to exercise control over national
currencies as a way of influencing their individual economies. '9" The
abdication of control over monetary policy could result in serious harm to
an individual nation's economic well-being.'1" This is partly due to the fact
that exchange rate flexibility enables a government to choose inflation rates
in order to fight unemployment."
It has also been argued that trade within the EU may actually
suffer under a common currency.'The link between exchange-rate
stability and trade has been questioned, because trading companies can
hedge in efficient markets at a relatively low cost.'" Finally, opponents
note that, at least until the tax laws of the various countries have been
harmonized, tax breaks will not be available to counter economic
stagnation, as they are in the United States."
Advantages and drawbacks notwithstanding, the ascendancy of the
Euro appears to be highly likely. 01 Thus, contractual disputes may arise
where payment has been stipulated in one of the moribund currencies. The
next section anticipates this problem and suggests strategies by which
parties may avoid such complications.

194. Marc Dassesse, Selected Aspects of European Economic Community Law on
Investments and Acquisitions in Europe, 25 INT'L LAW 375, 390 (1991).
195. PAUL DE GRAUWE, THE ECONOMICS OF MONETARY INTEGRATION 42 (1992).
196. Martin Feldstein, The Case Against EMU, THE ECONOMIST, June 13, 1992, at 19
[hereinafter Feldstein]. According to an example posited by Professor Feldstein, if a U.K.
exporter were competing against a U.S. exporter for a French buyer, the U.K. exporter would no
longer enjoy any benefit from a devaluation of Sterling as against the dollar when U.K. costs but
not EU costs would have necessitated a devaluation. Thus, the U.K. would be forced to lower
prices and wages.
197. DAVID LAIDLER ET AL., EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS
155 (M. T. Sumner & G. Zis eds., 1982).
198. See Feldstein, supra note 196, at 19.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See THE CHANGEOVER, supra notes 124-133.
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A PROJECTION OF THE IMPACT A SINGLE EUROPEAN CURRENCY
WILL HAVE ON MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM TRANSACTIONS

A. Contractual Problems Associated With Impossibility as National
CurrenciesAre Phased Out
For most business parties, who presumably wish to maintain a
good reputation in the international community, contractual difficulties
related to the changeover in currency should be easily avoidable. The
parties can either plan in advance for the new regime, or they can make
necessary modifications while their contracts are still executory. However,
the changeover presents some potential for abuse if a party should decide
to try to take advantage of the currency problem. This section imagines a
scenario in which an unscrupulous obligor seeks to be excused from
performance by raising the defense of impossibility. Following the
discussion of impossibility, suggestions are offered as means by which
parties may ensure performance of their mutual obligations without
disruption.
1. The Impossibility Defense
The doctrine of impossibility has long been recognized in the
United States.5

This doctrine holds that if an unforeseeable supervening

event renders a contractual obligation incapable of performance, the
promisor's non-performance is excused."' Impossibility is generally
divided into two categories. First, performance may be objectively
impossible if the supervening event has rendered the contract literally

impossible to perform. 0 For example, if a promisor is obligated to
provide sound equipment for a concert at Carnegie Hall, the subsequent
destruction of the building by fire would discharge the promisor's duty
under the contract.
202. See, e.g., Martin Emerich Co. v. Siegel, Cooper & Co., 86 N.E. 1104, 1106 (Ill.
1908) (holding that the continuing existence of a material object is essential to the contract; when
the object ceases to exist, performance becomes impossible); Siegel v. Eaton & Prince Co., 46
N.E. 449, 451 (II1. 1896) (discharging contract to install an elevator because a fire had destroyed
the building). See generally Christopher J. Bruce, An Economic Analysis of the Impossibility
Doctrine, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 311, 323-32 (1982).
203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 261. See generally E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 9.5-9.9, at 700-37 (2nd ed. 1990) [hereinafter Farnsworth].
204. See, e.g., Mullen v. Wafer, 480 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Ark. 1972) (discharging an
obligation for personal services in connection with the sale of a business because the seller died
shortly after the sale).
205. For a Ninteenth Century version of this illustration, see Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng.
Rep. 309 (1863), where the court stated:
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As a second matter, the performance of a contract may be
impossible because a supervening event has made the required action
illegal.0 Thus, if a retailer agrees to buy 200 dual-port videocassette
recorders from a manufacturer, and Congress then promptly outlaws the
possession and sale of dual-port VCRs, the retailer would be excused for
its failure to perform.m
In order to establish either objective or legal impossibility as a
defense, a party must demonstrate the following:
1) that an event occurred which rendered performance of a duty
impossible;
2) that the non-occurrence of the supervening event was a mutually
shared basic assumption on which the agreement was made;
3) that the supervening event occurred through no fault of the party
raising the defense; and
4) that the party seeking discharge did not implicitly or explicitly assume
the risk of the supervening event.
2. For Example
Suppose an exporter in Norfolk, Virginia "We Sell" enters into a
contract with a buyer in Marseille, France, "Nous Achetons" for the sale
of two million armor-plated moth balls. The contract is executed on
January 1, 1998. As part of the deal, We Sell extends a six-year term of
credit to Nous Achetons.
Nous Achetons in turn issues negotiable
promissory notes to We Sell in an amount equal to the price of the goods
plus the cost of forfait financing. The promissory notes are guaranteed by
Banque de Marseilles. We Sell then endorses its guaranteed promissory
notes without recourse to Fred's Forfaiting at a discount for cash.
Pursuant to the credit agreement, Fred presents promissory notes to
The principle seems to us to be that, in contracts in which the performance depends on
the continued existence of a given person or thing, a condition is implied that the
impossibility of performance arising from the perishing of the person or thing shall
excuse the performance. In none of the cases is the promise in words other than
positive, nor is there any express stipulation that the destruction of the person or thing
shall excuse the performance; but that excuse is by law implied, because from the
nature of the contract it is apparent that the parties contracted on the basis of the
continued existence of the particular person or chattel. Id. at 314.
206. See, e.g., Vimar Seguros Y. Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540-41
(1995) (observing that if a provision is illegal or unconscionable it is unenforceable).
207. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 264; Texas Corp. v. Hogarth
Shipping Co., 256 U.S. 619, 630-31 (1921) (discharging promisor's duties where a vessel
necessary for performance was requisitioned by the British government).
208. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 261; Farnsworth, supra note 203, at
700-37.
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Banque de Marseille on a semi-annual basis. In return, Banque pays Fred
in French francs. Banque is then reimbursed accordingly by Nous
Achetons.
Meanwhile, on January 1, 1999, the EMU is inaugurated by the
Luxembourg, Austria,
first wave of participating member states:
Germany, and France. Since member states are granted three years in
which to phase out national currencies, Banque can continue to pay Fred in
French francs during that time. However, in 2002, with nearly two years'
worth of payments still to be made, the franc loses its status as legal
tender. The parties are now in an awkward position. According to the
literal terms of the agreement, Banque has only to issue French currency
now stripped of its value. There is no doubt that scrupulous parties will,
on their own initiative, modify their contracts to allow for payment in
Euros, or perhaps U.S. dollars. However, it is possible that others will try
to use this chain of events to their advantage. Banque, for instance,
decides to continue issuing the French francs to Fred.
He
Fred sues in federal district court for breach of contract.argues that the parties agreed to consideration of actual value at the time
the contract was formed, and did not contemplate payment in a dead
currency. Banque concedes that it agreed to yield French currency of
actual value, but claims that its obligation to so perform has been made
Banque argues first that
impossible by the forces of the EMU.
performance is objectively impossible, because the subject matter of the
contract has been destroyed. It further argues that European Union law
has rendered its performance legally impossible.
Banque's defense will probably not be very persuasive. In raising
the argument, Banque should have no trouble with the first element of
impossiblity. It simply needs to show that the EMU changeover has
deprived the franc of any actual value. Negotiating the second element
will require some finesse. Banque will have to show that the parties shared
a basic assumption that the French currency would remain valid legal
tender. Fred will argue that they did not share such an assumption,
because it was common knowledge that France would join the EMU.
However, Banque might prevail on this point. The contract was executed
prior to the determination of which countries were eligible for EMU
membership, so the prospects for France's accession might not have been

209. Assuming no difficulties in obtaining jurisdiction. Note, however, that forfait notes do
not generally include clauses, which subject the obligor to a foreign jurisdiction. See Ludwig &
Coursey, supra note 16, at 387-88 (citing Tavernier, Legal Aspects of Forfaiting, 11 INT'L BUS.
LAW 25, 31 (Oct. 1983)).
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so clear. 2'0 Furthermore, the fact that Fred assented to the agreement is
strong evidence that he expected the franc to retain its value. The third
element will be no problem, because the advent of a single European
currency clearly was not attributable to Banque's conduct.
The final element of impossibility is where Banque's defense will
fail. Banque must show that it did not assume the risk that the French
currency would lose its value. The question of whether or not a party has
assumed the risk of a supervening event turns most on whether the event
was reasonably foreseeable.21 Here, the three-year obsolescence of the
franc was foreseeable for several reasons. First, the Treaty of Maastricht
and its progeny of administrative decisions had already put the world on
constructive notice of the changeover to a single currency. 22
Second, while France's eligibility for the EMU was not certain as
of January 1998, that country was clearly engaging in serious efforts to
comply with the convergence criteria. Thus, a reasonable business party
could have inferred a strong probability of France's accession. Finally, it
could be argued that, as a financial institution, Banque should have had its
hand even more firmly on the EMU pulse than would be expected of
ordinary business parties. Since the currency problem should have been
foreseen, the court will undoubtedly reject the impossibility claim, on the
ground that Banque voluntarily assumed the risk of monetary unification.
In order to vindicate the contract, the court will most likely use its
reformative powers to change the terms of the agreement and order Banque
to honor the promissory notes in the new currency.
Difficulties related to countertrade would in essence trace the same
pattern as the foregoing illustration. In the case of a counterpurchase
agreement, " for example, a German exporter may be obligated to buy
210. For purposes of this imagined scenario, the contract was signed in January of 1998.
Final determinations on EMU eligibility were not made until April of that year.
211. See, e.g., Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir.
1974) (holding that government regulation was sufficiently foreseeable to preclude the defense of
impossibility); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that
problems with construction of a computer system were foreseeable); Eastern Airlines, Inc. v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (holding OPEC oil crisis was foreseeable);

Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 310 N.E.2d 363 (Mass. 1974) (holding
that a labor strike was foreseeable). But see Opera Co. of Boston, Inc. v. Wolf Trap Found. for
Performing Arts, 817 F.2d 1094, 1100-01 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating "[P]ractically any occurrence
can be foreseen but whether the foreseeability is sufficient to render unacceptable the defense of
impossibility is 'one of degree' of the foreseeability and whether the non-occurrence of the event
was sufficiently unlikely. or unreasonable to constitute a reason for refusing to apply the
doctrine. ")
212. See supra notes 74-116.
213. See supra notes 29-35.
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limestone from Malawi on a yearly basis for five years. Alternatively,
under a bilateral clearing agreement,z4 Austria may be obligated to pay
installments to cover its over-consumption of goods with respect to
Romania. In each of these scenarios, questions of performance are likely
to arise as the Deutsche mark and the Austrian schilling are phased out.
The resolution of these questions would very likely tend to parallel
the Fred v. Banque example outlined above, because they share the
common issues of consideration and ability to perform. Whether the
chosen financing involves forfaiting, counterpurchase, or a clearing
agreement, it is important for parties to consider and prevent the potential
difficulties linked to the new currency regime. The following subsection
suggests negotiating strategies for parties who, unlike Banque, wish to do
business in good faith.
B. Devising ContractualProvisionsto Avoid Litigation
Most conscientious parties will want to avoid Fred and Banque's
predicament by incorporating contract terms which anticipate the currency
problem. Any firm wishing to do business with parties in the EU should
draft special provisions to ensure a smooth transition. This is true even
with respect to countries who do not appear to be likely EMU candidates
anytime soon, such as Italy and the United Kingdom Such a clause is
simple to draft. It would only require words to this effect: "In case the
denominated currency loses its status as legal tender, the Euro will suffice
as a substitute." Alternatively, the parties may wish to arrange payment in
U.S. dollars, or some other hard currency. If these measures are taken at
the negotiation stage, subsequent disputes will be easily deflected.
If the parties fail to provide for the currency problem when the
contract is executed, there will still be plenty of opportunities to modify the
agreement. Assuming that the parties have no interest in ambushing each
other, they should be willing to reform the contract as appropriate. Once
again, a simple clarification about what constitutes acceptable currency
under the contract will do. Under United States law, no new consideration
21
is necessary, so long as the modification is fair under the circumstances. 1
VI. CONCLUSION
Forfaiting enables an exporter to ship capital goods to a buyer
whose credit standing may be obscure or non-assessable, by shifting
virtually all of the transaction risks to a forfaiter who buys the exporter's
214. See supra notes 36-40.
215. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 89.
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receivables without recourse. 216 The notes are secured by the guarantee of
a bank in the importer's country, who is primarily liable to the note-holder
for payment. t 7 The note-holder is then able to cash in the notes
periodically according to the credit terms. 28 In return for the notes, the
note-holder receives payment in the currency prescribed by the
21 9
agreement.
Other forms of medium and long-term trade agreements include
counterpurchase and bilateral clearing agreements. A counterpurchase
contract is a transaction in which one party agrees to buy goods from
another on condition that the second party promises to make a subsequent
purchase from the first.= Bilateral clearing agreements involve reciprocal
lines of credit between countries for a predetermined period of time."'
Along with forfaiting, these techniques help to facilitate international
commerce.
It is possible, however, that many of these agreements fail to
contemplate the implications of a single currency in Europe.2
For
medium and long-term credit agreements, the denominated currency is in
danger of a fatal changeover.Although scrupulous business parties
should be able to adapt their contracts to solve the currency problem, some
opportunists may insist that their duties are discharged by adhering to the
literal terms of the agreement. If one party sues for breach, the obligor
may try to claim that the changeover in currency rendered performance
impossible. However, this defense is likely to fail because the obligor
assumed the risk of the supervening event.

216. See supra notes 3-12.

217. See supra
218. See supra
219. See supra
220. See supra
221. See supra
222. See supra
223. Id.

note 9.
note 10.
note 8.
notes 29-35.
notes 36-40.
notes 78-83.
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INTRODUCCI6N
I.
Cuando contratantes comerciales entran en acuerdos, no estA en su
inter6s meramente considerar la dintnica inmediata del intercambio, sino
anticipar las maneras en las que un mundo cambiante podria afectar sus
obligaciones. Las circunstancias individuales son s6lo una linea bAsica en
las negociaciones de contrato. Para lograr mixima seguridad para los
contratantes, el acuerdo debe armonizarse a realidades politicas y
econ6micas.
En el Area de finanzas de comercio de exportaci6n una de las
influencias externas ms significantes que los contratantes necesitan tener
en cuenta hoy es la imminente Uni6n Monetaria Europea (UME). La
UME, fijada para comenzar en 1999, es la culminaci6n dramintica de
esfuerzos sostenidos para unificar polizas econ6micas y monetarias en
Europa. Esta sefiala la muerte de varias monedas nacionales que seran
sucedidas por una tinica unidad monetaria. En este momento, s6lo una
minoria de los estados miembros de la Uni6n Europea funcionan
suficientemente bien econ6micamente para calificar para la UME.' No
obstante, se espera que la UME proceda segtn como esta programado,
instalando los paises calificados inmediatamente, seguido por los otros
paises segun estos sean elegibles. 2
La obsolescencia de monedas nacionales presenta algunas
dificultades tdcnicas, porque muchos contratos estipulan una moneda
especifica en la que el pago debe hacerce. La primera parte de este papel
explora los problemas de monedas que podrfan surgir como consecuencia
de una moneda, enfocando en particular en el contra-comercio y las
transacciones de forfaiting. La segunda parte del papel discute los rasgos
identificando el financiamiento de forfait.
La tercera parte aborda
acuerdos de contra-compra y los acuerdos de aclaramiento bilaterales del
tratado. La cuarta parte examina la historia y los aspectos t6cnicos de la
UME. La quinta parte anticipa las disputas monetarias relacionadas con
las transacciones de forfaiting y contra-comercio. Finalmente, la sexta
parte concluye que los contratantes de negocio deben prestar atenci6n a la
influencia externa de la UME cuando ellos coordinen sus obligaciones
mutuas.

1.
Estos incluyen Francia, Alemania, Austria, B61gica, Luxemburgo y los
Paises Bajos. Vea infra nota 160.
2.

Vea infra notas 153-54.
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FORFAITING COMO UN M9TODO DE FINANZAS DE EXPORTACION

A. Rasgos Identificando
Como con otras formas de finanzas de exportaci6n, forfaiting es un
mecanismo disefiado para afianzar cr~dito a los compradores con el menor
posible riesgo a los vendedores. 3 Los exportadores encuentran forfaiting
atractivo porque se recibe el dinero en efectivo brevemente despu~s del
envio. 4 Los compradores lo encuentran titil porque les permite comprar
sin tener que presentar pago inmediato.5 Los estimados indican que
aproximadamente dos por ciento de todo el comercio internacional
involucra forfaiting. 6 Este m~todo de finanzas ahora estd ganando
aceptaci6n en los Estados Unidos, donde muchas casas de forfait europeas
han establecido oficinas representativas. 7
En una transacci6n de forfaiting, el exportador vende recibideros
de la exportaci6n en descuento a un forfaiter a cambio de dinero en
efectivo. s Instrumentos de comercio usados para este prop6sito incluyen
pagards, facturas garantizadas de intercambio (i.e., per aval), y cartas de
cr~dito.9 La deuda ordinariamente se paga en instalaciones semi-anuales,
cada uno de los cuales se comprueban por un instrumento negociable o por

3.
Vea CHARLES J. GMUR ET AL., TRADE FINANCING 117 (1981) [en adelante
Gmur]; Elnora Uzzelle, Forfaiting Should Not Be Overlooked As An Innovative Means of Export
Finance, Bus. AM., Feb. 1995, a 20 [en adelante Uzzelle].
4.
Vea Uzzelle, supra nota 3, a 20.
5.
Vea A. I. Trade Finance, Inc. v. Centro Internationale Handelsbank AG, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15100, 1992 WL 296419 at 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
6.
Vea Uzzelle, supra nota 3, a 22.
7.
Vea Id. a 20. Forfaiting se desarollo siguiendo la Segunda Guerra Mundial
por financieros suizos para facilitar la venta de los recursos capitales de Alemania Oriental a
Europa Oriental. Hoy, el centro del mercado del forfaiting es Londres. Id. Edmond Tavernier,
Legal Aspects of Forfaiting, 11 INT'L BUS. LAW 25 (Oct. 1983) (describiendo el papel de
forfaiting en las exportaciones de grano en Estados Unidos) [en adelante Tavernier].
8.
Vea A. I. Trade Finance, Inc. v. Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir.
1993).
9.
Vea Tavernier, supra nota 7, a las 27-28. Un per aval garantizado por un
banco es "una obligaci6n incondicionalmente irrevocable y libremente asignable del banco, no
s6lo como garante, sino tambi~n como coobligado." (Nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).
Uzzelle, supra nota 3, a 20. Asi, al banco como garante se le exige hacer pago sin respeto a
cualquier problema de la inejecuci6n que podria afligir la transacci6n subyacente.
Vea
HandelsbankAG, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15100, a 2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1992). Una carta de
cr&dito es "una tarea emitida por un banco para la cuenta del comprador (el Solicitante) o para su
propia cuenta, para pagar'al [vendedor] el valor del Proyecto y/o documentos con tal de que los
t~rminos y condiciones de la [carta de cr&lito] se cumplan." (Nota editorial: traducido del
Ingles). CHARLES DEL BUSTO, ICC GUIDE TO DOCUMENTARY CREDIT OPERATIONS 22 (1994).
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una carta de cr6dito. " Cuando el exportador vende los instrumentos
negociables, el forfaiter puede poseerlos hasta que maduren, o puede
revenderlos en un mercado secundario. "
Ya que el forfaiter compra los instrumentos del exportador en base
de no-recurso, todos los riesgos relacionados con la deuda extranjera se
cambian del exportador al forfaiter. 2 El recurso contra el exportador s6lo
esta disponible en tres situaciones extraordinarias. 13 Primero si los
instrumentos no son vilidos, el forfaiter tiene recurso. 14 El recurso
tambi6n puede tenerse si la garantia del banco no era vdlida cuando fue
hecha. 15 Finalmente, el forfaiter tiene recurso si la transacci6n fue "no
como representada." 16

B. Por ejemplo
Suponga que Spacely Sprochets, un exportador de los Estados
Unidos, entra en un acuerdo de ventas con Compratore di Milano, un
10.
Vea Uzzelle, supra nota 3, a 20.
Vea Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76, a 78. Los mercados secundarios son
11.
bastante activos e involucran un comercio de notas fuerte. Vea HOWARD PALMER, INT'L TRADE
FINANCE: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 50 (1995).
[Los productos y los objetivos de este mercado son muy diferentes a aqu61los de
los forfaiters originales. Los participantes en el mercado secundario yen cualquier
artfculo generado en el primero ciclo (como un medio para financiar la exportaci6n)
meramente coma un recurso riesgoso para ser endosado y negociado como
obligaciones comerciables. Los banqueros participantes simplemente compran riesgos,
invariablemente en un no-recurso y juzgan ese riesgo segun su pais de origen, el
estado del cr~dito del garantizador o los contratantes y sus objetivos de manejar las
obligaciones comerciales. Riesgo popular, asi como buena calidad, papel Chino,
podria cambiar de manos tanto como 10 veces en el mercado secundario. Id. a 51
(nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
12.
Vea GMUR, supra nota 3, a 117.
13.
Vea A.I. Finance, Inc. v. Centro Internationale Hjandelsbank, AG, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15100, a 68 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1992)..
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
Id. Vea tambin Eugene A. Ludwig & Michael J. Coursey, The Export
Trade Note: A New Instrwnentfor InternationalTrade, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 381 (1986)
[en adelante Ludwig & Coursey]:
[N] o esta clara bajo la icy civil europea si el exportador, a pesar de endorsar la nota
sin recurso, implicitamente estipula al comprador de la nota que la nota que se esta
vendiendo es una nota vdlida, validamente ejecutada por el importador y vAlidamente
[garantizada] por el banco del importador. Asi, el exportador en una transacci6n de
forfait puede ser finalmente responsable al comprador de la nota si la nota demuestra
ser invdlida en forna o substancia.
Id. a 387 (citando Tavernier, Legal Aspects of Forfaiting, 11 INT'L BUS. LAW. 25, 28-29
(Oct. 1983)). (Nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).
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comprador italiano.' 7 Compratore acuerda en comprar diez mil dientes de
rueda de cadena a cambio de un cr~dito en la venta de seis-afios. Como
parte del arreglo, Compratore afianza una garantia de pago de su banco
local. Luego, Spacely envia los dientes a Italia y endorsa los instrumentos
negociables garantizados en base de no-recurso a favor de Fred Forfaiting.
Fred entonces paga a Spacely las gananacias descontadas en dinero en
efectivo. Spacely ahora est, fuera del cuadro, aunque todavia es
responsable por la calidad de la mercancia."8 Entretanto, Fred ha
absorbido todos los riesgos relacionados con la transacci6n: el riesgo del
cr~dito del banco de Compratore; el riesgo de fluctuaciones en el
intercambio; y los riesgos politicos de hacer negocio con una empresa
italiana.' 9 Fred ahora tiene la opci6n de transferir esos riesgos vendiendo
las notas a otro banco o a un inversionista privado. '2
Bajo un acuerdo de forfaiting, los t6rminos de cr6dito pueden ser
de dos meses a diez aflos.2' Sin embargo, el periodo de tiempo normal estA
entre 180 dias y aproximadamente seis afios. 22 En general, la cantidad de
tiempo concedida para el reembolso corresponde a los riesgos
involucrados. 2 Por consiguiente, las transacciones de riesgo altos traen
consigo t6rminos de reembolso cortos y las proporciones de descuento
altas, mientras las transacciones de riesgo bajo implican lo contrario.24
III. CONTRA-COMERCIO
Contra-comercio es un tdrmino genericamente usado para describir
una variedad de acuerdos de comercio intemacionales.' Las formas mis
comfines de contra-comercio son acuerdos de counterpurchase, acuerdos
de compra-devoluci6n (by-back agreements), y trueque. 26 Mientras
17.
Este ejemplo esta basado en una ilustraci6n que aparecfo en el articulo de
Elnora Uzzelle. Vea Uzzelle, supra nota 3, a 21.
18.
Id.
19.
Vea Uzzelle, supra nota 3, a 21
20.
Vea PALMER, supra nota 11.
21.
Vea Uzzelle, supra nota 3, a 21.
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Id. "Para las ventas a Jap6n, Canada, y Francia, los t~rminos pueden
alcanzar hasta cinco afios y el descuento es de alrededor de 6.75%. Sin embargo, las ventas a
PakistAn pueden rendir un t~rmino limitado de un afto con una proporci6n de descuento de 7.5%,
reflejando el riesgo percibido." Id. (Nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).
25.
Vea generalnente Cedric Guyot, Countertrade Contracts in International
Business, 20 INT'L LAW 921, 922-24 (1986) [en adelante Guyot].
26.
Vea Steven Rinaldi, Can United States Anti-Dumping Law Be Effectively
Applied to Countertrade Transactions?, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LAW 441, 442 (1987).
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trueque y acuerdos de compra-devoluci6n (by-back agreements),
tipicamente no requieren pago de dinero en efectivo,2 7 otras t6cnicas del
contra-comercio a menudo lo requieren.28
Dado los cambios que
rdpidamente se acercan en el sistema monetario de Europa, esta secci6n
resume dos de estas t6cnicas: los acuerdos de contra-compra y los tratados
de compensaci6n.
A. Contra-compra
En un acuerdo de contra-compra, los contractantes se
comprometen por contratos mdltiples, y el valor de entregas reciproca no
necesita ser equivalente. 29 El primer contrato simplemente es una
transacci6n del dinero en efectivo por mercancia. 3 El segundo contrato
prescribe las condiciones de la contra-compra, i.e., cubre la obligaci6n del
exportador original de comprar productos del comprador original. 3 El
contrato final, conocido como un protocolo, conecta los primeros dos
acuerdos.32 Este protocolo es frecuentemente incorporado en el contrato de
la contra-compra. 33
Los dos acuerdos de compra esenciales son transacciones discretas
e involucran pagos separados de moneda.'
La realizaci6n de entregas y
pagos ordinariamente se extiende a periodo de uno a cinco afios. 5 Para
ilustrar, una compafifa de telecomunicaciones alemana podria venderle
articulos a un comprador en la Reptiblica de Malawi por dinero en
efectivo. Esta compra inicial entonces se uniria a un acuerdo de compra
reciproco. La compafa alemana asumiria una obligaci6n por la compra
subsecuente de algdin articulo de comercio, como caliza o uranio.

27.
Id. En una transacci6n de cambio, los contractantes intercambian g6nero de
valor igual. Id. En una transacci6n del compra-devoluci6n, un compafiero comercial exporta
tecnologfa y equipos para construir una planta en otro pals y en cambio recibe un suministro
predeterminado del mejor rendimiento de ia planta. Id. a 444.
28.
Vea S. Douglas Nugent, United States Countertrade Policy: Is It
Economically Sound?, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 829, 830-34 (1985) [en adelante
Nugent].
29.
Vea William D. Zeller, Countertrade, the GA7T, and the Theory of the
Second Best, 11 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 247, 251 (1988).

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
M.
Vea Guyot, supra nota 25, a 930.
ld.
Id.
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B. Acuerdos de Aclaramiento Bilateral
Bajo un acuerdo de aclaramiento bilateral, dos paises acuerdan
extender lineas mutuas de cr~dito y transar ciertas cantidades de sus
productos durante un periodo de tiempo especificado. 36 En otras palabras,
un pais compra productos del otro y el precio del producto se carga a su
linea de cr~dito.37
Cuando el periodo de aclaraci6n expira, hay a menudo un
desequilibrio entre las cantidades de cr6dito usadas por cada pais.38 En
semejante caso, el pais de menos-consumo esta obligado a pagar cualquier
diferencia residual al pais de mayor-consumo.39 Por ejemplo, si Austria
comparte un acuerdo de aclaramiento bilateral con Rumania, y si al final
de aclaraci6n Austria ha importado mis productos de Rumania que
Rumania ha importado de Austria, entonces Austria seri responsable por
su deuda residual pendiente. 4
Si la transacci6n en cuesti6n involucra un acuerdo de aclaramiento
bilateral, contra-compras o fimanciamiento de forfait, se les aconseja a los
contratantes con los t6rminos de cr6dito a medio y largo plazo considerar
su posible exposici6n a los riesgos relacionados con el adelanto firme de un
sistema unificado de moneda en Europa. La secci6n siguiente describe las
fuerzas que propulsan el nuevo r6gimen, los detalles t6cnicos
concomitantes y los argumentos por y en contra de su consumaci6n.
IV. LA UNION MONETARIA EUROPEA

En 1957, el concepto de una estructura econ6mica y monetaria
unificada en Europa fue formalmente sugerido en el articulo 3(g) del
Tratado de Roma.4 Desde 1957 hasta 1972, el Acuerdo de Bretton-Woods
36.
Vea Nugent, supra nota 28, a 833.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Id. Rumania tambi~n tendra la opci6n de vender su cr&lito a un tercer
contractante en un descuento. Id. a las 833-34.
41.
El Tratado de Roma fue firmado por Francia, Alemania, Italia y los paises
de Benelux, y fue ratificado por cada uno de esos estados a partir del 1958. Vea AURTHUR I.
BLOOMFIELD Er AL., EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION AND ITS MEANING FOR THE UNITED

STATES 1 (Lawrence B. Krause & Walter S. Salant eds., 1973) [en adelante Bloomfield]. Este
tratado mantuvo ia disoluci6n de restricciones en el movimiento libre de capital entre los pafses
participantes y el establecimiento de una sola uni6n advanera. Id. El articulo 2 del Tratado
proclam6 que un mercado comtin se lograria y que las politicas econ6micas de los signatarios
serfan armonizadas. Vea John P. Flaherty & Maureen E. Lally-Green, The European Union:
Where is it Now?, 34 DuQ. L. REV. 923, 937 (Summer 1996) [en adelante Flaherty & LallyGreen]. El artfculo 3 estipula los detalles instrumentales, incluyendo: (1) la coordinaci6n de un
solo comercio extemo y polfza; (2) la eliminaci6n de barreras al movimiento libre de labor,
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represent6 el esfuerzo principal para estabilizar las monedas Europeas
relacionadas entre si. 42 Bajo este r6gimen, las fluctuaciones en el
intercambio en mercados extranjeros estaban sujetas a mandos firmes en
los paises participantes.4 a Sin embargo, presiones recesionarias a finales
de los 1960 y principio de 1970 les obligaron a los participantes originales
a retirarse del acuerdo para rehabilitar sus economias individuales." El
abandono de Bretton-Woods producio fuerte inestabilidad en el intercambio
en Europa y los mercados para mercancia y capital sufrier6n por
consiguiente.45
A. El Sistema Monetario Europeo
Inspirado en parte, por las lecciones aprendidas de Bretton-Woods,
el esfuerzo actual por mantener mercados estables e intercambios es
conocido como el Sistema Monetario Europeo (SME). ' El SME es mucho
mIs ambicioso que Bretton-Woods, y contempla la coordinaci6n de polizas
fiscal y monetaria asi como la estabilizaci6n de monedas.47 Mds alli de
estos objetivos, el SME tambi6n fue concebido como un vehiculo para el
establecimiento de una moneda que eventualmente podria ser conveniente
para el comercio internacional. 4 a
El empuj6n por una moneda puede remontarse al Plan de Werner
de 1970 que puso en camino las implicaciones de una Uni6n Monetaria
Europea.49 Este plan busc6 eliminar restricciones en el movimiento de

capital, g6nero, y servicios; (3) el desarrollo de polfza comuin en ciertas dreas de la economfa
como agricultura y transporte; (4) la unificaci6n de poliza econ6mica y monetaria; (5) la
armonizaci6n de las varias leyes de los signatarios para nutrir elmercado comfin; (6) el
establecimiento de un Fondo Social Europeo y un Banco de Inversi6nes Europeas para promover
empleo y expansi6n comercial; y (7) elaumento de comercio con otros paises y territorios. Id.
42.
Los paises participantes incluyen a Francia, Alemania, Italia y los paises de
Benelux. Vea BLOOMFIELD, supra nota 41, a las 22-23.

43.

Id.

44.
Vea Susan B. Shulman, A Rapid or Evolutionary Approach: The EEC's
Adoption of the ECU as a Common Currency, 12 J. INT'L LAW BUS. 392, 407 (1991) [en

adelante Shulman].
45.

Vea BLOOMFIELD, supra nota 41, a 23.

46.

Vea LAWRENCE B. KRAUSE ET AL., EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION

AND ITS MEANING FOR THE UNITED STATES, supra nota 41, a las 114-15 [en adelante Krause].

47.

Id.a 115.

48.

Id.; HORST UNGERER ET AL.,

THE EUROPEAN

MONETARY SYSTEM:

DEVELOPMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 2-3 (1990) [en adelante Ungerer].
49.
El Informe de Werner document6 la necesidad de laconvertibilidad total de
monedas, asi como la eliminaci6n de fluctuaciones en elintercambio y elestablecimiento de
proporciones de paridad. Vea KRAUSE, supra nota 46, a las 114-15.
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capital y adelantar la meta de coordinaci6n de poliza.50 En 1979, esta
filosofia encontr6 expresi6n cuando la Comunidad Econ6mica Europea
(CEE) adopt6 el SME.5'
Tdcnicamente, el SME es "un acuerdo entre bancos centrales para
manejar tipos de cambios de intracommunidades y fmanciar intervenciones
de mercado de intercambio." 52 Este sistema incluye tres componentes
operativos.
Primero, se le exigen a los estados miembros limitar
fluctuaciones de intercambio de monedas a trav6s de un Mecanismo de
Intercambio (MIC). 54 Segundo, los estados miembros pueden obtener
cr6dito a corto plazo para intervenir en casos de fluctuaci6n seria."
Finalmente, el SME abraza la Uni6n Monetaria Europea (UME) como el
recurso de la reserva oficial, y como la unidad de contabilidad oficial para
la CEE.56
La estabilidad de la moneda bajo el SME se mantiene por una reja
de paridad y un indicador de divergencia.57 La reja de paridad mide la
actuaci6n del dinero de un pais contra el de otro."
La tarifa de
intercambios bilaterales deseado son fijados por acuerdos y funcionan
como puntos de referencia para parimetros mis alld de los cuales las
monedas no se les permite fluctuar 5 Si una moneda se desvia fuera de las
franjas prepuestas, el banco central de ese pafs esta obligado a intervenir. 6°
Asi, el SME trabaja como un arreglo de intercambio clavado. 6'
50.

Id. alas 115-16.

51,

Vea MICHELE FRATIANNI

&

JURGEN

VON

HAGEN,

THE EUROPEAN

MONETARY SYSTEM AND EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION 1 (1992) [en adelante Fratianni &

von

Hagen].
52.

JOHN

B.

GOODMAN,

MONETARY

SOVEREIGNTY:

CENTRAL BANKING IN W. EUR. 192 (1992) [en adelante Goodman].
del Ingl6s).

THE POLITICS OF

(Nota editorial:

traducido

53.
Vea STEPHEN ZAMORA ET AL., BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INT'L ECONOMIC
LAW 471 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds., 1990) [en adelante Zamora].
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Id. El ECU es una unidad de cuenta que representa un promedio de las
monedas individuales de los estados miembros. Vea John H. Works, Jr., The European Currency
Unit: The Increasing Significance of the European Monetary System's Currency Cocktail, 41
BUS. LAW 483, 494 (1986) [en adelante Works].
57.
Vea Brian K. Kurzmann, Challenges to Monetary Unification in the
European Union: Sovereignty Reigning Supreme?, 23 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 135, 143
(Fall, 1994) [en adelante Kurzmann].
58.

Id.

59.

Id.

60.
Si ia moneda de un banco central se acerca al extremo alto de su rango en
comparaci6n con otra moneda, el banco debe vender su moneda supervalorada y comprar la
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Mientras la reja de paridad mide variaciones bilaterales, el
indicador de divergencia mide la actuaci6n de monedas individuales contra
el promedio de importancia de todas las otras monedas.62 Si la moneda de
un estado miembro tambi~n diverge lejos del UME ese estado es obligado
a ajustar vendiendo o comprando su propia moneda, segun sea el caso.63
Sin embargo, la participaci6n entre los estados en la reja de paridad y el
indicador de divergencia es voluntaria.'
En la ausencia de presiones del mercado excesivas, la reja de
paridad y el indicador de divergencia han ayudado estabilizar la tarifa de
intercambio.65 No obstante, estos dispositivos han fallado cuando las
intensas fuerzas del mercado han arriesgado monedas individuales.' Por
ejemplo, Italia y el Reino Unido retiraron sus monedas del SME en 1992
debido a condiciones econ6micas drdsticas. 67
Cuando el SME se llev6 a cabo en 1979, los crfticos discutieron
que las grandes disparidades entre las economias de los estados miembros
evitarian un sistema viable." Estos criticos sefialaron tres posibilidades
como resultado de las divergencias econ6micas.69
Primero, ellos
argumentaron que el sistema fallaria ripidamente porque no era
suficientemente flexible para acomodar tales diferentes economas.70
Segundo, los criticos advirtieron que el sistema tendrfa un impacto
deflacionario, asi sea forzando paises con inflaci6n alta a apretar sus
polizas o hacidndo necesario suprimir la competitividad de todos los
moneda infravalorado. Recfprocamente, un banco central cuya moneda se acerca el extremo bajo
de su rango debe comprar su propia moneda y vender ia otra. Vea Works, supra nota 56, a las
493-94.
61.
Vea Kurzmann, supra nota 57, a 144.
62.
Id.
63.
Vea Works, supra nota 56, a 495.
64.
Vea Schluter v. Hauptzollamt Lorrach, [1973] E.C.R. 1135, 1161
(sosteniendo que a los estados miembros no se les exige someter a los t6rminos del Mecanismo
de intercambio de monedas).
65.
Vea Kurzmann, supra nota 57, a 144.
66.
Id.
67.
Vea Emma Tucker, Obligations of European ERM Members, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 1992, a 5. Italia se volvio a juntar al ERM en noviembre del 1996. Vea Angelo
Tarallo, On the Road to the Euro, THE BoTroM LINE, Spring 1997, a 4 [en adelante Tarallo].
68.
Por ejemplo, en 1979 la proporci6n de inflaci6n en Alemania era 2.7%,
comparado a 12.2% en Italia. Las disparidades drarnticas en proporciones de inflaci6n entre los
estados miembros del CEE fueron compuestas en pane por la crisis de OPEP en los 1970's. Vea
JACQUES VAN YPERSELE & JEAN-CLAUDE KOEUNE, THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM:

ORIGINS, OPERATIONS AND OUTLOOK 66 (1984) [en adelante Van Ypersele & Koeune].

69.
70.

Id.
Id.
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estados miembros para sostener los paises mis d6biles.7' La tercera
posibilidad era que la inflaci6n severa podrfa suceder porque los paises con
inflaci6n baja tendrian que importar inflaci6n de otros estados miembros en
forma de apoyos del precio y aumentos en sus bases monetarias. 72 Sin
embargo, a pesar de estos riesgos, el SME ha sobrevivido y actualmente
sirve como precursor funcional a la moneda dinica."
B. El Tratado de Maastricht de 1992
En diciembre de 1991, una conferencia intergubernamental sobre
la UME hizo su informe a la Asamblea Europea de Maastricht.74 La
contribuci6n de la conferencia fue entonces incorporada formalmente como
parte del Tratado en la Uni6n Europea (TUE) el 7 de febrero de 1992. 75
Bajo los trminos del TUE, la Uni6n Monetaria Europea se lanza con otras
instituciones de la UE 76 significantes, como una de tres pilares qu6 juntos
levanta la UE. 7
El Tratado especifica tres fases incrementales para el cambio
eventual a una moneda. 7' La primera fase (ahora completa) implico la
coordinaci6n elevada de polizas econ6micas entre los estados miembros
dentro del armaz6n institucional existente. 79 El 1 de enero de 1994, la
segunda fase empez6. s Esta fase de transici6n trajo una prohibici6n en
todas las barreras al movimiento libre de capital, no s6lo entre los estados

71.

Id.

72.

Id.

.73.

74.

Vea GOODMAN, supra nota 52, a las 182-83.

Vea Roger J. Goebel, The European Union Grows: The Constitutional

Impact of the Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1092, 1109

(1995) [en adelante Goebel].
75.
El TEU se hizo vigente el 1 de enero de 1993. Id. (referiendose a 24 BULL.
EC 12-1991, a las 7-8).
76.
Estos incluyen la propia Uni6n Europea, asf como dos otras instituciones
basadas en tratados conocidas como Euratom (qu6 coordinan la polfza de energia nuclear) y la
Comunidad Europea de Carb6n y Acero (qu6 coordinan materias que se relacionan al carb6n y
el acero-programado incidentalmente, para ser subsumido por la Uni6n Europea en el 2002).
Id. a 1110.
77.
Vea TEU art. G. El segundo pilar es la Poliza Comin de Exterior y
Seguridad. Vea TEU art. J. Bajo este articulo, el Concilio Europeo establecera y administrara
reglas no-obligatorias sobre la polfza de exterior y seguridad. Id. El tercer pilar es conocido
como Cooperaci6n en Justicia y Asuntos Interiores. Vea TEU art. K. El Articulo K involucra la
coordinaci6n de asuntos de justicia. Id.
78.
GOODMAN, supra nota 52, a las 202-08.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
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miembros sino tambi~n con respecto a los tercer estados. 8 ' Ademis,
algunas restricciones fueron trazadas en d6ficites gubernamentales; el
Instituto Monetario Europeo (IME) fue formado; y la independencia
eventual del banco central de cada estado fue prescrita.8 2 La tercera fase
esta fijada para comenzar a mis tardar el 1 de enero de 1999 en el tiempo
en el que parses participantes adoptardn una poliza monetaria finica y una
poliza de tarifa de intercambio fnica.'
Bajo la fase dos, el cambio institucional importante fue el
establecimiento del Instituto Monetario Europeo (IME).'
El IME
supervisa el Sistema Monetario Europeo (SME); promueve el uso del
UME en transacciones privadas; y dirige el desarrollo del tratado de
compensaci6n del UME.8
El IME tambi~n serd consultado por las
autoridades de los estados miembros en polizas monetaria, y sern
autorizados a emitir recomendaciones pertinentes. 6 Si un estado miembro
desea poseer reservas de intercambio extranjero con el IME, el Instituto es
competente en manejar las reservas como el agente del estado."
Sin
embargo, el IME no puede intervenir en mercados extranjeros por su
propia iniciativa. 88
El IME consiste en los gobernadores del banco central de todos los
estados miembros, asi como un Presidente de jornada completa.8 9 Los
gobernadores son totalmente independientes, pero la independencia no se
requiere para los bancos centrales durante la fase dos.'
Los bancos
centrales son responsables por los costos administrativos del IME. 9'
Dos eventos significantes se introducirdn en la tercera fase.
Primero, el intercambio entre monedas participantes sera fijo
permanentemente. 9 Segundo, el Banco Central Europeo (BCE), con la

81.

Id.

82.

Id.

83.
Id.
84.
Vea The MaastrichtAgreement on Economic and Monetary Union, 32 BANK
OF ENG. Q. BULL. 64, 67 (1992) [en adelante BEQB].
85.

Id.

86.

Id.

87.

Id.

88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
The Maastricht Agreements on Economic and Monetary Union, supra nota

84, a 67.
91.
Id.
92.
Ya que la tarifa de intercambio estaran fijas, el ECU ya no representard un
promedio de las monedas individuales. Id. a las 64-65.
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cooperaci6n del Sistema Europeo de Bancos Centrales (SEBC), asumiri
mando directivo sobre la nueva moneda. 93 El BCE determinard polizas
monetaria para la UE, y serd "autorizado a hacer cumplir reglas
94
obligatorias en presupuestos nacionales."
El objetivo principal para el BCE y el SEBC serd asegurar
estabilidad de precios. 95 El SEBC tambi6n estara a cargo de una multitud
de deberes colaterales. Primero, desarrollari y administrard una poliza
Segundo, sostendri y manejard las reservas de
monetaria (nica. 96
intercambio extranjeros de estados miembros. 97 Como un tercer asunto, el
SEBC es obligado a facilitar el funcionamiento de sistemas de pagos. 9'
Finalmente, debe ayudar a autoridades competentes en la vigilancia
prudencial de instituciones del cr6dito y el mantenimiento de un sistema
financiero estable. 99 Los gobernadores del banco central de los varios
°
estados servirin como miembros de la Asamblea Gobernante del BCE."
Ellos seran unidos en la Asamblea por una junta ejecutiva de jornada
completa fijada por los estados miembros.'0 °
El BCE y los SEBC deben ser libres de toda influencia externa.'O2
Esta poliza de independencia fue disefiada para evitar las complicaciones
administrativas que surgiera si el BCE fuera responsable en una base
individual a quince gobiernos nacionales y parlamentos. 0 3 En cambio, la
responsabilidad seri mantenida a trav6s de la Asamblea Europea de
Ministros de Finanzas (AEMF).'" Aunque el Presidente de la AEMF no
puede votar en las reuniones de la Asamblea Governante del BCE, el
Presidente puede participar y puede someter mociones para
consideraci6n.° 5 La Asamblea de AEMF tambi6n puede discutir objetivos

93.
94.
95.

Id. a 65.

96.
97.

Id.
Id.

98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Vea BEQB, supra nota 84, a 65.

102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

supra nota 52, a 203 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
Vea BEQB, supra nota 84, a 65.
GOODMAN,
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de BCE con el Presidente de BCE y puede enmendar el estatuto de SEBC
en una magnitud limitada. "
Las medidas de responsabilidad adicionales incluyen como un
requisito que el BCE entrege un informe anual sobre polizas monetaria0 a7
la AEMF, el Parlamento Europeo, la Comisi6n, y la Asamblea Europea.1
Ademis, miembros de la junta ejecutiva de BCE, incluyendo el Presidente,
puede pedirles aparecer a la audiencia de ciertos comit6s del Parlamento
Europeo. 0 8 Finalmente, los gobernadores del banco central pueden asistir
a los comit6s parlamentarios nacionales libremente, como representantes de
la Asamblea Gobemante o en sus capacidades nacionales. "
Durante la fase tres, la AEMF retendrd responsabilidad por la
opci6n del sistema del curso de cambio de la nueva moneda con relacion a
monedas que no son parte de la UE, por la proporci6n central dentro del
sistema."' Sin embargo, para asegurar polizas consistente con la meta de
estabilidad de precios, la AEMF tiene que consultar con el BCE antes de
tomar tales decisiones. " El funcionamiento diario de la tarifa de
intercambio quedan en manos de la BCE que controlard inicialmente a casi

106.
El Concilio de ECOFIN no puede enmendar provisiones que gobiernan las
tareas y objetivos principales de SEBC, ni puede alterar la fundamental independencia de SEBC.
Id.
107.
Vea BEQB, supra nota 84, a 65. El Parlamento Europeo sirve como una
asamblea para debatir problemas de preocupaci6n a las personas de los estados miembros. Vea
BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 66 (1993).

El Parlamento es considerado el

brazo mts democrltico de la UE, parque sus miembros son elegidos directamente por el pueblo.
Id. a 68. Sin embargo, "aunque su papel en el legislativo y los procesos presupuestarios han
crecido, al Parlamento todavfa le falta el poder que ordinariamente disfrutarfa en una democracia
moderna." Id. (Nota editorial: traducido del Ingls). Por ejemplo, la legislaci6n no es
propuesta par el Parlamento, sino por la Comisi6n. Id. a 66.
La Comisi6n normalmente realiza tareas asociadas con un 6rgano ejecutivo: la
vigilancia y ejecuci6n de polfzas. Id. a 57. El deber de la Comisi6n es promover las intereses
de la UE, en lugar de los estados miembros. Id. a 58. Sus dreas de responsabilidad incluyen la
administraci6n de finanzas de la UE, las relaciones extemas, y comercios y acciones legales
contra los estados miembros por violaciones de ia ley de la UE. Vea BERMANN ET AL.,
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 59, 66 (1993). El Concilio Europeo coordina ia polfza extranjera
de los estados miembros. Id. a 56. EstA compuesto de las cabezas de estado y el Presidente de la
Comisi6n. Id. El Concilio Europeo somete informes de progreso cada afio al Parlamento, y
pone normas en las polfzas econ6micas de ambos los estados miembros y ia UE en conjunto. Id.
108.
Vea BEQB, supra nota 84, a 65.
109.
Id.
110.
Id.
111.

Id.
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UME cincuenta billones1 2 con el prop6sito de la intervenci6n del mercado
de intercambio." 3
En t~rminos de poliza macroecon6mica, la fase tres abraza tres
principios bisicos: ningtin deficit excesivo; ninguna financiaci6n
monetaria; y ningtin desaguar." 4 Adenfis, se le prohibe a los BCE y los
bancos centrales nacionales ofrecer facilitaci6n de cr~dito a las
instituciones de la Comunidad o a los estados miembros." 5 Ademis se les
prohibe comprar directamente instrumentos de deuda de estas
instituciones. 116
1. Criterio de la Convergencia
Para unirse a la UME, los estados miembros deben concordar con
cuatro criterias de limite que mide la actuaci6n econ6mica." 7 Primero, el
estado miembro debe demostrar estabilidad de precio significante." 8 En
particular, la proporci6n de inflaci6n debe ser comparable a los tres
estados miembros con la mis grande estabilidad de precio." 9 Segundo, la
posici6n financiera del estado aplicante debe ser sustentable.'2 Gobiemos
con d~ficites excesivos, por consiguiente, no sernn elegible.12 1 Tercero, el
estado debe de haber adherido a los mirgenes de fluctuaci6n del MIC
durante por lo menos dos afios, sin devaluar contra el dinero de cualquier
otro estado miembro.". El dltimo criterio exige al estado aplicante

112.

Esta cifra iguala a aproximadamente 65 billones de d6lares estadounidenses.

Id.
113.
114.

Id.a 67.
Vea BEQB, supra nota 84, a 67
115.
Id.
116.
Id.
117.
Vea TEU art. 109(0).
118.
Id.
119.
El promedio de inflaci6n del estado aplicante, segfin sea observado durante
un periodo de un afuo, no debe exceder a los de los tres estados de mejor composici6n por mS de
un punto y medio del porcentaje. La inflaci6n seri medida por el Indice de Precio de
Consumidor. Id. Desde el comienzo del 1997, el mAximo de inflaci6n anual aceptable era de
casi 3%. Vea Tarallo, supra nota 67, a 3.
120.
Vea TEU art. 109(j).
121.
Id. Las normas para la realizaci6n presupuestaria se encuentran en el
articulo 104(c)(2) del TEU: primero, la proporci6n del actual o planeado d6ficit gubernamental a
PIB no debe exceder 3%, a menos que la proporci6n halla decaido substancialmente o el exceso
sea s6lo temporal; y segundo, la proporci6n de deuda gubernamental a PIB no debe exceder
60%, a menos que la proporci6n este disminuyendo a una proporci6n satisfactoria. Vea the TEU
Protocolon the Excessive Deficit Procedure.
122.
Vea TEU art. 109(0).
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mantener tablas de inter6ses comparables a los tres estados
miembros con
23
la mds grande estabilidad de precio por al menos un afto. 1
2. El Cambio
La introducci6n de la nueva moneda procederd segfin cuatro puntos
de control cronol6gicos."
El primer paso significante esta fijado para
realizarse aproximadamente un afio antes de que la fase tres empieze. En
ese momento, la Asamblea Europea decidiri qu6 paises califican para la
UME basado en el criterio de la convergencia."
Segundo, mientras la
fase tres empieza, los intercambio entre los estados miembros serd.n
26
reemplazados por intercambio de la conversi6n permanentemente fijas.1
Funcionalmente, la nueva moneda (sera conocida como el Euro) y las
varias monedas nacionales serin intercambiables 1 27 Solamente los
billetes nacionales llevar~n estado legal hasta que los billetes Europeos se
introduscan.12 8 El SEBC entonces incorporard el Euro como su unidad
central de su itnica poliza monetaria. 29 Aunque se espera que los
mercados financieros cambien al Euro rdpidamente, casi todos los negocios
privados e individuos continuaran usando las monedad nacionales por un
periodo de tiempo mIs largo. 3 0
El tercer punto de control esta fijado para a mIs tardar tres afios
despu6s de que la fase tres empieze. El SEBC en ese punto empezara a
emitir el Euro e intercambiarlo contra los billetes nacionales y monedas.' 3'
Finalmente, seis meses despu6s que el Euro sea presentado, el cambio
estarin completos para todos los agentes y funcionamientos. 3 2 Las

123.

El promedio nominal de inter6s a largo plazo del estado aplicante, segtin sea

observado durante un periodo de un afio, no debe exceder a los de los tres estados de mejor

composici6n por mds de dos puntos del porcentaje. Los promedios de interds se miden en
referencia a bonos gubernamentales a largo plazo.o similares obligaciones. Id.
124.
Vea The European Monetary Institute, THE CHANGEOVER TO THE SINGLE
CURRENCY 13 (1995) [en adelante THE CHANGEOVER].

125.
126.

Se espera que esta decisi6n se haga al principio de 1998. Id.
La fase tres esta programada comenzar a mas tardar el 1 de enero de 1999.

127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.

130.

Vea THE CHANGEOVER, supra nota 124.

131.

Se espera que la introducci6n del Euro ocurra a mas tardar el 1 de enero de

132.

La iltima fecha para desaparecer las monedas nacionales es el 1 de julio de

2002. Id.
2002. Id.
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desaparecerin.'33

perderdn

su

estado

legal

y

gradualmente

3. Desarrollos Durante los Ultimos Dieciocho Meses
En diciembre de 1995, el entonces Primer Ministro Britdnico John
Major expres6 dudas serias sobre la UME sugiriendo que la fecha del
lanzamiento en 1999 era arbitraria y no relacionada a las realidades
econ6micas.' 34 1 estaba especialmente interesado en la relaci6n entre los
135
primeros paises y los estados restantes que no hardn el corte inicial.
"Hay un riesgo que esto pudiera rasgar Europa y podria destruir el
mercado tinico.... Podria producir una situaci6n donde los paises dentro
de la UME forman un bloque de proteccionista contra [estados miembros
de la UE que no califican para la UME]." 136 Los comentarios de
comandante reflejan la reticencia del Reino Unido con respecto al UME,
asi como un pesimismo que resuena por toda Europa. Por ejemplo, una
encuesta en 1996 dirigida por el Instituto Harris Polling indic6 que setenta
y ocho por ciento de los brit~nicos estan opuestos a la UME mientras
setenta por ciento de alemanes, cincuenta y cinco por ciento de los
franceses y cincuenta por ciento de los belgas tambi6n estaban opuestos. 37
Esta oposici6n no es sorprendente, porque los estados miembros han
llevado a cabo algunos cortes en gastos significantes como un esfuerzo
para acercarse al criterio de la convergencia' 3 8 Estos cortes han tenido un
impacto fuerte previsibles sobre empleos y beneficios de bienestar.139
Ir6nicamente, oficiales han notado que la UME ayudaria a
estimular la inversi6n y crecimiento necesario para reducir el desempleo
cr6nico de Europa." 4 El antiguo Embajador estadounidense a la UE,
Stuart Eizenstadt explic6 el esfuerzo comprensivo que es necesario para
mitigar los duros golpes de transici6n: "Los costos de no-sueldo deben
reducirse, pesados impuestos de n6mina deben cortarse, los mercados
obreros deben ponerse mds flexibles, deben hacerse inversiones en

133.

134.

Id.

Vea Joe Kirwin, EU Leaders Summit Reaches Accord on Key Monetary and

Trade Issues, 12 INT'L TRADE REP., Dec. 20, 1995, a 2097.
135.

Id.

136.

Id. (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).

137.

Vea EU to Seek to Conclude Disagreement With Britain, BNA INT'L TRADE

DAILY, June 21, 1996, a 16 [en adelante EU].
138.

Id.

139.

Id.

Vea Outgoing U.S. Ambassador Says Monetary Union Plans Moving Ahead,
140.
BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Feb. 9, 1996, a 20.
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entrenamiento para trabajos, aprendizaje perpetuo, y educaci6n
vocacional."141 Ademls, se ha indicado que serias medidas para reducir el
presupuesto de los estados miembros con d6ficites grandes eran
inevitables, sin respeto al criterio de la convergencia de la UME. 4 2
Para levantar la moral en Europa, el Presidente de la Comision
Europea,. Jacques Santer, propuso lo que 61 llama "el pacto de
confianza. "14 El rasgo central del pacto es el Trans-European Network
que es una infraestructura detallada de transporte, energia, y
telecomunicaciones."" Santer y otros oficiales estan convencidos de que
este plan debe llevarse a cabo para competir eficazmente en el mercado
global. 45 Sin embargo, el costo del plan es por encima de un billon de
d6lares estadounidenses, pondria una tensi6n sobre fondos sobrantes de la
UE; los cuales los estados miembros necesitan ayudar a pagar por las
reducciones deficitarias. "
En septiembre de 1996, los ministros de f'manzas de la UE se
reunieron en Dublin y acordaron en dos detalles importante de la UME. 47
El primer punto de acuerdo general involucr6 la formaci6n de un "pacto de
estabilidad" con el prop6sito de esforzar la disciplina presupuestaria entre
los participantes de la UME. 48
El pacto establecerA un concilio
administrativo para imponer sanciones econ6micas contra estados de la
UME que desarrollen d6ficites excesivos.1 49 Segundo, los ministros
acordaron crear un nuevo modelo del Mecanismo de Intercambio que
regulard monedas entre estados miembros de la UME y los que no son
miembros. 50 El nuevo mecanismo, conocido como MIC2, esforzara a una
venda de fluctuaci6n de mas o menos quince por ciento contra el Euro.'5
Si una moneda participante se desviase del rango mdximo, el BCE
intervendria para mantener estabilidad de precio. 52
Inmediatamente
141.

Id. (nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).

142.

Vea Slow Growth Troubling, But Some Members Should Be Ready For

EMU, Commission Says, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Mar. 7, 1996, a 18.

143.

Vea EU, supra nota 137, a 17 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingls).

144.

Id.

145.

Id.

146.

Id.

147.
Vea EMU Framework Pact Reached, Euro Said On Track For '99 Launch,
13 INT'L TRADE REP, Sept. 25, 1996, a 1500 [en adelante EMU].
148.

Id.

149.
150.

Id.
Id. a 1501.

151.

Id.

152.

Id.
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despu6s de la reuni6n en Dublin, Santer anunci6 que "la UME es
irreversible y va en rumbo" de acuerdo con el itinerario contemplado por
53
el Tratado de Maastricht. 1
El optimismo de Santer fue apoyado por la reciente publicaci6n de
nuevos presupuestos por varios candidatos de la UME:
Francia;
Alemania; Italia; Espafia; B61gica; y los Paises Bajos. 1
Todos los
presupuestos fueron disefiados para bajar d6ficites de presupuesto a los
requeridos tres por ciento PIB.'"
Sin embargo, a pesar de los
presupuestos impresionantes, no todos estos paises estn en buena salud
econ6mica.156 B61gica, por ejemplo, tradicionalmente ha tenido una deuda
muy alta de la proporci6n de la deuda-a-PIB mIs que doblo los requeridos
sesenta por ciento en 1995.57 Por otra parte, el Ministro Extranjero
Italiano Lamberto Dini sugiri6 en octubre de 1996 que la fecha del
lanzamiento de la UME debe de posponerse hasta que la situaci6n fiscal de
5
su pais se estabilize."'
Entretanto, Italia ha llevado a cabo serias medidas
para poner su d6ficit bajo control, y como resultado el rendimiento de
bonos para la lira comparada a la marca alemana ha decaido
significativamente. 5 9 Sin embargo, los cortes drdsticos y el impuesto en el
nuevo presupuesto italiano es probable que impidan un crecimiento
econ6mico.6o
Tambi6n parece haber algo de contabilidad creativa empleada en
los nuevos presupuestos.161 Por ejemplo, Francia pidi6 prestado dinero de
los fondos jubilatorios de Francia Telecom para pagar por su presupuesto,
mientras B61gica vendi6 oro. 162 El economista Richard Reid avis6 que
"[e]sto pudiera regresar a atormentar a estos paises despu6s de que la
UME comienze porque entonces los d6ficites pudieran subir de nuevo sin
hacer los cortes necesarios. " 16 En parte basado en los presupuestos
recientemente propuestos, otros economistas han proyectado que la
153.
Vea EMU, supra nota 147. Para detalles relacionados con el prograna de la
EMU, vea supra notas 124-33 (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
154.
Vea Joe Kirwin, With EMU Expected to Happen, Attention Turns to Who
Will Make the Cut, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Oct. 8, 1996, a 10.
155.

Id.

156.
157.

Id.
Id. a 11.

158.

Id.

159.
160.
161.

Id.
Vea Kirwin, supra nota 154, a 10.
Id.

162.

Id. a 12.

163.

Id. (nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).
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primera ola de la UME consistird de Alemania, Francia, Austria, y los
paises de Benelux.64
El 17 de marzo de 1997, los ministros de finanzas de la UE
examinaron formalmente y aprobar6n los presupuestos alemanes y
franceses. 165 Hasta muy recientemente, habia gran especulaci6n sobre la
fecha del lanzamiento en 1999 debido al doce por ciento de desempleo en
Alemania.'" Despu6s de que se perdieran 500,000 empleos alemanes en
enero, muchos economistas dudaron que el pafs pudiera lograr su trazado
2.9% proporci6n del d6ficit-de-PIB. 67 En abril, el desempleo habfa
alcanzado su marca ms alta desde que Hitler tomo el poder. 168 Muchos
expertos estan convencidos que, porque es el motor de la economia de la
UE, si Alemania no alcanza el criterio de la convergencia, la UME no seri
69
sustentable. 1
Mds incertidumbre se alcanzo en mayo de 1997, cuando una
disputa ocurri6 entre el gobierno alemdn y su banco central. 70
El
Bundesbank objet6 al plan del Ministro de la Finanzas Alemin de Theo
Waigel para poner un valor mis alto al oro y la reserva de dinero como un
medio de reforzar recibos a la tesoreria nacional. 17' El Bundesbank
enfatiz6 que esta t6cnica de contabilidad dudosa dafiaria la credibilidad del
Euro y abriria la puerta para poderes econ6micos mds d6biles como Italia
para entrar en la primera ola de la UME. 72 Como resultado de esta
critica, Waigel estipul6 que la revaluaci6n no ocurriria hasta el 1998.173
En Francia, las recientes elecciones parlamentarias le obligaron al
Presidente Conservador Jacques Chirac a compartir el mando del gobierno
con el nuevo Primer Ministro Socialista, Lionel Jospin.' 74 Esto llev6 a
164.
Id. a 11.
165.
Vea EU Finance Ministers Approve France, Germany F6r EMU
Membership, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Mar. 18, 1997, a 3 [en adelante Finance Ministers].
166.
Id.
167.
Id.
168.
Vea Ian Geoghegan, EU Ministers to Meet on EMU, Cheered by Kohl, THE
REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., Apr. 4, 1997, a 1.

169.
170.

Vea Finance Ministers, supra nota 165, a 3.
Vea Jeremy Gaunt, German Gold Row Prompts EMU Jitters, THE REUTER

EUR. COMMUNITY REP., May 29, 1997, a 1.
171.

Id.

172.

Id.

173.
Vea Jeremy Gaunt, EU FinanceMinisters to Meet on EMU on Sunday, THE
REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., June 4, 1997, a 1.
174.
Este sistema llamado la convivencia requiere cooperaci6n entre los lideres
ideol6gicos opuestos. Vea Paul Taylor, New French Government Takes Its Time on EMU, THE
REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., June 6, 1997, a 2.
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nueva especulaci6n, porque Jospin puntu6 su campafia de elecci6n con
critica contra austeridad fiscal, y sugiri6 que "el pacto de estabilidad" no
75
tendria autoridad para imponer sanciones en los estados miembros.1
Ademds, el partido Socialista exigi6 un cambio significante en la
filosofia de la UME.' 76 La plataforma de los contractantes requiri6 varias
condiciones precedente a la cooperaci6n de la UME, incluyendo
membrecia anticipada por Espafia e Italia; la interpretaci6n flexible del
acuerdo de Maastricht; un Euro que no este supervalorado; y un nuevo
gobierno econ6mico europeo.'7 7 Hablando en nombre del nuevo Primer
Ministro franc6s, el antiguo Presidente de la Comisi6n Jacques Delors
anunci6 el 9 de junio de 1997 que Francia buscarfa un protocolo al pacto
de estabilidad que clarificard c6mo los estados miembros coordinardn sus
polizas econ6micas despu~s de que la nueva moneda sea presentada
particularmente con respecto al desempleo."'
Las preocupaciones francesas fueron contestadas en parte por la
adopci6n de la Resoluci6n en el Crecimiento y Empleo, por la Asamblea
Europea, la cual complementara el pacto de estabilidad. 179 La nueva
resoluci6n enfatiza polizas economicas y presupuestos, asi como el
crecimiento sustentable y empleo.'80 Se espera que la resoluci6n aplacara
la insistencia de Francia en crear empleos en Europa, donde un estimado
de dieciocho millones de personas estdn sin empleo.'8 ' Un informe en la
aplicaci6n de la Resoluci6n se someteri la Asamblea Europea en
Luxemburgo en diciembre de 1997. '2 Ademds de la Resoluci6n, las
medidas principales del pacto de estabilidad incluyen regulaciones que
establecen normas compulsivas de disciplina fiscal para los paises de la

175.

Id. Para una explicaci6n del pacto de estabilidad, vea supra notas 147-49.

176.

Id.

177.
178.

Id.
Vea Myra MacDonald, France Seeks Protocol to EMU Budget Pact, THE
REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., June 9, 1997, a 1. En junio de 1997, el desempleo en Francia

habia alcanzado un record de 12.8%. Vea CommissionerDe Silguy Opposes French EMU Delay,
THE REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., June 10, 1997, a 1.

179.
Los detalles se finalizaron por el Ministro de Finanzas de la UE en
Amsterdam el 16 de junio de 1997, como parte de una conferencia intergubernamental. Vea Peter
O'Donnell et al., European Council, June 16/17, 1997: Summit Sees EU Stumble Onwards in
Amsterdam, EUR. REP., June 18, 1997, a 5.
180.

Id.

181.

Id.

182.

Id. a7.
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primera-ola, y criterio de elegibilidad para los otros estados miembros o
los que no son miembros de la UME.183

4. Costos y Beneficios
Se espera que una moneda inica traiga una gama amplia de
beneficios a clases particulares de individuos. Prinero, los inversionistas
se asegurarian que la competitividad y potencial de exportaciones serian
inmunes de fluctuaciones en la tarifa de intercambio.I 4 Segundo, los
negocios podrian cotizar precios en una moneda sin el riesgo de perjudicar
sus propias ganancias. 18 Tercero, los consumidores tendrian una base
superior para comparar los precios de productos de dos o mis paises.' 86
Cuarto, los turistas podrian viajar a lo largo de la CEE sin tener que

intercambiar monedas. " Y quinto, los banqueros podrian pedir prestado y
188
prestar a lo largo de la regi6n sin ningun riesgo de intercambio.
Adems, se espera que el cambio produzca varias ventajas
sist6micas. Por ejemplo, se estima que los ahorros en costos de conversi6n

de monedas seran mis de quince UME

89

cada afio, lo cual representa

aproximadamente 0.4% del PIB anual de la UE. 19

El estimulo de

183.
Id. a las 7-9. Empezando el 1 de junio, el Concilio de Finanzas evaluarA
paises para determinar si el deficit de un pals excede el Ifmite mdximo y dard recomendaciones al
pals que exceda el miximo. El pas entonces tiene cuatro meses para actuar. Si el pas no actdia,
otra advertencia sera emitida. Id. Despu6s de dos meses adicionales, el Concilio puede imponer
sanciones bajo el articulo 104(c) del Tratado. La sanci6n variari entre 0.2% de PIB y 0.5% de
PIB durante el primer afio de infracci6n. Id. Durante el segundo aflo, el minimo no aplicarA,
pero la sanci6n todavia se limitard a un maximo de 0.5%. Sin embargo, durante los primeros
dos afios, cualquier dinero que el pals debe pagar solo representar- un dep6sito de seguridad para
ser abandonado en complacencia. Si el pals continia violando las normas en el tercer afio, el
dep6sito convertirl en una multa permanente.
Otro dep6sito seri entonces obligatorio.
Finalmente, donde un pals es asediado por un retroceso severo, el Concilio esta autorizado para
tomar sus decisiones caso-por-caso y para tener en cuenta "las circunstancias excepcionales y
temporales." Id. a 9.
184.
Vea MICHAEL EMERSON & CHRISTOPHER HUNE, Foreword to THE ECU
REP. 11 (1991).
185.
Id.
186.
Id.
187.
Id.
188.
Id.
189.
Esta cifra es el aproximado equivalente a 19.5 billones de d6lares
estadounidenses. Id.
190.
Vea HUNE, supra nota 184, a 32. Hay algfinos debates sobre si la
desaparici6n de costos de la conversi6n de monedas significarfa verdaderos ahorros y no una
redistribuci6n de riquezas. Se espera que la mayorfa de las economias aumente de la eliminaci6n
de comisiones del banco. Otros ahorros resultarlan como corporaciones elimine sus secciones de
tesorerla. Sin embargo, esto a su vez implicaria un aumento en desempleo. Asi, la noci6n de
"ahorros" puede ser una cuesti6n de perspectiva. Id.
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comercio entre los estados miembros de la UE tambi6n es probable,
porque el riesgo del intercambio contribuye significativanente al costo alto
de transacciones de mercancia internacionales. 9 1 Adicionalmente, como la
incertidumbre entre los inversionistas probablemente disminuira, las
empresas no tendran que pagar tanto en riesgos de primas para invertir y
levantar capital." 9 La incertidumbre reducida tambi6n podria llevar a
aumentos sostenidos en ingreso y disminuciones en el tipo de desempleo. 93
'
Por otro lado, los criticos han sefialado que el progreso hacia una
moneda dinica severanente impedira la habilidad de los estados miembros
de responder a los golpes econ6micos en sus pafses.' 9
Los estados
miembros tambi6n perderin mucho su habilidad de ejercer el mando sobre
las monedas nacionales como una manera de influir sus economias
individuales. 95 La abdicaci6n de mando sobre la poliza monetaria podria
producir dafios serios al bienestar individual econ6mico de una naci6n.,
Esto es en parte debido al hecho que la flexibilidad del intercambio le
permite a un gobierno escojer los tipos de inflaci6n para luchar en contra
del desempleo.'
Tambi6n se ha discutido que los comercios dentro de la UE
realmente pueden sufrir bajo una moneda comiin. 98 El eslab6n entre
estabilidad de intercambio y el comercio se ha cuestionado, porque las
compafifas comerciales pueden circundar en mercados eficaces a un costo
relativamente bajo.' 99 Finalmente, los antagonistas notaran que, por lo
menos hasta que las leyes de impuesto de los varios paises se hallan

191.
Id. a 33.
192.
Por ejemplo, si los premios de riesgo caen en un porcentage de 0.5%, esta
reducci6n podrfa levantar ingreso en el futuro por tanto como 5 a 10%. Id.
193.
Id.
194.
Marc Dassesse, Selected Aspects of European Economic Community Law on
Investments and Acquisitions in Europe, 25 INT'L LAW 375, 390 (1991).
195.
PAUL DE GRAUWE, THE ECONOMICS OF MONETARY INTEGRATION 42
(1992).
196.
Martin Feldstein, The Case Against EMU, THE ECONOMIST, June 13, 1992,
a 19 [en adelante Feldstein]. Segfin un ejemplo por el Profesor Feldstein, si un exportador
ingles estubiera compitiendo en contra de un exportador americano para un comprador francks, el
exportador ingles ya no disfrutarfa ningun beneficio de una desvalorizaci6n de Esterlina contra el
d6lar cuando los costos ingleses pero no los costos de la UE habrfan hecho necesario una
desvalorizaci6n. Vea id. Asf, U.K. estara obligado a bajar precios y sueldos.
197.
Vea DAVID LAIDLER ET AL., EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION: PROGRESS
AND PROSPECTS 155 (M. T. Sumner & G. Zis eds., 1982).
198.
Vea Feldstein, supra nota 196, a 19.
199.
Id.
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armonizado, los descansos de impuesto no estarn disponibles para
oponerse a estancamiento econ6mico, como en los Estados Unidos. 2°
No obstante a las ventajas e inconveniencias, el ascendiente del
Euro parece ser muy probable. 20 1 Asi, las disputas contractuales pueden
levantarse donde el pago se ha estipulado en uno de las monedas
moribundas.
La pr6xima secci6n anticipa este problema y sugiere
estrategias por las que las panes pueden evitar tales complicaciones.
V. UNA PROYECCI6N DEL IMPACTO QUE UNA MONEDA EUROPEA
UNICA TENDRA EN TRANSACCIONES DE MEDIO Y LARGO PLAZO
A. Problemas ContractualesAsociados Con Imposibilidad mientras
Monedas Nacionalesse Desaparecen
Para la mayoria de los contractantes comerciales que
probablemente desean mantener una reputaci6n buena en la comunidad
internacional, las dificultades contractuales relacionadas al cambio en
moneda deben ser ficilmente evitables. Los contractantes pueden planear
de antemano para el nuevo regimen, o pueden hacer modificaciones
necesarias mientras sus contratos todavia estan por efectuarse.
Sin
embargo, el cambio presenta un poco de potencial para el abuso si algun
contractante decide intentar aprovecharse del problema de la moneda. Esta
secci6n imagina una situaci6n en que un prometedor poco escrupuloso
busca ser excusado de la realizaci6n levantando como defensa la
imposibilidad.
Siguiendo la discusi6n de imposibilidad, se ofrecen
sugerencias como medios por los que los contractantes pueden asegurar la
realizaci6n de sus obligaciones mutuas sin ruptura.
1. La Defensa de Imposibilidad
La doctrina de imposibilidad se ha reconocido por mucho tiempo
en los Estados Unidos. 2 2 Esta doctrina considera que si un evento
imprevisible da una obligaci6n contractual incapaz de realizarse, la no-

200.

Id.

201.

Vea THE CHANGEOVER, supra notas 124-133.

202.
Vea, e.g., Martin Emerich Co. v. Siegel, Cooper & Co., 86 N.E. 1104,
1106 (Iii. 1908) (sosteniendo que la existencia continua de un objeto material es esencial al
contrato; cuando el objeto deja de existir, la realizaci6n se hace imposible); Siegel v. Eaton &
Prince Co., 46 N.E. 449, 451 (II1. 1896) (descargando contrato para instalar un ascensor porque
un fuego habia destruido el edificio). Vea generalmente Christopher J. Bruce, An Economic
Analysis of the Impossibility Doctrine, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 311, 323-332 (1982).
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realizaci6n del prometedor se excusa.2 °3 La imposibilidad es generalmente
Primero, la realizaci6n puede ser
dividida en dos categorfas.
objetivamente imposible si el evento supervenido ha hecho el contrato
literalmente imposible de realizarse. 2° Por ejemplo, si un prometedor es
obligado a proveer equipo de sonido para un concierto en la Sala de
Carnegie, la destrucci6n subsecuente del edificio por fuego descargarfa el
deber del prometedor bajo el contrato.2°5

Como una segunda materia, la realizaci6n de un contrato puede ser
imposible porque un evento supervenido ha hecho la acci6n requerida
ilegal. 2° Asi, si un minorista estd de acuerdo a comprar 200 registradores
de videocassette de doble-puerta de un fabricante, y el Congreso entonces
rdpidamente proscribe la posesi6n y venta de VCR de doble puerta, el
minorista se excusaria por su fracaso en realizar su obligaci6n.*°7
Para establecer imposibilidad objetiva o legal como una defensa,
un contractante debe demostrar lo siguiente:
1) que un evento ocurri6 qu6 hizo la realizaci6n de un deber
imposible;
2) que la no ocurrencia del evento supervenido fue una suposici6n
bdsica mutuamente compartida en la que el acuerdo fue hecho;
3) que el evento supervenido ocurri6 sin ninguna culpa de la parte
que planteo la defensa; y

203.

Vea generalmnente E.
§§ 9.5-9.9, a las 700-37 (2nd ed. 1990) [en adelante

Vea RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 261.

ALLAN FARNSWORTH,

CONTRACTS

Farnsworth].
204.
Vea, e.g., Mullen v. Wafer, 480 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Ark. 1972)
(descargando una obligaci6n para servicios personales en relaci6n con la venta de un negocio
porque el vendedor se muri6 brevemente despuds de la venta).
205.
Para una versi6n del Siglo IXX de esta ilustraci6n, yea Taylor v. Caldwell,
122 Eng. Rep. 309 (1863), donde la corte declar6:
El principio parece ser que, en contratos en los que la realizaci6n depende en la
existencia continua de una persona o cosa, una condici6n es implfcita que la
imposibilidad de realizaci6n que ocurre al perecer la persona o cosa excusard la
realizaci6n. En ninguno de los casos lapromesa estA en palabras no positivas, ni hay
una estipulaci6n expresada que la destrucci6n de lapersona o cosa excusar-A la
realizaci6n; pero esa excusa esta implicada por la ley, porque por la naturaleza del
contrato esti claro que los contratantes acordaron en base a la existencia continuada de
la persona o enseres. Id. a 314.
206.
Vea, e.g., Vimar Seguros Y. Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S.
528, 540-41 (1995) (estipulando que si laprovision es ilegal o sin conciencia no se puede
ejecutar).
Vea RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 264; Texas Corp. v.
207.
Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U.S. 619, 630-31 (1921) (descargando los deberes de prometedor
donde un buque necesario para larealizaci6n del contrato fue requisado por el gobierno
britAnico).
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4) que la parte que busca descarga no asumio implicitamente o
explicitamente el riesgo del evento supervenido. 2 8
2. Por ejemplo
Suponga que un exportador en Norfolk, Virginia "Nosotros
Vendemos" entra en un contrato con un comprador en Marseille, Francia
"Nous Achetons" para la venta de dos millones de bolas de naftalina con
plancha blindadas. El contrato se ejecuta el 1 de enero de 1998. Como
parte del trato, Nosotros Vendemos extiende un t6rmino de credito por
seis-afios a Nous Achetons. Nous Achetons a su vez emite negociables a
Nosotros Vendemos en una cantidad igual al precio de los productos mts el
costo del financiamiento de forfait financiero.
Los pagar6s son
garantizados por el Banque de Marseilles. Nosotros Vendemos entonces
endorsa los pagar6s garantizados sin recurso a Fred Forfaiting a un
descuento por dinero en efectivo. Consiguiente al acuerdo de credito Fred
presenta los pagar6s al Banque de Marseille en una forma semi-annual. A
cambio, Banque paga a Fred en francos franceses. Banque entonces es
reembolsado como corresponde por Nous Achetons.
Entretanto, el 1 de enero de 1999, la UME es inaugurada por la
primera ola de estados miembros participantes: Luxemburgo, Austria,
Alemania y Francia. Como que a los estados miembros se les conceden
tres afios para retirar progresivamente las monedas nacionales, Banque
puede continuar pagandole a Fred en francos franceses durante ese tiempo.
Sin embargo, en el 2002, con casi dos afios de pagos todavia por hacer, el
franco pierde su estado como oferta legal. Las partes estAn ahora en una
posici6n dificil. Segfin los tdrminos literales del acuerdo, Banque tiene
s6lo que emitir moneda franc6s ahora despojadas de su valor. No hay
duda que las partes escrupulosas quisieran, en su propia iniciativa,
modificar sus contratos para permitir pago en Euros, o quizis d6lares
Estadounidenses. Sin embargo, es posible que otros intenten usar esta
cadena de eventos a su ventaja. Banque, por ejemplo, decide continuar
emitiendo los francos franceses a Fred.
Fred pone una demanda en corte de distrito federal por
incumplimiento de contrato. 9 tl argumenta que las partes aceptaron
consideraci6n de valor real en el momento que el contrato fue formado, y

208.
Vea RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 261; Farnsworth, supra
nota 203, a las 700-37. (Nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
209.
Asumiendo que no hay dificultades obteniendo jurisdieci6n. Note, sin
embargo, que las notas del forfait incluyen generalmente cltusulas que sujetan el obligor a una
jurisdicci6n extranjera. Vea Ludwig & Coursey, supra nota 16, a las 387-88 (refiriendose a
Tavernier, Legal Aspects of Forfaiting, 11 INT'L Bus. LAW 25, 31 (Oct. 1983)).
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no contemplaron pago en una moneda invilida. Banque concede que
estaba de acuerdo en rendir dinero francds de valor real, pero demanda que
su obligaci6n para realizar eso se ha hecho imposible por las fuerzas de la
UME. Banque argumenta primero que la realizaci6n es objetivamente
imposible, porque la materia del contrato ha sido destruida. Ademas
argumenta que la ley de Uni6n Europea ha hecho su realizaci6n legalmente
imposible.
La defensa de Banque probablemente no seri muy persuasiva.
Cuando plantee el argumento, Banque no debe tener ningfin problema con
el primer elemento de imposibilidad. Necesita mostrar simplemente que el
cambio del UME ha privado el franco de cualquier valor real. Negociar el
segundo elemento le requiere un poco de sutileza. Banque tendrl que
mostrar que las partes compartieron una suposici6n bsica que la moneda
francesa seguiria siendo oferta legalmente vdlida. Fred argumentara que
ellos no compartieron semejante suposici6n, porque era conociniento
comfin que Francia se uniria a la UME. Sin embargo, Banque podria
prevalecer en este punto. El contrato se ejecut6 antes de determinar cuales
paises eran elegibles para ser miembros de la UME, asi que las
perspectivas para el asentimiento de Francia no podrian haber estado tan
claras.2" ° Aderrds, el hecho que Fred asinti6 al acuerdo es evidencia fuerte
que 61 esper6 que el franco manteniera su valor. El tercer elemento no
seri ningdn problema, porque el advenimiento de una moneda europea no
era claramente atribuible a la conducta de Banque.
El elemento final de imposibilidad es donde la defensa de Banque
fallari. Banque debe mostrar que no asumi6 el riesgo que la moneda
francesa perderia su valor. La pregunta de si la parte ha asumido el riesgo
de un evento supervenido depende de si el evento era bastante previsible.211
Aquf, la obsolescencia del franco de tres-afios era previsible por varias
razones.
Primero, el Tratado de Maastricht y su descendencia de
210.
Para los prop6sitos de este gui6n imaginativo, el contrato se firm6 en enero
de 1998. Las determinaciones finales de la elegibilidad de la UME no se hicieron hasta el mes
de abril de ese afho.
211.
Vea, e.g., Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283
(7th Cir. 1974) (la regulaci6n gubernamental era suficientemente previsible para evitar a la
defensa de imposibilidad); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966) (los
problemas con la construcci6n de un sistema de computadora eran previsibles); Eastern Airlines,
Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (Ia crisis de petroleo de OPEP era

previsible); Mishara Constr. Cfa. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 310 N.E.2d 363 (Mass.
1974) (ia huelga obrera era previsible). Pero yea Opera Co. of Boston, Inc. v. Wolf Trap Found.
for Performing Arts, 817 F.2d 1094, 1100-01 (4th Cir. 1987) ("[P]racticamente cualquier
ocurrencia puede preverse pero si la previsivilidad es suficiente para rendir inaceptable la defensa
de imposibilidad es 'uno de grado' de la previsivilidad y si la no-ocurrencia del evento es
suficientemente improbable o irrazonable para constituir una raz6n para negarse a aplicar la
doctrina."). (Nota editorial: traducido del Ingl(s).
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decisiones administrativas ya habia puesto el mundo en aviso constructivo
212
del cambio a una moneda.
Segundo, mientras la elegibilidad de Francia para la UME no era
cierta en enero de 1998, ese pais estaba dedicandose claramente en
esfuerzos serios para obedecer la criteria de la convergencia. Asi, una
parte comercial razonable podria inferir una probabilidad fuerte del
Finalmente, podria argumentar como una
asentimiento de Francia.
instituci6n financiera, Banque debia de haber tenido mis aun firmemente
su mano en el pulso de la UME que se esperaria de parte comerciales
ordinarias. Como que el problema de la moneda se debia de haber
previsto, la corte rechazard la demanda de imposibilidad indudablemente,
debido a que Banque voluntariamente asumio el riesgo de unificaci6n
monetaria. Para vindicar el contrato, la corte usard probablemente su
fuerza reformativa para cambiar los tdrminos del acuerdo y ordenar a
Banque a que honre los pagar6s en la nueva moneda
Las dificultades relacionadas con el countertrade calcarian el
mismo modelo de la ilustraci6n anterior. Por ejemplo, en el caso de un
acuerdo del counterpurchase,1 3 un exportador alemdn puede ser obligado a
comprar piedra caliza de Malawi anualmente durante cinco afios.
'
Austria
Alternativamente, bajo un acuerdo de aclaramiento bilateral,2 14
puede ser obligada a pagar a plazo para cubrir su sobre consumo de
productos con respecto a Rumania. En cada uno de estas situaciones, las
preguntas de realizaci6n son probables mientras el deutschemark y el
schilling austriaco se retira.
La resoluci6n de estas preguntas muy probablemente tiende a
parangonar el ejemplo de Fred v. Banque resumido anteriormente, porque
ellos comparten los problemas comfines de consideraci6n y habilidad de
realizar. Si la financiaci6n escogida involucra forfaiting, counterpurchase,
o un acuerdo de aclaramiento, es importante para las partes considerar y
prevenir las dificultades potenciales unidas al nuevo r6gimen de la moneda.
La subdivisi6n siguiente sugiere estrategias de negocios para las partes
que, distinto a Banque, desee hacer negocio en buena fe.
B. Planeaci6nde Provisiones Contractualespara Evitar Litigaci6n
La mayoria de las partes de conciencia querran evitar el apuro de
y
Banque incorporando t6rminos del contrato que anticipen el
Fred
problema de la moneda. Cualquier empresa que desee hacer negocio con

212.

Vea supra notas 74-116.

213.

Vea supra notas 29-35.

214.

Vea supra notas 36-40.
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partes en la UE debe redactar provisiones especiales para asegurar una
transici6n sin problemas. Esto incluso es verdad con respecto a paises que
no parecen ser prontos candidatos de la UME como Italia y el Reino
Unido. Semejante clusula es simple de redactar. Solo requeriria palabras
a este efecto: "en caso de que la moneda denominada pierda su estado
legal, el Euro bastard como un suplente." Altemativamente, las partes
pueden desear arreglar pagos en d6lares estadounidenses, o alguna otra
moneda fuerte. Si estas medidas se toman en la fase de la negociaci6n, se
desviardn disputas subsecuentes fAcilmente.
Si las partes no mantienen el problema de la moneda cuando el
contrato se ejecuta, habrian todavia oportunidades suficientes de modificar
el acuerdo. Asumiendo que las partes no tienen interns emboscir, ellos
deberian estar dispuestos a reformar el contrato como apropiado. Una vez
mds, una clarificaci6n simple sobre lo que constituye dinero aceptable bajo
el contrato seria suficiente. Bajo la ley de Estados Unidos, ninguna nueva
consideraci6n es necesaria, mientras que la modificaci6n sea justa bajo las
circunstancias.2'
VI. CONCLUSI6N

Forfaiting le permite a un exportador que envie productos
importante a un comprador cuyo credito puede ser oscuro o no-imponible,
cambiando virtualmente todos los riesgos de la transacci6n a un forfaiter
que comprarian los recibideros del exportador sin recurso.2 "6 Las notas
son aseguradas por la garantia de un banco en el pals del importador que es
principalmente responsable al poseedor de la nota.217 El poseedor de la
nota puede entonces cobrar peri6dicamente las notas segdin los t~rminos del
cr~dito.21 8 A cambio de las notas, el poseedor de la nota recibe pago en el
dinero prescrito por el acuerdo.2 19
Otras formas de acuerdos de comercio a medio y largo plazo
incluyen contra-compra y los acuerdos de aclaramiento bilaterales. Un
contrato de contra-compra es una transacci6n en la cudl una parte estA de
acuerdo en comprar productos de otro en condici6n que la segunda parte
promete hacer una compra subsecuente del primero. 22° Los acuerdos de
aclaramiento bilaterales involucran lIfneas reciprocas de crddito entre los
215.

Vea generalmente RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,

216.

Vea supra notas 3-12.

217.

Vea supra nota 9.

218.
219.

Vea Uzzelle, supra nota 10.
Vea Petra Bank, supra nota 8.
Vea supra notas 29-35.

220.

§ 89.
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paises por un periodo de tiempo predeterminado. 22' Junto con forfaiting,
estas tdcnicas ayudan a facilitar comercio internacional.
Es posible, sin embargo, que muchos de estos acuerdos no
contemplen las implicaciones de una moneda en Europa. 22 Para los
acuerdos de crddito a medio y largo plazo, la moneda denominada estd en
peligro de un cambio fatal.'
Aunque las partes comerciales escrupulosas
deben poder adaptar sus contratos para resolver el problema de la moneda,
algunos oportunistas pueden insistir que sus deberes sean descargados
adhiriendo a los t6rminos literales del acuerdo. Si una parte demanda por
incumplimiento, los prometedores pueden intentar exigir que los carnbios
en monedas hicieron imposible la realizaci6n. Sin embargo, es probable
que esta defensa falle porque los prometedores asumieron el riesgo del
evento supervenido.

Vea supra notas 36-40.
Vea supra notas 78-83.
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CUBA
Judiciary
Judicial power is exercised by the People's Supreme Court on the
national level, by courts of justice in cases that are provincial or regional
in nature, and by the municipal courts. Revolutionary tribunals are
convened to deal with crimes against the state.
Magistratura
El poder judicial es ejercido por la Corte Suprema de las Personas en el
nivel nacional, por cortes de justicia en casos que son provinciano o
regional en naturaleza, y por las cortes municipales. Se emplazan
tribunales revolucionarios para tratar con crimenes contra el estado.
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INTRODUCTION

From the moment the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Act, popularly known as the Helms-Burton Act,' entered the 104th
Congress it sparked a great deal of controversy domestically and

*
Due to the on going debate over the Helms-Burton Act, it is important to note that this
Comment only reflects developments through September 27, 1997.
** Juris Doctor, January 31, 1998, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law
Center; B.A., April 1992, Florida International University, College of Arts and Sciences.
1. Cuban Liberty & Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat.
785 (1996) codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6021-91 (1996) [hereinafter Helms-Burton].
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internationally.2 Most of the struggle surrounding the Helms-Burton Act
centered on the far reaching provisions contained in Title III and the
adverse effects such a policy would have on United States trade allies.'
Nonetheless, with a great deal of lobbying,4 and a little luck,- this
controversial bill was signed into law by President Clinton on March 12,
1996.6 However, the struggle did not end there. Since then, the race to
pressure the Clinton administration to instill Congress to modify the Act

has intensified., From Europe, miles away, to Mexico and Canada, across
United States borders, the debacle continues. 8 Never before have so many
countries united to block the application of a United States anti-trade

sanction abroad.
This Comment explores the controversy surrounding the HelmsBurton Act and proposes that despite the stark opposition, its end is far

from becoming a reality.

The following will be the major points of

2. The degree of the controversy surrounding the Helms-Burton Act is evident from the
floor discussions presented in the Conference Report on the Cuban Liberty & Democratic
Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996. See 142 CONG. REC. H1724, H1727-04 (daily ed. Mar. 6,
1996) [hereinafter Conference Report].
3. The concern that the Helms-Burton Act would adversely effect United States trade
allies was made clear by Mr. Moakley, the gentleman from Massachusetts, in the floor debate on
House Resolution 370 where he points to the European Union's statement read on the record.
Id. at H1726. In that statement, the European Union implicitly attacks Title III of the HelmsBurton Act whereby it states: "Mhe EU objects, as a matter of principle, to those provisions
that seek to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction of United States Federal courts over disputes
between the United States and foreign companies regarding expropriated property located
overseas." Id. at H1731 (noting that Title III is the section of the Helms-Burton Act that
provides the above mentioned jurisdiction over foreign companies trafficking in the confiscated
properties).
4. Id. at H1724-04. The debate in Congress over passing the Helms-Burton Bill was so
poignant, that the President of the United States had to intervene to push its enactment. See
William J. Clinton, PresidentStatement on Cuban Liberty Act, Mar. 12, 1996, available in 1996
WL 107140.
5. Though ironic, the death of three nationals and one resident alien as a result of the
Cuban government's downing of two unarmed United States civilian aircrafts prompted the
President's signing of the Helms-Burton Act. Id.
6. Id.
7. EU Steps Up Reactions to U.S. Cuba Law, 8 EUROWATCH, US-EU RELATION,
No.11, Jul. 22, 1996 (citing European Union's threat of retaliation against the United States if
the Helms-Burton Act is implemented)[hereinafter E]. Some CanadianInvestors to be Barred
from United States, CARIBBEAN UPDATE, June 1, 1996 (noting that Canada might retaliate the
implementation of the Helms-Burton Act) outrage and threat of retaliation to the implementation
of the Helms-Burton Act) [hereinafter CanadianInvestors]. Red Herring?Mexico Defies United
States over Cuba, INT'L REP., INC., Jul. 29, 1994, available in Westlaw; News Service, IAC
File (noting Mexico's irritation and claim that the Helms-Burton violates international law)
[hereinafter Red Herring.].
8. Id.
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discussion: Part I commences with an introduction to the controversy
surrounding the Helms-Burton Act; Part II provides a background of the
events leading up to and culminating in the Helms-Burton Act's
establishment; Part III explains the controversy in light of the HelmsBurton Act's specific provisions and rebuts the numerous attacks posed to
the Helms-Burton Act's legality; Part IV delves into the struggle to bring
the Helms-Burton Act to an end; Part V discusses the Helms-Burton Act's
potential for change in light of Congress' proclaimed impediment; and Part
VI concludes with a prediction that the controversy surrounding the HelmsBurton Act is not bound to end anytime soon.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
of
On the eve new year's day of 1959, Fidel Castro took command
of Cuba and began a reign of power that has lasted over thirty-eight years.9
Before Castro, the United States played an active role in Cuban poiitics. 0
With the imposition of the Platt amendment, armed with political
interference, together with a growing presence in the island, the United
States became a significant player in Cuban politics.,, However, that role
came to a halt when the Castro regime espoused its allegiance with
2
Marxist-Lenninism, and Soviet involvement in the island increased.'
These events, together with the expropriations of all property belonging to
United States citizens and firms in the island," led to the establishment of a
comprehensive boycott against Cuba geared at strangulating its economy
4
by eliminating the island's primary source of currency and reserve.

9. See JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ, To MAKE A WORLD SAFE FOR REVOLUTION 8 (1989);
See also Trevor R. Jefferies, The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992: A Rotten Carrotand a Broken
Stick?, 16 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 75, 76 (Fall 1993).
10. See Jeffries, supra note 9, at 76. From the moment the Spaniards sunk the Maine,
United States involvement in Cuba transcended mere economics. JULES R. BENJAMIN, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 45 (1990). After the Spanish
defeat in 1898, the United States became the sole victor over Spanish colonialism and oppression
achieving a preferred status in the island. Id. at 61.
11. LOUIS A. PEREZ, JR., CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES: TIES OF SINGLUAR INTIMACY
XV (1990).
12. David S. De Falco, Comment, The Cuban Liberty & Democratic Solidarity (Libertad)
Act of 1996: Is the U.S. Reaching Too Far?, 3 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 125, 127 (Winter 1997).
13. In response to United States termination of the Cuban sugar quota, Cuba retaliated by
nationalizing the remaining all American-owned industries, agrarian enterprises and banks. See
WAYNE S. SMITH, THE CLOSEST OF ENEMIES 57 (1987).
14. See Jeffries, supra note 9, at 77. For a history of hostilities between the United States
and Cuba that culminated in the embargo's creation, see Shari Ellen Bourque, Note, The
Illegality of the Cuban Embargo in the Current InternationalSystem, 13 B.U. INT'L L. J. 191,
195-99 (1995).
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Ironically, instead of causing Castro's demise through economic strain, the
United States left a vacuum promptly filled by the Soviet Union."
Recently, with the end of the Cold War and the cessation of Soviet

6
aid, Castro turned to a different source for funds--foreign investment.'

For the past five years, Cuba has actively sought to attract foreign
investment in the island by allowing foreign ownership of land.,' With the
modification to the Cuban Constitution and the enactment of the Foreign
Investment Act, the Cuban trade market provides fewer restrictions in the
area of domestic labor or limits to foreign investment.'" As a result of the
foregoing changes, foreign investment and trade with Cuba have grown
significantly."
This latest financial strategy by the Castro regime
represents yet another challenge to the thirty-seven year old embargo.
Thus, support for the Helms-Burton Act resulted from the apparent

ineffectiveness of the embargo in light of Castro's increased financial
backing.

15. Elliot Abrams, What are Soviet Intentions in Latin America?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18,
1989, at A7 (noting the author's estimation that the Soviet Union contributed $5-8 billion
annually to the Cuban economy).
16. See DeFalco, supra note 12, at 130.
17. Octavio Castilla, Cuba: Progress and Prospects, (visited Mar. 23, 1998)
< http://www.santafe.edu/-naninet/naminews/insert/castilla.html >.
18. Id.
19. The following excerpt(s) demonstrates the significance of foreign investment to the
Cuban economy after Soviet aid to the island ceased:
In 1993 Cuba's GDP had fallen almost 35 percent compared to that of 1989; imports were
down 75 percent. By the end of 1994, for the first time in the last five years, the negative
tendency in growth was reversed and a modest increase of .07% was obtained .... In the
first nine months of the present year GDP has grown 2.3% and, for the first time in the last
six years, so has GDP per inhabitant. As for Cuban exports in general, they grew 16% in
1994 and a similar is expected for 1995. In 1989, foreign trade was centralized in a few
dozen state enterprises. Today almost 150 national entities have export authorities, as well
as 200 economic associations of joint capital. More than 630 foreign production and trading
companies are registered to conduct activities in Cuba. Id. (noting that these figures are
pulled from an article written in 1995).
The following excerpt provides a more recent account of the foreign investment in
Cuba:
[C]anada's external trade with Cuba has grown since 1992. Imports from Cuba have
expanded from a low of around US$ 130 million in 1993 to a high of US $237 million in
1995. Also, exports to Cuba have boomed from a low of approximately US$ 100 million in
1993 to a high of US$ 203 million in 1995.
See DeFalco, supra note 12, at n.37.
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THE HELMS-BURTON ACT

The goal of the Helms-Burton Act is to promote democracy by
closing all viable economic subsistence to Cuba. The Act has three major
objectives: to encourage and finance a democratic transition government
in Cuba; to block all financial investments filtering through to the Castro
regime; and, to ensure that United States nationals receive compensation
for the expropriations conducted post-revolution in 1959.1 In addition, the
Helms-Burton Act attempts to strengthen the embargo by prohibiting
indirect financing to Cuba; 21 opposing Cuba's participation in international
financial institutions;12 and, barring assistance for the purpose of
maintaining Cuba's nuclear power plant.23 Title I of the Helms-Burton Act
includes a more extensive list of prohibitions to other countries in their
relations with Cuba23 The following is a detailed analysis of only the most
controversial provisions set forth in the Helms-Burton Act, Title's II, III,
and IV.
A. ControversialProvisions
Title II focuses on the establishment of a democratic transition
government in Cuba. This Title allows the United States to resume
diplomatic and financial relations with the island.2 It further details that
the United States will: reinstate trade, provide assistance, organize
international efforts to aid a transition, and lift the embargo, upon the
President's report announcing the existence of a transition government in
Cuba. 26 However, the most controversial section of this Title, section
207(d), 21 requires resolution of property claims in Cuba before it can be
regarded as having a democratically elect government. 2 As a result of this
section, Cuba is obligated to compensate United States citizens before it
can benefit from renewed diplomatic relations with the United States. 29
Thus, the controversy regarding this section centers on the requirement
that the United States approve of the new government, and that the new
20. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 1, §§ 101-116 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6031-46).
21. See id. §§ 104, 106, 108, 109, 111.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id. §§ 104, 106, 108, 111.
See id. § 111.
See id. §§ 110-111.
Helms-Burton Act, supra note 1, §§ 201-07 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6061-67).
Id.
Id. § 207(d).
Id.
Id.
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government be ready and able to comply with the pending claims made by
United States nationals for diplomatic relations to resume.
Title III of the Helms-Burton Act safeguards property claims in
Cuba by providing a civil remedy to United States nationals that possess
certified claims to property in Cuba;" and, grants these claimants a
presumption that shifts the burden of proof to the party being sued.,,
Section 302 of Title III directly affronts foreign investors by shifting the
responsibility to pay claims owed, from the Cuban government to the
companies trafficking in the confiscated property.3 2 A proper suit under
this section requires that the claims for the confiscated properties initially
be filed and certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission under
the International Claims Settlement Act (ICSA) of 1949.11 Only if the
suing party's property claims are certified can a suit be brought under this
section against a person, corporation, agent, or relative in the United
States.' Thus, unlike opponents to the Helms-Burton Act claim, not just
any naturalized Cuban can bring a claim for compensation for trafficking in
the confiscated property.
Incidentally, Title III also includes a loophole allowing the
President of the United States to suspend the entire Title if either a national
security interest exists or a transition government is in place in Cuba.
Section 306 gives the President the power to postpone implementation,
initially for six months. Additionally, this section allows the President to
continue suspending Title III's implementation for six-month intervals
indefinitely.3 The only requirement for the suspension is that the President
inform Congress in writing at least 15 days prior to the effective date of
the additional suspension.37 Suspensions are permitted for either the
national security interest of the United States or to expedite a transition
government in Cuba.3' While these suspensions are in effect, no property
claims can arise.3 9 However, the suspension shall not disturb pending

30. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 1, §§ 201-07.
31. Id. § 302(b)(2) (noting that the amount of liability is presumed to be the amount
certified in a lawsuit).
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
See generally Helms-Burton, supra note 1, Title II.
Id.
Helms-Burton Act, supra note 1 § 306(b)(1)(a).
Id. § 306(b)(1)(b).
Id.
Helms-Burton, supra note 1, §§ 301-06.
39. Id.
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suits.40 The President of the United States has already put this section to
good use by suspending Title III's implementation three times since the
41
Helms-Burton Act's enactment.
The other controversial provision of the Helms-Burton Act, Title
IV, focuses on the exclusion of aliens who traffic in confiscated property
from United States territory. 2 Section 401 of this Title provides grounds
for the exclusion of a person who "has confiscated or has directed or
overseen confiscation of, . . . property [whose claims are] owned by
United States national[s]"; who engage in the trafficking of confiscated
property; who is a corporate officer, "or shareholder with a controlling
interest of an entity involved in such trafficking; or who is a spouse, minor
43
child, or agent of a person excludable under" the preceding categories.
However, such exclusions may not take effect against a person who enters
the country for a medical reason or for the purpose of transferring title to
the tainted property."
Thus, Title IV excludes the families of the
traffickers as well as any person even marginally involved with the
transaction from entering the United States.

B. QuestionableLegality of the Helms-Burton Act
The legality of the Helms-Burton Act has been under attack since
its inception by those advocating to end a bad law. But, is the HelmsBurton Act really a bad law, or just a highly criticized piece of legislation
that is fully justified from the United States standpoint? The arguments
posed against the Helms-Burton Act rest on two grounds: 1) its
inconsistency with United States domestic law and 2) its violation of
international law.41 The argument under the first ground is that the HelmsBurton Act runs counter to certain agreements entered into by the United

40. Id. § 306(c)(3).
41. President Clinton continues to suspend Title III of the Helms-Burton Act to appease
United States trade allies. Carol Giacomo, Caught in Vise on Cuba, Clinton Pleases No One,
REUTERS N. AM. WiRE, Jul. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, World File (noting
the first suspension of Title III); see also Urgent Clinton Announces Decision to ProlongHelmsBurton Freeze, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,

World File (noting Clinton's second suspension of Title i1); and see Edwin D. Williamson,
Protecting Everyone's Right to Property, THE WASH. TIMEs, July 11, 1997, at A21 (noting the
third suspension of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act as a result of the United States and the
European Union's agreement on April 11 th to protect investment and inhibit future acquisition of
expropriated property).
42. Helms-Burton, supra note 1, § 401 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. § 6091).
43. Id. § 401(a)(1)-(4).
44. Id. § 401(c).
45. See Bourque, supra note 14, at 207-11.
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States to promote free trade." The arguments under the second ground are
that the application of the Helms-Burton Act infringes on international law
because it impedes state sovereignty, represents a secondary boycott, and
is wholly unjustified.4 7 These arguments, though justly made, fail to
account for the United States' justifications." The following paragraphs
question the validity of the arguments advanced above in light of those
justifications.

1. Inconsistency with Domestic Law?
The Helms-Burton Act ostensibly violates certain multilateral
agreements to which the United States is a party; geared at promoting free
trade in the international sphere. Among the most notable of these
agreements are: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 9 Both of these
agreements are often used by opponents of anti-trade legislation to point
out the United States' incapacity in creating laws such as the Helms-Burton
Act." However, these can only provide a cause of action domestically if
they are self-executing or have implementing legislation.'
Here, both
2
Agreements have been implemented through Fast Track, though not
entirely. 3 Thus, both Agreements provide viable avenues through which
member countries can attack the legality of the Helms-Burton Act.
NAFTA or World Trade Organization member countries could, in
dispute settlement resolution proceedings, argue that the Helms-Burton Act
violates some of the provisions in either NAFTA or GATT.4 The
46. See generally infra note 49 (citing GATT & NAFTA as possible avenues to further a
domestic attack against the Helms-Burton Act).
47.

U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para 7.

48.

See infra Part III B(2)(c).

49. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,

32

I.L.M. 296, 297-456 & 605-800 [hereinafter NAFTA], General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT
1947].
50. Anthony M. Solis, Comment, The Long Arm of U.S. Law: The Helms-Burton Act, 19
LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 709, 732-36 (Apr. 1997).
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 (1985)
[hereinafter THIRD § 111].
52. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2111-12, 2191-93 (1988), reprinted in Samuel C. Straight,
Note, GATT and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty
States, 45 DUKE L.J. 216, n.121 (Oct. 1995) (noting that Fast Track is utilized to implement
international agreements as needed).
53. Id.

54. NAFTA, supra note 49 art. 1105(I); see also Kenneth L. Bachman, Anti-Cuban
Sanctions May Violate NAFTA, GAYT, NAT'L L. J.C3 (Mar. 11, 1996)[hereinafter Bachman].
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following are just some of the arguments advanced under either trade
agreement." First, a NAFTA member country can argue that Title III of
the Helms-Burton Act contradicts NAFTA article 1105, which requires
that a NAFTA country abide by international law when dealing with the
investment of a NAFTA country national.16 Additionally, a NAFTA
member country could also argue that Title III of the Helms-Burton Act
infringes article 1105 because it lacks the justification to exercise
jurisdiction over foreign activity wholly unconnected to the United States. 5
Likewise, under GATT, a World Trade Organization member can argue
that the Helms-Burton Act impermissibly burdens freedom of trade.-"
Thus, the above mentioned provisions provide viable arguments against the
Helms-Burton Act.
The problem with these arguments is that the agreements from
which they were taken provide exceptions to their application. These
agreements allow member countries to withdraw a dispute or simply not
abide by the agreement in the interest of national security, and in the
interest of preserving sovereignty.59 That is, the United States need not
uphold its commitment to either document, where a national security
interest in not doing so exists. Though many would disagree,60 the United
States continues to brand the Cuban government as a threat to national
security.61 The United States justifies its claim of national security against
55. There are other avenues for attack under NAFTA and/or GATlr which have been
recently explored. The following is a brief recapitulation of those arguments: first, under
NAFTA, a member country can argue that the Act maintains a prohibition or restriction on the
importation of a foreign good that touched Cuban soil in violation of article 309(1); second,
under GATT, a member country can argue that the Act violates Articles I;III, V, XI, and XII
because it interferes with a foreign company's sourcing of raw materials; but more specifically,
under GATT, a member country can argue that the Helms-Burton discriminates against 'like
products' in violation of article 1 (1). See Brian J.Welke, Comment, GAIT and NAFTA v. The
Helms-Burton Act: Has the United States Violated MultilateralAgreements?, 4 TULSA J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 361, 366-9 (Spring 1997).
56. See Bachman, supra note 54, at C3.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. The so called national security exception for NAFTA is located in Chapter 21, Article
2102 which states that: "[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed ... to prevent any party
from taking any actions that it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests ...

taken [for an] emergency in international relations .

. . ."

See Welke, supra note

55, at n. 99. NAFTA's counterpart, GATr, has a similar provision in Article XXI. Id. at 376.
60. See ADOLFO LEYVA DE VARONA, Ph.D., PROPAGANDA AND REALITY: A LOOK AT
THE U.S. EMBARGO AGAINST CASTRO'S CUBA (Canf 1994) [hereinafter PROPAGANDA] (noting

the author's response to the argument that Cuba fails to present a national security threat to the
United States).
61. Id.
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Cuba on the following: 1) their antagonistic history; 2) their geographic
proximity; and 3) their pending economic interests.2 Since the above
mentioned agreements do not define national security, the use of this
exception leaves the door wide open for its continual use to evade their
provisions." Thus, the United States application of the Helms-Burton Act
is not inconsistent with domestic law.
2. Invalidity Internationally?
International criticism against the Helms-Burton Act revolves
around the following three arguments: first, that the Helms-Burton Act
interferes with state sovereignty; second, that the Helms-Burton Act
represents an impermissible secondary boycott against United States trade
allies; and third, that the United States has no justification to implement the
Helms-Burton Act to actions occurring outside its borders.6 Although the
above arguments seem compelling at first glance, they are fundamentally
flawed because they insist on disregarding the United States' position on
Cuba from its analysis. For that reason, the following paragraphs will
explicate the validity of the above mentioned arguments in light of the
United States' justifications in pursuing implementation of the HelmsBurton Act.
a. Interference with State Sovereignty
The first argument against the international invalidity of the
Helms-Burton Act rests on its alleged interference on state sovereignty.
The concept of sovereignty is memorialized under article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter which states that: "All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or the use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." ' Other than a
'threat' or a 'use of force,' a state victim of a violation of an international
obligation by another state may use unilateral measures, though unlawful,
only where: necessary to end the violation or the injury, or to remedy the

62.

CARLOS ALZUGARAY TRETO, PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE CUBAN-

U.S. HISTORIC BREACH, IN U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS IN THE 1990'S, 90-93 (Westview Press

1989) (citing to the numerous national security themes that shaped the United States and Cuban
conflict); see also PROPAGANDA, supra note 60 (noting the current United States national
security concerns in Cuba).
63. See Welke, supra note 59, at 376.
64. W. Fletcher Fairey, Comment, The Helms-Burton Act: The Effect of International
Law on Domestic Implementation, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1289, 1312-21 (Apr. 1997).
65. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
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violation; and proportional to the violation and the injury suffered."6 Since,
the Helms-Burton Act represents neither a 'threat' nor a 'use of force,' the
international validity of its application rests solely on the necessity and
proportionality of said measure to the injury.67 Thus, whether the HelmsBurton Act's interference on state sovereignty violates international law
depends on the magnitude of the injury suffered by the United States.
United States nationals suffered serious financial loss as a result of
the Cuban nationalizations in 1960.61 Under international law, a state is
responsible for any injury resulting from a taking of property owned by a
national of another state, unless: it is taken for a public purpose; is not
discriminatory; or is accompanied by just compensation. 6 Cuba arbitrarily
confiscated property owned by United States nationals without providing
just compensation in violation of international law.70 Although the
confiscations provided for payment to the aggrieved parties, the terms of
payment have never been fulfilled by the Castro regime." Moreover, the
properties were not taken for a public purpose because the record shows
Castro's intent to expropriate was to affront the United States.7 Since
Cuba continues to owe an international obligation to United States
nationals, unilateral measures from the United States are permissible to
remedy the injury or violation." Thus, in light of the facts, the minimal
interference with state sovereignty, if any, caused by the Helms-Burton
Act is permissible under international law.

66.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §905 (1)(a-b),

(2), cmt. a (1987).

67. Id.
68.

"When Castro nationalized Cuba in 1960, several U.S. companies were forced out.

At the time, the United States was doing more than $500 million in business with Cuba (about
$2.5 billion in 1994 dollars)." Cuba Scouting for Investors, USA TODAY, Dec. 27, 1994, at 6B.
The following United States' companies lost millions: International Telephone and Telegraph
$131, Moa Bay Mining $88.3, American Sugar $71.6, Texaco $51.0, Bangor Punta $39.2,
Nicaro Nickel $33.0, Coca-Cola $27.5, Lone Star Cement $24.8, Colgate-Palmolive $14.4, etc.
Id. The value of the claims registered with the United States Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission is $1,851,057,358 (at a present compensable value of $13,051,845,500). John
Smagula, Redirecting Focus: Justifying the U.S. Embargo Against Cuba and Resolving the
Stalemate, 21 N.C.J. INT'L & COM. REG. 66, 68 (Fall 1995).
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §712 (1987)
[hereinafter THIRD § 712].
70. See Smagula, supra note 68, at 72-74.
71. Id. at note 55 (noting that the Castro regime's actions at the time demonstrated its lack
of intent toward providing compensation for the expropriated properties).
72. Id.
73. Id.

1270

ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law

[Vol. 4:1259

b. A Secondary Boycott on U.S. Trade Allies
The second argument against the Helms-Burton Act internationally
is that it simulates an impermissible secondary boycott on United States
trade allies. To determine the validity of this argument, the query turns to
the strict definition of a secondary boycott taken from federal labor law.
"A secondary boycott is any combination [of acts] if its purpose and effect
are to coerce customers or patrons, or through fear or loss ... to withhold
or withdraw their business relations from [an] employer under attack. "14 In
comparing the above definition to the Helms-Burton Act, there is merit to
the argument that said Act 'in intent and probably in effect' is a classical
secondary boycott." The validity of said argument stems from the HelmsBurton Act's stated purpose aimed at discouraging foreign investment in
76
Cuba by threatening to subject investors to litigation in the United States.
However, by virtue of the above mentioned definition, the Helms-Burton
Act does not operate as a secondary boycott because it does not directly
coerce foreign investors outright from doing business with Cuba." Since
the Title III merely discourages foreign investment in the island, the
argument that the Helms-Burton Act is a secondary boycott on United
States trade allies is likewise unconvincing.
c. Lack of Jurisdictionand Reasonableness
The last argument against the Helms-Burton Act, discussed here,
is that its extraterritorial jurisdiction is wholly unjustified and, in the
alternative, unreasonable under international law. Title III of the HelmsBurton Act is United States law geared at proscribing foreign investment in
Cuba. In order for the United States to exercise jurisdiction over acts of
non-nationals outside its territory, it must first be justified to do so under
international law. 8 Since the conduct proscribed by the Helms-Burton Act

74. Wright v. Teamsters' Union Local No.690, 33 Wash. 2d 905, 207 P.2d 662, 665
(1949). The term refers to refusal to work for, purchase from or handle products of an employer
with whom the union has no dispute with object of forcing that employer to stop doing business
with another employer with whom union does have a dispute. C. Cornelia, Inc. v. United Farm
Workers Organizing Committee, 33 Ohio App. 2d 61, 292 N.E.2d 647, 656 (1976).
75. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L
L. 419, 429 (July 1996).
76. See generally Helms-Burton, supra note 1, Title III.
77. See Lowenfeld, supra note 75, at 430. But, even if Title III of the Helms-Burton Act
represented a secondary boycott on United States Trade allies, such would not be a per se
violation of international law. See Fairey, supra note 64, at 1314.
78. International law recognizes five basis for prescriptive jurisdiction: nationality,
territoriality, universality, protective principle and passive personality. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §402, cmt. a (1987).

1998]

Pifia

1271

occurs outside United States territory by non-nationals, neither the
territoriality, nor the nationality principles can provide a valid
justification. 9 However, section 402 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations provides one justification that allows prescription of conduct of
non-nationals outside United States borders, where said conduct has direct
effects inside the United States--the direct effects doctrine. 0 With regards
to the Helms-Burton Act, the fact that non-nationals are trafficking in the
confiscated properties has intentional and substantial effects on United
States nationals who possess claims to those properties within the United
States.81 Thus, the prescriptive jurisdiction of the Helms-Burton Act is
justified.
However, "[e]ven when one of the bases for jurisdiction under
§402 is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law...
when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable."8 2 Although critics
argue that the Helms-Burton Act will not meet any of the reasonableness
factors, the following arguments demonstrate the contrary.83 First, there
are substantial economic connections between the United States and the
traffickers, to wit--the tainted property.8 ' Second, implementation of the
Helms-Burton Act to stop foreign investment in the island is necessary to
protect U.S. nationals' property claims.85 Third, the Helms-Burton Act is
important to the international system in that it aids in terminating the last
79. Id. at cmt(s) c & e.
80. Id. at cmt. d.
81. See DeFalco, supra note 12.
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(1)
(1987). The factors used to determine reasonableness of prescriptive jurisdiction are:
a. the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state;
b. the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity between the
regulating state and the individuals regulated;
c.
the character of the activity to be regulated;
d. the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation;
e.
the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic
system;
f.
the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international
system;
g. the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and
h. the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id. at (2)(a-h) , cmt b. (noting that not all factors are given the same importance in all
situations).
83. See Fairey, supra note, 64 at 1318.
84. RESTATEMENT, supra note 82, § 403 (2)(b).
85. Id.§ (2)(c).
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bastion of communism in the Western world." Fourth, implementation of
the Helms-Burton Act is consistent with the international tradition, which
permit unilateral measures to counteract the breach of an international
obligation.7 Lastly, no other state is interested in regulating foreign
investment in Cuba other than the United States." Thus, the Helms-Burton
Act does not inhere international requirements for the valid exercise of
jurisdiction abroad.

IV. TRADE WAR LOOMING?
Vestiges of the controversy that would befall the Helms-Burton Act
were evident since the Helms-Burton Act's presentment in Congress."
However, the best record of the stark opposition to the Helms-Burton Act
appears in the Congressional Record of the floor debates on House
Resolution 370.90 The arguments posed against the Helms-Burton Act
therein include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) Castro will not
be hurt by this legislation; (2) the Helms-Burton Act weakens the United
States ability to encourage democracy in Cuba; (3) the economic embargo
against Cuba will not hasten the end of the Castro regime; (4) there is no
indication that the Cuban economy is on the brink of collapse; (5) the
Helms-Burton Act denies the President the flexibility to respond to a
democratic transition in Cuba; (6) the Helms-Burton Act coerces United
States trade allies to join in the Cuban embargo at the risk of retaliation;
and (7) the Helms-Burton Act subverts United States national interest for a
select few. 91 While these arguments failed to block the Helms-Burton Act's
enactment, they set the stage for the struggle to end the Helms-Burton Act
in a different forum--the international arena.
A. Waging an InternationalTrade War
Scholars predict that a different threat, not involving the military
or saving human lives, grows near: an international trade war.' The cause
of this new form of engagement is not oppression, communism, or
freedom; but, rather a United States law sought to proscribe the conduct of

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. § (2)(e).
Id. § (2)(f).
Id. § (2)(g).
See Bill Tracking, H.R. 927, Oct. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
See Conference Report, supra note 2, at H1725.
Id.
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non-nationals outside United States borders called the Helms-Burton Act.92
Although application of said law to conduct outside United States territory
is not inconsistent with international law,91 the affected countries are
likewise permitted to use unilateral measures to counteract the HelmsBurton Act's unruly provisions." These measures, if taken, could have
numerous repercussions on trade relations between the United States and
up to seventeen countries in the world (including Canada and Mexico)."
One aspect of the potential repercussions involving the seven most
industrialized countries in the world as a result of the Helms-Burton Act,
has already taken hold by virtue of the threats announced by Canada, the
European Union and Mexico.' 6 Thus, it is to the effectiveness of these
threats that this paper turns to next.
B. Threatened Sanctionsfrom Canada, EU, and Mexico
Enactment of the controversial Helms-Burton Act sparked serious
criticism. Chief among the protesters are Canada, Mexico, and the
European Union, whose corporate citizens, incidentally, are the major
traffickers in the tainted property.Y7 These governments have denounced
the Helms-Burton Act as being an invalid use of extraterritorial jurisdiction
and as launching a direct attack at their nations' sovereignty."
Consequently, these countries have launched a concerted attack against the
Helms-Burton Act to prevent its implementation." The question here
becomes, whether the pressure from these countries, in and of itself, is
sufficient to compel the United States to modify and/or amend the HelmsBurton Act to exclude the controversial provisions delineated in Part III
above. In answering the above query, however; a threshold analysis into
each country's plan of attack against the Helms-Burton Act is merited.

92. Antonio Paneque Brizuelas, 1Se aboca el mundo hacia una guerra comercial?,
GRANMA INT'L (visited July 25, 1995) <http://www.cubanet.cu/granma/j unio/4junle.html >.

93. See supra Part III(B)(2)(c).
94. See supra Part III(B)(2)(a) (noting the same analysis applies to the retaliating countries
since the Helms-Burton Act, if implemented, will injure their respective citizens alike).
95. See Brizuelas, supra note 92.
96. See generally EU, supra note 7; see CanadianInvestors, supra note 7; and also, Red
Herring?, supra note 7.
97. See generally Conference Report, supra note 2 at H1724-04.
98. Id. at H1730.
99. See generally EU, supra note 7; see CanadianInvestors, supra note 7; Red Herring?,
supra note 7.
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1. Canada
Canada, Cuba's largest foreign investor, vigorously opposed the
Helms-Burton Act from its inception. ' ®
0 In the interest of protecting its
corporate citizens, Canada drafted and introduced a bill to counteract the
Helms-Burton Act's implementation." °0

Canada's Trade Minister, Art

Eggleton, described the Canadian bill as 'antidote legislation."2 The
Canadian bill strikes back at the United States anti-trade legislation by
providing the following measures: refusing to recognize the HelmsBurton; ignoring any court rulings issued in accordance with the HelmsBurton Act; allowing Canadian firms to countersue Canadian subsidiaries
of American firms; and allowing the Canadian government to fine
Canadian firms that succumb to the Helms-Burton Act's provisions. 03 As
Mr. Eggleton repeats the threat he advises: "If the President of the United
States does not proceed with the implementation of the Helms-Burton Act,
then our companies won't need this...

."1

Thus, at this venture,

Canada's threats do not seem at all vain.
2. European Union
The European Union, on the other hand, has encountered more
difficulty in moving up to speed in introducing an 'antidote' to the HelmsBurton Act like their Canadian counterparts. The only draft for an antiboycott measure against United States extraterritorial sanctions, such as the
Helms-Burton Act, failed to pass the Council of Ministers last October.' °
The regulation was unable to procure a unanimous approval from the
member states.' °0 The most recent measure taken by the European Union,
in conjunction with Canada and Mexico, is to file a complaint in the World
Trade Organization to set up a dispute settlement panel to discuss
violations to GATT and NAFTA by the Helms-Burton Act. 1w After a
previous rejection, the United States accepted the creation of a panel to

100. Canada Introduces Anti Helms-Burton Legislation, REUTERS FIN. SERV. (Sept. 16,
1996) [hereinafter Canadian Bill]; Bill Would Protect Firms From Helms-Burton Law, THE
RECORD, Sept. 17, 1996, at B08.
101. CanadianBill, supra note 100.
102. Id.
103. d.
104. Id.
105. EU/US: Commission Plays Down Danish Snag on Anti Helms-Burton Move, EUR.
INFO. SERV. (Oct. 27, 1996).
106. Id.
107. See infra note 114.
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investigate the legality of the Helms-Burton Act.Im Thus, the European
Union is also a strong contender to the Helms-Burton Act and any sanction
implemented by the Council of Ministers will not be taken lightly.
3. Mexico
Of the three opponents to Helms-Burton Act, Mexico is the
weakest and least involved. The most Mexico has done, besides making
several denunciations, is to participate in the complaint to the World Trade
Organization with Canada and the European Union.""9 Although Mexico
has not been actively involved in creating an 'antidote' to the HelmsBurton Act, it is an avid supporter of the Cuban theme in the Organization
of American States (OAS)." 0 In the last OAS convention on June 5, 1996,
every member, except the United States, voted on a resolution to submit
the Helms-Burton Act to a judicial committee to determine its validity in
international law.", Other than Mexico's participation in the latter two
events, the Mexican government has done nothing more than ride on the
coattails of Canada and the European Union."12 Furthermore, Mexico has
never directly attacked the United States or threatened to retaliate, other
than protest the illegality of the Helms-Burton Act."13 Thus, Mexico
remains the 'jack in the box' as to precisely what measures, if any, it will
employ against the Helms-Burton Act.
V. DUBIOUS U.S. COMPROMISE TO CHANGE THE ACT
The magnitude of the controversy surrounding the Helms-Burton
Act does not end with each of the foregoing countries' individual plan(s)
for retaliation. As discussed supra Part III(B)(1), there are other concerted
measures that can achieve more effective results such as instituting a World
Trade Organization (WTO) complaint against the Helms-Burton Act.'
Both Canada and the European Union have actively sought to attack the

108. See Solis, supra note 50, at 734.
109. William Willits, Mexico's Zedillo Denounces U.S. Anti-Cuban Sanctions, LATINO
LINK (June 11, 1996); David Perez, Mexico, Canada Prep to Defy Helms-Burton, WORKERS
WORLD NEWS SERV. (Jun. 27, 1996).
110. Fernando Martinez, Reves en la OEA a la Helnu-Burton, LA JORNADA, June 5, 1996.
111. OAS Condemns Helms-Burton, LATIN AM. LAW AND BUS. REP. (June 30, 1996)
(noting 32 out of 34 votes in favor--only the United States voted against the resolution, the
Dominican Republic was not present in the vote).
112. See Willits, supra note 109.
113. Id.
114. Canada To Support EU in WTO Panel on Helms-Burton, REUTERS FIN. SERV. (Nov.
21, 1996).
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validity of the Helms-Burton Act beyond its territorial boundaries in
dispute settlement proceedings before the WTO.1'1 This latter measure has
already proven its effectiveness in light of recent pronouncements made by
the United States in lieu of the proceedings.1 6
However, those
pronouncements are suspect, at best, in light of Congress' impediment to
changing the controversial provisions of the Helms-Burton Act."' Thus, to
assess the validity of the United States commitment to the European Union,
a look into the legislation currently proposed in Congress to the Helms-

Burton Act is essential.
Irrespective of the agreement between the European Union and the

United States to suspend the WTO hearings,

the Foreign Affairs

Committee of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress
continues to support legislation aimed at reinforcing the blockade against

Cuba."' Most of the bills Congress passed this past legislative session are
additions and/or modifications to the Helms-Burton Act, aimed at
preempting renewed efforts at debilitating the Act.1" The subversive
nature of the Committee's actions in passing these bills is evident in the
secrecy with which they were carried out; their continued imposition on

115. Id.
116. EU and U.S. Reach Deal on Helms-Burton, WORLD NEWS DIG. (Apr. 17, 1997)
(noting the Clinton administration's promise to seek a change in Helms-Burton that allows the
President to waive Title IV, in return for the suspension of the WTO hearing and the European
Union's commitment to deter European companies from dealing in the tainted properties).
117. Id. As Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Florida) clearly stated, in reaction to
the April 11 accord between the European Union and the United States, "any attempt to change
Helms-Burton 'would be met with stiff resistance in Congress.'" Id.
118. The following legislation passed the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of
Representatives on May 6, 1997 amending the Foreign Policy Reform Act to include:
1. Sec. 308: Withholding U.S, assistance to countries that aid the government of Cuba
2. Sec. 506: Availability of funds for the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(Liberty) Act of 1996 and the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992
3. Sec. 513: Requirements for assistance to the Russian Federation
4. Sec. 577: Withholding of assistance to countries that provide nuclear fuel to Cuba
5. Sec. 705: Assistance to human rights groups in Cuba
6. Sec. 1106: United States Informational, Educational and Cultural Programs
7. Sec. 1261 Reports to Congress concerning Cuban immigration policies
8. See. 1412: Authorities of the Broadcasting Board of Governors
9. Sec. 1705: Reports on determinations under Title IV of the Liberty Act
10. Sec. 1709: Programs or projects of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Cuba
Denunciation of new actions against Cuba in the United States Congress, GRANMA
INT'L, Aug. 21, 1997.
119. Id.
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the administration to submit periodic reports on its policy toward Cuba; the
obvious contradiction to the United States' promise to the European Union
to relax the Helms-Burton Act; and the obvious impediment posed by
supporters of the Helms-Burton Act to change.' 2 The ulterior motive
behind the passage of these bills is to heighten Washington's offensive
toward Cuba by granting Congress increased decision-making over United
States foreign policy with Cuba.' 2' If successful, these actions will
undercut any effort by the Clinton administration to relax the controversial
Thus, in light of Congress'
provisions of the Helms-Burton Act.'2
impediment to change, it is unlikely that the United States will be capable
of keeping its promise to the European Union.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the outcome of the foregoing analysis is that despite the
controversy surrounding the Helms-Burton Act, its end is far from
becoming a reality. While the Clinton administration's promise to the
European Union in lieu of the WTO hearings seemed hopeful, it did not
account for the strong forces in Congress that viciously seek an end to the
Castro regime at all cost. More than likely, when the d6tente between the
European Union and the United States comes due, the Clinton
administration will arrive empty-handed to the bargaining table. And then
what? Will Title III of the Helms-Burton Act ever get implemented? Will
the European Union go forward with its WTO complaint? Will there be a
trade war?
These are questions to which only time can provide answers.
However, the record as presented here strongly suggests that all but the
last question will be answered in the negative. As long as the President
possesses the power to suspend Title III every six months indefinitely, it is
unlikely that the Helms-Burton Act will ever go into effect. Furthermore,
with regards to the European Union and its WTO complaint, there is little
chance that such a measure will succeed in bringing an end to the HelmsBurton Act's controversial provisions. Moreover, the chances of the
European Union, and the border nations of Mexico and Canada, instigating
a commercial trade war against the United States, is slim at best
considering that the American people consume a large part of these
nations' exports; and a trade war against the United States would certainly
backfire on the instigators (considering that said measures would hurt them

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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more). In closing, however, one thing is clear, there is no telling what
will happen to the Helms-Burton Act next.
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I.

INTRODUCCI6N

Desde el momento en que el Acta Por La Libertad Cubana y
Solidaridad Democritica, popularmente conocido como la ley Helms*
Debido al gran debate sobre la lay Helms-Burton, es importante notar que este
comentario solo refleja su desarrollo hasta, e incluiendo, el 27 de Septiembre, 1997.
**
Juris Doctor, el 31 de enero de 1998, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad
Law Center; B.A., abril de 1992, Florida International University, College of Arts and Sciences.

1280

ILSA Journal of Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 4:1279

Burton,' entr6 en el Congreso numero 104 este causo mucha controversia
dom~sticamente e internacionalmente. 2 La mayor parte de la controversia
en torno a la ley Helms-Burton se centr6 en las provisiones contenidas en
el Titulo III y los efectos adversos que semejante politica tendria en los
aliados comerciales de los Estados Unidos.3 No obstante, mediante la
presi6n ejercida por grupos de inter~s,' y la intervenci6n de un poco de
suerte, esta controvertida propuesta fue firmada por el Presidente Clinton
el 12 de marzo de 1996.6 Sin embargo, la poldmica no termino ahi. Desde
entonces se ha intensificado la presi6n a la administraci6n Clinton para que
este insiste al Congreso la modificaci6n de la ley Helms-Burton.' Desde
Europa, como, desde Mjico, y Canadi, a trav~s de las fronteras con
1. Cuban Liberty & Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat.
785 (1996) (codificado en 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6021-91 (1996)) [de aquf en adelante laley HelmsBurton].
2. El grado de lacontroversia que rodea a ia ley Helms-Burton es evidente en las
discusiones del suelo presentadas en elInforme de la Conferencia sobre el Acta por laLibertad
Cubana & la Solidaridad Democrdtica (Libertad) de 1996. Vea 142 CONG. REC. H1724, H172704 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1996) [de aqui en adelante elInforme de la Conferencia].
3. Las preocupaciones que la ley Helms-Burton efectuarfa adversamente a los aliados del
comercio de los Estados Unidos se hizo claro por Sr. Moakley, el sefior de Massachusetts, en el
debate del suelo en la Resoluci6n de la Casa 370 donde 61 hace referencia a la declaraci6n de la
Uni6n Europea leido en el registro. Id. a H1726. En esa declaraci6n, laUni6n Europea
implicitamente ataca el Titulo III de laley Helms-Burton donde declara: "La UE objeta, como
una materia de principio, a esas provisiones que buscan afirmar jurisdicci6n extraterritorial sobre
las cortes Federales de los Estados Unidos sobre las disputas entre los Estados Unidos y las
compafifas extranjeras con respecto a la propiedad desposeida localizadas fuera de su territorio."
Id. a H1731 (notando que elTitulo III es la secci6n de la ley Helms-Burton que proporciona la
antedicha jurisdicci6n sobre las compafifas extranjeras que trafican en las propiedades
confiscadas). (Nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).
4. Id. a H1724-04. El debate en el Congreso sobre el pasaje de la ley Helms-Burton fue
tan profundo, que el Presidente de los Estados Unidos tuvo que intervenir para empujar su
promulgaci6n. Vea Declaracion del Presidente sobre el Acta de Libertad Cubana, mar. 12,
1996, disponible en, 1996 WL 107140.
5. Aunque ir6nico, el acto del goviemo Cubano en tumbar dos aviones civiles
desarmados de los Estados Unidos de tres nacionales y un forastero residente incit6 al Presidente
a firmar el Acta en ley. Id.
6.

Id.
7. EU Steps Up Reactions to U.S. Cuba Law, 8 EUROWATCH, U.S.-EU RELATIONS,
No. 11, Jul. 22, 1996 (citando laamenaza de la Uni6n Europea de imponer sanciones contra los
Estados Unidos si la ley Helms-Burton es implementada)[de aqui en adelante UE]. Some
Canadian Investors to be Barred from United States, CARIBBEAN UPDATE, June 1, 1996
(notando que el Canadd podrfa desquitarse a la aplicaci6n de la ley Helms-Burton y amenaza con
imponer sanciones si dicha ley es implementada) [de aquf en adelante los Inversionistas
Canadienses]. Red Herring?Mexico Defies United States over Cuba, INT'L REP., INC., Jul. 29,
1994, disponible en Westlaw, News Service, IAC File (notando lairritaci6n de Mjico y su
insistencfa que ia ley Helms-Burton viola ley internacional) [de aquf en adelante Red Herring?].
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Estados Unidos, la debacle continua.' Nunca se habfan unido tantos parses
en el pasado para intentar bloquear una sanci6n anti-comercial.
Este Comentario explora la controversia que rodea a la ley HelmsBurton y propone que a pesar de la severa oposici6n, su final estA lejos de
convertirse en una realidad. Los siguientes serin los principales puntos de
discusi6n: la Parte I comienza con una introducci6n de la controversia que
rodea a la ley Helms-Burton; en la Parte II se analizan los eventos que
propiciaron el establecimiento y culminaci6n de la ley Helms-Burton; la
Parte III explica en profundidad la controversia suscitada en torno a
algunas especfficas provisiones de la ley y refuta los numerosos ataques
propuestos a la legalidad de la misma; la Parte IV profundiza en la actual
lucha por llevar la ley Helms-Burton a un final; la Parte V analiza el
potencial del Acta para cambiar dado el impedimento proclamado por el
Congreso; y la Parte VI concluye con la predicci6n de que la poldmica que
rodea la ley Helms-Burton no acabard pronto.
II. FONDO HISTORICO
En la vispera del dia del afio nuevo de 1959, Fidel Castro tom6 el
poder de Cuba y comenz6 un reino de poder que ha durado mis de treinta
y ocho afios. 9 Antes de la llegada de Castro, Estados Unidos jug6 un papel
muy irhportante en la polftica Cubana.10 La imposici6n de la enmienda
Platt, la interferencia tanto armada como politica, y la creciente presencia
anglosajona en la isla, hizo que Estados Unidos se convirtiera en un
jugador significante en la polftica Cubana." Sin embargo, este papel se
acab6 cuando el regimen de Castro expres6 su lealtad hacia el MarxismoLenninismo incrementando sus relaciones con la Uni6n Sovi6tica.' 2 Estos
eventos, junto con las expropiaci6n de todas las pertenencias que tanto
ciudadanos como compafifas americanas tenian en la isla,' 3 condujeron al
8. Id.
9. Vea JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ, To MAKE A WORLD SAFE FOR REVOLUTION 8 (1989); yea
tambi6n Trevor R. Jefferies, The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992: A Rotten Carrot and a Broken
Stick?, 16 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 75, 76 (Fall 1993).
10. Vea Jeffries, supra nota 9, a 76. Desde el momento en que los Espafioles hundieron al
Maine, el envolvimiento de los Estados Unidos en Cuba transcendi6 hasta laeconomfa. JULES R.
BENJAMfN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION, 45 (1990).
Despu~s de la derrota Espafiola en 1898, los Estados Unidos se volvi6 el solo vencedor del

colonialismo Espafiol y la opresi6n, logrando un estado preferido en laisla. Id. a 61.
11.

LoUIS A. PtREZ, JR.,

CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES:

TIES OF SINGLUAR

INTIMACY, XV (1990).
12. David S. DeFalco, Comment, The Cuban Liberty & Democratic Solidarity(Libertad)
Act of 1996: Is the US. Reaching Too Far?,3 J. INT'L. LEGAL STUD. 125, 127 (Winter 1997).
13. En respuesta a laterminaci6n de los Estados Unidos de lacuota de azdicar cubana, Cuba se
desquit6, nacionalizando todas las industrias americanas que quedaban, empresas agrarias, y los bancos.
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establecimiento de un boicot contra Cuba con la f'malidad de estrangular su
economia mediante la eliminaci6n de sus principales fuentes de divisas y
reservas. 4 Ir6nicamente, en lugar de causar el derribamiento del regimen
castrista, esta tensi6n econ6mica produjo un vacio que fue r:pidamente
cubierto por la Uni6n Sovi6tica.'5
Recientemente, con el final de la Guerra Fria como de la ayuda
Sovi&ica, Castro ha vuelto hacia una fuente de fondos diferente--la
inversi6n extranjera." Durante los (iltimos cmnco afios, Cuba ha buscado
vehementemente atraer inversi6n extranjera a la isla, permitiendo a
extranjeros ser propietarios de tierra. 7 Con la modificaci6n de la
Constituci6n Cubana y la promulgaci6n del Acta de Inversiones
Extranjeras, el mercado comercial cubano presenta menos restricciones en
el Area del trabajo dom6stica o en los limites a la inversi6n extranjera.' 8
Vea WAYNE S. SMITH, THE CLOSEST OF ENEMIES 57 (1987).

14. Vea Jefflies, supra nota 9, a 77, Para una historia de las hostilidades entre los Estados
Unidos y Cuba que culmin6 en la creaci6n del embargo, yea Shari Ellen Bourque, Nota, The
Illegality ofthe Cuban Embargo in the Current International System, 133.U. INT'L L. J. 191, 19599 (1995).
15. Elliot Abrams, What are Soviet Intentions In Latin America?, WALL ST. J., 18, 1989,
A7 (notando laestimaci6n del autor que la Uni6n Sovi6tica contribuy6 $5-8 mil millones
anualmente a la economfa Cubana).
16. Vea Falco, supra nota 12, a 130.
17. Octavio Castilla, Cuba: Progress and Prospects, disponible en <http:Ilwww.
santafe.edu/-naminet/naminews/insert /castilla.html>.
18. Id.
19. El excerpto siguiente demuestra la importancia de lainversi6n extranjera a la economfa
Cubana despu&s que la ayuda Sovi6tica a la isla ces6:
En 1993 el PIB de Cuba se habfa caido casi 35 por ciento comparado al del 1989; las
importaciones estaban abajo 75 por ciento .... A finales de 1994, por primera vez en los
(ltimos cinco aflos, la tendencia negativa en crecimiento se invirti6 y un aumento modesto
de .07% se obtuvo. . . . En los primeros nueve meses del afio presente PIB ha crecido
2.3% y, por primera vez en los tiltimos seis aflos, asf que tiene PIB por el habitante. En
general, en cuanto a las exportaciones cubanas ellas crecieron 16% en 1994 y una cifra
similar se espera para 1995. En 1989, el comercio extranjero fue centralizado en una
docena de empresas de estado. Hoy casi 150 entidades nacionales tienen autoridad para
exportar, asi como 200 asociaciones econ6micas de capital. Mis de 630 compaffias de
producci6n extranjera y las de comercio estin registradas para dirigir actividades en Cuba.
Id. (notando que estas figuras son de un artfculo escrito en 1995).
La cita siguiente proporciona un recuento mis reciente de la inversi6n extranjera en
Cuba:
El comercio externo de Canada con Cuba ha crecido desde 1992. Las importaciones de
Cuba han extendido de un bajo de alrededor de EE.UU. $130 mill6n en 1993 a un alto de
EE.UU. $237 mill6n en 1995. Tambi6n, las exportaciones a Cuba han retumbado de un
bajo de aproximadamente EE.UU. $100 mill6n en 1993 a un alto de EE.UU. $203 mill6n
en 1995.
Vea DeFalco, supra nota 12, a n.37.
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Como resultado de los cambios anteriores, la inversi6n, y el comercio
extranjero con Cuba han crecido significativamente.19
Esta (iltima
estrategia financiera por el regimen castrista representa otro desafio al
embargo de 37 aftos. Por lo tanto, el apoyo a la ley Helms-Burton fue
consequencia de la aparente ineficacia del embargo ya que Castro aument6
sus apoyos financieros.
III.
LA LEY HELMS-BURTON
La finalidad de la ley Helms-Burton es la promoci6n de la
democracia en Cuba mediante el cierre de toda viabilidad de subsistencia
econ6mica a la isla. El Acta tiene tres objetivos: potenciar y financiar a
un gobierno de transici6n democrdtico en Cuba, bloquear todas las
inversiones financieras que se filtran al r6gimen de Castro y asegurar que
los nacionales de los Estados Unidos recibirdn una compensaci6n por las
expropiaciones producidas antes de la revoluci6n en 1959.0
Adicionalmente, la ley Helms-Burton, intenta fortalecer el embargo,
prohibiendo financiaci6n indirecta a Cuba, 2' oponi~ndose a la participaci6n
cubana en instituciones financieras internacionales2 y denegando ayuda con
el prop6sito de mantener plantas de energia nuclear. 2 El Tftulo I de la ley
Helms-Burton incluye una lista mis detallada de prohibiciones a otros
pafses en sus relaciones con Cuba.2' El siguiente es un anAlisis detallado de
s6lo las provisiones mds controvertidas de la ley Helms-Burton, Titulo, II,
III, y IV.
A. Provisiones controversiales
El Titulo II enfoca en el establecimiento de un gobierno
democrdtico en Cuba. Este Titulo permite a los Estados Unidos reanudar
las relaciones diplomiticas y financieras con la isla.Y Mas detalladamente,
Estados Unidos restablecerd el comercio, proporcionard ayuda, organizard
esfuerzos internacionales para ayudar a la transici6n y alzar! el embargo,
cuando el Presidente anuncie la existencia de un gobierno de transici6n en
Cuba.1 Sin embargo, la secci6n mds controvertida de este Titulo, secci6n

20. Helms-Burton, supra nota
21. Veaid. §§ 104, 106, 108,
22. Vea id. §§ 104, 106, 108,
23. Veaid. § 111.
24. Veaid. §§ 110-111.
25. Helms-Burton, supra nota
26. Id.

1, §§ 101-116 (codificado en 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6031-46).
109, 111.
111.

1, §§ 201-07 (codificado en 22 U.S.C.A. § § 6061-67).
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207(d)," exige la resoluci6n de las demandas de propiedad en Cuba antes
de poder considerar la existencia de un gobierno elegido democrdticamente.Y
Como resultado de esta secci6n, Cuba queda obligada a
compensar a los ciudadanos americanos antes de poder reanudar las
relaciones diplomiticas con Estados Unidos.?
Asi, el centro de la
controversia contenida en estd secci6n se concentra en el requisito que los
Estados Unidos aprueba al nuevo gobierno y que dicho nuevo gobierno
este dispuesto y sea capaz de cumplir con las demandas pendientes
formuladas por los nacionales de los Estados Unidos antes de que las
relaciones diplomfiticas reanuden.
El Titulo III de la ley Helms-Burton protege las demandas de
reclamaci6n por propriedades en Cuba, proporcionando un remedio civil a
los nacionales de los Estados Unidos que posean certificados de demandas
de reclamaci6n para propiedades en Cuba;3° y concede, a estos
demandantes, una presunci6n que invierte la carga de prueba hacia la parte
demandada. 3' La secci6n 302 del Titulo III afronta directamente a los
inversores extranjeros mediante la inversi6n de la responsabilidad de pagar
las demandas que se ganan desde el gobierno cubano hacia las compamias
que trafican con las propiedades embargadas. 31 Bajo estA secci6n para que
un procedimiento sea considerado oportuno, es necesario que las demandas
de reclamaci6n de propiedades confiscadas sean archivadas y certificadas
inicialmente por la Comisi6n de Liquidaci6n de Demandas Extranjeras bajo
el Acta Internacional de Liquidaci6n de Demandas (ICSA) de 1949.33
Unicamente si la demanda de reclamaci6n de propiedad estA certificada
puede traerse el procedimiento bajo estd secci6n contra una persona,
corporaci6n, agente, o pariente en los Estados Unidos3' De este modo,
distinto a lo que argumentan los oponentes a la ley Helms-Burton,
cualquier Cubano naturalizado no puede traer una demanda de
compensaci6n por traficaren la propiedad confiscada.
Incidentalmente, el Titulo III tambi6n incluye una escapatoria
permitiendo al Presidente de los Estados Unidos suspender la totalidad del
Titulo si existe un inter6s de seguridad nacional o si se establece un
27. Id. § 207(d).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Helms-Burton, supra nota 1, §§ 201-07.
31. Id. § 302(b)(2) (notando que la suma de las obligaci6nes se presume de la suma
certificada en el pleito).
32. Id.
33. Vea generalmente Helms-Burton, supra nota 1, Tftulo II.
34.

Id.
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gobierno de transici6n en Cuba. La secci6n 306 otorga al Presidente poder
para posponer la implementaci6n de este Titulo por seis meses."
Adicionalmente, esta secci6n permite al Presidente seguir suspendiendo la
implementaci6n del Titulo III por intervalos de seis mesas de manera
indefmida. 6 El inico requisito para la suspensi6n del Titulo III es que el
Presidente informe por escrito al Congreso al menos 15 dias antes de la
fecha efectiva de cada suspensi6n adicional.1
Las suspenciones son
permitidas tanto por motivos de seguridad nacional como para acelerar el
establecimiento de un gobierno de transici6n en Cuba." Mientras estas
suspensiones estdn en vigor, no podri formularse ninguna demanda de
reclamaci6n de propiedad.11 Sin embargo, la suspensi6n no afectari a los
procedimientos pendientes.40 El Presidente de los Estados Unidos ha
utilizado estA secci6n bastante, suspendiendo la implementacion del Titulo
III tres veces desde que la ley Helms-Burton se promulg6."
La otra provisi6n controvertida de la ley Helms-Burton, Titulo IV,
trata sobre la exclusi6n del territorio de los Estados Unidos a los
extranjeros que trafican con propiedades confiscadas.12 La secci6n 401 de
este Titulo establece las bases para la exclusi6n de una persona que "ha
confiscado o dirigido o supervisado la confiscaci6n de . . . propiedad [de
quien las demandas provienen de] poseida por nacionales de los'Estados
Unidos;" quienes trafican con propiedades confiscadas; quidn sea directivo
en una corporaci6n, "o accionista con control de cualquier entidad envuelta
en dicho trAfico; o quidn es un esposo, o nifto menor de edad, o un agente
de una persona suceptible a ser excluidas de acuerdo con" las categorias
precedientes. 3 Sin embargo, dichas provisiones no pueden tomar efecto
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
aplacar a

Helms-Burton, supra nota 1, §§ 306(b)(1)(a).
id. § 306(b)(1)(a).
Id.
Helms-Burton, supra nota 1, §§ 301-06.
Id.
Id. § 306(c)(3).
El Presidente Clinton continda suspendiendo el Titulo III de la ley Helms-Burton para
los aliados de los Estados Unidos. Carol Giacomo, Caught in Vise on Cuba, Clinton

Pleases No One, REuTERs N. AM. WIRE, Jul. 16, 1996, disponible en LEXIS, Biblioteca de las

Noticias, el Archivo Mundial (notando la primera suspensi6n del Titulo III); tambin vea, Urgent
Clinton Announces Decision to Prolong Helms-Burton Freeze, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 3,
1997 disponible en LEXIS, Biblioteca de las Noticias, el Archivo Mundial (notando ia segunda

suspensi6n de Clinton de Tftulo III); y yea Edwin D. Williamson, ProtectingEveryone's Right to
Property, THE WASH. TIMES, Jul. 11, 1997, a A21 (notando la tercera suspensi6n del Tftulo III

de la ley Helms-Burton como resultado del acuerdo entre los Estados Unidos y la Uni6n Europea
el 1I de abril para proteger la inversi6n y inhibir adquisici6n futura de propiedad desposeida).
42. Helms-Burton, supra nota 1, § 401 (codificado en 22 U.S.C.A. § 6091).
43. Id. § 401(a)(1)-(4) (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
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contra una persona que entra en el pais por una raz6n m6dica o con el
prop6sito de transferir titulo a la propiedad corrompida." Por lo tanto, el
Titulo IV excluye de entrar en los Estados Unidos a las familias de los
traficantes asi como a cualquier persona marginalmente envuelta con la
transacci6n.
B. Legalidad Cuestionable de la Ley Helms-Burton
La legalidad de la ley Helms-Burton ha sido atacada desde sus
inicios por aqu6llos que abogan acabar con una ley mala. Sin embargo,
,Es la ley Helms-Burton realmente una ley mala, o solo una ley altamente
criticada que estA totalmente justificada del punto de vista de los Estados
Unidos? Los argumentos planteados contra la ley Helms-Burton descansan
sobre dos pilares: 1) su inconsistencia con respecto a la ley dom6stica de
los Estados Unidos y, 2) su violaci6n de la ley internacional.'4
El
argumento que descansa sobre el primer pilar sostiene que la ley HelmsBurton es contraria a ciertos acuerdos firmados por los Estados Unidos
para promoci6n de la libertad de comercio." El argumento que descansa
sobre el segundo pilar sostiene que la ley Helms-Burton infringe la ley
internacional porque impide la soberania estatal, representa un segundo
boicot, y estA totalmente injustificada.4 1
Estos argumentos, aunque
justamente hechos, no consideran las justificaciones de los Estados
Unidos.48 Los siguientes pdrrafos, cuestionan la validez de dichos
argumentos tomando en cuenta las justificaciones de los Estados Unidos.
1. LExiste Inconsistencia con la Ley Dom6stica?
La ley Helms-Burton ostensiblemente viola ciertos acuerdos
multilaterales de los cuales los Estados Unidos es parte que estAn disefiados
para la promoci6n de la libertad comercial dentro de la esfera
internacional. Entre los mis notables de esos acuerdos estdn: el Acuerdo
de Comercio Libre Norteamericano (NAFTA) y el Acuerdo General en los
Aranceles y Comercio (GATT).4 9 Estos acuerdos son usualmente utilizados

44. Id. §401(c).
45. Vea Bourque, supra nota 14, a las 207-11.
46. Vea generalmenteinfra nota 49 (citando GAT'T & NAFTA como posible avenidas para
llevar un ataque en cortes dom6sticas contra la ley Helms-Burton).
47. Carta Constitucional de las Naciones Unidas art. 2, para 7.
48. Vea infra la Parte III B(2)(c).
49. El Acuerdo de Comercio Libre Norteamericano, Dec. 17,. 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 296, 297-456 & 605-800 [de aqui en adelante NAFTA], General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [de aqui en
adelante GATT 1947].
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por los detractores de la legislaci6n de anti-comercio para sefialar que
Estados Unidos no puede crear leyes como la ley Helms-Burton.w Sin
embargo, 6stos acuerdos s6lo pueden proporcionar causa para una acci6n
dom~stica si son ejecutables por si mismos o si tienen legislaci6n que deba
implementarse.' Aqui, ambos acuerdos han sido implementados a travs
de la via rdpida,2 aunque no enteramente 3 De este modo, ambos
acuerdos proveen vias viables a trav6s de las cuales los estados miembros
pueden atacar la legalidad de la ley Helms-Burton.
NAFTA-o los paises miembros de la Organizaci6n de Comercio
Mundial pueden, en procedimientos de resoluci6n de convenio en disputa,
alegar que la ley Helms-Burton viola algunas de las provisiones del
NAFTA o del GATT.Y Los siguientes son solo un adelanto de algunos de
los argumentos para cualquiera de los dos convenios."5 Primero, un pais
miembro de NAFTA puede sostener que el Tftulo III de la ley HelmsBurton contradice NAFTA articulo 1105, el cual exige que los paises de la
NAFTA se atengan a la ley internacional cuando traten con inversiones de
un nacional de otro pais perteneciente a la NAFTA.5 Adicionalmente, un
pais miembro de la NAFTA podria argumentar que el Titulo III de la ley
Helms-Burton infringe el articulo 1105 por carecer de justificaci6n el
ejercicio de jurisdicci6n sobre una actividad extranjera totalmente

50. Anthony M. Solis, Comment, The Long Arm of U.S. Law: The Helms-Burton Act, 19
LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 709, 732-36 (Apr. 1997).
51.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §111 (1985) [de
TERCERO § 111].

aqui en adelante

52. Vea 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2111-12, 2191-93 (1988), reimprimido en Samuel C.
Straight, Nota, GATFy NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement and the Sovereingly of the
Fifty States, 45 DuKE L.J. 216, n. 121 (Oct. 1995) (notando que Fast Track se utiliza para llevar
a cabo acuerdos internacionales, no autoejecutables, como sea necesario).
53. Id.
54. NAFTA, supra nota 49, art. 1105 (1); tambi~n vea Kenneth L. Bachman, Anti-Cuban
Sanctions May Violate NAFTA, GATT, NAT'L L. J. C3 (Mar. 11, 1996) [de aqui en adelante
Bachman].
55. Hay otras avenidas para el ataque bajo NAFTA y/o GATT que se han explorado
recientemente. Lo siguiente es una recapitulaci6n breve de esos argumentos: primero, bajo
NAFTA, un pais miembro puede defender que la ley mantiene una prohibici6n o restricci6n en la
importaci6n de un extranjero que toca tierra cubana en violaci6n de articulo 309(1); segundo,
bajo GATr, un pals del miembro puede defender que la ley viola los Articulos 1, III, V, XI, y
XII porque interfiere con los recuros de las compafifas extranjeros de materiales crudos; pero
mis especificamente, bajo GATT, un pals miembro puede defender que la ley Helms-Burton
discrimina en contra de 'productos similares' en violaci6n del artfculo 1 (1). Vea Brian J. Welke,
Comment, GATT and NAFTA v. The Helms-Burton Act: Has the United States Violated
MulitilateralAgreements?,4 TULSA J. COMP. & INTL L. 361, 366-9 (Spring 1997).
56. Vea Bachman, supra nota 54, a C3.
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Igualmente, bajo el GATT, un

miembro de la Organizacion del Comercio Mundial podria argumentar que
la ley Helms-Burton dificulta impermisiblemente la libertad de comercio.
Asi pues, las provisiones mencionadas arriba, proporcionan argumentos
viables contra la ley Helms-Burton.
El problema de estos argumentos es que los acuerdos en los que se
basan establecen excepciones a su aplicaci6n. Estos acuerdos permiten los
estados miembros retractarse en caso de disputa o simplemente no atenerse
a lo establecido en el convenio en inter6s de la seguridad nacional y en
inter6s de la preservaci6n de soberanias 9 Es decir, los Estados Unidos no
necesita sostener sus compromisos en cualquiera de estos dos documentos
cuando exista un interes de seguridad nacional. Aunque muchos no
estarian en desacuerdo,60 Estados Unidos continta marcando al gobierno
cubano como una amenaza a la seguridad nacional.61 Estados Unidos
justifica su demanda de seguridad nacional en lo siguiente: 1) su historia
antag6nica; 2) su proximidad geogrifica; y 3) sus intereses econ6micos
pendientes.6
Dado que los acuerdos anteriormente mencionados no
def'men seguridad nacional, el uso de esta excepci6n deja la puerta
ampliamente abierta para con su uso continuado evadir sus provisiones. 6
De este modo, la aplicaci6n de los Estados Unidos de la ley Helms-Burton
no es incongruente con la ley dom6stica.

57. Id.

58. Id.
59. La excepci6n de la seguridad nacional para NAFTA se localiza en Capftulo 21,
Artfculo 2102 qu6 dice: "Nada en este Acuerdo ser- interpretado . . . como impedir a cualquier
parte tomar cualquier acci6n que considera necesario para una protecci6n de sus intereses de
seguridad esenciales . . . tornado [para una] la emergencia en relaciones internacionales ....
Vea Welke, supra nota 55, a n. 99. El colega de NAFTA, GAT7, tiene una provisi6n similar en
el Artfculo XXI. Id. a 376. (Nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
60. Vea ADOLFO LEYVA DE VARONA, Ph.D., PROPAGANDA AND REALITY: A LOOK AT
THE U.S. EMBARGO AGAINST CASTRO'S CUBA (Canf 1994) [de aqui en adelante PROPAGANDA]
(notando la contestaci6n del Autor al argumento que Cuba no presenta una amenaza de seguridad
nacional a los Estados Unidos).
61. Id.
62.

CARLOS ALZUGARAY TRETO, PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE CUBAN-

U.S. HISTORIC BREACH, IN U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS IN THE 1900'S, 90-3 (West view Press
1989) (citando a los numerosos temas de seguridad nacionales que formaron los Estados Unidos
y conflicto cubano); tambign yea PROPAGANDA, supra nota 60 (notando las preocupaciones
actuales de los Estados Unidos sobre la seguridad nacional en Cuba).,
63. Vea Welke, supra nota 59, a 376.
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2. LInvalidez Internacionalmente?
La critica internacional contra la ley Helms-Burton gira en tomo a
los siguientes tres puntos: primero, la ley Helms-Burton interfiere con la
soberania estatal; segundo, que la ley Helms-Burton representa un boicot
secundario impermisible contra los aliados comerciales de Estados Unidos;
y tercero, que Estados Unidos no tiene ninguna justificaci6n para
implementar las provisiones de la ley Helms-Burton a actos que ocurren
fuera de sus fronteras." Aunque a primera vista estos argumentos parecen
ser convincentes, decaen porque insisten en desatender en su anAlisis la
posici6n de Estados Unidos sobre Cuba. Por esta raz6n, los siguientes
pdrrafos explicaran la validez de los mencionados argumentos tomando en
cuenta las justificaciones de los Estados Unidos en seguir con la
implementaci6n de la ley Helms-Burton.
a. Interferencia con la SoberaniaEstatal
El primer argumento contra la invalidez internacional de la ley
Helms-Burton descansa en su alegada interferencia con la soberania estatal.
El concepto de soberania es conmemorado bajo el articulo 2(4) de la Carta
de Las Naciones Unidas: "Todos los miembros se abstendr.n en sus
relaciones internacionales de amenazar o de usar la fuerza contra la
integridad territorial o la independencia politica de cualquier estado o en
cualquier forma inconsecuente con los Prop6sitos de las Naciones
Unidas."61 Fuera de amenazar o de usar lafuerza, el estado victima de la
violaci6n de una obligaci6n internacional por parte de otro estado puede
utilizar. medidas unilaterales, aunque sean ilicitas, s6lo cuando: sea
necesario para acabar con la violaci6n o lesi6n sufrida." Dado que la ley
Helms-Burton no representa ni una amenaza, ni un uso de fuerza, la
validez internacional de su aplicaci6n descansa solamente en la necesidad y
en la proporcionalidad de dicha medidas a la lesi6n.67 De este modo, si la
aplicaci6n de la ley Helms-Burton interfiere con la soberania estatal o no
depende en la magnitud de la lesi6n sufrida por los Estados Unidos.
Los nacionales de los Estados Unidos sufrieron grandes Prdidas
financieras como resultado de las nacionalizaciones de 1960.6 Bajo la ley
64. W. Fletcher Fairey, Comment, The Helms-Burton Act: The Effect of InternationalLaw
on Domestic Implementation, 46 Am. U. L. REv. 1289, 1312-21 (Apr. 1997).
65. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4) (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §905 (1)(A-B),
(2), CMT. a (1987).

67. Id.
68. "Cuando Cuba fue nacionalizada en 1960, varias compafiias americanas fueron
forzadas a abandonar la isla. En ese momento, los Estados Unidos estaba haciendo mis de $500
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internacional, un estado es responsable por cualquier dafto que resulta de la
expropriaci6n de propiedades poseidas por un nacional de otro estado
miembro una toma de propiedad, la cual es poseida por un nacional de otro
estado miembro salvo que: sean expropriadas para un uso piblico; no sea
discriminatoria o que se acompafie de una compensaci6n justa.6 9 Cuba
confisc6 arbitrariamente propiedades poseidas por nacionales de los
Estados Unidos sin ofrecer una compensaci6n justa por su violaci6n a la
ley internacional.70 Aunque las confiscaciones establecian pagos para las
partes afectadas, los t6rminos de pago nunca han sido cumplidos por el
r6gimen castrista. 7 1 Por otra parte, las propiedades no fueron expropiadas
para destinarlas a un uso ptiblico, ya que los registros muestran que el
motivo de la expropriaci6n era enfrentar a los Estados Unidos. 2 Ya que
Cuba continda debiendo una obligaci6n internacional a los nacionales de
los Estados Unidos, las medidas unilaterales de los Estados Unidos son
acceptables para remediar la lesi6n o violaci6n.71 De este modo, en vista
de los hechos aqui presentes, la minima interferencia con la soberania
estatal causada por la ley Helms-Burton es permisible bajo la ley
internacional.
b.

Un Boicot Secundario en los Aliados de Comercio de los Estados
Unidos
El segundo argumento internacional contra la ley Helms-Burton es
que simula un boicot secundario impermisible a los aliados comerciales de
los Estados Unidos.
Para determinar la validez de este argumento
debemos acudir a la definici6n especifica de un boicot secundario ofrecida
por la Ley Laboral Federal.
"Un boicot secundario es cualquier
mill6n en negocio con Cuba (sobre $2.5 mil millones en 1994 d6lares)."

Cuba Scouting for

Investorss, USA. TODAY, Dec. 27, 1994, a 6B (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s). Las
.siguientes compafilas de los Estados Unidos representan algunos de los millones perdidos:
International Telephone and Telegraph $131, Moa Bay Mining $88.3, American Sugar $71.6,
Texaco $51.0, Bangor Punta $39.2, Nicaro Nickel $33.0, Coca-Cola $27.5, Lone Star Cement

$24.8, Colgate-Palmolive $14.4, etc., Id. El valor de las demandas registradas con la Comisi6n
de Pago de Demandas Extranjera en los Estados Unidos es $1,851,057,358 (a un valor
indemnizable presente de $13,051,845,500). John Smagula, Redirecting Focus: Justifying the
U.S. Embargo Against Cuba and Resolving the Statement, 21 N.C.J. Int'l & Com. REG. 66, 68
(FALL 1995).

69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §712 (1987) [de
aqui en adelante Tercer tratado §712].
70. Vea Smagula, supra nota 68, a las 72-74.
71.

Id. a nota 55 (notando que las acciones del r6gimen de Castro muestran su intencion de

no proporcionar compensaci6n a los dueflos de las propiedades desposeidas).
72.

Id.

73.

Id.
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combinaci6n [de actos] si sus prop6sitos y efectos son coercer a clientes y
patrocinadores, o a trav6s del miedo o p6rdida . . . detener o retirar sus
relaciones comerciales de [un] patr6n bajo ataque. "74 Contraponiendo
dicha definici6n a la ley Helms-Burton, hay m6rito en el argumento para
decir que el Acta "en intenci6n y probablemente en efecto" es un boicot
secundario clj.sico. 7 La validez de este argumento proviene del prop6sito
de la ley Helms-Burton, el cual, intenta desalentar la inversi6n extranjera
en Cuba amenazando a los inversionistas con litigfo en los Estados
Unidos.76 Sin embargo, por medio de esta definici6n, la ley Helms-Burton
no opera como un boicot secundario porque no coerce directamente a los
inversores extranjeros para no hacer negocios con Cuba." Ya que el Titulo
III solamente desalienta las inversiones extranjeras en la isla, el argumento
de que la ley Helms-Burton es un boicot secundario a los aliados
comerciales de los Estados Unidos es igualmente poco convincente.
c. Falta de Jurisdicci6ny Racionalidad
El tiltimo argumento contra la ley Helms-Burton es que su
jurisdicci6n extraterritorial es totalmente injustificada y, en la alternativa,
irrazonable bajo la ley internacional. El Titulo III de la ley Helms-Burton
es una ley americana destinada a proscribir las inversiones extranjeras en
Cuba. Para que los Estados Unidos puedan ejercer su jurisdicci6n sobre
actos de no nacionales producidos fuera de su territorio, debe
primeramente justificarse bajo la ley internacional.7 1 Ya que la conducta
prohibida por la ley Helms-Burton ocurre fuera del territorio de los
Estados Unidos por individuos que no son nacionales, ni el principio de la
territorialidad ni el de nacionalidad pueden proporcionar una justificaci6n
vdlida.79 Sin embargo, la secci6n 402 del Tratado (Tercero) de Relaciones
74. Wright v. Teamsters' Union Local No. 690, 33 Wash. 2d 905, 207 P.2d 662, 665
(1949) (nota editorial: traducido del Ingles). El tdrmino se refiere a lanegativa para trabajar
para, comprar de o productos manejar de un patr6n con quien la uni6n no tiene ninguna disputa
con objeto de farzar que elpatr6n deje de hacer negocio con otro patr6n con quien la uni6n si
tiene una disputa. C. Comella, Inc. v. United Farm Workers Organizing Committee, 33 Ohio
App. 2d 61, 292 N.E.2d 647, 656 (1976).
75. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 Am. J. INT'L.

L. 419, 429 (JULY 1996). (Nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
76.

Vea generalmente Helms-Burton, supra nota 1, Titulo III.

77.

Vea Lowenfeld, supra nota 75, a 430. Pero, aun cuando el Titulo III la ley Helms-

Burton represente un boicot secundario a los aliados de los Estados Unidos, tal no seria una
violaci6n a la ley internacional. Vea Fairey, supra nota 64 a 1314.
78. La ley internacional reconoce cinco fundamentos para tener jurisdicci6n prescriptiva:
la nacionalidad, territorialidad, universalidad, principio proteccionista, y personalidad pasiva.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 402, cmt. a (1987).

79. Id. a cmt(s) c y e.
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Extranjeras proporciona una justificaci6n que permite prescribir las
conductas de los no nacionales fuera de los Estados Unidos cuando dichas
conductas tienen efectos directos dentro de los Estados Unidos--la doctrina
de efectos directos.Y Con respecto a la ley Helms-Burton, el hecho de que
no nacionales est~n traficando con propiedades confiscadas tiene
intencionados y substanciales efectos sobre los nacionales de los Estados
Unidos que posean demandas de reclamaci6n de propiedad sobre esas
propiedades.1' De este modo la jurisdicci6n prescriptiva de la ley HelmsBurton estA justificada.
Sin embargo, "aun cuando las bases para la jurisdicci6n bajo § 402
estA presente, un estado no puede ejercer jurisdicci6n para prescribir la
ley... cuando el ejercicio de tal jurisdicci6n es irrazonable." 82 Aunque los
crfticos argumentan que la ley Helms-Burton no satisfacerg ninguno de los
factores de racionalidad, los siguientes argumentos muestran lo contrario
Primero, hay sustanciales conexiones econ6micas entre los Estados Unidos
y los traficantes por ejemplo, la propiedad corrompida."' Segundo, en la
implementaci6n de la ley Helms-Burton para detener la inversi6n
extranjera en la isla es necesario proteger las demandas propietarias de los
nacionales de los Estados Unidos.8 1 Tercero, la ley Helms-Burton es
importante al sistema internacional porque ayuda a terminar el tiltimo

80. Id. a cmt. d.
81. Vea DeFalco, supra nota 12.
82.

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(1)

(1987).
(Nota editorial: traducido del Ingles). Los factores usados para determinar la
racionalidad de la jurisdicci6n prescriptiva son:
a.
el eslab6n de la actividad al territorio del estado regulando;
b.
las conexiones, como la nacionalidad, residencia, o la actividad econ6mica
entre el estado regulado y los individuos regulados;
C.
el cardcter de la actividad de ser regulado;
d.
la existencia de expectativas justificadas que podrian protegerse o podrfan
ser lastimadas por la regulaci6n;
e.
la importancia de la regulaci6n al sistema politico, legal, o econ6mico
internacional;
f.
hasta que punto la regulaci6n es consistente con las tradiciones del sistema
internacional;
g.
hasta que punto otro estado puede tener un interds en regular la actividad; y
h.
la probabilidad de conflicto con la regulaci6n de otro estado.
Id. a (2)(a-h), cmt b. (notando que no todos los factores se les da la misma importancia
en todas las situaciones) (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
83. Vea Fairey, supra nota 64, a 1318
84. RESTATEMENT, supra nota 82, 403 (2)(b).
85. Id. § (2)(c).
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baluarte de comunismo en el mundo occidental.M6
Cuarto, la
implementaci6n de la ley Helms-Burton es consistente con la tradici6n
internacional que permite la utilizaci6n de medidas unilaterales para
contrarrestar la violaci6n de una obligaci6n internacionalY Por diltimo,
ningdn otro estado, fuera de los Estados Unidos, est, interesado en regular
las inversi6nes extranjeras en Cuba.u De este modo, la ley Helms-Burton
no inhibe los requisitos internacionales para el ejercicio vdlido de
jurisdicci6n en el extranjero.
IV.

LAMENAZA UNA GUERRA DE COMERCIOS?

Vestigios de la controversia que caeria sobre la ley Helms-Burton
son evidentes desde la presentaci6n del Acta en el Congreso. 9 Sin
embargo, el mejor informe de la severa oposici6n a la ley Helms-Burton
aparece en el Registro del Congreso de los debates en la Resoluci6n 370 de
la Casa de Representantes.90 Los argumentos propuestos en la Resoluci6n
contra el Acta incluyen, pero no se limitan, a lo siguiente: (1) Castro no
serA lastimado por esta legislaci6n; (2) el Acta debilita la capacidad de los
Estados Unidos de fomentar la democracia en Cuba; (3) el embargo
econ6mico contra Cuba no acelerarl el final del r6gimen de Castro; (4) no
hay ninguna indicaci6n que la economia cubana este al borde del colapso;
(5) el Acta le niega al Presidente la flexibilidad para responder a una
transici6n democrftica en Cuba; (6) el Acta coerce a los aliados
comerciales de los Estados Unidos para que se unan al embargo cubano
bajo riesgo de represalias; y (7) el Acta subvierte el inter6s de los Estados
Unidos por el inter6s de unos pocos seleccionados.11
Aunque estos
argumentos no bloquearon la promulgaci6n de la ley Helms-Burton, ellos
dictaron la fase a seguir para acabar con la ley Helms-Burton en un foro
diferente -- la arena internacional.
A.

Labrando una Guerra de Comercio Internacional
Los eruditos predicen que una amenaza diferente, una que no
involucra a los militares o el salvamiento de vidas humanas se acerca: una
guerra de comercio internacional. La causa de este nuevo compromiso no
es opresi6n, comunismo, o libertad; pero, mas bien es una ley de los
86. Id. § (2)(e).

87. Id. § (2)(0.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. § (2)(g).
Vea Bill Tracking, H.R. 927, Oct. 16, 1996, disponibleen LEXIS, Nexis Library.
Vea Informe de la Conferencia, supra nota 2, a H1725.
Id..
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Estados Unidos lamada la ley Helms-Burton, que busca proscribir la
conducta de no nacionales fuera de las fronteras de los Estados Unidos.Y
Aunque la aplicaci6n de dicha ley fuera del territorio de los Estados
Unidos no es inconsistente con la ley internacional, 91 los paises afectados
est~.n igualmente permitidos a usar medidas unilaterales para contrarrestar
las provisiones ingobernables de la ley Helms-Burton." Estas medidas, si
se toman, podrian tener repercusiones en las relaciones comerciales entre
los Estados Unidos y diecisiete paises en el mundo (incluyendo CanadA y
M6jico).9 Un ejemplo de las potenciales repercusiones en las que estin
involucrados los siete paises mis industrializados del mundo, la ley HelmsBurton, ha sido ya producido en virtud de los acuerdos anunciados por el
Canada, la Uni6n Europea y M6jico.9 De este modo, por la efectividad de
estas amenazas este documento cambiard pr6ximanente.
B. El Canad4, UE, y Mffico Amenaza Sanciones
La promulgaci6n de la ley Helms-Burton provoc6 una critica seria.
Entre los principales criticos del Acta est~n el Canada, la Uni6n Europea y
Mjico, cuyo ciudadanos corporativos son, incidentalmente, los principales
traficantes en propiedad corrompida.9 Estos gobiernos han denunciado la
ley Helms-Burton por considerar que es un uso invilido de la jurisdicci6n
extraterritorial y por lanzar un ataque directo contra la soberania de sus
naciones. 9"
Consecuentemente, estos paises han iniciado un ataque
conjunto contra la ley Helms-Burton con la finalidad de prevenir su
implementaci6n." La pregunta aqui es si la presi6n de estos paises, en si,
son o no suficientes para compeler a los Estados Unidos una modificaci6n
y/o una enmiende de la ley Helms-Burton excluyendo las provisiones
controvertidas del Titulo III anteriormente sefialadas. En respuesta a la

92. Antonio Paneque Brizuelas, Se aboca el mundo hacia una guerra comercial?,
GRANMA. INT'L disponible en < http://www.cubanet.cu/granma/junio/4junle.htmi >.

93. Vea supra Parte Ill(B)(2)(c).
94. Vea supra Parte III(B)(2)(a) (notando que el mismo an;lisis aplica a los paises que
amenazan sanciones ya que la ley Helms-Burton, si implementada, lastimarfa a sus ciudadanos
respectivos al de la misma forma).
95. Vea Brizuelas, supra nota 92.
96. Vea generalmente UE, supra nota 7; vea Inversionistas Canadienses, supra nota 7; y
tambiin, Red Herring?,supra nota 7.
97. Vea generalrente Informe de la Conferencia, supra nota 2, a H1724-04.
98. Id. a H1730.
99. Vea generalmente UE, supra nota 7; yea Inversionistas Canadiences, supra nota 7; y
tambiMn, Red Herring?, supra nota 7.
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anterior pregunta es meritorio realizar un anlisis de los planes de cada uno
de estos paises en contra de la ley Helms-Burton.
1. Canad
Canadi, el inversionista extranjero mis grande de Cuba, se opuso
vigorosamente a la ley Helms-Burton desde sus inicios.10 En el inter6s de
proteger a sus ciudadanos corporativos, Canadd hizo un borrador e
introdujo una propuesta de ley para contrarestar la implementaci6n de la
ley Helms-Burton.' 0 El Ministro de Comercio del Canadd, Art Eggleton,
describi6 la propuesta de ley canadiense como "un antfdoto legislativo. "102
El projecto de ley canadiense golpea la legislaci6n anti-comercio de los
Estados Unidos, proporcionando las siguientes medidas: negdndose a
reconocer la ley Helms-Burton; ignorando cualquier decisi6n judicial
dictada de acuerdo con las provisiones de la ley; permitiendo que las
empresas canadienses contrademanden a las empresas subsidiarias
canadienses de firmas americanas; y permiti~ndole al gobierno canadiense
multar a empresas canadienses que sucumben a las provisiones de la ley
Helms-Burton. 0 3 Como el sefior Eggleton repiti6 en su amenaza, "si el
Presidente de los Estados Unidos no procede con la implementaci6n de la
ley Helms-Burton, entonces nuestras compaftfas no necesitarn esto...
.",
De esta forma, las amenazas del CanadA no parecen ser vanas.
2. Uni6n Europea
La Uni6n Europea, por otro lado, ha encontrado mds dificultades
introduciendo un antfdoto contra la ley Helms-Burton como el de su
compafiero Canadl. El tinico borrador de medidas anti-boicot contra las
sanciones extraterritoriales de los Estados Unidos, como la ley HelmsBurton, fue rechazada por el Consejo de Ministros el pasado Octubre. 0° El
reglamento fue incapaz de obtener la aprobaci6n de los estados
miembros. 06 La mis reciente medida tomada por la Uni6n Europea, en
conjunto con Canadi y M~jico, fue presentar una queja ante la
100. Canada Introduces Anti Helms-Burton Legislation, REUTERS FIN. SERVICE (Sept. 16,

1996) [de aquf en adelante Ley Canadiense]; Bill Would ProtectFirms From Helms-Burton Law,
THE RECORD, Sept. 17, 1996, a B08.

101. Ley Canadiense,supra nota 100.
102. Id. (nota editorial: traducido del Ingls).
103. Id.
104. Id. (nota editorial: traducido del Ingls).
105. EU/US: Commission Plays Down Danish Snag on Anti Helms-Burton Move, EUR.
INFO. SER. (Oct. 27, 1996).
106. Id.
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Organizaci6n de Comercio Mundial (OCM) para que se estableciera un
papel de resoluci6n de disputas que discutiria las violaciones del GATT y
del NAFTA por la ley Helms-Burton.'al Despuds de un rechazo previo,
Estados Unidos acept6 la creaci6n de un panel que investigard la legalidad
de la ley Helms-Burton.' ° De esta forma, la Uni6n Europea tambi6n se
convierte en un fuerte contendiente a la ley Helms-Burton y cualquier
sanci6n implementada por el Consejo de Ministros no serd tomada
ligeramente.
3. M6jico
De los tres oponentes a la ley Helms-Burton, M6jico es el mis
d6bil y el menos implicado. Lo que M6jico ha hecho, aparte de hacer
varias denuncias, es participar en la demanda ante el OCM junto con
Canadi y la Uni6n Europea.1°9 Aunque Mdjico no ha estado activamente
envuelto en la creaci6n de un antidoto contra la ley Helms-Burton, es un
afanado partidario del tema cubano en la Organizaci6n de Estados
Americanos (OEA).1'0 En la filtima convenci6n de la OEA el 5 de junio de
1996, cada miembro, excepto los Estados Unidos, vot6 en una resoluci6n
para someter la ley Helms-Burton a un comit6 juridico que determinaria su
validez en la ley internacional."' Fuera de la participaci6n de M6jico en
estos dos eventos, el gobierno mejicano no ha hecho mucho Inds que seguir
las huellas de Canadd y la Uni6n Europea. '1 2 Ademds, Mjico nunca ha
atacado directamente a los Estados Unidos o tomado represalias que la de
protestar la ilegalidad de la ley Helms-Burton."3 De esta forma, Mdjico
continua siendo una caja de sorpresas en cuanto a las medidas, si es que
alguna, empleari contra la ley Helms-Burton.

107. Vea infra nota 114.
108. Vea Solis, supra nota 50, a 734.
109. William Willits, Mexico's Zedillo Denounces U.S. Anti-Cuban Sanctions, LATINO
LINK (Jun. 11, 1996); David Nrez, M6jico, Mexico, Canada Prep to Defy Helms-Burton,
WORKERS WORLD NEWS SERV. (Jun. 27, 1996).

110. Fernando Martinez, Reves en la OEA a la Helms-Burton, LA JORNADA (June 5,
1996).
111. OAS Condemns Helms-Burton, LATIN AM. LAW AND Bus. REP. (June 30, 1996)

(notando 32 fuera de 34 votos en favor--s6lo los Estados Unidos voto contra laresoluci6n, la
Reptiblica Dominicana no estaba presente en elvoto).
112. Vea Willits, supra nota 109.
113. Id.
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COMPROMISO DUDOSO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS PARA
CAMBIAR EL ACTA

La magnitud de la controversia en torno a la ley Helms-Burton no
acaba con el plan individual de venganza de los paises anteriores. Como
se discuti6 en la Parte III(B)(1), hay otras medidas convenidas que pueden

alcanzar resultados mIs efectivos; como instituir una queja en la OCM
contra la ley Helms-Burton."' El Canadi y la Uni6n Europea ya han
buscado activamente atacar la validez de la ley Helms-Burton mIs alld de

sus limites territoriales en procedimientos de establecimiento de disputa
ante la OCM."5

Esta iltima medida ha demostrado su efectividad dado las

recientes declaraciones hechas por los Estados Unidos en sede de
procedimiento.'
Sin embargo, estas declaraciones son sospechosas dado
el impedimento del Congreso para cambiar las disposiciones controvertidas
de la ley Helms-Burton."' De este modo, para evaluar la validez del
compromiso de Estados Unidos a la Uni6n Europea, una mirada hacia las
propuestas de ley actualmente discutidas en el Congreso es esencial.'
Independiente del acuerdo entre la Uni6n Europea y los Estados
Unidos para suspender las audencias del OCM, el Comit6 de Asuntos

Extranjeros de la Casa de Representantes del Congreso de los Estados
Unidos continda apoyando la legislaci6n dirigida a reforzar el bloqueo

contra Cuba."' La mayoria de las propuestas de que el Congreso pas6 en
114. Canada to Support EU in WTO Panel on Helms-Burton, REUTERS FIN. SERV. (Nov.
21, 1996).
115. Id.
116. EU and U.S.Reach Deal on Helms-Burton, WORLD NEWS DIG. (Apr. 17, 1997)
(notando lapromesa de laadministraci6n Clinton en buscar un cambio a laley Helms-Burton que
le permita al Presidente renunciar al Tftulo IV, a cambio de la suspensi6n de la audiencia del
OCM y el compromiso que la Uni6n Europea va a detener a las compaffias Europeas que
continuan repartiendose las propiedades corrompidas).
117. Id. Como la Congresista Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Florida) claramente declar6, en
reacci6n al acuerdo de abril 11 entre laUni6n Europea y los Estados Unidos: "cualquier esfuerzo
por cambiar laley Helms-Burton encararA 'con una tersa resistencia en el Congreso '." Id.
118. La siguiente legislaci6n pas6 el Comit6 de los Asuntos Extranjero de la Casa de
Representantes el 6 de mayo de 1997 enmendando el Acta de Reforma de Polftica Extranjero
(H.R. 1486) para incluir: (nota editorial: traducido del Ingls).
1.
2.
3.

Sec. 308: Retener la ayuda de los Estados Unidos a parses que ayudan al gobierno de
Cuba;
Sec. 506: Disponibilidad de fondos para elActa por la Libertad Cubana y Solidaridad
Democr~tica (Libertad) de 19 9 6 y elActa de Democracia cubano de 1992;

5.

Sec. 513: Requisitos para la ayuda a la Federaci6n rusa ;
Sec. 577: Deteniendo ayuda a palses que proporcionan combustible nuclear a Cuba;
Sec. 705: Ayuda a los grupos de los derechos humanos en Cuba;

6.

Sec. 1106: Programas Informativos, Educativos y Culturales de los Estados Unidos;

4.
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esta legislatura son adiciones o modificaciones a la ley Helms-Burton
dirigidas a renovar los esfuerzos en la debilitaci6n del Acta.'19 La
naturaleza subversiva de las acciones del comit6 en pasar estas propuestas
de ley es evidente en: el secreto con que se ilevaron a cabo, su continua
imposici6n a la para que la administraci6n Clinton someta informes
peri6dicos sobre su poliftica hacia Cuba; la contradicci6n obvia de la
promesa de los Estados Unidos a la Uni6n Europea para relajar la ley
Helms-Burton; y el impedimento obvio propuesto por los partidarios de la
ley Helms-Burton hacia un cambio.'12 El motivo ulterior detras de las
propuestas es acrecentar la ofensiva de Washington hacia Cuba
concediendo un aumento de decisi6n del Congreso sobre la politica exterior
de los Estados Unidos con Cuba.' 2' Si tienen 6xito, estas acciones
socavardn cualquier esfuerzo por la administraci6n de Clinton para relajar
las provisiones controvertidas de la ley Helms-Burton. 122 Dado el
impedimento del Congreso para cambiar, es improbable que los Estados
Unidos sea capaz de mantener la promesa a la Uni6n Europea.
VI. CONCLUSION
En fin, el resultado del anlisis anterior es que a pesar de la
controversia que rodea la ley Helms-Burton, su final estA lejos de
convertirse en una realidad. Mientras que la promesa de los Estados
Unidos en sede de las audiencias de la OCM parecfa esperanzadora, no
consider6 las fuerzas en el Congreso que buscan terminar absolutamente
con el regimen de Castro a cualquier precio. Lo mds probable, cuando se
produzca una distenci6n entre Estados Unidos y la Uni6n Europea es que
la administraci6n Clinton llegue con las manos vacfas a la mesa de
negociaciones. Y entoces, ,que? LSeri implementado el Titulo III de la
ley Helms-Burton? ,Prosperard la queja de la Uni6n Europea ante la
OCM? LSe desatard una guerra comercial?

7.
8.
9.
10.

Sec.
See.
Sec.
Sec.

1261:
1412:
1705:
1709:

Informes al Congreso acerca de las politicas de inmigraci6n Cubanas;
Autoridades de la Junta de gobernadores de la Radiodifusi6n;
Informes en las determinaciones bajo el Titulo IV del Acta Libertad;
Programas o proyectos de la Agencia de Energia At6mica Internacional en

Cuba
Denunciation of new actions against Cuba in the United States Congress, GRANMA
INT'L (Ago. 21, 1997).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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tstas son las preguntas a las cuales s6lo el tiempo puede dar
respuestas. Sin embargo, los registros sugieren que todos menos la filtima
pregunta serin contestadas en negativa. Mientras que el Presidente posea
la facultad de suspender el Titulo III cada seis meses indefimidamente es
improbable que la ley Helms-Burton alcance alguna vez un efecto.
Ademis, con respecto a la Uni6n Europea y su queja al OCM, hay pocas
esperanzas que semejante medida tenga 6xito y acabe con las provisiones
controvertidas de la ley Helms-Burton. Es mfis, las probabilidades de que
la Uni6n Europea, Mdjico y Canadd inicien una guerra comercial contra
los Estados Unidos es poco probable teniendo en cuenta que los Estados
Unidos consume gran parte de las exportaciones de estos paises y una
guerra comercial produciria un resultado negativo contra los instigadores.
Pero una cosa si es cierta, no hay quien prediga que va a pasar con la ley
Helms-Burton
pr6ximamente.
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UNITED STATES
Judiciary
The federal court system derives its powers from Article III of the
Constitution. The system includes the Supreme Court of the United
States, established by the Constitution; and 12 courts of appeal
(sometimes called circuit courts), 91 district courts, and special courts
such as the Tax Court, the Claims Court, and the Court of Veterans'
Appeals, all established by Congress.
Magistratura
El sistema judicial federal deriva sus poderes del Articulo III de la
Constituci6n. El sistema incluye la Corte Suprema de los Estados
Unidos, establecida por la Constituci6n; y 12 cortes de apelaci6n (a
veces liamadas cortes de circuito), 91 cortes de distrito, y cortes
especiales como la Corte de Impuesto, la Corte de Demandas, y la Corte
de Apelaciones de Veteranos, todas establecidas por el Congreso.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Technology permeates every aspect of our society. From medicine
to data processing and the banking industry, technology, while arguably an
advancement, has the potential of breeding unexpected consequences.
Technology has permeated the banking industry as well. The once
conservative, old-fashioned industry has grown to accept technological
advances and adapt to the advances in technology, primarily in response to
consumer demand.' International banking has grown proportionally to
business demand.'
The technological advances are not limited within the United
States' borders. Many nations have surpassed the United States in their
B.S., 1991, University of Miami; J.D., 1997, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center. The author is employed with Flanagan, Maniotis & Berger, P.A. The
author wishes to express her gratitude to Professor Marilyn B. Cane for her assistance in
preparing this article, and especially to her parents and family for their support and
encouragement.
*

1.

FLOYD E. EGNER, III, THE ELECTRONIC FUTURE OF BANKING 18 (1991).

2.
SEUNG H. KIM & STEPHEN W. MILLER, COMPETITIVE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
BANKING INDUSTRY 15 (1983).
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acceptance of the technological advances in banking. These advances and
the possibilities they allow erase international borders and start the process
toward a global economy. The United States' legal community has
attempted to keep up with technological advances in banking; however, the
advances continue to surpass the legislature. The international legal
community must also strive to keep in step with each industry's
advancement in order to protect the entire public.
Major advancements in banking include the advent of on-line or
PC banking. PC banking is a method by which consumers can bank, as
they would normally do in person at a brick and mortar bank.3 Concurrent
with the major banking advancements are others like on-line credit,
electronic checks, electronic cash, smart cards, and digicash. All of these
advances allow for the quick transfer of funds internationally as well as the
It seems logical that with the recent
use of funds internationally.
technological advances one in the United States can transfer funds to
another in Jamaica with the click of a button.
All of the advancements to the banking industry correspond with
the information superhighway. According to technocratic proponents, the
information superhighway provides the availability of legions of
information at the touch of a button. With the superhighway one can shop,
bank, study, play, and work at home. Computer hardware and software
companies, obvious proponents of the superhighway, are already providing
electronic banking which includes inter alia check cashing and deposits,
debit cards,, via virtual branches, 6 and payment systems. 7 Additionally,
these computer companies offer electronic cash, e.g., smart cards and
3.

See generally Kelly M. Miley, Electronic Banking: Developments in Banking Law, 15 ANN.

REV. BANKING L. 2 (1996); Vanessa O'Connell, PC Banking Puts Accounts at Your Fingertips,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1995, at Cl; Karen Epper, Bank of America Strives to Stay Lean in Electronic
Banking, AM. BANKR., Oct. 27, 1995, at 13; Timothy L. O'Brien, On-line Banking Has Bankers
FrettingPCs May Replace Branches, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1995, at Al.
4.

On-line shoppers may make purchases on the Internet by using their credit cards.

The

electronic check system, promulgated by the Financial Services Technology Consortium [hereinafter
FSTC], allows Interet payments in a manner like the paper checkbook. See Penny Lunt, Payments
on the 'Net. How Many? How Safe?, A.B.A. BANKING J., (Nov. 1995) available in LEXIS,
Banking Library, ABABJ File. Electronic cash includes the smart card and digicash. Miley, supra

note 3, at 14-15. Physically, the smart card looks like a credit card. The difference is that the smart
card has a memory chip with a monetary value assigned to it. Miley, supra note 3, at 14-15. The
smart card is analogous to a ATM debit card. Id. at 14. Digicash is relatively new to the electronic
cash scene and is also referred to as e-cash. Id. at 14-15. Users of digicash access an on-line account
equipped with a password and authorizes the Ecash Mint to transfer their money. Id. at 15-16.
Digicash is analogous to e-mail.
5. Miley, supra note 3, at 10, 12-13.
6. Id. at 5.
7. Lunt, supra note 4.
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digicash.8 These companies see the endless possibilities electronic banking
can provide, but even more importantly, computer companies see the
monetary potential access can afford.9
Accordingly, hardware and
software companies market the information highway to prospective
customers using attractive education and income specific metaphorical
language to entice subscribers.'0 We can see, through the allegorical
language used to describe the superhighway, specifically electronic, online, or PC banking," that proponents seek to attract specific groups; thus,
excluding access to some. This concept begs the question of whether the
technological developments are for public consumption and advancement
or for private gain.
This note seeks to determine the assets along with the liabilities of
the superhighway through the electronic banking scheme and the
implications on international law. While access to electronic banking may
be the new trend, there are aspects for consideration. Part two seeks to
analyze access to the superhighway, specifically as it relates to electronic
banking, the technological advances in banking, and some of the legal
issues these advances raise. Part three seeks to analyze and apply these
issues using the laws promulgated domestically and internationally. Part
four seeks to discuss some groups of people within the legal community as
it relates to technological advances in banking, both domestically and
internationally.
Part five seeks to discuss some of the liabilities of
electronic banking, both domestically and internationally. Finally, part six
seeks to determine whether access to electronic banking via the
superhighway, while presumably the wave of the future, will be the wave
for all.
II. ELECTRONIC BANKING AND TECHNOLOGY
Banks have become part of the superhighway via electronic
banking. As the name suggests electronic banking combines concepts of
electronics and banking to provide such services as automated data
processing,2 electronic funds transfer,'3 and on-line services like electronic

8. Miley, supra note 3, at 14-16.
9. See generally O'Connell, supra note 3.
10. Id.; Epper, supra note 3; O'Brien, supra note 3.
11. For example, authors discussing the technological advancements of the banking industry use
phrases such as fast and flexible and promises such as complete autonomy in the use of PC banking.
See generally Catherine M. Downey, The High Price of a Cashless Society: Exchanging Privacy
Rights for DigitalCash? 14 J.MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 303 (1996).
12. Mark Budnitz, The Finicky Computer, the Paperless Telex and the Fallible Swiss: Bank
Technology andthe Law, 25 B.C. L. REv. 259 (1984).
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payment systems, electronic credit cards, electronic checks, and electronic
cash. 4 The harbinger to electronic banking was the automated teller
machine (ATM). The ATM was first introduced as a means to decrease
the workload of tellers; however, such decrease has evolved into an
elimination of the teller.' 5
The ATM evolved into mini branches that are open twenty-four
hours a day. 6 The banking customer can withdraw or deposit funds at any
hour of the day and at virtually any ATM location." At its inception, the
ATM was a marketing scheme for banks providing them with a
competitive edge.' 8 Recently however, the ATM for the banking industry,
is more than just a marketing scheme, but a requirement to effectively
compete in the industry. 9 For the average banking consumer, the ATM
was merely the technological start of advancements to come.

A. The Smart Card
The smart card takes the form of an ATM card, but with very
different features. The smart card looks like a credit card but has stored
value.2 Smart cards are sometimes referred to as PCMCIA cards because
they are accessible to computers and fit into the PCMCIA slots in portable
2
computers. '
There are four basic types of smart cards:
1) money cards, are most analogous to an ATM card, having data
storage space and are accessible via a personal identification
number (PIN). In France, these memory cards are used to
access telephones;"

13. Id.
14. Id.; Miley, supra note 3; Downey, supra note 11.
15. EGNER, supra note 1, at 99.

16. The ATM, as the name states, is the electronic version of a bank without the human interaction.
Id. One gains access to the ATM via an ATM card and a personal identification number (PIN).
DANIEL C. LYNCH & LESLIE LUNDQUIST, DIGITAL MONEY: THE NEW ERA OF INTERNET
COMMERCE 19-20 (1996) [hereinafter DIGITAL MONEY]. The ATM card looks like a credit card;

however it does not provide the customer with credit. Rather, the ATM card provides the customer
with access to his/her bank account and the funds therein. Id.; see also EGNER, supra note 1.
17.

EGNER, supra note 1, at 109.

18. Id. at99.

19. Id. at 100-01. There has been a marked increase in the use of the ATM machine from its
inception. Such increase is primarily due to consumer comfortability. Id. at 100-01.
20. DIGITAL MONEY, supra note 16, at 116.
21.

Id.

22. Id.
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2) shared key cards are a network of smart cards that can
communicate with each other;
3) signature-transporting cards are analogous to check books with
pre-printed check numbers;23 and
4) signature creating cards are similar to signature transporting
cards with one main difference the user generates the blank
check numbers.24 Signature creating cards are expensive to
produce.?
Rather than merely providing the customer with access to a bank
account, the smart card has stored value. The smart card is used
internationally, and most notably in Europe and Asia.26 Other nations have
announced the implementation of smart card systems.?7 The Conditional
Access for Europe (CAFE) is developing a smart card for payment
throughout Europe.28 With the CAFE smart card, one will be able to travel
throughout Europe with one universal card, allowing the ease of paying in
cash without foreign exchange. 29 Functionally, the smart card is a pre-paid
debit without the access to an account in that once the stored value is
exhausted, the consumer must either purchase a new card or add value to
the existing one.1°
B. DigitalMoney (DigiCash)
Digicash is independent of the smart card., It allows the user to
conduct business via the internet. 2 In order to use digicash the user must
have a computer and the digicash software.33 Armed with a computer, the
user accesses a previously assigned account by using her previously issued
23. With the signature-transporting cards, the user assigns a dollar amount to each numbered
check.
24. Id.
25.

Id.

26.

DIGITAL MONEY, supra note 16, at 116; EGNER, supra note 1, at 28. In France, smart cards

are used for telephone access and can be purchased at newspaper stands. DIGITAL MONEY, supra
note 16, at 116. In Japan, researchers are developing the smart coin. EGNER, supra note 1, at 28.
27.

DIGITAL MONEY, supra note 16, at 117.

28. Id.

29. Id.
30.

ld. at 115.

31. Miley, supra note 3.
32. DIGITAL MONEY, supra note 16, at 109-12.
33. Id.
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account number and password, and requests funds be transferred.3'

The

user's request for a transfer must be authenticated via the Ecash Mint.15
The Mint is essentially a computer server. 6

Electronic money has the potential to bypass international borders
and bypass the cost of foreign exchange. 7 So long as digital money is
accepted as legal tender" by a government, most other nations will accept
the same in their economy. 9 Proponents of electronic money predict its
societal acceptance and moreover, they predict that one day digital money
will be indistinguishable from more traditional forms of money. 4

The potentially indistinguishable character of digital money from
traditional money prompted a concern for its regulation. 4' In paper form
all of these electronic services are regulated pursuant to a state and/or
federal statute.'2 However, via the Internet, regulation is virtually non-

existent. In fact, once the consumer transfers money via a digicash
transfer, the Federal Deposit Insurance Company's (FDIC) protection is no
longer available."

Proponents of digicash and other technological

advances state that the consumer's privacy is protected." However, others
do not reach the same conclusion. 3 While privacy laws are designed to
protect the digicash user/consumer, one's privacy is easily violated by the
simple tracking of account numbers and account holders to the purchases
made.46
34. Id.; Miley, supra note 3, at 15.
35. Id. at 15.
36. Id.
37. DIGITAL MONEY, supra note 16, at 121.
38. Legal tender is defined in § 1-201(24) of the Uniform Commercial Code. U.C.C. § 1-201(24).
39. Sarah J.Hughes, A Call for International Legal Standardsfor Emerging Retail Electronic
Payment Systems, 15 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 197, 208 (1996) (citing Electronic Money; So Much
for the Cashless Society, ECONOMIST., Nov. 26, 1996, at 21). However, the issue of the foreign
exchanges may still need to be addressed.
40. Id.
41. The electronic banking community is attempting self-regulation by using encryption.
Encryption, an electronic security method, enables the electronic banking user to have an
identifiable mark, or signature which purportedly deters fraud and forgery.
42. For example, a customer's right to stop payment of checks is regulated under the Uniform
Commercial Code. See Budnitz, supra note 12, at 268. ATM machines, which are essentially
computer bank branches, are regulated pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1997). See also Plant City v.
Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969); Indep. Bankers Ass'n. v. Marine Midland Bank, 757 F.2d 453 (2d
Cir. 1985).
43. Miley, supra note 3, at 16.
44. Id.
45.

DIGITAL MONEY, supra note 16, at 112.

46. Id.; see also Joshua Quiuner, Who's Out There Watching You?. TIME, Aug. 25, 1997, at 28-32.
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III. ELECTRONIC BANKING AND THE LAW
A. Domestic Law
At this time, the United States has a few statutes that may be
considered electronic banking regulation. Some of these laws include the
Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA)," the Uniform Commercial Code
Article 4A,'" the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 9 the Right to Financial
Privacy, 0 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act." Presently, the
standard for legal tender is defined by the Uniform Commercial Code.52 It
follows that if a country accepts a particular form of tender as legal tender
it is legal tender in that country. So if the United States and Europe
decided to accept a particular form of digicash as legal tender in either
country, the use of digicash would be facilitated.
Because of this
possibility, there must be laws in place to protect users of electronic
money.
In order for the present laws to be applicable to the use of
electronic money, one must first survive the issue of whether such money
is legal tender, as defined in the UCC. The next issue involves whether
the electronic banking institution, i.e. the issuer of the electronic funds,
whether it be digicash or smart cards, is a banking institution as defined by
the federal statutes." After determining whether such institution is a
banking institution, the next issue is the proper venue for bringing suits.
Presently, the federal banking venue statutes provide that any action
against any banking association may be had in any district or territorial

47. The EFFA applies to any transfer of funds other than transfers originated by the traditional
check, i.e., transfers via any electronic media. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693(a)(6) (1997). The EFTA
applies to the use of the ATM. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693(g) (1997).
48. Article 4A applies to some concepts of electronic banking, specifically the use of payment
orders, which combined the traditional concept of the check to electronic users.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1997). Said chapter implements regulations protecting the consumer against
credit card fraud.
50. 12 U.S.C. § 3404 (1994).
51. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2518 (1994).
52. See U.C.C. § 1-201(24). Specifically, that section defines legal tender or money as a medium
of exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government and includes a monetary unit
of account established by an intergovernmental organization or by agreement between two or more
nations. Id.
53. The United States Code defines a banking institution, i.e. a financial institution, as any business
which engages in any activity which is deemed to be an activity similar to, related to, or a substitute
for any banking activity. 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (1995). If an institution falls within such category
the Secretary of the Treasury may require such institutions to keep records. Moreover, such banking
institutions must comply with federal privacy laws. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401, 3402, 3403 (1997).
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court in the United States where such banking institution is located.5 '
When a banking institution is on the Internet the question arises as to
where the institution is located Y
For the consumer, other issues involve his or her right to privacy.5
Most specific to electronic banking is the Right to Financial Privacy Act of
1982. This act precludes government access to or release of consumer's
financial records without the government's written certification of the
government's investigation to the financial institution and compliance with
statutory requirements.n Another such federal regulation is the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986.59 Said regulation protects the
consumer from unauthorized interception of electronic communication.
The two acts seemingly intertwine in electronic banking to protect the
banking consumer from unauthorized interception of financial records over
the Internet. However, its impact in international electronic banking has
not yet been determined.
Internationally, there has been a call among commentators for
international laws and standards. With or without adequate regulation, the
concept of electronic banking has various benefits.
B. InternationalLaw
On an international scale, electronic money has been widely
discussed but minimally regulated. Researchers of global electronic money
have stated, "the electronic networks and computers which are the
infrastructure for the current global financial community have been
instrumental in the decline of national control of money. "6 According to
these scholars, the use of the smart cards and digicash are consistent with
the tradition of substituting legal tender for an obligation to pay;6' hence,
the label electronic cash is erroneous and should be replaced with
electronic credit. The American Bar Association Section of Business Law

54.

12 U.S.C. § 94 (1997).

55. Similar issues have been discussed in the federal courts with pornography on the Internet.
56. See Downey, supra note 11, at 309.
57. 12 U.S.C. § 3404 (1997).
58.

See 12 U.S.C. § 3403(b) (1997); see generally Downey, supra note 11, at 311.

59.

18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2518 (1997); see generally Downey, supranote 11, at 312.

60. Jeffery B. Ritter, US HR Subcommittee on Monetary Policy, Aug. 10, 1996, available in
LEXIS, Banking Law Library, Banking Law File (citing KURTZMAN, THE DEATH OF MONEY:
How ELECTRONIC ECONOMY HAS DESTABILIZED THE WORLD MARKET AND CREATED FINANCIAL
CHAOS (1993) and Kazuaki Sono, Electronic Funds Transfer Blurs the Meaning of Money, 2 THE
DATA L. REP. 1 (May 1995)).

61. Ritter, supra note 60.
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Task Force on Stored Value Cards conducted research on same and
concurred.6 1 While critical of the concept of electronic cash as money,
these scholars understand that the development is critical in establishing the
global market.61 Until the legislature develops laws regulating electronic
money, scholars will call for self-regulation and the development of legal
norms to establish the consumer confidence that has already been
established with the ATM.61
In 1986, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
Working Party on Facilitation of International Trade Procedures developed
a tool to assist in the electronic transfer of cash globally, the Electronic
Data Interchange for Administration, Commerce, and Transport
(EDIFACT). The EDIFACT has been endorsed in the United States and
has been accepted for integration in the European Union.
The EDIFACT attempts to facilitate international trade by
permitting users with a standard of trade. According to proponents,
EDIFACT provides certainty, which establishes confidence in the
electronic commerce.
Others concerned with the development of electronic money and its
transfer on the net have organized a venue for discussion and development
of standards.6M Known as the Internet Law and Policy Forum, the forum
seeks to provide an arena for businesses and legislators in establishing a
model for lawmaking in the future. Specifically, the forum seeks to
develop: 1) uniform definitions of terms for commercial transactions, 2)
model agreements, codes of conduct, or other terms reflecting global
industry standards, and 3) model national laws and eventually treaties or
conventions.66
Proponents of the international regulation of electronic banking are
but one faction within the legal community considering the effects of
technological advances in electronic banking. Other factions within the
community have alternative views.
IV. FACTIONS IN THE LEGAL COMMUNITY
One's view of electronic banking as an asset or liability depends on
that person's view of technology. The legal community, as part of the

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See also Intemet Law andPolicy Forum (visited Mar. 24, 1998) < http://www.ilpf.org/>.
Id.
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general population, also has differing views of technology and its
commensurate advances.
According to researchers, technology and the law may be viewed
differently.
One way of viewing technology, called technological
messianism,67 embraces technology as a blessing.'8 Those who adhere to
technological messianism may also be referred to as technocrats.'8
Conversely, there are others who believe that technological advances are
an unmitigated curse.70 These extremists, referred to as technological
determinists, believe that technology robs people of jobs, privacy, overall
dignity, and inevitably controls society.*" In the middle, are those who
seem to take the realist approach, and believe that technology has the
potential for good but must be controlled.? These people are referred to as
humanizers.7 3 Humanizers recognize the determinists and the messianists
positions. However, humanizers believe that technology can be beneficial
to society if properly controlled."4
Humanizers believe that technology is a product of innumerable
individual decisions." At the time, these decisions seem reasonable
individually, but in the end, the amalgamation of those decisions may not
be what was originally desired.6 The humanizer rejects the idea that any
one group should control the manner in which technology is deployed.
Instead, they believe that technological advances should be used as an
instrument of society." The humanizers have the most logical view of
technology because they understand it is unwise to defer to a particular
group's desire, especially when each grant of a group's desire may have an
unexpected impact on other groups and eventually, society as a whole.7'

67. Budnitz, supra note 12, at 261.
68. Id.
69. Other commentators would also call the technocrat a gadgeteer. See also EGNER, supra note 1,
at 48-49.
70. Id.
71. Id. Other commentators would call the determinist a procrastinator. Compellingly the
procrastinators are those who are older and also in the lower socio-economic sector. EGNER, supra

note 1, at 51.
72. Budnitz, supra note 12, at 262.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Budnitz, supra note 12, at 264.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In the banking industry, the humanizers must be the legal
community. Presently, the need for a humanistic approach to banking is of
vital importance because of virtual banks'," like Security First Network
Bank, desire to become full-service banks. For now, the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) has only approved these banks to accept deposits.10
Recently, banks have been promoting PC banking to desiring customers.,
it is not
PC banking is quickly permeating many major banks. For 8some
2
only the wave of the future but an integral part of the present.
Because virtual banks may become the wave of the future, the
legislature should analyze the benefits and liabilities of each advancement
to assure that this amalgamation of virtual banks does not become a
detriment to society. Analysis of the benefits and liabilities of such
advances may protect the consumer from feeling as though Big Brother3 is
always watching and is omniscient, omnipotent, with the specific power of
controlling our very existence.8 '
While technological advances abound and individually, each
advance is for the benefit of society, the legal community must strive to
keep up and protect the community from the amalgamation of each
advance becoming Big Brother. Forms of Big Brother have seemingly
crept its head in other industries.85 Because the Internet has the potential to
invade all aspects of our society, ' 6 the legal community must not be enticed
by the promotions of technological messianists, but be ever mindful of the
determinists' position of doom and view of the liabilities of these advances.

79. A virtual bank, also known as an Internet bank, allows consumers to access their accounts, pay

bills, and essentially function as a regular bank. See Miley, supra note 3; O'Connell, supra note 3;
O'Brien, supra note 3.
80. Miley, supra note 3, at 9-10.
81.

O'Connell, supra note 3.

82.

Id.

83.

See generally GEORGE ORWELL 1984 (New America Library 1961).

84.

Fictionally, we have seen the potential technology has in movies similar to the recently released

movie, THE NET (1995), depicting a woman's quest to reinstate her existence deleted by a computer.
85. For example, in the credit card industry, companies can buy the customer database of another
company to solicit customers fitting a certain profile. In the end, the consumer, who may have
believed their transactions were private, is solicited from an unknown and possibly unwelcome
solicitor who wants to give the consumer the deal of a lifetime. See Tim Huber, The Check Card is
in the Mail Like it or Not, 14 MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL CITY Bus. 33, Jan. 18, 1997, at 4.

86. The Internet and its components offer services like on-line periodical subscriptions, on-line
shopping malls, on-line communication, in addition to on-line banking.
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LIABILITIES OF BANKING TECHNOLOGY: DETERMINISTS V.
MESSIANISTS

Technological determinists have a valid point concerning
advancements in banking. Recently, there have been reports of security
breaches on the Internet." Further, despite the security breaches there is
the concern that consumer data information will invade consumers' privacy
interests.u Consumers' privacy interests are daily being compromised in
the data bank sales market. According to some researchers, current
legislation does not adequately address privacy concerns raised by
consumer banking use on the Internet. 89 Relatively recent legislation like
the Privacy Act of 1974, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1982, and
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, attempts to examine
and protect consumer privacy. Internationally, there is no corresponding
legislation." However, each act of legislation does not properly protect
on-line banking consumers from Big Brother;1 nor does this legislation
address the following issues of legal tender, whether the electronic banking
institution is an institution, or the location of the institution. Additionally,
the legislatures do not address the issue of security within the industry.
Researchers conclude that the move to a cashless society stretches the
parameters of current legislation.2 Specifically, researchers implore the
legislature to enact statutes that directly address the use of digital cash.Y
While the use of electronic banking may not ultimately be our
doom, as the determinists predict, clearly adequate legislation is critical to
protect legitimate on-line users from Big Brother, whether he is the
government or the business community. The liabilities of electronic
banking must be addressed as soon as possible to ward off the determinists'
expectation of doom for all users of electronic banking.
Messianists predict electronic banking as the wave of the future,
but will it be the wave for all? While costs of computers have decreased
tremendously, such decline has not afforded use for all those who desire to
87. See generally Miley, supra note 3, at 8; Epper, supra note 3; Lunt, supra note 4; Jonathan Gaw
& Ulysses Torassa, Security Bugs On-Line Banking, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 12, 1995, at IC.
88. Downey, supra note 11, at 305.
89. d. at 308-09.
90. See Ritter, supra note 60; Hughes, supra note 39.
91. See generally Downey, supra note 11, at 313-14; Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21
(1974) (concluding that the Bank Secrecy Act does not preclude the government from collecting
banking information of criminal suspects); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (generally
defining the zone of privacy and restricting an individual's right to financial privacy).
92. Downey, supra note 11, at 315, 318.
93. Id. at 321.
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go on-line.
To purchase a computer along with all the requisite
attachments, a consumer needs at least three thousand dollars
($3,000.00)."' Such costs will preclude a low or moderate income family
from purchasing a computer, which ultimately forecloses that family from
going on-line.
Economists predict that on-line banking will, ultimately, cause a
significant cost differential between computer and regular banking." Such
cost differentials may make the poor poorer and the rich richer because the
poor will be required to pay more than the more affluent in banking
transactional costs, while the more affluent who own computers will be
able to reduce their transactional costs. The poor bank customers will thus
be foreclosed from purchasing a computer because of their inability to save
because they must pay more in banking transactional costs.
VI. CONCLUSION
If electronic banking via the information superhighway is the wave
of the future, one must consider both the benefits and the liabilities. One
of the reasons for the maintenance of traditional banks was to allow the
working citizens access to the industry and provide stability for both the
banking consumers and the government as a whole. On the international
scale, smaller, lesser developed countries may have difficulty getting
access to on-line banking. Moreover, international laws seem ill-equipped
to control the legal implications that such banking incurs. Hence, there has
been a unanimous call among legal scholars for implementation of
international laws as it relates to electronic banking." While there are
obvious benefits to on-line banking, there are some liabilities that must be
addressed. It may be unreasonable for one to think that on-line banking
will be available to all, as is access to brick and mortar banks, but one
must consider all the potential factors, including all the legal implications
and corresponding issues when considering the next technological
advancement.

94. For computer prices see Steve Alexander, The Do-All Otip, Intel Corporations New MMX
Technology is Generating PC Sales for Retailers Such as Best Buy and Later This Year More
Software Will Take Advantage of the Improved Multimedia Processing, STAR TRIBUNE, Apr. 27,
1997, at 1D; for printer prices see James Kim, Printer Companies Vie for Shrinking Share, USA
TODAY, June 5, 1997, at 613.
95. See generally Miley, supra note 3; Peter Sinton, Banking's Brave New World, S.F. CHRON.,
Oct. 9, 1995, at BI.
96. See Miley, supra note 3; Hughes, supra note 39; Ritter, supra note 60.
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I. INTRODUCCION
La tecnologfa penetra cada aspecto de la sociedad. Desde la
medicina, al proceso de datos y la industria bancaria, la tecnologia,
mientras discutiblemente un avarice, tiene el potencial de criar
consecuencias inesperadas.
La tecnologia ha penetrado la industria
bancaria tambi~n. La antiguamente conservadora y pasada de moda
industria ha aceptado los adelantos tecnol6gicos y se ha adaptado a los
adelantos en tecnologia, principalmente en contestaci6n a la demanda de el
consumidor.' La banca internacional ha crecido proporcionalmente a la
demanda comercial.2
Los adelantos tecnol6gicos no estin limitados dentro de las
fronteras de los Estados Unidos.

Muchas naciones han superado los

*
B.S., 1991, University of Miami; J.D., 1997, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center. La autora esta empleada con Flanagan, Maniotis & Berger, P.A. La autora
desea expresar su gratitud a la Profesora Marilyn B. Cane por su ayuda preparando este artfculo,
y sobre todo a sus padres y familia por su apoyo y estfmulo.
1.

FLOYD E. EGNER, II, THE ELECTRONIC FUTURE OF BANKING 18 (1991).

2.
SEUNG H. KIM & STEPHEN W.
INTERNATIONAL BANKING INDUSTRY 15 (1983).

MILLER,
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Estados Unidos en su aceptaci6n de adelantos tecnol6gicos bancario. Estos
adelantos y las posibilidades que permiten, borran fronteras internacionales
y empiezan el proceso hacia una economia global. La comunidad legal de
los Estados Unidos ha intentado seguir con adelantos tecnol6gicos
bancarios; sin embargo, adelantos continfian superando las legislaturas. La
comunidad legal internacional tambi6n debe esforzarse por mantener a paso
con cada avance industriar para proteger al pfiblico entero.
Los avances mayores bancarios incluyen el advenimiento de la enlinea o PC banca. PC banca es un m6todo por el que consumidores pueden
hacer transacci6nes bancarias, igual que el que normalmente harian
personalmente en un banco de ladrillo y mortero. 3 Coexistente con los
avances mayores bancario son el cr6dito en-linea, cheques electr6nicos,
dinero en efectivo electr6nico, tarjetas inteligentes, y digicash.4 Todos
estos adelantos permiten el traslado rapido internacionalmente tal como el
uso de fondos internacionalmente. Parece 16gico que con los recientes
adelantos tecnol6gicos que uno en los Estados Unidos puede transferir
fondos a otro en diga, Jamaica, con el pulso de un bot6n.
Todos avances a la industria bancaria corresponden con el
superhighway de informaci6n.
Segfin defensores de tecnologia, el
superhighway de informaci6n proporciona la disponibilidad de legiones de
informaci6n al toque de un bot6n. Con el superhighway uno puede ir de
compras, hacer transacci6nes bancarias, estudiar, jugar, y trabajar en la
casa. Los equipos de computacion y las compafiias que proveen programas
para las computadoras, los cuales son defensores obvios del superhighway,
ya estdn proporcionando transaci6nes bancarias electr6nicas qu6 incluye
inter alia cambio de cheques y depositos, tarjetas de d~bito, 5 via las ramas
3.
Vea generalmente Kelly M. Miley, Electronic Banking: Developments in Banking Law,
15 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 2 (1996); Vanessa O'Connell, PC Banking Puts Accounts at Your

Fingertips,WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1995, a C1; Karen Epper, Bank of America Strives to Stay Lean in
ElectronicBanking, AM. BANKR., Oct. 27, 1995, a 13; Timothy L. O'Brien, On-line Banking Has
Bankers FrettingPCs May Replace Branches, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1995, a Al.
4. L coWa en4f
p
hc
m cl lnww ujo
(u
de cr dlI. El sistema del cheque

electr6nico, promulgado por el Consorcio de Tecnologia de Servicios Financiero [en adelante
FSTC], permite pagos de Internet de una manera como el talonario de cheques de papel. Vea
Penny Lunt, Payments on the 'Net. How Many? How Safe?, A.B.A. BANKING J., (Nov. 1995)
disponible en LEXIS, Banking Library, ABABJ File. El dinero en efectivo electr6nico incluye Ia

tarjeta inteligente y digicash. Fisicamente, las miradas de ia tarjeta inteligentes como una tarjeta
del cr&lito. La diferencia es que la tarjeta inteligente tiene una astilla de memoria con un valor
monetario asignado a 61. Miley, supra nota 3, a las 14-15. La tarjeta inteligente es angloga a
una trajeta ATM. Id. a 14. Digicash es relativamente nuevo a la escena del dinero en efectivo
electr6nico y tambi~n estA Ilamado el e-cash en efectivo. Id. a las 14-15. Usuarios de acceso del

digicash una cuenta en-linea equip6 con una contrasefia y autoriza que el Ecash Mint transfiera su
dinero. Id. a las 15-16. Digicash es analogo al e-mail.
5.

Miley, supra nota 3, alas 10, 12-13
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virtuales, 6 y sistemas de pago. 7

Adicionalmente, 6stas compaffias de
computadoras ofrecen dinero en efectivo electr6nico, e.g., tarjetas
inteligentes y digicash.8
Estas compafifas ven las posibilidades
interminables que la banca electr6nica proporciona, pero hasta mis
importante, las compafifas de computadora yen el potencial monetario que
proporciona el acceso. 9 Por lo tanto, compafiias de equipos y programas
de computacion comercializan la carretera de informaci6n a clientes
prospectivos usando, educaci6n e ingreso con idioma metaf6rico especifico
para incitar a subscriptores.' 0 Nosotros podemos ver, a travds del idioma
aleg6rico, usado para describfr el superhighway, especfficamente
electr6nico, en-lIfnea, o PC banca," que los defensores buscan atraer
grupos especificos, asi, excluyendo acceso a algunos. Entonces la
pregunta es si los desarrollos tecnol6gicos son para el consumo pfiblico y
el avance o para la ganancia privada.
Esta nota busca determinar los recursos juntos con las obligaciones
del superhighway a trav6s del esquema bancario electr6nico y las
implicaciones en las leyes internacionales. Mientras el acceso al banco
electr6nico puede ser la nueva tendencia, hay aspectos para consideraci6n.
La primera parte busca analizar acceso especfficamente al superhighway en
cuando relaci6n al banco electr6nico, adelantos tecnol6gicos bancarios, y
algunos problemas legales que estos adelantos provocan. La segunda parte
busca analizar y aplicar estos problemas usando las leyes promulgadas
domdsticamente y intemacionalmente. La tercera parte busca describir
algunos grupos de personas dentro de la comunidad legal relacionados a los
adelantos tecnol6gicos bancario, dom6sticamente y internacionalmente. La
cuarta pane busca describir algunas de las obligaciones de banco
electr6nico, dom6sticamente y internacionalmente. Finalmente, la quinta
pane busca determinar si acceso al banco electr6nico via el superhighway,
mientras probablemente la nueva moda del futuro, serd la nueva moda para
todos.

6.

Id. a5.

7. Lunt, supra nota 4.
8. Miley, supra nota 3, a las 14-16.
9. Vea generalmente O'Connell, supra nota 3.
10. Id.; Epper, supra nota 3; O'Brien, supra nota 3.
11. Por ejemplo, autores que discuten los avances tecnol6gicos de la industria banca usan
las frases como rdpido, y flexible y promesas como el uso de PC banca se permite el lujo de
autonomfa completa. Vea generalmente Catherine M. Downey, The High Price of a Cashless
Society: Exchanging Privacy Rights for Digital Cash?, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO.

L. 303 (1996).
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11. BANCO ELECTR6NICO Y TECNOLOGiA
Bancos se han vuelto parte del superhighway via el banco
electr6nico. Como el nombre sugiere, el banco electr6nico und conceptos
electr6nicos y bancarios para proporcionar servicios como proceso de datos
automatizado, 2 al traslado de fondos electr6nicos," y servicios en-linea,
como sistemas de pago electr6nicos, tarjetas de cr&lito electr6nicas,
cheques electr6nicos, y el dinero en efectivo electr6nico.'4 El heraldo al
banco electr6nico fue la miquina del cajero automatizada (ATM). El
ATM se introdujo primero como un medio para disminuir el trabajo de
cajeros; sin embargo, la tal disminuci6n ha evolucionado en una
eliminaci6n del cajero.1'
El ATM evolucion6 en ramas pequefms que eran abiertas
veinticuatro horas en el dia.'6 El cliente bancario puede retirar o dep6sitar
fondos a cualquier hora del dia y en virtualmente cualquier localizaci6n de
ATM.' En su principio, el ATM era una esquema del mercado para
bancos que les proporcionan un borde competitivo.11 Recientemente, sin
embargo, el ATM es para la industria bancaria mis que solo una esquema
del mercado; es un requisito para competir eficazmente en la industria. 9
Para el ordinario consumidor bancario, el ATM era meramente la salida
tecnol6gica de avances por venir.
A. La Tarjeta Inteligente
La tarjeta inteligente toma la forma de una tarjeta de ATM pero
con rasgos muy diferentes. La tarjeta inteligente luce como una tarjeta de
cr6dito pero tiene valor guardado. 20 Las tarjetas inteligentes a veces est~n
12. Mark Budnitz, The Finicky ConpWuter, the Paperless Telex and the Fallible Swiss: Bank
Technology and the Law, 25 B.C. L. REV. 259 (1984).
13.

Id.

14. Id.; Miley, supra nota 3; Downey, supra nota 11.
15. EGNER, supra nota 1, a 99.
16.

' AM,

el nombre afirma,

"
b

t wb

d

Id.

Uno gana

acceso al ATM vfa una tarjeta de ATM y un ndmero de identificaci6n personal (PIN). DANIEL
C. LYNCH & LESLIE LUNDQUIST, DIGITAL MONEY:

THE NEW ERA OF INTERNET COMMERCE

19-20 (1996) [en adelante DIGITAL MONEY]. La tarijeta ATM parece como una tarijeta de
cr6dito; sin embargo, no le proporciona cr&lito al cliente. M~s bien, la tarjeta de ATM le
proporciona acceso al cliente A la cuenta bancaria de el/ella y los fondos en ese. Id.; yea tambiin
EGNER, supra nota 1.
17. EGNER, supra nota 1,a 109.
18.

Id. a 99.

19. Id. alas 100-01. A habido un marcado aumento en el uso de la mdquina de ATM desde su
principio. El tal aumento es principalmente debido a la comodidad del consumidor. Id. a las 100-01.
20.

DIGITAL MONEY, supra nota 16, a 116.
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Ilamadas las tarjetas de PCMCIA porque son accesible a las computadoras,
y encajan en las ranura de PCMCIA en computadoras portdtiles.2 '
Hay cuatro tipos bisicos de tarjetas inteligentes:
1)
las tarjetas de dinero, son arlogo a una tarjeta de
ATM, tienen espacio para almacenar datos y son accesible
via un niimero de identificaci6n personal (PIN). En
Francia, 6stas tarjetas de memoria se usan para tener
22
acceso a los telgfonos;
2)
las tarjetas de llave compartidas son unas redes de
tarjetas inteligentes que pueden comunicar entre otros;
3)
tarjetas de transporte de firma son andlogos a
libros de cheques con nfimeros de cheque pre-impresos, el
usuario asigna una cantidad de dinero para cada cheque
23
con ntfimero;
4)
tarjetas creando firma son similar a trajetas de
transporte de firma con una diferencia principal, el usuario
genera ndmeros de cheque en blanco.2 4 Tarjetas creando
25
firmas son caras de producir.
Mds bien, que meramente proporciondndole acceso al cliente a una
cuenta del banco, la tarjeta inteligente tiene valor guardado. La tarjeta
inteligente es usada internacionalmente y mas notablemente en Europa y
Asia?" Otras naciones han anunciado la aplicaci6n de sistemas de la tarjeta
inteligente.2 7
El Acceso Condicional para Europa (CAFt) estd
desarrollando una tarjeta inteligente para el pago de un extremo a otro en
Europa? Con la tarjeta inteligente CAFt, uno podrd viajar de un extremo

21. Id.
22.

Id. (nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).

23. Id. (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s). c---j
a. ctu
,a

de etc,

a

d

-de

firma, eoams.

=m.dW

ico.

24.

Id. (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).

25.

Id. (nota editorial: traducido del Ingles).

26. DIGITAL MONEY, supra nota 16, a 116; EGNER, supra nota 1, a 28. En Francia se usan
tarjetas inteligentes para acceso del teldfono y se pueden comprar a las posiciones del peri6dico.

DIGITAL MONEY, supra nota 16, a 116. En Jap6n investigadores estn desarrollando la moneda
inteligente. EGNER, supra nota 1, a 28.

27. DIGITAL MONEY, supra nota 16, a 117.
28.

Id.
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a otro en Europa con una tarjeta universal, permitigndo la facilidad de
pagar con dinero en efectivo sin el intercambio extranjero. 29
Funcionalmente, la tarjeta inteligente es un d~bito pre-pagado sin el acceso
a una cuenta, porque a la vez que el valor guardado es exhausto el
consumidor debe comprar una nueva tarjeta o debe agregar valor a la
tarjeta existente3 0
B. Dinero digital (DIGICASH)
Digicash es independiente a la tarjeta inteligente. 31 Le permite a la
persona que usa la tarjeta dirigir negocio via el internet.32 Para usar
digicash el usuario debe tener una computadora y el programa de
computacion del digicash.33 Armado con una computadora, el usuario
accede una cuenta previamente asignada, usindo su nfimero de cuenta preasignada y su contrasefia, puede pedir que sus fondos sean transferido. 34
La demanda del usuario para un traslado debe autenticarse via36la Ecash
Mint.35 La Mint es esencialmente el servidor de la computadora.
El dinero electr6nico tiene el potencial para desviar fronteras
internacionales y el costo del intercambio extranjero.37 Por lo tanto,
cuando el dinero digital se acepta como oferta legal38 por un gobierno, mis
de las otras naciones aceptaran lo mismo en su economia. 39 Defensores de
el dinero electr6nico predicen su aceptaci6n social y es mlis, predicen que
un dia, posiblemente mis pronto que nosotros pensamos, el dinero digital
seri indistinguible de las formas mis tradicionales de dinero. 4°

29. Id.
30. Id. a 115.
31.

Miley, supra nota 3.

32. DIGITAL MONEY, supra nota 16, a las 109-12.

33. Id.
34. Id; Miley, supra nota 3, a 15.
35. Id. a 15.

36. Id.
37. DIGrTAL MONEY, supra nota 16, a 121.
38.

S'e&
dflTh fertIc11-20(24)dd

Uniform Commercial Code. U.C.C. § 1-201(24).

39. Sarah J. Hughes, A Callfor InternationalLegal Standardsfor Emerging Retail Electronic
Payment Systems, 15 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 197, 208 (1996) (citandoElectronic Money; So Much

for the Cashless Society, ECONOMIST., Nov. 26, 1996, a 21). Sin embargo, el problema de los
intercambios extranjeros todavfa puede necesitar ser dirigido.
40. Id.
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El caricter potencialmente indistinguible del dinero digital al
dinero tradicional incit6 una preocupaci6n para su regulaci6n." En forma
de papel todos estos servicios electr6nicos se regulan consiguiente a un
estado y/o estatuto federal.' 2 Sin embargo, via el Internet, la regulaci6n es
casi inexistente. De hecho, una vez que el consumidor transfiere dinero
via un traslado del digicash, la proteccion de la Compafiia de Seguro del
Dep6sito Federal (FDIC) ya no esta disponible Defensores de digicash y
otros adelantos tecnol6gicos afirman que la privacidad del consumidor es
Sin embargo, otros no legan a la misma conclusi6n.4protegida."
Mientras leyes de privacidad son disefiadas para proteger el
usario/consumidor del digicash, la privacidad de uno es violada ficilmente
por la trayectoria de nfimeros de cuenta y posedores de cuenta a las
compras hechas."
III. BANCO ELECTRONICO Y LA LEY
A. Ley Domdstica
En este momento los Estados Unidos tiene unos estatutos que
pueden ser considerados regulaci6nes de banca electr6nica. Algunas de
estas leyes incluyen: el Acto de Traslado de Fondos Electr6nico (EFTA); 47
el C6digo Comercial Uniforme Articulo 4A; 4 8 el Acto de la Protecci6n de
Cr6dito de Consumidor;4 9 el Derecho a la Privacidad Financiera; 50 y el
"&c' Encrypcion es un m6todo de
w
S o' a
"
v
41. L oeos,,ddes
seguridad electr6nico que le permite al usuario banca electr6nico que tenga una marca
identificable o firma que supuestamente detiene fraude y falsificaci6n.
p godecbcqs c resoi b*o Uniform Commercial Code. Vea
42. Pot cicplo, d dcho de = dic pm,
Budnitz, supra nota 12, a 268. Miquinas de ATM que son esencialmente ramas de banco de
computadora, se regulan consiguiente a 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1997). Vea twnbitn Plant City v.
Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969); Indep. Bankers Ass'n. v. Marine Midland Bank, 757 F.2d 453
(2d Cir. 1985).
43. Miley, supra nota 3, a 16.
44. d.
45. DIGITAL MONEY, supra nota 16, a 112.
46. Id.; vea tamnbib Joshua Quitmer, Who's Out There Watching You?, TIME, Aug. 25, 1997,
a las 28-32.
,doosi. ix.. traslados vfa
's ogid
dos s
cbebq
a cuniquia ftwIdoe f o*d aparte de
47. El EFrA
cualquier medio de comunicaci6n electr6nico. Vea 15 U.S.C. § 1693(a)(6) (1997). The EFTA aplica
al uso de laATM. Vea 15 U.S.C. § 1693(g) (1997).
48.
c
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49. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1997). El capitulo dicho leva a cabo regulaciones que protegen el
consumidor contra el fraude de tarijeta de cr~dito.
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Acto de Privacidad en Comunicaciones Electr6nica. 51
Presentemente,
como previamente descrito, la norma para la oferta legal es definida por el
C6digo Comercial Uniforme.52 Sigue que si un pais acepta una forma
particular de oferta como oferta legal, esa oferta es legal en ese pais. Asi,
si los Estados Unidos y Europa decidieran aceptar una forma particular de
digicash como oferta legal en cualquier pais, el uso de digicash se
facilitaria. Debido a esta posibilidad, debe haber leyes en lugar para
proteger a usuarios de dinero electr6nico.
Para que las leyes presentes sean aplicables al uso de dinero
electr6nico uno debe sobrevivir el problema primero de si el tal dinero es
oferta legal, como def'mido en el UCC. El pr6ximo problema invoca si la
instituci6n banca electr6nica, i.e., el emisor de fondos electr6nicos, asi sea
digicash o las tarjetas inteligentes, es una instituci6n bancaria como
definida por estatutos federales. 3 Despu6s de determinar si la tal
instituci6n es una instituci6n bancaria, el pr6ximo problema es el sitio de
una acci6n apropiado por determinar pleitos. Presentemente, estatutos del
sitio de una acci6n bancaria federal proporcionan que cualquier acci6n
contra cualquier asociaci6n bancaria puede tenerse en cualquier corte de
distrito o territorial en los Estados Unidos donde la tal instituci6n bancaria
esta localizada. 54 Cuando una instituci6n bancaria estA en el Internet la
pregunta es donde estA la instituci6n localizada. 55
Para el consumidor otros problemas involucran su derecho de
privacidad. ' Mis especifico al banco electr6nico es el Acto del Derecho a
la Privacidad Financiera de 1982.17
Este Acto excluye acceso
gubernamental al descargo de archivos financieros de consumidores sin el
gobierno usando una certificaci6n escrita de la investigaci6n del gobierno a
50. 12 U.S.C. § 3404 (1994).
51. Vea generalmente 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2518 (1994).
52. Vea UCC § 1-201(24). Especificamente, esa secci6n define oferta legal o dinero como un
medio de intercambio autorizado o adoptado por un gobiemo dom~stico o extranjero y incluido en
una unidad monetaria de cuenta establecida por una organizaci6n intergubernamental o por acuerdo
entre dos o mAs naciones. Id.
53.
cdo de los
m= 111"4
,,
' ria- 'e-, una instituci6n financiera como cualquier
negocio que compromete en cualquier actividad que se juzga para ser una actividad similar a,
relacionado a, o suplente para cualquier actividad bancaria. 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (1995). Si
una instituci6n se cae dentro de la tal categorfa que la Secretaria de la Tesorerfa puede exigir a
las tales instituciones guardar archivos. Es mis, esas instituciones bancarias deben obedecer
leyes federales de retiro. Vea 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401, 3402, 3403 (1997).
54. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1997).
55 . Lm probla "wjum han s o dO d = In cum ftdis C p opall eli lme n .
56. Vea Downey, supra nota 11, a 309.
57. 12 U.S.C. § 3404 (1997).

Rowe

1998]

1325

la instituci6n financiera y a complacencia con requisitos estatutarios. ' Otra

tal regulaci6n federal es el Acto de Privacidad en Comunicaciones
Electr6nica de 1986.5Y La regulaci6n protege el consumidor de la
interceptaci6n desautorizado de comunicaci6n electr6nica. Dos actos
aparentemente entrelazan el banco electr6nico para proteger el consumidor
de la interceptaci6n desautorizado de archivos fmancieros encima del
Internet. Sin embargo, su impacto al banco electr6nico internacional no ha
sido determinado todavia.

Ha habido una necesidad internacional, entre comentaristas para
leyes o el criterio. Con o sin la regulaci6nes adecuadas, el concepto de el
banco electr6nico tiene varios beneficios.
B. Ley Internacional
En una balanza internacional, el dinero electr6nico se ha discutido
ampliamente pero regulado minimanente.
Investigadores del dinero
electr6nico global han declarado que "las redes electr6nicas y
computadoras que est~n a favor de la infraestructura de la comunidad
corriente financiera global han sido instrumentales en el declive del control
nacional de dinero. " 60 Seg-in estos estudiosos, el uso de las tarjetas
inteligentes y digicash es consistente con la tradici6n de sustituir ofertas
legal por la obligaci6n de pagar;6' por lo tanto, la etiqueta del dinero en
efectivo electr6nico es err6neo y debe reemplazarse con cr6dito
electr6nico. La Secci6n de Asociaci6n de Barra Americana de Fuerza de
Tarea de Ley Comercial en Tarjetas de Valor Guardadas dirigi6 una
investigaci6n sobre lo mismo y concurrio.6 Mientras critico del concepto
de dinero en efectivo electr6nico como dinero, estos estudiosos entienden
que el desarrollo es critico para establecer el mercado global.63 Hasta que
la legislatura desarrolle leyes que regulen el dinero electr6nico, estudiosos
requieren la autorregulaci6n y el desarrollo de normas legales para

58. Vea 12 U.S.C. § 3403(b) (1997); yea generalmente Downey, supra nota 11, a 311.
59. 18 U.S.C. §§2510-2518 (1997); vea generalnenteDowney,supranota 11, a 312.
60. Jeffery B. Ritter, US IR Subcommittee on Monetary Policy Aug. 10, 1996, disponibleen
LEXIS, Banking Law Library, Banking Law File (citando KURTZMAN, THE DEATH OF MONEY:
How ELECTRONIC ECONOMY HAS DESTABILIZED THE WORLD MARKET AND CREATED FINANCIAL

CHAOS (1993) y Kazuaki Sono, ElectronicFunds Transfer Blurs the Meaning of Money, 2 THE DATA
L. REP. 1 (mayo 1995)) (nota editorial: traducido del Ingl6s).
61. Ritter, supra nota 60.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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establecer la confianza del consumidor que ya se ha establecido con el
ATM."
En 1986, la Comisi6n Econ6mica para Europa Partido Trabajador
en la Facilitaci6n de Procedimientos de Comercio Internacionales de las
Naciones Unidas, desarroll6 una herramienta para ayudar globalmente en
el traslado electr6nico de dinero en efectivo, Datos Electr6nicos
Intercambian para la Administraci6n, Comercio, y Transporte
(EDIFACT). El EDIFACT ha sido endorsado en los Estados Unidos y se
ha aceptado para la integraci6n en la Uni6n Europea.
El EDIFACT intenta facilitar comercio internacional pennitiendo a
usuarios una norma de comercio.
Segdin los defensores, EDIFACT
proporciona certeza que establece confianza en el comercio electr6nico.
Otros involucrado con el desarrollo de dinero electr6nico y su
traslado en el Internet han organizado un sitio de acci6n para la discusi6n y
el desarrollo de criterios. 61 Conocido como la Ley de Internet y Foro de la
Politica, el foro busca mantener una arena de negocios y legisladores
estableciendo un modelo para leyes que se haran en el futuro.
Especfficamente, el foro busca desarrollar: 1) las definiciones uniformes
de t~rminos para las transacciones comerciales, 2) acuerdos ejemplares,
c6digos de conducta, o otros ttrminos que reflejan normas de industria
globales, y 3) modelos de leyes nacionales y en el futuro tratados o
convenciones."
Los defensores de la regulaci6n internacional del banco electr6nico
son pero una facci6n dentro de la comunidad legal considerando los efectos
de los adelantos tecnol6gicos del banco electr6nico. Otras facciones dentro
de la comunidad tienen puntos de vistas alternativo.

IV. FACCIONES EN LA COMUNIDAD LEGAL
La vista de uno sobre el banco electr6nico como un recurso o
obligaci6n depende en el punto de vista de la tecnologia de esa persona.
La comunidad legal como parte de la poblaci6n general, tambi~n tiene
puntos de vistas diferente sobre la tecnologia y sus adelantos
correspondientes.
Segfin a los investigadores, la tecnologia y la ley pueden verse
diferentemente. Una manera de ver a la tecnologia llamada, messianism

64. Id.
65. Vea tambign Internet Law and Policy Forum (visitado el 24 de mar. 1998)
<http://www.ilpf.org/>.
66. Id.
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tecnol6gico,67 abraza a la tecnologia como una bendici6n. 68 Aquellos que
adhieren al messianism tecnol6gico tambi6n pueden estar Ilamado
Hay otros que creen reciprocamente, que adelantos
tecn6crata. 69
tecnol6gicos son una maldici6n profunda.70 Estos extremistas, llamados
determinadores tecnol6gicos, creen que la tecnologia roba a las personas
de trabajos, privacidad, dignidad global, y inevitablemente del control de
la sociedad. 71 En el medio, existen aquellos que, aparentemente toman el
acercamiento del realista, y creen que la tecnologia tiene el potencial para
Estas personas estfn Ilamadas
bueno pero debe controlarse.7 2
humanitarios. 7 Humanitarios reconocen determinadores y las posiciones
del messianist. Sin embargo, humanitarios creen que la tecnologia puede
ser beneficiosa a la sociedad si es propiamente controlada.7 4
Humanitarios creen que la tecnologia es un producto de decisiones
individuales innumerables.75 En el momento, estas decisiones individuales
parecen razonables individualmente, pero en el extremo, la fusi6n de estas
decisiones a lo mejor no son lo que se dese6 originalmente. 76 El
humanitario rechaza la idea que un grupo debe controlar la manera en la
que la tecnologia se despliega. En cambio, creen que deben usarse los
adelantos tecnol6gicos como instrumentos de sociedad. 7 Humanitarios
tienen la vista mis l6gica de tecnologia porque entienden que es
imprudente diferir al deseo particular de un grupo particular, sobre todo
cuando cada concesi6n del deseo de un grupo puede tener un impacto
78
inesperado sobre otros grupos y en el futuro, de la sociedad en conjunto.
En la industria bancaria, humanitarios deben ser la comunidad
legal. Presentemente, la necesidad para un acercamiento humanitario para

67. Budnitz, supra nota 12, a 261.
68. Id.
tcrmawgadgeteer.Vea tambin EGNER, supra nota 1, a las 48-49.
69. O= co marsiastambinlllm
70. Id.
71.

Id.

Otros comentaristas Ilamarfan el determinist un dilatador.

Obligatoriamente, los

dilatadores son aquflos que son mis viejos y tambidn que estan en el sector socio-econ6mico mis
bajo. EGNER, supra nota 1, a 51.
72. Budnitz, supra nota 12, a262.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Budnitz, supra nota 12, a 264.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78.

Id.
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la industria bancaria es de importancia vital porque bancos virtuales,",
como Security First Network Bank, desean volverse en bancos de servicio
total. Por ahora, la Oficina de Vigilancia de Economia (OTS) ha aprobado
s6lo estos bancos para aceptar dep6sitos.10 Recientemente, bancos han
estado promoviendo PC banca a clientes que lo desean.1' La PC banca estA
penetrando ripidamente a todos los bancos mayores y para algunos no solo
es la ola del futuro pero una parte integra del presente.2
Porque bancos virtuales pueden volverse la ola del futuro, la
legislatura debe analizar beneficios y obligaciones de cada avance para
asegurar que la fusi6n no se vuelve un detrimento a la sociedad. El
anAlisis de beneficios y obligaciones de tales adelantos puede proteger el
consumidor de sentirse como si el Hennano Grande 3 siempre esta mirando
y es omnisciente, omnipotente, con el poder especffico de controlar nuestra
existencia. 8 4
Mientras adelantos tecnol6gicos abundan, y, individualmente, cada
adelanto es para el beneficio de la sociedad, la comunidad legal debe
esforzarse por mantener y proteger la comunidad de la fusi6n de cada
adelanto volverse Hermano Grande. Las formas de Hermano Grande han
ensefiado su cabeza aparentemente en otras industrias.85 Porque el Internet
tiene el potencial de invadir todos los aspectos de nuestra sociedad, 86 la
comunidad legal no debe ser incitada por las promociones del messianist
tecnol6gico, pero debe estr atenta a la posici6n de determinadores de
ruina y del punto de vista de las obligaciones de estos adelantos.
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OBLIGACIONES DE LA TECNOLOGIA BANCARIA:
DETERMINADORES V. MESSIANISTS

Los determinadores tecnol6gicos tienen un punto vilido acerca de
avances bancario.
Han habido informes de brechas de seguridad
recientemente, en el Internet. 87 Ms alli, a pesar de las brechas de
seguridad la preocupaci6n es que la informaci6n de datos de consumidor
invadirl los intereses de privacidad de consumidores 88 Intereses de
privacidad de consumidores est~n componi6ndose diariamente en datos
bancarios del mercado de ventas. Segtin algunos investigadores, la
legislaci6n actual no se dirige adecuadamente a las preocupaciones de
privacidad levantadas por consumidores que usan el banco por el
Internet.8 9 Relativamente reciente legislaci6n como el Acto de Privacidad
de 1974, el Derecho al Acto de Privacidad Financiero de 1982, y el Acto
de Privacidad de Comunicaciones Electr6nico de 1986, intenta examinar y
proteger la privacidad del consumidor. No hay ninguna legislaci6n
correspondiente internacionalmente. 9° Sin embargo, cada legislaci6n no
prot6g6 a consumidores que banquean en-lIfneas del Hermano Grande;91 la
legislaci6n tampoco discute la direcci6n de los problemas siguientes de
oferta legal; si la instituci6n bancaria electr6nica es una instituci6n, o la
situaci6n de la instituci6n para nombrar unos. Adicionalmente las
legislaturas no se dirigen el problema de seguridad dentro de la industria.
Investigadores concluyen que el movimiento a una sociedad sin efectivo
estira par-nietros de la legislaci6n actual. 92
Especificamente, las
investigaciones imploran la legislatura para promulgar estatutos que
directamente dirigen el uso del dinero en efectivo digital. 93
Mientras el uso del banco electr6nico no puede ser finalmente
nuestra perdici6n, cuando determinadores predicen, claramente la
legislaci6n adecuada es critica para proteger a los legitimos usuarios en87. Vea generalmente Miley, supra nota 3, a 8; Epper, supra nota 3; Lunt, supra nota 4;
Jonathan Gaw & Ulysses Torassa, Security Bugs On-Line Banking, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 12, 1995, a
1C.
88. Downey, supra nota 11, a 305.

89. Id. alas 308-09.
90. Vea Ritter, supra nota 60, Hughes, supra nota 39.
91. Vea generabnente Downey, supra nota 11, a las 313-14; Cal. Bankers Ass'n. v. Schultz,
416 U.S. 21 (1974) (concluyendo que el Acto de Secreto de Banco no evita al gobierno de
coleccionar informaci6n banca de sospechosos delictivos); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976) (generalmente definiendo ia zona de privacidad y restringiendo el derecho de un individuo a la
privacidad financiera).
92. Downey, supra nota 11, alas 315, 318.
93. Id. a 321.
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lineas del Hernano Grande, si 61 es el gobierno o la comunidad comercial.
Deben dirigirse las obligaciones del banco electr6nico lo mis pronto
posible para prevenir la expectativa de los determinadores de perdici6n
para todos los usuarios del banco electr6nico.
,Predicen Messianists que el banco electr6nico es la ola del futuro,
pero serd la ola para todos? Mientras costos de computadoras han
disminuido tremendamente, tal declive no ha permitido el lujo de uso para
todos aquellos que desean ir en-linea. Para comprar una computadora
junto con todas las ataduras requeridas, un consurnidor necesitaria tres mil
d6lares por lo menos ($3,000.00)." Estos costos evitarin que una familia
de ingreso bajo o moderado compre una computadora que finalmente
excluye a esa familia de yendo en-linea.
Economistas predicen que banca en-linea, finalmente, causara un
diferencial de costo significante entre la computadora y el banco regular. 95
Los diferenciales en costo pueden que hagan a los pobres ms pobres y a
los ricos mis ricos porque a los pobres se les exigirin pagar mis costos
transaccionales bancario que a los mis abundante, mientras que los mis
abundantes quidnes poseen una computadora podrin reducir sus costos
transaccionales comprando una computadora. Clientes del banco pobre se
excluirin asi de comprar una computadora debido a su incapacidad de
ahorrar porque deben pagar mis costos transaccionales bancario.
VI. CONCLUSI6N
Si el banco electr6nico, via el superhighway de informaci6n, es la
ola del futuro, uno debe considerar los beneficios y las obligaciones. Una
de las razones para el mantenimiento de los bancos tradicionales era
permitir el acceso del ciudadano trabajador a la industria, y mantener
estabilidad en conjunto con consumidores bancario y el gobierno. En la
balanza internacional, paises pequefios menos desarrollados pueden tener
dificultad en consiguir acceso al banco en-linea. Ademis, las leyes
internacionales parecen mal-equipada para controlar las implicaciones
legales que tal banco incurre. Ha habido una Ilamada unnime, entre
estudiosos legales para la aplicaci6n de leyes internacionales cuando

94. Para precios de computadora yea Steve Alexander, The Do-All Clp, Intel Corporations
New MMX Technology is Generating PC Salesfor Retailers Such as Best Buy and Later This Year
More Software Will Take Advantage of the Improves Multimedia Processing, STAR TRIBUNE, Apr.
27, 1997, a ID; para precios de maquinas de printiar yea James Kirn; Printer Companies Vie for
Shrinking Share, USA TODAY, June 5, 1997, a 613.
95. Vea generalmente Miley, supra nota 3; Peter Sinton, Banking's Brave New World, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 9, 1995, a B1.
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relaciona al banco electr6nico. 96 Mientras hay beneficios obvios al banco
en-linea, hay algunas obligaciones que deben dirigirse.
Puede ser
irrazonable para uno pensar que el acceso a banca en-linea estA disponible
a todos, como es el acceso a bancos echos de ladrillo y mortero, pero uno
debe considerar todos factores potenciales, incluyendo todas las
implicaciones legales y los problemas correspondientes, cuando
considerando el pr6ximo avance tecnol6gico.

96.

Vea Miley, supra nora 3; Hughes, supra nota 39; Ritter, supra nota 60.

